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Abstract
This thesis is a comparative investigation of how federal institutions accommodated 
linguistic and religious identities in India and Pakistan. There are three explanatory 
variables. The first is the history of self-rule for the principalities within South Asia; 
tracing continuities in territorial autonomy from the Mughals up to independence. The 
second is the distribution of linguistic and religious identities within the states of India 
and Pakistan, both at the provincial and national levels. The third is the articulation of a 
national identity in India and Pakistan. These explanatory variables are not independent 
of one another; their interaction accounts for the different strategies adopted by India 
and Pakistan in the formation and stabilisation of their federations. The differences in 
federal design are calculated according to a scoring system that measures the degree of 
consociationalism within the federal plans proposed before independence, and the 
constitutions created after independence. The state-sponsored national identities are 
distinguished according to their recognition of identities in the public and private 
spheres. They are further categorised according to the costs for a non-dominant group 
of being managed by this strategy. The three explanatory variables explain why 
linguistically homogeneous states were created in India but not in Pakistan. It is argued 
that this variable explains the stabilisation or otherwise of their federations. It therefore 
confirms Wilkinson's rebuttal of Lijphart's claim that India under Nehru was 
consociational. Unlike Wilkinson, it argues that the degrees of consociationalism that 
emerged since the formation of the constitution have enhanced federal stabilisation 
within India. It defines federal stabilisation according to continuity in state borders, the 
number and type of secessionist movements, but more importantly by correlating the 
effective number of linguistic groups at state level with the effective number of parties 
in national elections. It concludes that federal accommodation of linguistic groups in 
homogeneous provinces has enabled the party system to fractionalise in India and 
Pakistan; an indication of the security of these groups. Where secessionist movements 
have existed in India and Pakistan, their emergence is explained by the lack of security 
for a group - defined on either linguistic or alternative criteria.
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Chapter One: The federal 'problem' in South Asia: an 
introduction to conceptual debates
'The combination of territorially distinctive segments and federalism's grant of partial autonomy
sometimes provides additional impetus to demands for greater autonomy ...federalism has not been
markedly effective as a conflict-regulating practice' (Nordlinger 1972: 32).
'The question remains open as to -what kinds or combinations of diversity are compatible with federal 
unity and which kinds or combinations are not' (Elazar 1979: 29).
Federalism is 'significant at the beginning of a central government as a way to bring in regional
governments with the promise of autonomy. Once the central government is actually in operation,
however, what maintains or destroys local autonomy is not the more or less superficial features of
federalism but the more profound characteristics of the political culture' (Riker 1969: 142).
1.1. Comparative Politics
Any comparisons in political science not only have to justify the choice of case studies, 
in this case, India and Pakistan, as well as the theoretical framework chosen, but also 
justify the range of case studies. The two competing strategies are to compare one 
variable over many cases, often using quantitative analysis - e.g. the relationship of 
economic development to democratic development (Lipset 1971: Ch 2; Vanhanen 1997: 
5) - or to compare certain countries with the aim of drawing theoretical conclusions of 
potential wider applicability. The second strategy can be subdivided into what J.S Mill 
termed the 'method of difference' versus the 'method of agreement'. The 'method of 
difference' strategy analyses cases with a similar background, but which differ 
according to the study variable identified. In contrast, the 'method of agreement' 
analyses cases that share the study variable, but have apparently different causes (Mill 
1875: 451; VanEvera 1997: 23-4).
This study adopts the method of difference approach. India and Pakistan had a similar, 
if not identical, colonial background, and adopted very similar federal structures after 
independence. This is what Van Evera terms a 'controlled comparison' (1997: 56-8) 
and enables me to concentrate upon one important variable on which they differed - the 
design of provincial units. The differences on this variable account for many of the 
tensions within both countries and the relative success of India compared to that of 
Pakistan. Comparing two countries within the same area increases the significance of 
the conclusions drawn, by
reserving comparisons for countries that present analogies sealed by history or 
geography. This strategy, known as 'area study', seems to ensure ... the control
-11-
of those environmental variables the observer would like to keep constant in 
order better to analyze the fluctuation of others (Dogan and Pelassy 1984: 15).
A binary comparison of macro-state structures with a common historical formation 
rather than a wide-ranging analysis of n-cases of federations enables me to focus upon 
the ethnic composition of the provincial units 1 . This strategy also permits me to 
investigate the relationship between the articulation of the national identity of India and 
Pakistan after independence, and the federal plans resulting from these conceptions. 
Tilly argues strongly for comparative analysis conducted with a smaller number of 
cases.
On the whole, comparative studies of big structures and large processes yield 
more intellectual return when investigators examine relatively small number of 
instances. This is not because of the intrinsically greater value of small 
numbers, but because large numbers give an illusory sense of security (1984: 
78).
Binary studies do, however, suffer from the danger that antecedent variables will be 
emphasised or identified as the main cause of the phenomena that is being studied. 
While this has value for explaining a deviant or exceptional case, it limits the 
applicability for wider comparative research. In addition, it runs the risk of 
degenerating into descriptive narrative. Therefore, to increase the applicability of my 
research to comparative politics, one of the methods used to test my hypotheses will be 
quantitative. I utilise statistical equations such as the effective number of ethnic groups 
adapted from Hirschman (1945: 159), Taagepera and Shugart (1989: 78) and recently 
applied to explaining stability in democratic federations by O'Leary (2001a: 289). I 
also develop a formula to assess the difference of degrees of consociationalism within 
the federal designs promoted before and after independence. In so doing I increase the 
comparative value of my research.
Finally, my thesis performs a macro-level analysis. A concentration upon macro 
processes is essential to understanding the nature of the federal design, as well as the 
way in which it has operated within South Asia. I have not conducted a detailed case 
study of ethnic movements, secessionist or otherwise, within either country. As 
Skocpol advises, macro analysis is possible (and desirable) as long as excellent case
1 In this chapter 'ethnic' is used as shorthand for linguistic and religious identities. The definition of an ethnic 
group is contested (Glazer, Moynihan et al. 1975: 18; Smith 1997: 28-31), Although it is necessary to unpack 
these identities as Connor (1994: 100-103) and Manor argue (1995: 120; 1996: 460-463), it is not necessary to 
do so here. They will be separated in later chapters.
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studies exist, upon which the researcher can build (1984: 382). The use of secondary 
source material is essential to conducting such a wide-ranging study - both between the 
two countries, but also over time. In the cases of India and Pakistan, many thorough 
and informative case studies of the many ethnic movements exist (e.g. Marwah 1979; 
Ganguly 1996; Mitra and Lewis 1996; Bose 1997; Singh 2000; Phadnis and Ganguly 
2001).
1.2. Methodological technicalities
A study of this breadth raises many challenging methodological questions arising from 
the choice of countries and conceptual framework. 'Every researcher decants reality. 
But such a decanting is a necessity for the comparativist, who must have a theoretical 
orientation from the start' (Dogan and Pelassy 1984: 4). My hypotheses are discussed 
in more detail later. However, what specific methodology do I use to test them? The 
methodology used has to be relevant and pertinent to permit valid testing of the 
hypotheses.
Firstly, I pursue a qualitative analysis of the documents surrounding the independence 
struggle, focusing upon the policies proposed by the Congress and the League. The 
statements I am most interested in concern the position of minorities and non-dominant 
groups and about institutional structures of managing diversity. I categorise the 
statements according to the extent to which they permit the recognition of identities in 
the public sphere. This categorisation enables me to determine the state strategy that 
was adopted to manage these identities. It also enables me to assess the relationship 
between the identities articulated before and after independence and the changing nature 
of the federal plans that were proposed.
Secondly, I analyse documentary evidence. I evaluate the British constitutional plans 
before 1909. In addition, I scrutinise the documents produced by the major players 
from 1916 until 1946. This facilitates analysis of the constitutions produced after 
independence, and subsequent changes in the form of the federations.
Thirdly, I conduct a quantitative analysis. Many quantitative studies suffer from the 
charge that they are spurious and superficial, and while they may establish correlations, 
rarely definitively prove causation (Di Palma 1990: 4). However, while the researcher
- 13-
has to be transparent about the coding used and reasons for the variables chosen for 
analysis, quantitative studies remove the difficulty facing the area specialist; that 
everything is specific to one case. I use interval-ratio, ordinal and nominal data. The 
quantitative 'heart' of my thesis is based around correlating the 'effective number of 
ethnic groups' in a unit with the effective number of parties in that unit.
1.3. Comparative Federalism and South Asian Studies
Many excellent contemporary case studies of either India or Pakistan exist (e.g. Vanaik 
1990; Brass 1994; Waseem 1994b; Samad 1995a; Khilnani 1997; Corbridge and Harriss 
2000). Books on South Asia as a whole proliferate (e.g. Ahmed 1996; Mitra and Lewis 
1996; Bose and Jalal 1998; Harrison, Kreisberg et al. 1999; Phadnis and Ganguly 2001). 
Although many of these texts provide valuable insights, and are invaluable resources for 
this thesis, they rarely provide macro-level analysis. If they do, as in the introductory 
chapter to Mitra and Lewis, they do not concentrate upon federal institutions and 
design. Surprisingly there are few direct comparisons of India and Pakistan. This 
omission is even more startling given the huge differences between India and Pakistan, 
both in terms of democratic development but also the religious bases of the two 
countries. Unfortunately, these differences are the reason for the lack of explicit 
comparison. The best approach to conducting a rigorous investigation of the two 
countries is to start the analysis in the pre-independence period. This automatically 
poses the question - what explains the differences afterwards? It is significant that the 
two best comparative frameworks of the two in recent years come from historians. Any 
comparative study of India and Pakistan written since 1995 inevitably confronts Ayesha 
JalaPs 'Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia' (1995), and more recently the 
introductory chapter to lan Talbot's 'Pakistan: A Modern History' (1998) and 
'Inventing the Nation: India and Pakistan' (2000). Both authors argue that it is possible 
to compare the two countries, but justify the comparison from different perspectives. 
Jalal argues that India and Pakistan can be compared as a result of the shared colonial 
viceregal tradition. She discerns elements of authoritarianism in both regimes, as well 
as the rest of South Asia, despite the outwardly very different democratic trajectories 
(1995: esp. 4-8 and 249-257).
Talbot in comparison, while not entirely rejecting this view, argues that the differential 
colonial inter-penetration of the areas that came to comprise Pakistan in north-west
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India explains not only the different democratic development between the two states, 
but also differences in democratic development between the two wings of Pakistan 
(1998: 55). Both approaches are more complex than has been set out, but both come 
from an essentially historical perspective. They do not explicitly concentrate upon the 
federal designs, although any comparative analysis of the two states inevitably touches 
on the issue.
To my knowledge, only Jai Prakesh Sharma (1987) and Swarna Rajagopalan (2001) 
have attempted a post-independence analysis of the two federations. Sharma's 'Federal 
Systems of India and Pakistan: A comparative perspective' was published in 1987 and 
is dated enough to warrant a follow up. More substantively, as well as being very short, 
the book does not provide a historical analysis separating out the differing colonial and 
historical legacies of the areas of the British Raj which came to comprise India and 
Pakistan. A more complex historical analysis is required to sustain a careful 
examination of the nature of the provincial units that were created within the newly 
independent states. Although Sharma discusses the linguistic question, which any 
comparison of the two federations inevitably has to do, he does not concentrate upon the 
identity politics behind their creation. Additionally, Sharma is more concerned with the 
relationship between centralisation and democracy than with ethnic conflict regulation. 
He argues, despite his comparative analysis, that because Pakistan's federation exists 
without democracy it is rendered virtually meaningless (1987: x). As will become 
evident, I dispute this.
Rajagopalan's 'State and Nation in South Asia' is closer in scope and aims to this 
thesis. Rajagopalan compares India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. He argues that the federal 
form, especially the design of the provincial units, is indicative of the identity of the 
state (2001: 56-57). This study concurs with his approach. However, Rajagopalan does 
not address pre-independence federal forms or the preferences of Congress and the 
League in relation to these. He is therefore not concerned to explain the differences in 
federal design after independence or to relate these to the changed ethnic composition of 
the two countries. Finally, although he is concerned to analyse three areas of conflict 
within the three states2 he is not concerned with federal stability per se.
2 Sind, Tamil Nadu and the Sri Lankan Tamils.
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My thesis proceeds from an essentially historical standpoint. How and why did these 
two states, product of the same colonial regime and partitioned by that regime, pursue 
such radically different paths in reference to the design of their provincial units? 
Although there is more than adequate material to treat both countries separately, this 
does not and should not preclude comparative work. South Asia has generally been 
seen as a 'place apart'. The existence of caste as a ordering principle of society is one 
of the most obvious ways that India stands apart from the rest of the world. Both India 
and Pakistan are extremely heterogeneous and complex societies - India is perhaps the 
most heterogeneous country in the world. A comparison of India and Pakistan with 
countries outside South Asia requires a rigorous framework in order that antecedent 
variables such as the role of Hinduism and Islam are not given unwarranted emphasis. I 
argue for an historical approach akin to Jalal (1995) and Talbot (1998). Unlike them I 
concentrate upon one specific element of comparison - federal development and 
structures. India and Pakistan since independence provide excellent examples for a 
comparative analysis of federalism as an ethnic conflict regulation mechanism. As well 
as being very heterogeneous, at independence they had similar constraints: they needed 
to pursue economic development, state building and nation building. Both were 
products of the same colonial regime and similar, if not identical, institutional 
frameworks. Yet despite their similarities, within eight years of independence 
important differences developed between them that had profound implications for 
federalism as an ethnic conflict regulation mechanism - specifically the ethnic 
composition of the units of the federations. There has been little research on a 
comparison between the two federations, and little material exists that explicitly 
compares India or Pakistan's federal systems with those of states outside South Asia. 
Hicks (1978), Horowitz (1985), Islam (1990), Arora and Verney (1995), Crook and 
Manor (1998), Verney (1995), Copland and Rickard (1999) are the exceptions. One 
reason for this is that India's federation has been described as 'quasi federal' (Wheare 
1963: 28), as 'unitarism with a high degree of decentralisation of powers' (Gangal 
1962: 248) or 'prefectorial federalism' (Rajashekara 1997: 246). The fact that Pakistan 
has not been democratic for much of its existence partially explains the lack of 
comparative federal material.
The composition of federal units is a crucial yet contested feature of federal design, 
especially in relation to its status as a method of ethnic conflict regulation (Watts 1970:
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32-34; Vile 1982: 222-223; Horowitz 1985: 613-619). As both states are ethnically 
heterogeneous and issues of provincial design recur in the political debates within the 
two countries, this increases their value as a subject for comparative political analysis. 
While there is a danger within political science of applying 'western' concepts and 
structures to societies not possessing the same values, a contention in this thesis is that 
federalism and federal structures are not alien to post-independence Indian and 
Pakistani society. Khan even goes as far to argue that the British disrupted India's 
federal development, evident even before the Mughals (1992: 37).
Tatu Vanhanen has already discussed the relationship between ethnic conflict regulation 
and the homogeneity of provincial units in India. His 'Ethnic Nepotism in India' is 
primarily concerned to explain levels of democratisation - why, he asks, has India's 
(in)famous ethnic heterogeneity not destroyed India's democracy (1992: 3)? While two 
of his dependent variables are similar to mine - the regionalisation of the party system 
and levels of violence - he omits two important factors. Firstly, he does not look at the 
rationale behind the creation of the federal design in any theoretical detail. Secondly, in 
his analysis of the regionalisation of the party system he does not follow his argument to 
its logical conclusion. Homogeneity of units may produce multiple regionally based 
parties, vying for votes within that unit. Therefore, despite ostensibly similar 
hypotheses, my thesis proceeds from different premises. I extend the focus both 
forward (what dynamics occur in the party system of homogeneous provincial units?), 
and backwards (what explains the formation and form of the federal institutions?). My 
thesis is also explicitly comparative and makes use of the election data up to 2002 in 
Pakistan and 1999 in India. The most recent election Vanhanen analyses is that of 
1984, an aberrant election held in the wake of Indira Gandhi's assassination.
1.4. Comparative Federalism
As well as contributing to comparative politics and South Asian studies, this thesis 
develops the literature on comparative federalism. The literature is diverse - and can be 
categorised into many different camps. To understand the field to which my thesis 
contributes, two points of clarification are necessary.
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What is federalism?
Federalism as a concept and federation as a structure of government rest on the division 
of sovereignty between at least two territorially defined levels of government, although 
there can be overlapping jurisdictions of sovereignty. The division of powers between 
the constituent units does not preclude the interdependence of the two levels of 
government; it merely requires that for at least some governmental functions neither 
level is subordinate to the other (Watts 1970: 11). This division of sovereignty entails 
that federations have a written constitution and an independent Supreme Court to 
adjudicate disputes that arise between the two levels of government. The territorial 
dimension distinguishes federation as a structure of government from that of a 
consociation under which autonomy is granted to groups rather than to territorially 
defined units (although the two can, and often do coincide).
Many authors analyse federations as the institutional configuration of a process of 
previously independent states coming together and amalgamating their sovereignty. 
The citation from Riker at the head of this chapter is an example of this, as is Vile's 
legalistic definition of federations as a merger of sovereignty (1982: 218). To 
appreciate properly the process of federal design in the twentieth century de­ 
colonisation cannot be ignored. Many of these countries created federal structures, as 
did India and Pakistan, in an attempt to manage their diverse populations or to maintain 
institutional continuity with their colonial past3 . Therefore, many motivations behind 
the creation of a federation can be identified.
• to achieve administrative efficiency for reasons of size or complexity, especially in 
territorially large countries;
• to bring previously independent states into one political unit, for economic, political 
or military reasons;
• as an ideal in itself, connected to other ideological features of government (Verney 
1995: 83), such as the desire to increase 'democratic functioning', and;
• as an attempt to reconcile diversity within the structure of a single country.
3 Although many states in the developing world explicitly rejected federalism because of its reputation as a 
state and nation-destroying institution (Rothchild 1966: 276; Nordlinger 1972: 32; Mozafiar and Scarritt 2000: 
230-250). -18-
This thesis concentrates upon the last motivation. The salience of the other reasons has 
diminished in the post-Cold War era, while questions of how best to manage ethnic 
tensions have proliferated (as ethnic tensions themselves have increased and grown in 
international prominence). As a method of ethnic conflict regulation, federalism is a 
means to manage rather than eliminate ethnic differences (McGarry and O'Leary 1993: 
4)4 . Federalism often coincides with other strategies for managing diversity - such as 
consociationalism and multiculturalism. Indeed, O'Leary argues that federations 
without a dominant group require additional consociational mechanisms (2001a- 284- 
285).
Although the distinction smacks of semanticism, it is essential to distinguish federalism, 
federal political systems and federations. Watts' discussion is clear, concise, and 
succinctly sums up the debate. Federadisrn is denned as a normative or an ideological 
concept, primarily referring to the self-government of a people. Federal political 
systems in contrast refer to a broad 'genus of political organisation that is marked by the 
combination of shared rule and self-rule' (Watts 1998: 120). This definition 
encompasses federacies, confederations and other hybrid political arrangements. The 
term federation defines a specific political system within the genus of federal political 
systems. The very specificity of the system explains why definitional conflicts arise. 
Watts defines federations as a compound of constituent units and central government. 
This part of the definition is incontestable. A more contested statement is that 'each 
(government is) directly elected by its citizens' (Watts 1998: 121).
What federations are not.
'What we mean by federalism is not a fixed point on a map, but a tendency which is 
neither unitary nor separatist' (Trager 1968: ix). As Wheare argues 'federations must 
desire to be united but not to be unitary' (1963: 36). Federations therefore differ from 
unitary states, but should also be distinguished from a confederation where the 
constituent units retain their sovereignty, and form a union for limited purposes. The 
division of sovereignty is what distinguishes federations from decentralised unitary 
states such as the United Kingdom. Despite Scottish and Welsh devolution, sovereignty 
resides with Westminster. The case of Northern Ireland since the 1998 Belfast
4 Although it is not the only method to manage diversity.
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Agreement is a more complicated case. The relationship of Northern Ireland to the 
Westminster parliament during the operation of the devolved assembly can be equated 
to that of a federacy (O'Leary 2002a: 307). A federacy is denned by its status as an 
autonomous area, whose relation to the central government is federal even if the rest of 
the state is unitary. Another federacy is the Swedish speaking Aland Islands that belong 
to Finland.
Federations are also not the same as the consociational form of government advanced 
by Lijphart (1969; 1977). While the two have often been conflated and can be 
combined, and it is arguable that consociational features are necessary to make a 
federation successful as a means to limit the potential tyranny of the dominant group at 
the centre, as Lijphart has demonstrated, there exist notable differences (1979: 509- 
512).
• Not all federations are democratic, while consociational democracy, as defined by 
Lijphart is5 .
• Unlike consociational democracies, federations are not necessarily designed to 
accommodate ethnic diversity. Some explicitly reject ethnic territorial organisation 
or were designed before their federations became ethnically diverse such as the USA 
(Glazer 1983: 275). Some federations are created for reasons of military security, 
although not all federations necessarily follow this route, contrary to Riker's 
assertion (1964: 30).
• The territorial management of ethnic conflict is central to the federal idea 'as it 
allows for the expression of both diversity and unity' (Gagnon 1993: 15). 
Federations that are consociational can exist with heterogeneous units. However, 
when their units are heterogeneous, federal structures do not provide territorial 
segmental autonomy, and additional consociational devices will be required to 
secure this autonomy.
• Consociational democracy not only provides segmental autonomy for groups, but 
also permits a veto for groups over decisions of consequence for the group. While 
federations guarantee a division of powers, the ability to permit a veto for groups is 
dependent upon the type of powers devolved. Lijphart, (at least in 1979) is strident
5 Although consociations have precursors in arrangements such as the millet system of Ottoman Turkey which 
were not democratic (Finer 1997a: 1170, 1196-7).
-20-
about this point, a federation can only be a consociational democracy if all four 
features of consociational democracy - a grand coalition, segmental autonomy, 
proportionality in appointments and a mutual veto - are present.
Different definitions of federalism and federations.
While a basic definition of federations has been advanced, the question must be posed, 
why bother to conduct a comparative analysis of federations at all? How can a set of 
institutions so divergent across states be said to be part of the same phenomenon, let 
alone analysed as such? Are all federations the result of historical accident and 
circumstances specific to each country? If so, how legitimate is it to seek to draw 
meaningful comparisons between them? What can such an analysis contribute to 
comparative politics in general, and to the study of ethnic conflict regulation in 
particular? Although a given federation's institutional form depends to some extent on 
what it seeks to achieve, to be analysed effectively, coherently and comparatively, basic 
parameters have to be established.
While the division of sovereignty and the creation of at least two territorially defined 
levels of government are necessary features of a federation, multiple variations exist. 
The comparative literature on federation is as diverse as the phenomenon it seeks to 
analyse or explain. Three basic approaches to comparative federal analysis can be 
identified although some authors can be situated within more than one approach: 
constitutional, institutional and normative.
a) Constitutional analyses:
The best-known example of a constitutional analysis of federations is Wheare's 
institutional and American-centric definition.
Does a system of government embody predominantly a division of powers 
between general and regional authorities, each of which, in its own sphere, is 
coordinate with the others and independent of them? If so, that government is 
federal. It is not enough that the federal principle should be embodied 
predominantly in the written constitution of the country (1963: 33).
Wheare's definition proceeds from the assumption that certain levels of powers have to 
be devolved for a federal constitution to exist or the government to operate in a federal
fashion. In his analysis only the USA, Canada, Switzerland and Australia could be
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classified as federations (1963: 33). This definition, and others like it, has resulted in 
certain federations being termed 'imperfect' or 'flawed' federations, at least partially 
because they do not conform to the American institutional configuration. This is 
particularly inappropriate for analysing federations that were formed with a very 
different rationale to that of America - especially for those states seeking to manage 
their ethnic diversity. In contrast, Burgess asserts that it is constitutional autonomy 
rather than any particular division of powers - the inclusion of constituent units within 
the decision-making process - which defines a federation (1993: 5). To possess any 
validity, constitutional analyses of federations need to be as non-context specific as 
possible.
b) Institutional analyses:
Much of the literature fits into the institutional category to some extent, partially a 
function of the imperative to delineate what is being compared. Even Elazar, a 
normative analyst of federations argues that pluralism, his central value of federalism, 
needs to be 'institutionalized constitutionally' (1994: 25). Despite the need of all 
comparative work to define clearly the phenomena being compared, the institutional 
definitions can be context-specific or possess broader applicability. Wheare's 
constitutional analysis is an example of a context-specific approach. McGarry and 
O'Leary provide a institutional definition of federations, but one with broader 
applicability as the authors' concern is ethnic conflict regulation (1993: 32). The four 
features identified are:
• a codified and written constitution which demarcates the distribution of powers 
and functions. A codified constitution in its turn requires an independent Supreme 
Court to adjudicate disputes between the two levels of government.
• a guaranteed division of powers6 . It is important to establish which powers are 
allocated to each level of government and why. Not only does this permit the 
analyst to establish whether a federation is centrist or decentralised, but also whether 
it encourages multicultural practices.
6 There are many different ways that powers can be divided. Powers are always strictly separated between the 
two levels of government. Yet some powers may be concurrent, as in India and Pakistan. In contrast, as in 
Germany, policy-making and implementation may be separated: the centre is responsible for the making of 
policy, whereas the Lander are responsible for its implementation. A final method of delineating powers 
between the two levels of government is to allocate residual powers (which are substantial) to the units, as in 
Switzerland. All federations allocate residual powers to one or other level of the government; this becomes 
significant when not many powers are constitutionally allocated to either level of government.
• a bicameral legislature in which the units are represented within a different 
chamber to those of the 'people'. In such a chamber the smaller units are usually 
disproportionally represented7 .
• a constitutional amendment process that requires the consent of both levels of 
government. This does not mean that every single unit within the federation has to 
consent to proposed changes. In practice it has often been articulated through the 
formula that a two-thirds majority in both houses of parliament (and ideally the 
provincial legislatures) should have to be in favour before the changes are ratified.
While the above definition is a useful one and is less restrictive than others in the 
literature, a solely institutional characterisation of federalism is fraught with dangers. 
Federations vary between cases and an institutional definition runs the risk of excluding 
from analysis systems that may not conform to all institutional criteria, but have federal 
aspects. One example is that although most federations possess bicameral legislatures, 
not all do so. Micronesia, St Kitts and Nevis and Venezuela are three examples out of 
the twenty-four existing federations that possess unicameral legislatures. Until the 
secession of East Pakistan, Pakistan also possessed a unicameral legislature. Therefore 
the analyst must be ready to make exceptions and assess whether a state without a 
federal constitution has federal government8 . To accept this is to acknowledge that 
federation is a specific political system that permits variety.
c) Normative analyses:
A normative analysis of federal structures analyses federations according to the effects 
that they achieve, and specifies what those effects should be. This approach assesses 
the validity of the federation according to the extent to which it has promoted other 
values such as democracy or multiculturalism. As Elazar argues, 'the 'given' of 
federalism is that humans are born free and that good government must be grounded in 
a framework of maximum human liberty' (1994: 26). Elazar posits an interesting 
distinction between those who advance federalism as a means to an end, regardless of 
what those ends are, and those who assess federalism's contribution according to the
7 Although this over-representation does not mean that their interests will always be protected.
8 Wheare argued that the fact that the Executive of the Dominion in Canada has the power to disallow Acts 
passed by a provincial legislature meant that it was a quasi federation. However, because the operation of the 
government has not abused the central powers, 'it is predominantly federal in practice...Canada has not a 
federal constitution, it has a federal government' (1963: 21).
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ends it seeks to advance (a normative definition). The latter 'hold(s) that federalism is 
designed to produce the highest form of political and human relationships' (Elazar 
1987: 80). This method of comparing federations runs the risk of excluding valid cases 
for comparison, artificially limiting the range of cases through introducing the analysts' 
normative values. It also poses problems for quantification - upon what variables will a 
federation be measured as more democratic than another? Finally, evaluating 
federalism according to normative criteria ignores the intended effects of a particular 
system, and thus excludes other measures of analysis.
As has become clear, many authors fit into more than one camp. Even Elazar concedes 
that 'while the USSR may have been a sham as a federation, federalism has played a 
major role in its history over the past 70 years' (1994: 73). The limitation of all 
approaches is that the federal form often has unintended as well as intended 
consequences. An example of an author who analyses federal institutions according to 
their consequences is Lemco - who is concerned with federal stability (1991: esp. 41- 
48). This distinction between structures and consequences is a useful one. It lends 
itself well to comparative analysis - either through a quantitative measurement of 
identified effects, or through a comparative analysis of the differences in institutional 
design and their posited relationship to dependent variables such as federal stability. 
Unlike most institutional analyses, concentrating on intended and unintended 
consequences does not presume a democratic federation. Therefore, although in 
democratic federations all the constituent units should be included in the decision- 
making process, and have to consent to constitutional changes, the absence of 
democracy should not exclude a federation from analysis.
Why am I concentrating on federal structures?
My thesis adopts an institutionalist approach. It not only concentrates upon institutional 
design and the rationale behind the institutional differences, but also measures the 
intended and unintended effects of these differences in design. This study analyses the 
likely effectiveness of a specific type of federal design within ethnically heterogeneous 
societies. Nordlinger contests the effectiveness of federalism as an ethnic conflict 
regulation device. He argues in the heading to this chapter that federalism is an 
imperfect conflict regulation device as it is likely to increase pressures for secession
(1972: 32). However, federal structures have been invented and proposed as a solution
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for ethnic conflict, e.g. in India, Pakistan, Belgium, Sri Lanka, Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
in Nigeria. More to the point, there have existed several successful multiethnic 
federations e.g. Switzerland, Canada and India. Although there are many countries 
where federations have significantly failed to regulate ethnic conflict, e.g. Nigeria in 
1966 and Pakistan in 1971, it is my contention that those multiethnic federations that 
failed were not necessarily fated to do so. Multiethnic states per se are not doomed to 
failure; there are always additional factors affecting their success - this study 
concentrates upon institutional factors. The main differences between federations 
include, but are not exhaustive of, the degree of centralisation, the number and 
composition of the provincial units, the degrees of consociationalism within the federal 
design and the composition of the bicameral legislature. Following on from Watts, a 
distinction needs to be made between federalism as an idea and federations that will 
vary according to the country (Verney 1995: 87).
My analysis proceeds from the supposition that political institutions are autonomously 
important in the regulation of ethnic conflict, and that ethnic identities are situational. 
The question what constitutes a nation or an ethnic group is hotly contested (e.g. Van 
den Berghe 1978: 402-7; Gellner 1983: 2-7; Smith 1989: 340-363; Hobsbawm 1990: 
14-45). The acceptance of one or other of these definitions influences what approach to 
adopt to managing multiethnic states. Do 'Basic Human Needs' need to be satisfied 
(Burton 1990: 36-48), or do political entrepreneurs need to be bought off? Suffice to 
say that in South Asia and elsewhere, individuals have more than one identity that can 
be defined by caste, class, religion, tribe, language, gender or race. These identities can 
combine, crosscut or oppose one another. While ethnic identities are undoubtedly open 
to manipulation by political entrepreneurs, these identities must have resonance with the 
relevant population. The causes of ethnic tensions are multiple, as situational as the 
identities which they seek to mobilise, and too numerous to catalogue exhaustively here. 
Common causes derive from denial of recognition, reduced security and conflict over 
resources. Institutional design can address these issues .
Yet as all institutions arise out of the power relations and existing cleavages in society it 
is problematic to separate the independent and dependent variables. Which comes first: 
a given pattern of ethnic relations or a certain set of political institutions? The question
9 Even Vanhanen who espouses a primordial theory of ethnic conflict argues that ethnic interest conflicts have 
to be managed institutionally (1992: 18).
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can only be answered historically. However, it is the presupposition of political 
sociology, political science and of 'new' institutionalism, that political creativity in 
institutional design is not reducible to previous constellations of interests, even if the 
latter explain the receptivity of agents to new institutional designs. This reasoning 
shapes my approach to federal institutions. Similarly, Duchacek argues that institutions 
can structure incentives and behaviour even if federal structures are just there for show 
(1991: 23). The breathing of life into the USSR's federal institutions before their 
sudden deflation was a recent and profoundly important demonstration of this argument. 
As Meisel argues, federalism is a 'technique' which frequently creates loyalties and 
states of minds (1995: 341). Horowitz, while arguing the same, reminds us that 
institutions 'have a more powerful influence on some incentives than on others' (1985: 
601). The institutionalisation of a territorial division of political powers creates 
conditions for a new level of political debate to occur, both between the centre and the 
provincial unit, but also within the provincial unit. This is why the design of the 
provincial units is so important. The nature of this 'political space' in which political 
entrepreneurs can command loyalty from their provincial and state-wide populations is 
crucial for determining the success of a federal system in a multiethnic state. An 
understanding of the institutional set up and ideals inherent in a particular federal 
system is necessary to determine the likelihood of success in managing potential or 
actual ethnic conflict.
Federalism as an independent variable consists of federal structures that promote 
certain types of behaviour through the existence and the implementation of rules that 
structure political actors' incentives for co-operative behaviour. In certain 
configurations, federations create political compartments for ethnic groups to govern 
themselves. By so doing they secure their recognition, enabling the existence of ethnic 
identities that do not necessarily conflict with the identity of the centre. A federation 
permits dualism: loyalty to the unit need not detract from loyalty to the central 
government. Linz and Stepan demonstrate this in the Spanish case (1996: 102-103) and 
Elazar stresses the importance of 'dual citizenship' for the success of a federation 
(1994: 67). 'That the two loyalties must be there is the prerequisite of federal 
government, but that the one should not overpower the other is also a prerequisite' 
(Wheare 1963: 49).
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Federalism as a dependent variable is a set of institutional repertoires specifically 
intended to structure political behaviour, e.g. where elites self-consciously create a 
federation with the intention to regulate ethnic conflict. The unification of previously 
independent units (Canada), re-arranging the political system of an already existing 
entity (Belgium), or creating a new entity (India) are all examples of federal repertoires 
as dependent variables.
The fact that a set of institutional repertoires can be both independent and dependent is 
no surprise. Ideas and political conflicts help to shape institutions and their formation. 
A dialectical relationship exists, and the rationale behind an institution's adoption 
cannot be ignored. As Mitra reminds us, analysts tend to concentrate upon the 
institutional structures of federalism, without taking into account the fact that these 
institutional structures are themselves often contested (1999: 1).
The concentration on federal design, development and effects has led me to focus on the 
main variable in which India and Pakistan have differed in their federal development. 
My specific null hypotheses to test are:
• There was no difference between the plans of Congress and League before 
independence.
• There was no difference between the constitutions of India and Pakistan after 
independence.
• There was no relationship between the changed linguistic and religious population 
of India and Pakistan after independence and the nature of the federal form adopted.
• There was no relationship between the state-sponsored national identities in India 
and Pakistan, and the nature of the federal form.
• There was no relationship between the homogeneity of a federal unit and the party 
system in that unit.
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Chart 1.1. Diagrammatic representation of variables in hypotheses.
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(compound) variable
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Two debates in the literature have profoundly affected my hypothesis creation and 
thesis design. Firstly, can a non-democratic state's federal structures (such as Pakistan) 
be compared with a democratic federation (such as India)? Secondly, why is unit 
design contested between comparative federal analysts, and why has it proved so 
controversial in practice?
1.5. Democratic and non-democratic federations.
A danger exists of comparing two states 'based on a subject that is clearly more 
appropriate to one country than to the other' (Dogan and Pelassy 1984: 114). The 
relationship between democratic and federal forms has been extensively commented on, 
with many authors explicitly Unking the two concepts (Duchacek 1987: 332-333, 354- 
355; Burgess 1993: 5-6; Chryssochoou 1998: 1-20). Many authors argue that 
federalism is inherently democratic (Hicks 1978: 4), or promote federalism specifically 
for its democratic credentials, thereby espousing a normative appraisal of federations 
(Elazar 1979: 47-52). Duchacek stated that 'a federal constitution expresses the core 
creed of democracy, pluralism, in territorial terms'. This is because both sets of 
government operate directly upon the people (1987: 192). However, many of these 
arguments ignore the existence of federations that have been of dubious democratic 
repute (Pakistan for much of its existence), or those that have been ideologically non- 
democratic and coercive, those of the old Yugoslavia and the USSR.
Can these non-democratic federations be analysed as 'genuine' federations? Riker 
denied that Pakistan was a real federation (1964: 30). As the above debate on the nature
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of federalism made clear, many different ways of comparing federations exist. 
Although most federations have historically been linked to democracy, they do not have 
to be. A contention of this thesis is that although it has historically been linked to 
democracy, federalism as a mechanism of ethnic conflict regulation can still have 
resonance within a state, affecting the potential for state consolidation and the 
accommodation of different ethnic groups in the absence of democracy. This is a 
different question than whether such a federation would remain stable over time. To 
make the debate clearer I have identified three testable propositions.
AH federations are democratic
The first hypothesis is that all federations are democratic. Chryssochoou argues that 
'democratic representation of all participating communities is an essential feature 
common to all federal entities' (1998: 5). However, his analysis suffers from the 
perception that constituent units need their 'sovereignty protected', ignoring the fact that 
many federations are not formed from the consent of previously sovereign units, or 
indeed, of the individuals within them (1998: 7). Another argument often made is that 
non-democratic federations are not 'genuine' (McGarry and O'Leary 1993: 35). This 
position can be justified from three viewpoints. The first is a normative position; that 
federalism exists to promote other goals such as democracy. Therefore, a non- 
democratic federation by definition is not a federation. The second is a more practical 
one, made by those who advance institutional analyses of federations. This is that as 
non-democratic federations do not represent the people at the different levels of 
government, they cannot bring government closer to the people and do not devolve 
sovereignty to the different levels of government (assuming that in a non-democratic 
state, all power resides at the centre). As Duchacek states 'federal noncentralisation of 
political power cannot be conceived or practised without democracy ... Authoritarian 
arrangements of territorial agendas federalism doeth not make' (1987: xi).
The third justification is the strongest. The key problem with non-democratic 
federations is that sovereignty is not divided if there is a supreme ruler. In the absence 
of a division of sovereignty, the head of government can unilaterally change the 
constitution, the division of powers, or abolish the federation altogether. While this is 
true, it is important to remember that even non-democratic federations possess
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alternative sources of power than the central leader. President Zayeed of the UAE 
cannot unilaterally abolish or radically change the federal structure without the consent 
of the other rulers of the Emirates. Secondly, even though a non-democratic leader 
might be able to amend the constitution unilaterally - federal effects still operate. It is 
indeed hard to imagine non-democratic federations bringing government closer to the 
people in any meaningful sense, and they certainly do not represent the people. It is 
also true that the centre is technically all-powerful. However, many of these non- 
democratic federations have based their structures of administration and rule around 
federal structures, and more importantly, around the units that comprise the federation. 
In the cases of the USSR, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, at the time of the 
democratisation of all three states, pressures for dissolution appeared. It is my 
contention as well as of others such as Roeder (1992: 148) and Linz and Stepan (1996: 
367) that the composition of these federations - either the number of constituent units as 
in the Czechoslovakian case, or the creation of titular nationalities in the Soviet Union - 
hastened the break up of these federations. The structure of the federation, especially in 
the Yugoslav and Soviet cases influenced the creation and maintenance of ethnic 
identities. In the case of the USSR, McGarry and Leiven argue that 'the republics, 
admittedly to somewhat varying degrees, became focuses for local patriotism and 
loyalty' (1993: 65) 10 . In the old Yugoslavia, Schopflin argues that, 'initially, these 
newly established republics were no more than facades (but) ... (g)radually the 
republics acquired identities of their own and came to see themselves as real loci of 
power' (1993: 183).
Both these non-democratic federations created effects in the realm of ethnic conflict 
regulation, similar to that identified by Nordlinger - increasing pressure for secession. 
Therefore, as Graham Smith argues,
while such federations as measured by liberal democratic criteria may be rightly 
judged to be imperfect ... (t)o ignore this diversity is to limit our understanding 
of federations and to impoverish comparative analysis (1995: 8).
If the institutional analysis of federalism is accepted, then the information in Chart 1.2 
and Table 1.1 concludes the debate.
10 For a fuller discussion of the role of unit design in the Soviet Union Roeder (1992) provides a fascinating
analysis. -30-
Chart 1.2. Federations since 1900.
24%
28%
48%
• Democratic
• Not Democratic 
D Not consolidated
Democratic n = 22
Non democratic n=13
Non-consolidated democracies n = 11
Total n = 46
Source: Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc. (1958-1999) and Central Intelligence Agency (2002).
Notes: Because of the long time period under consideration - 1955-2003 - I have placed Pakistan in the
'non-consolidated' democracies column11 . Many 'democratic federations' have had chequered
democratic histories during the 20th century. Most of these are in the non-consolidated democracy
column.
While 72% of federations since 1900 have been democratic, 28% have not been and 
24% have had seriously chequered democratic histories, which is why I have classified 
them as non-consolidated democracies. If the normative approach is adopted then the 
debate hinges on what constitutes a 'genuine' federation. I have already made my 
position clear on this point.
11 A non-consolidated democracy exists when democracy is not the 'only game in town' (Linz and Stepan 
1996: 5).
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Table 1.1: Democratic Status of the World's Federations since 1900
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
Democratic
Argentine Republic
Australia. Commonwealth of
Austria, Republic of
Belgium, Kingdom of
Brazil, Federative Republic of
Burma 1948-1962
Canada
Germany, Federal Republic 
of > 1990
Germany, Federal Republic 
of 1945-1990
India, Republic of
Malaysia > 1965
Malayan 1963-1965
Mexico, (United Mexican 
States)
Micronesia, Federated States 
of
Nigeria 1963-1966
Nigeria 1979-1983
Russian Federation
Saint Kitts and Nevis, 
Federation of
Spain, Kingdom of
Switzerland, (Swiss 
Confederation)
United States of America
Venezuela, Republic of
48%
Non-democratic
Cameroon 1961-1972
Central African Federation (South and 
North Rhodesia with Nyasaland), 1953-63
Czechoslovakia <1992
Ethiopia 1952-1962
Federation of Iraq and Jordan, 1958
Libya (Federal Kingdom of) 1951-1963
Malayan 1947-1963
Mali Federation (with Senegal) 1959-1960
Uganda 1962-1967
United Arab Emirates
United Arab Republic 1958-1961 (Egypt 
and Syria)
USSR
Yugoslavia 1945-1992
28%
Non-consolidated 
democracies
Bosnia & Herzegovina
Comoros, Federal Islamic 
Republic of
British West Indies
Congo 1960-1969
Ethiopia, Federal Democratic 
Republic of
Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia 1992-2003
Indonesia 1947-1950
Nigeria > 1999
Pakistan 1955-1971
Pakistan > 1971
Union of Serbia & Montenegro 
>2003
24%
Source: Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc. (1958-1999) and Central Intelligence Agency (2002). 
Notes: Those federations in bold type are not in existence any more or have been superseded.
Some federations are democratic.
Following on from the above analysis, the necessary conclusion is that while not all 
federations are democratic it is undeniable that some federations are. If we take those 
federations that are democratic today, we find the statistics skewed even further from
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the position set out in Chart 1.2. The vast majority of federations in the world today are 
consolidated democracies. There is only one federation that is not democratic - the 
United Arab Emirates. Many others are nominally democratic, but are either too 
recently democratised to classify as consolidated democracies, such as Nigeria and 
Pakistan, or have experienced tensions such as Ethiopia.
Chart 1.3. Federations of the year 2003.
25%
71%
H Democratic 
• Not Democratic 
D Not consolidated
Democratic 
Non democratic 
Non-consolidated 
Total
n=17 
n=l 
n = 6 
n = 24
Source: Central Intelligence Agency (2002).
The n in Chart 1.3 has decreased substantially. In Table 1.1, some countries were 
included more than once. Therefore, Nigeria and Malaysia each appear three tunes, and 
Pakistan twice. This is because of changes in territory, radical changes hi federal 
organisation, or the transition back to a federal democracy (hi the case of Nigeria). The 
n has also diminished substantially because many states in the developing world 
experimented with federal structures in the 1950s and 1960s for military, economic or 
political reasons. They subsequently reverted to unitary states, or the federation 
disbanded in the case of Mali, Iraq with Jordan and the British West ladies. 
Additionally, in the post Cold-War world, several federations have split - notably 
Czechoslovakia, USSR, Yugoslavia and Ethiopia. As Chart 1.3 shows only the 
federations that exist today, the sample size is necessarily smaller. Details of the 
federations are included in Table 1.2.
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Table 1.2. Democratic status of the world's federations in 2003
I
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
Democratic
Argentine Republic
Australia, Commonwealth of
Austria, Republic of
Belgium, Kingdom of
Brazil, Federative Republic of
Canada
Germany, Federal Republic of
India, Republic of
Malaysia
Mexico, (United Mexican States)
Micronesia, Federated States of
Russian Federation
Saint Kitts and Nevis, Federation of
Spain, Kingdom of
Switzerland, (Swiss Confederation)
United States of America
Venezuela, Republic of
71%
Non-democratic
U.A.E
4%
Non-consolidated democracies
Bosnia & Herzegovina
Comoros, Federal Islamic Republic of
Ethiopia, Federal Democratic Republic of
Nigeria, Federal Republic of
Pakistan, Islamic Republic of
Union of Serbia and Montenegro
25%
Source: Central Intelligence Agency (2002).
The classification of the federations as democratic, non-democratic or non-consolidated 
democracies is itself problematic. Many states are hard to classify definitively. Both 
concepts have meant different things to different people over time, and between 
countries. Volumes of literature exist on both concepts. Democracy has been 
minimally defined as the existence of free and fair elections (Huntington 1991: 6) or 
maximally, requiring for example, human development and economic equality as well 
as the existence of democratic institutions (Sen 1999: 9-12). Once it is recognised that 
it is problematic to classify definitively a state as democratic or non-democratic, the 
rejection of certain states as unworthy of classification as federations becomes suspect 12 .
A more interesting starting point is not to reject the categorisation as a federation those 
federations that are not democratic, or are non-consolidated democracies, but to ask 
whether those federations which are not democratic are likely to be less successful in 
managing their ethnic groups.
12 Is Malaysia to be classified as a democratic or a non-democratic federation? It lacks certain prerequisites of 
a 'full democracy' such as a free press. Tables 1.1 and 1.2 classify it as a democratic federation, but I note the 
problems here in so doing. As elements of its democracy are suspect, as seen with the recent trial and 
imprisonment of the major challenger to Mahathir, Anwar Ibrahim, should it be categorised as a 'false' 
federation? To do so would follow those who analyse federalism in a normative fashion, the problems of 
which have been discussed.
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No federations are democratic:
«
As the majority of the world's federations are democratic, it may appear nonsensical to 
say that no federations are democratic. As has been alluded to however, both federalism 
and democracy are problematic concepts because of the variety of descriptions 
attributed to them. Democracy can mean many things. At its most basic, it means the 
rule of (cracy) the people (demos'). Stepan's continuum is useful to cite at this juncture. 
He argues that federations can be categorised depending upon whether they are either 
demos-enabling or demos-constraining (1999: 21). The thrust of Stepan's analysis is 
that one of the first federations - the United States - designed its federation in tandem 
with one facet of democracy - that of the liberty of the individual. Federal institutions 
were partially designed to prevent the tyranny of the government and the tyranny of the 
majority. Therefore, primary emphasis was placed upon the separation of powers 
between the centre and the states, equal representation of the states in the bicameral 
legislature, and the policy scope of the second chamber (1999: 25-28). The United 
States was therefore a demo s-constraining federation. In contrast, Stepan categorises 
those federations devised in the twentieth century such as India as demos-enabling 
federations — placing emphasis upon the equality facet of democracy. In demos- 
enabling federations, states are represented in proportion to their population in the 
second chamber, fewer powers reside in the territorial chamber and more in the 
popularly elected lower house, and the centre possesses more power than the units. 
Stepan argues that both federations are equally democratic, but that demos-constraining 
federalism as epitomised by the United States is not necessarily suitable for all federal 
regimes. What is important for my analysis is that prioritising different aspects of 
democracy - liberty or equality - created different types of federations, neither of which 
is 'less federal' or 'less democratic' than the other is
Distinguishing between demos-enabling and demos-constraining federations helps to 
link the arguments concerning the incompatibility of federalism with majoritarian 
democracy. Analysts of federalism argue that a democratic federation, by bringing 
levels of government closer to the people, increases the rule of the people. Particularly 
in multiethnic federations, federal structures have been used as an institutional 
mechanism compatible with national self-determination. Federalism brings government 
closer to the people affected by it through the devolution of power to territorially 
concentrated ethnic groups. However, by introducing a separation of powers between
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the centre and the constituent units, a separation of powers between the two chambers, 
as well as increasing the policy scope of the second chamber, federations operate within 
the liberal principle of limiting powers. Its institutional configuration therefore reduces 
the will of 'the people' by restricting the operation of majoritarianism both at the centre, 
but also by redefining who are 'the people' to exercise majority rule. 'The people' of 
the whole state are redefined into 'the people' of the units for some decisions.
Wolterman's argument that 'mass democracy is incompatible with federalism in 
principle ... (d)emocracies create unitary states' is too strong a case, even for those 
federations which are demos-constraining (1993: 136). Additionally there is no 
democratic state that operates according to majoritarianism in its pure form, whether 
federal or not. In practice, democracy has evolved to mean much more than simply the 
will of the people. This is because of problems of defining who are the people, a 
question especially pertinent to federations seeking to manage diversity. Democracy 
has also been re-defined by its interaction with liberalism. As Parekh reminds us, while 
democracy historically preceded liberalism, it was liberals in the nineteenth century 
'realising that the democratic tide was irreversible' who re-adopted democratic 
structures and adapted them to fit with the principles of individual freedom and liberty 
(1992: 166). Federalism is perfectly compatible with liberal democracy. Although 
federal structures work against majoritarianism they do not prevent it. This distinction 
is important because no democratic system operates with complete freedom for 'the 
people'. To differing degrees, as with the federal typology discussed in Stepan's 
analysis, democratic states can be either demos enabling or demos constraining. No 
democratic systems solely operate on the principle of direct democracy - there are 
always elements of delegation. This is what is meant by representative democracy.
The fact that some federations are democratic while others are not is not surprising. 
Rarely does a complete association between institutions within a state and regime type 
exist (many non-democratic regimes still hold elections). According to my analysis, 
federations do not have to be democratic to qualify for scrutiny. However, all the non- 
democratic federations which have been used as examples in the analysis - Yugoslavia, 
Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and of course, Pakistan - have experienced the most 
severe tensions in their federations at the moment of democratisation. Conceding this 
point does not, however, mean that federal system design is irrelevant. Other non- 
democratic federations have democratised without similar secessions - Nigeria being a
-36-
prime example, although it frequently experiences severe ethnic conflict. Pakistan also 
democratised after the death of General Zia in 1988 and held national and provincial 
elections in 2002. Neither of these cases can however, be described as consolidated 
democracies.
Therefore, the apposite question is not 'is a federation a 'real' federation, if it is not 
democratic'? The key question is, will federalism have an effect - or more simply, do 
federal structures matter, and if so, howl This is very different from arguing that 
federalism will be successful as an ethnic conflict regulation device in a non-democratic 
state. The nature of the non-democratic federation, the locus of power and the ethnic 
composition of the constituent units are also relevant. Tensions may only be forcibly 
expressed when the country democratises. This is a 'pressure cooker' effect - occurring 
when tensions simmering under the surface have not been expressed and 
accommodated. Stepan argues that non-democratic federations are likely to break up at 
the moment of democratisation because of this pressure cooker effect (1999: 19). In 
contrast Duchacek argues that multiethnic federations will, in the absence of 
democracy, increase rather than contain ethnic conflict (1979: 67-8). Duchacek 
perceived tensions before the moment of democratisation. Therefore, one final 
hypothesis has to be addressed.
For federalism to be successful as an ethnic conflict regulation mechanism does it have 
to be democratic? If this were true it would be a necessary not a sufficient condition of 
success because democratic federations have failed to stay intact, both in the moment of 
democratisation as seen in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia and federations with more 
of a history of democratic governance as the Malayan Federation in 1965 13 . In addition, 
countries such as Canada and India have experienced secessionist movements and 
pressures despite possessing consolidated democratic structures. However, the question 
remains unanswered, would the non-democratic federations of the 'eastern bloc' have 
failed if they had remained non-democratic? The question of whether democratisation 
was inevitable is a different one to whether non-democratic federations are doomed. 
The evidence points in the direction that newly democratising federations face dangers 
in so doing. Therefore as Stepan argues,
13 Discussions of all the wider conditions likely to make a federation successful are worthy of a book; this 
thesis does not attempt to answer them.
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This risk is especially grave when elections are introduced in the subunits of a 
formerly nondemocratic federal polity prior to democratic countrywide elections 
and in the absence of democratic countrywide parties (1999: 19) 14 .
This does not mean that they cannot remain federal in the absence of elections.
1.6. The boundary debate.
Why is the constituent unit design contested between comparative federal analysts, and 
why has it proved so controversial in practice? Many authors have alleged that 
federalism is likely to increase pressures for secession rather than regulating and 
accommodating ethnic differences. This is one of the main foci of this thesis. Within 
constituent units mobilisation around ethnic criteria can manifest itself against the 
centre if an ethnic group different to that in the unit dominates the centre. The primary 
variable I seek to analyse to narrow down the debate is that of the ethnic composition of 
the federal units. All federations presuppose the existence of units. The character of 
these units affects the ability of the federal system to accommodate regional interests 
(Watts 1970: 29).
Unit design is a contested variable, described differently by different authors. Tarlton 
uses the terminology of symmetrical and asymmetrical federations to distinguish 
between units which are a microcosm of the ethnic make up of the national state 
(symmetrical federations) and those with units corresponding to the boundaries of a 
particular ethnic group within the state (asymmetrical federations) (1965: 868-9). This 
terminology is easily confused with the distinction between federations permitting an 
asymmetrical division of powers. Therefore, to distinguish federations by their 
provincial composition I will use the terminology of homogeneous units (dominated by 
one group) and heterogeneous units (in which no one group dominates). In discussing 
homogeneous units, it must be recognised that complete homogeneity, especially in 
deeply divided societies, is unlikely15 . The Indian States Reorganisation Commission 
(SRC) defined homogeneity as comprising over 70% linguistic homogeneity (1955: 
Paragraph 783). Total homogeneity will be near impossible to achieve, especially in 
border regions but also because of migration patterns. In addition, units can be
14 Although as already noted, this is not a perfect relationship, as seen in the case of Nigeria which had state 
elections before national ones in the 1970s and did not split.
15 Therefore I prefer the terminology of homogeneous rather than mono-ethnic.
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homogeneous upon one criterion, such as language but be cross-cut by religion (as in 
the Indian and Swiss cases). This adds to the complexity of the debate.
There are many ways to constitute units within a federation and a state can adopt more 
than one. A constituent unit's borders can contain a geographically concentrated group 
to create a homogeneous units as advocated by Watts (1970: 32-34). In contrast, 
boundaries can deliberately cut across ethnic groups and create multiethnic provinces 
within the multiethnic state as advocated by Vile (1982: 222) 16 . The USSR adopted a 
version of this, with one dominant group in each unit, but ensuring that a section of the 
titular nationality remained within a neighbouring province. This was a device of 
control. Finally, in a federation created on non-ethnic criteria, ethnic composition is 
irrelevant or non-existent.
In general, advocacy of heterogeneous units can be equated with those who seek 
integration (where identity is relegated to the private sphere) while advocates of 
homogeneous units are multiculturalists (who seek to promote or protect cultural 
identities in the political sphere) 17 . This chapter does not argue that one strategy is 
normatively better than another, merely that if groups are territorially concentrated, 
homogeneous units stand a better chance of accommodating ethnic diversity than 
heterogeneous ones do. If groups are not territorially concentrated in a divided society 
then consociational power sharing devices or behaviour are likely to provide a better 
multicultural option e.g. in Malaysia where power sharing between different ethnic 
groups is played out through the electoral system (Lijphart 1977: 153; Mauzy 1993: 
106). The debate below sets out the main arguments that have been made against 
homogeneous units. It then attempts to rebut or qualify their concerns and accusations.
1. The danger of minorities within the homogeneous units being victimised.
The first argument against homogeneous provinces is that there is a danger of the 
inevitable minorities within the new units being victimised, either intentionally or 
unintentionally. Elites trying to maintain their power base may seek to do so at the 
expense of the other groups within the unit - mobilising one ascriptively defined group 
against another. This applies to minorities who are minorities within the national state
16 Vile discusses only 'communal cleavages'. A closer reading reveals that he is subsuming ethnic and 
linguistic cleavages within 'communal' ones (1982: 221-222).
17 Vanhanen does not fit within these categories. His preferred option is for biological assimilation through 
mixed marriages. His sub-optimal solution is to promote security through the creation of homogeneous 
provinces (1992: 166-7).
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as a whole, or those who are a majority in the national state. It is of course almost 
impossible without genocide and forced population transfers to avoid the existence of 
some peoples who do not belong to the dominant ethnic group within the unit. This is 
exacerbated by the migration of populations, as seen in Assam (Weiner 1978: Ch 3). 
However, this problem can be circumvented if Beran's recursive principle is applied: 
ethnic groups should not be allowed to govern their own units unless guarantees for 
minorities are respected (1984: 29). An enforceable Bill of Rights and central 
government provision for education and minority rights can achieve this. These 
provisions have been implemented in many federal constitutions, for example in India18 .
2. The increased pressures for secession.
It has been argued that ethnically homogeneous units increase the danger of ethnic 
conflict. This is because of the resources and legitimacy that such groups gain from a 
governmental power base. This is said to enhance the identity of the group and make 
them more likely to secede. Maurice Vile argues that,
It is clear that where the boundaries of the member states are drawn so as to 
coincide with communal divisions the likelihood is that the problems of operating 
the machinery of federalism will be exacerbated (1982: 222-223).
Nordlinger rejects federalism on similar grounds (1972: 32). Federalism is said to lead 
to intolerance and disregard for the interest of the collective whole (Duchacek 1987: 
120). The foundations of this argument lie in the claim a) that a less homogeneous unit 
would be inhibited if a substantial number of its ethnic group would be left behind after 
secession and b) that homogeneous units enhance separate loyalties.
a) through imbuing territorially concentrated ethnic groups with resources, 
legitimacy and a power base.
The provision of a homogeneous unit enhances security and provides conditions for the 
promotion of a dual identity and identification with the institutions of the central 
government, which may inhibit secession. To argue that the coincidence of ethnic and
18 Another way to counter the argument about the danger of minority victimisation is to assert that victimisation 
is unlikely to happen in homogeneous unit, as for mobilisation to occur, a threat needs to be perceived. This 
however, is not an entirely satisfactory answer, as identities are situational and while a unit may be nearly 
homogeneous on one criterion, it may be much less so on another. In 1971 79% of the Punjab population's 
mother tongue was Punjabi, but only 60% of them were Sikhs. In the same year, 67% of the inhabitants of 
Nagaland were recorded as Christian but the largest linguistic group were the Ao - with only 14% of 
Nagaland's population (Government of India 1976).
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constituent unit boundaries increases ethnic conflict and makes secession more likely 
assumes that there is a motivation to secede. This ignores the fact that federalism may 
be successful as an ethnic conflict regulation device. If the security of the ethnic group 
(as they define it) is promoted within a multiethnic state, the motivation to secede is 
diminished. In addition, once security is enhanced, the federal institutions themselves 
can attract loyalty, as well as the central government. Nordlinger argues that a state 
should not seek to create actively a dual identity for fear of exacerbating violence and 
repression (1972: 37). His rationale is that an uncontested national identity often cannot 
be created from a common past, because separate ethnic groups exist within the same 
state. However, the federal structures themselves can create a dual, possibly civic 
identity, encompassing both central and regional loyalties. Cairns argues that the 
central government should transmit messages of a heterogeneous nationhood and 
identity. This should explicitly include those not part of the 'natural' ethnic majority 
(1995: 35). Although federalism is rarely an end in itself, usually incorporating 
strategic motivations, it should be the intention of the constitutional framers to seek to 
create some affinity towards the institutions.
There can be positive reasons for staying within the federation - the benefits have 
increased.
The most potent way to assure that federalism...will not become just a step to 
secession is to reinforce those specific interests that groups have in the 
undivided state (Horowitz 1985: 628).
This is an age where economic and military reasons for increasing the size of states 
have diminished (although not disappeared). There are different interests that can be 
promoted through federal structures. Economic interests in unity are fostered through 
economic interdependence with the main state as well as a redistribution of resources. 
Cultural autonomy can increase the separateness of a group but simultaneously reduce 
conflict with the centre. Cultural autonomy to promote a group's language increases 
interaction with the centre if the identity is politically recognised and utilised as a 
method of power acquisition at the centre (e.g. civil service exams). Finally, political 
interdependence can be increased, either within a dominant party that represents 
regional interests, or through coalition politics. It is worth noting that although all the 
above have the potential to increase conflict with other groups who may oppose the
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reduction of their privileges or access to government; they are not necessarily zero-sum 
relationships.
b) through the creation of separate loyalties.
Addressing the point that separate states lead to the creation of separate and antagonistic 
loyalties, a contrasting viewpoint would be to argue that if the units are not ethnically 
homogeneous, the main rationale of federalism is in danger of being thwarted. This is 
of bringing the government closer to 'the people' affected by it - national self- 
determination. If the premises of nationalism are accepted, then 'any old' mixed state 
government will not achieve the same identification or promote the same degree of 
responsiveness to individual citizens and give expression to primary group attachments. 
Therefore heterogeneous units are as likely to give rise to secessionist impulses on 
behalf of a group as homogeneous units are said to do. This is borne out in India and 
Pakistan. Additionally, if boundaries do not coincide with ethnic ones, the division of 
powers will appear as a device of administrative efficiency or political manipulation 
rather than as a normative commitment to the ideal of a multiethnic state. The 
perception of such a normative commitment is essential to increase the security and well 
being of an ethnic group. It depends on the nature of the demand as well as the timing 
of the concession as to whether this in itself would be sufficient. For example, Khuhro, 
a Sindhi political scientist states that, 'the Pashtuns want a bigger share of the 
cake...(while the)...Baluch want something more - identity, serf-respect, real autonomy', 
(quoted in Harrison 1991: 313). Ethnically homogeneous units also provide 
institutional protection for cultural institutions against the central state's potential 
interference. This is especially the case where there is a staatsvolk. A staatsvolk can be 
defined as a group of people who dominate the federation, and are normally its 'co- 
founders'. A staatsvolk does not have to be the 'absolute majority of the population' 
(O'Leary 2001a: 285). They are the dominant titular nationality (O'Leary 2001c: 34). 
However, they may not dominate in the electoral arena - in fact this was precisely the 
problem in the case of Pakistan before 1971 - the staatsvolk - the Punjabis, comprised 
only 29% of the population19 .
19 O'Leary is discussing democratic federations - this is why he defines a staatsvolk as being 'electorally 
dominant'(200la: 285).
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3. Homogeneous units do not provide opportunities for inter-ethnic elite co­ 
operation.
Inter-ethnic relations can soften ethnic hostility among politicians. Personal 
relationships cannot be built from a distance. Although inter-ethnic competition will 
not disappear in heterogeneous units, it is argued that the conflict is more likely to 
concern 'mundane' power politics rather than zero-sum identity issues, as Horowitz 
outlines in Malaysia (1985: 408-9). This has the added attraction of favourably 
affecting federal processes on the 'national' level through small and manageable co­ 
operation (Duchacek 1991: 3).
However, homogeneous units can also promote competition and co-operation 
favourable to the success of federalism, albeit of a different kind.
When groups are territorially concentrated, devolution may have utility not 
because it provides 'self-determination', but because once power is devolved it 
becomes somewhat more difficult to determine who the self is (Horowitz 1985: 
617).
Federalism as a system necessarily divides governmental structures and thereby 
multiplies jobs (Gagnon 1993: 19). It also provides new political arenas to contest 
power within. In a homogeneous unit this increases intra-ethnic competition and may 
reduce conflictual relations with the centre. However, for intra-ethnic competition to 
occur, arguably security of culture needs to be assured through the creation of ethnically 
homogeneous units. Therefore, the goal of creating ethnically homogeneous units for 
achieving national self-determination and security of culture cannot be ignored. The 
existence of cross cutting cleavages within these homogeneous units is also a factor 
cited as increasing the likelihood of federal stability (Horowitz 1985: 618; Manor 1996: 
468). It is however, a possibility totally ignored by Vanhanen (1992: 84-95).
To sum up, the existence of homogeneous units by themselves will not necessarily 
reduce ethnic conflict; but ethnically homogeneous units do not necessarily cause state- 
breaking conflict. I have identified three extra conditions that elites must follow to 
ensure that homogeneous units are less likely to cause chaos and mayhem. Discussed in 
more detail later, it will assist the reader if I briefly set them out here.
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• The optimal number of units should be more than three;
• There should be no great disparities between the units, in terms of size, population 
or resources, and;
• A dominant group should, wherever possible, be subdivided into two or more units.
1.7. Chapter Structure
The structure of the rest of this thesis proceeds in a broadly chronological fashion. 
Chapter Two sets out the institutional precursors of federalism in South Asia - 
concentrating on the English and British period, but also including elements carried 
over from the Mughal Empire. Chapter Three's concern is with the pre-independence 
constitutional plans articulated by the British, Congress and the League and the degrees 
of consociationalism within these plans. Chapter Four provides a more detailed analysis 
of the rationale behind the adoption of the plans discussed in Chapter Three. Chapter 
Five assesses the post-independence constitutions of India and Pakistan and their 
differences to those that preceded them. It assesses to what extent the differences are 
explainable by the changed linguistic and religious populations of India and Pakistan. 
Chapter Six continues the analysis of the post-independence constitutions, but relates 
them to the nature of the state-sponsored articulation of national identity. It concludes 
with an appreciation of the interactive nature of the effective number of ethnic groups 
with the notion of national identity in explaining the adoption of the constitutions. 
Chapter Seven assesses the impact these changes, specifically those concerning the 
ethnic composition of the federal units, have had on federal stability. Its primary focus 
is on the correlation between the fractionalisation of the party system and the effective 
number of ethnic groups within the units of the federations. It also investigates the type 
and numbers of secessionist movements, and central interventions within these units. 
Chapter Eight evaluates the linkage between the five hypotheses. It identifies that one 
future research agenda is that of the relationship between federal stability and the 
number of units within a federation, as well as the conditions under which 
consociational elements are necessary elements of federal design.
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Chapter Two: Territorial autonomy in South Asia: an
inexorable slide?
'The British could not have organised India as they did if the people had not already been, as it were,
apprenticed to the idea of unity. Nor, in consequence, could independent India have grown so quickly in
unity and strength. Mr Nehru was sometimes called a great Mughal; he was their heir in a truer sense
than perhaps he himself realised' (Spear 1965: 51).
'The Mughals founded an imperial ideal and the Raj took it up and bettered it' (Finer 1997b: 121).
'The British rule ... disrupted the natural evolution of India into an authentic federal polity' (Khan 1992:
37).
2.1. Introduction
To assess the institutional precursors of federalism in India and Pakistan it is essential to 
look at the history of the subcontinent. The question of whether federalism was the 
only possible institutional configuration to rule such a diverse and large territory is my 
point of departure. Certainly under the Mughal period, but even further back, modes of 
governance premised upon territorial autonomy were devices to consolidate territory. 
While this autonomy did not involve a de jure division of sovereignty, and the ruler, 
whether Mughal or British, maintained supreme power, de facto territorial power 
sharing operated. This was because of the constraints imposed by geographic distance, 
cultural diversity, limited technology and means of transport and communication. As 
developments in technology and communications overcame the constraints of ruling 
large territories, the functions of government expanded. These developments ensured 
that territorial autonomy has remained a necessary feature of successful government in 
India and Pakistan20 .
An analysis of pre-independence governing structures serves two functions. Firstly it 
discusses one of my independent variables - the influence of historical institutional 
configurations on the formation and stabilisation of the Indian and Pakistani 
federations21 . Secondly, it establishes that territorial autonomy has been an essential 
feature of successful governance of India and Pakistan, although it does not argue that 
federal structures necessarily had to emerge. Even the historian Coupland, a fellow of 
All Souls's College, Oxford, who wrongly argued that 'there was ... no division of
20 And possibly in Sri Lanka as well. 
21 Federal stabilisation is my dependent variable; defined by the maintenance of territorial integrity, the 
fractionalisation of the party system and the number and type of secessionist movements within a state.
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authority, no trace of the federal idea in the constitution of British India before 1919' 
conceded that in practice 'superintendence and control' by the centre were limited by 
distance and the sheer volume of work involved (1942: 10). These restrictions on 
'superintendence and control' have been a constant pattern in organising the governance 
of the subcontinent.
This chapter assesses the continuities between the effective period of Mughal rule 
(1526-170722) and the British Raj up to and including the 1919 Government of India 
Act23 . The 1919 Act can be viewed as the first major step forward in the long and 
tortuous quest to grant Indians self-government24 even though the concession of 
provincial autonomy was an essential part of the British strategy to maintain 'real' 
power in their hands at the centre25 . In pursuing this strategy they did not differ from 
those who came before or went after them. Few authors have specifically analysed 
Mughal influences upon British federal institutions - although many historians such as 
Spear have investigated pre-British history (1965: esp. 16-46). One of the best recent 
discussions of the links between the Mughal and the British period has been undertaken 
by Brown (1994: esp. 33-40). However, she focuses on explaining Indian democracy 
rather than comparing Indian and Pakistani federal structures.
Interpretations of the nature of both regimes are contested (Kulke 1995: 1-47). An 
appreciation of the nature of both empires is essential to understand the continuities 
between the two regimes26 . This chapter traces the continuities that influenced the 
federal form in independent India and Pakistan. It does not directly address Stein's 
argument that Mughal India was a segmentary state or whether it was an example of a 
patrimonial bureaucracy as discussed in Blake (1995: 278-303), Kulke (1995: esp. 280- 
303) and Inden (2000: 206-211 & Ch 5).
22 From 1707-1857 the Mughals were ineffective and degenerate.
23 Which introduced more formal federal institutions.
24 As laid out in the Montagu Declaration of 1917.
25 This strategy followed on from the Mughal regime. In the early twentieth century the Indian political 
movements began putting forward their own constitutional proposals, notably the 1916 Lucknow Pact between 
the League and the Congress, the 1928 Nehru Report and Jinnah's 14 points in 1929. These plans are 
discussed in detail in Chapters Three and Four.
26 Blake accepts that there were a number of ways the British followed from the Mughals, but rejects the 
argument that there was a linear progression (1995: 279).
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In addition to disputes concerning the nature of the state, historic graphical 
interpretations of the nature of Indian society are contested27 . These understandings 
have affected the formation of constitutional structures and ideologies of governance.
• The Imperial or neo-imperialist school emphasises the divisions within the 
subcontinent to justify the need for British rule to unite the peoples and prevent 
bloodshed. Spear fits into this category. India is seen as a 'geographical 
expression', with the Hindu and Muslim divide fundamental and irreversible (1965: 
esp. 111).
• In contrast, the nationalist school, primarily writing around the time of the 
independence struggle, but not confined to this period, is concerned to emphasise 
the unity of the subcontinent, despite its divisions of race, region, ethnicity, caste 
and religion (Khan 1992: esp. 83; Bose and Jalal 1998: 4). Nehru's 'Discovery of 
India' typifies these writings, firstly stressing the solidarity the Congress Party was 
able to achieve despite the heterogeneity of Indian society, but also asserting that the 
whole was greater than the sum of its parts (1946: 391). The nationalist school can 
be subdivided into those claiming that social differences are not an obstacle to unity, 
and indeed, have strengthened the Indian nation (secular nationalists), and those 
who seek to justify the primacy of the ancient Hindu civilisation over the usurping 
Mughal (Hindu nationalists). Many of these writings sought to glorify the past as 'a 
compensation for the humiliating present' and 'stress the political unity of the 
country from earliest times' (Thapar 1968: 326-327).
• The third school is that of the 'contemporary ethnic nationalists' (Chadda 1997: 27). 
These authors typify the subcontinent as comprising several historical distinctive 
national entities that possess independent existence and validity, and are separate 
from 'the whole'. The political agenda behind this school of thought is often used 
to justify further autonomy or even independence for these separate units. The 
similarity to the imperialist understanding of Indian history is significant. Those 
who advocated the partition of the Indian subcontinent also fit into this category.
27 For a more detailed discussion of interpretations of India's past, see Chadda (1997: 26-31), Thapar (1968: 
318-335) and Hubel (1996: Ch 4). Hubel also discusses the subaltern interpretation of Indian history (which 
contends that the story of the Indian bourgeoisie cannot explain nationalism nor the national movement in 
India) as well as writings emphasising the role of women (1996: 80 & 109-113).
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Interpretations of Indian history have been used to justify constitutional design and 
political action. The interpretations differ precisely depending upon what present or 
future course of action is advanced. The perception of a divided country needing a firm 
imperial hand not only justified British imperial rule but was used to justify policies 
designed to separate Hindus and Muslims. The perception of a united India as 
epitomised by Nehru in 'Discovery' (1946: 219), similarly impacted upon the type of 
federal system designed after independence; one that sought to relegate 'ethnic' 
identities to the personal sphere. His understanding dictated which identities were to be 
recognised as politically legitimate. Jinnah's conception of India as comprised of two 
religiously defined nations similarly impacted on the form of the Pakistani federation.
Any interpretation of Indian society has to wade through these warring schools. Most 
interpretations possess validity - the devil is in the detail, or rather the emphasis. All 
interpretations emphasise the heterogeneity of Indian society. This ethnic heterogeneity 
is undeniable, in terms of religion, language, tribe, region and race. As Dikshit argues,
India is parcelled by nature into a number of somewhat self-contained units 
which, before the coming of modern communications, had for centuries 
developed in relative isolation and thus had come to possess their own 
distinctive cultural and linguistic complexes (1975: 120).
Where these alternative explanations of Indian history differ is in their accounts of how 
this diversity has impacted upon politics. Federal forms of government specifically, and 
territorially defined autonomy more generally, have permitted this diversity to receive 
political expression. These forms of government have reflected as well as encouraged 
diversity, especially along linguistic lines. This is especially the case when units of 
governance have been organised to coincide with the territorial boundaries of ethnic 
groups. This diversity has not necessarily precluded identification with a 'centre'. 
Indeed, independent India has been remarkably successful at creating a dual loyalty to 
region and centre, precisely through the accommodation of linguistic groups. However, 
this diversity has meant that while the two loyalties may be compatible, the centre 
cannot take its loyalty for granted. Over its 55 years of independence India has 
experienced pressures for independent states in the south, northeast and northwest of its 
territory. Pakistan has not been as successful at creating a dual loyalty and split into 
two in 1971.
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2.2. Mughal traditions of governance and power
Under the Mauryan Empire, Emperor Ashoka (d.232 BC) united most of India28 . In the 
fourteenth century, Alauddin Khalji (d.1316) established a smaller northern empire, the 
Delhi Sultanate. However, for most of its history before the Mughals, India was divided 
into separate kingdoms, some autonomous, others subordinate to a greater regional king 
(Inden 2000: 165). The process of subordination of one king to another was not 
uniform. Some kings were treated as equals, while others were clearly subordinates. 
Despite these differences, it was usual that the 'suzerain respected the local laws and 
customs' (Sharma 1932: 129). This system of asymmetrical indirect rule encouraged 
the flourishing of regional languages and culture in the absence of a uniform system of 
administration. As Finer argues, the span of 'effective unity' under the Mauryan, Gupta 
and Delhi dynasties amounted 'to little more than 362 years (in a period spanning 2500 
years) ... In the Indian subcontinent, empire was very much the exception and transience 
the norm'(1997b: 1211).
In common with all conquerors of India the Mughals built upon existing structures. 
However, they were also innovative, and differed from those that preceded them in their 
systemisation of administration (All 1995: 266). Schwartzberg compares the Mughal 
dynasty to the Tudors in England as it,
marked a distinct break with the past in bringing about a succession of strong 
rulers who welded disparate political and ethnic elements and spatially 
fragmented polities into an administratively and fiscally united country (1978: 
204).
By the end of Aurangzeb's reign, the Mughal Empire encompassed most of India. Its 
population at its greatest extent numbered 180 million, or 20% of the world's 
population (Bayly 1989: 54). The Mughals did not manage to unify completely India 
under their command. However, they controlled the core of what is now known as 
India, as well as most of the territory that now comprises Pakistan and Bangladesh29 .
28 Excluding the most southern parts.
29 Maps of the Mughal Empire radically differ in the extent of the areas they include. Schwartzberg, the 
acknowledged authority on South Asian political geography, also includes the areas under the suzerainty of the 
Mughal Empire even when they did not directly control them - the major ones being the territories of Bijapur 
and Golkonda in the south (1978: 46) . He reproduces nine authors' representations of the extent of the 
Mughal empire (1978: xxxv).
-49-
As the subcontinent was partitioned in 1947, no one single central authority has ever 
(directly) controlled the whole territory of India and Pakistan (two fifths of the territory 
was made up of princely states during the rule of the British). This fact has had an 
undeniable influence on the ability to forge an united 'nation' within the territory.
Systems of provincial government:
Akbar is widely credited for evolving the 'MughaF system of administration30 . This 
system provided institutional continuity to a regionally, linguistically and religiously 
diverse society. While the administration 'was ill organised, confusing and corrupt' 
(Finer 1997b: 1228), Akbar systematically reorganised the areas under his control (Ali 
1995: 266). This system was extended to areas conquered under his successors. The 
Mughal system differed from most of the other dynasties in its extent of territorial 
penetration and provincial organisation. The four central departments, finance, war, 
judiciary and supply were repeated at the provincial level, and the provinces were an 
integral part of the Mughal system of administration (Ali 1995: 267; Finer 1997b: 
1242).
Most authors concur that the Mauryan Empire was divided into four provinces, and the 
Delhi Sultanate possessed some division of administration. The problem of how to 
govern effectively without leading to disunity was not a new one31 . However, Akbar 
was the first ruler of India to base his entire administration around the provinces, and 
they assumed far greater importance than they possessed under Sher Shah. The 
provinces were the tools used to ensure that administration was organised on a uniform 
basis. Even though the Mughal Empire was authoritarian, the significance of this 
system of provincial organisation should not be underestimated.
30 However, he built extensively upon the institutions of the 'usurper' Sher Shah. In turn Sher Shah built 
extensively upon systems of government that preceded him, but also introduced elements of Persian 
government. Spear argues that as Sher Shah only controlled northern India for five years, his contribution 
'provided an administrative blueprint' at most (1965: 28). Ali argues that there were three ways in which the 
Mughals differed from what preceded them (1995: 166 & 279). He points out that they were neither a simple 
continuation of the Delhi Sultanate nor the Persians because they were so much more successful.
31 Keay argues that Sher Shah did not appoint a political governor of Bengal because of his fear that such a 
governor 'would cast off his allegiance at the first available opportunity'. Sher Shah divided the province into 
districts each one directly responsible to himself (2000: 300).
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The system of provincial administration was a miniature replica of the empire and was 
designed around the need to raise tax revenue efficiently32 . It was based upon the 
authority of provincial governors, subedars33 , who received instructions from their 
Emperor. The reliance on the provinces increased the freedom of the subedars vis-a-vis 
the centre . This complex chain of command was an administrative solution to the 
geographical size of India, and the ultimate basis of Mughal power. Although more 
centralisation may have been desirable from the perspective of the regime, it was 
impossible to achieve.
The personal connection between emperor and noble official was highly 
significant, to both parties in that relationship. Indeed, the empire was run not 
so much as a bureaucracy but as a blend of a bureaucratic and patrimonial 
machine35 (Brown 1994: 37).
The subedar was responsible for the protection of the province against external or 
internal rebellion, as well as for the maintenance and discipline of the military forces in 
that state. Weber argued that 'the fusion of the military and economic power of an 
administrative district in the hands of one person, soon tended to encourage the 
administrator's disengagement from the central authority' (1968: 1044). The danger of 
disengagement is similar to the powerful critique of federal structures of government; 
that of the danger of secession. The Mughals countered this danger through transferring 
leaders and forces between Subahs, approximately every four to five years. 'The 
Emperors succeeded only too well' as the nobles, rather than being the pillars of the 
state, sought to acquire their own power' (Finer 1997b: 1258). In addition, Akbar 
instituted a system in which the subedars were directly responsible to him. Not only 
did they owe their position to their Emperor, but to prevent the development of 
powerful families (with control over the land revenue of that Subah), Akbar and his
32 'Like the Ottoman Empire, Mughal India was a plunder state. It throve on conquest, tribute and booty. The 
army was where the taxes went and where the surplus revenue came from' (Finer 1997b: 1247).
33 A'subedar was an 'army commander' 'the man in general charge of provincial affairs' (Blake 1995: 292).
34 However, in the mid 1590s a centrally appointed drwan (finance officer) placed financial restrictions on their 
freedom of action, preventing money being drawn when it was not warranted. This policy was short lived.
35 In a patrimonial state "political administration is treated as a purely personal affair of the ruler... Ruler's 
personal discretion delimits the jurisdiction of his officials' (Weber 1968: 1029). Weber argues that 'in the 
course of financial rationalisation patrimonialism moves imperceptibly towards a rational bureaucratic 
administration which resorts to systematic taxation' (1968: 1014). In addition, 'patrimonial officialdom may 
develop bureaucratic features with increased functional division and rationalisation' (1968: 1028). Under a 
patrimonial administration, the officials are usually •maintained directly from the ruler's table (1968: 1031). A 
similar position is articulated by Blake (1995: 263-267). This does not mean that all patrimonial and indirect 
forms of bureaucracy lead to federalism. Ertman's examples of patrimonial and bureaucratic absolutist regimes 
(the Mughal regime does not exactly fit within the classification) include both those regimes which are now 
unitarv France and Denmark, as well as those which are now federal, Spain and Germany (1997: 10).
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successors did not permit heirs of nobles to succeed directly to their father's posts36 . 
Therefore the system was not a feudal one. It was a necessary mechanism to 
consolidate territory and promote efficiency - similar to motivations behind the 
formation of federations in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
Authors disagree as to the nature of the Mughal Empire. Sharma terms it a 'centralised 
despotism' (1932: 136). Ali argues it was 'bolstered by immense centralisation' (1995: 
273). In contrast, others such as Bayly contend that the Mughal Emperor was instead a 
'king among kings' (1989: 54). These positions are not necessarily incompatible. 'The 
Emperor became the motive power of the entire administrative machinery and it was to 
him the provincial governors looked for guidance in day-to-day administration'. The 
provincial system was a system of divide and rule. However, the restrictions caused by 
large distances and communications inevitably meant that the governors appointed by 
the Emperor 'exercised considerable influence in their territories' (Sharma 1932: 136). 
This did not mean that the Mughal empire was 'a complex, nuanced and loose form of 
hegemony over a diverse, differentiated and dynamic economy and society' as argued 
by Bose and Jalal (1998: 36)37 . The Mughal Empire and systems of rule were primarily 
based around the person of the Emperor. The most 'proximate cause of collapse' of the 
Empire in the early eighteenth century was 'the disastrous run of transient and effete 
phantom-emperors' (Finer 1997b: 1260). While the Emperor had to rely on 
intermediaries, the system of rule was essentially dictated from above. The system was 
therefore absolutist, centralised in the Emperor's person, even if intermediaries were 
required.
The rulers of the core Muslim areas were not appointed according to cultural criteria, 
many of them were members of the ruling dynasty - Aurangzeb was a subedar before 
his reign. However, the ancient Hindu states, especially the Rajputs, retained 
autonomy, although they had to swear fealty to the Emperor and attend court. These 
ties were reinforced through marriage. In the Muslim controlled areas that were 
acquired later, such as Bijapur, the original Sultan continued to rule - an arrangement 
that permitted him to expand southwards but also promoted stability (Griffiths 1952: 
130-1).
- 6 Spear confirms this. "Their failure to form a close oligarchy of the "ins" suggests the keenness of competition 
for entry and imperial or ministerial sagacity in keeping the appointment options open" (1970: 11). 
37 This argument fits firmly within the nationalist interpretation of history.
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The result of this provincial system of administration was that,
as the Governors carried out the imperial orders, the Empire gave India oneness 
in administrative system in all provinces by establishing the same order of 
officials, and by introducing the same court language38 and the same coinage 
and currency (Sharma 1932: 137).
Although the Emperor was ultimately supreme, this provincial system permitted certain 
aspects of indirect rule and cultural and ethnic diversity. It was vital for shoring up a 
mainstay of the Mughal regime - the system of taxation. It also accommodated the 
expansion of the Mughal Empire.
Provincial reorganisation
In 1580,
His Majesty apportioned empire into 12 divisions, to each of which he gave the 
name of Subah and distinguished them by the appellation of that tract of the 
country or its capital city39 .
That this reorganisation occurred is confirmed by other authors (e.g. Smith 1923: 24-25; 
Schwartzberg 1978: 205; Srivastava 1997: 113). What is contestable is Khan's claim 
that 'An obvious concern was shown for linguistic and socio-cultural homogeneity in 
the delimitation of provinces' (1992: 37-8). No scholars of the Mughal Empire mention 
this rationale behind the organisation40 and neither do political geographers (Day 1949: 
118; Spate and Learmouth 1967: 187-188). Khan's claim must therefore be treated with 
caution41 . Indeed, Day argues that 'the Suba or Provincial boundaries were not 
deliberately defined to coincide with 'natural' regions, for Subas were created as
38 Persian. For a discussion of the adoption of Persian see Rahman (2002: 127).
39 Abul Fazl, a contemporary and chronicler of Akbar's life, (cited in Khan 1992: 102).
40 These scholars include Elphinstone and Cowell (1889), Schwartzberg (1978: 205), Kulke and Rothermund 
(1990), Richards (1993a; 1993b), Kulke U995), Hintze (1997), Srivastava (1997: 113), Habib (1999), Metcalf 
and Metcalf (2001) and Robb (2002).
41 In addition. Khan's list of the 'Subahs of the Mughals and the Socio-Cultural Regions they covered' (1992: 
106-107), demonstrates that in all regions other than the south of the empire, more than one socio-cultural 
region was included within one subah, and sometimes as many as five.
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conquest was extended' (1949: 118). By the time Aurangzeb's conquests were 
completed, they numbered 2142.
Map 2.1. Composite picture of the nuclear areas under Akbar and Aurangzeb and 
the states of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh in 2002
Source: Composite map created by the author from three sources. The black lines showing the
persistence of nuclear areas were taken from Spate and Learmouth (1967: 176). The maps of the units of
Pakistan and India are adapted from wvw.libran'.utoronto.ca^cs/eps/pakistan^akmap.htm and
www.mapsofmdia.com.
Key: The map includes the three states created in India in 2000 u .
Boundaries (width proportionate to frequency)
The coloured areas represent the existing units of India and Pakistan and the state of Bangladesh.
42 Kabul (in north-west); Kashmir, Lahore and Multan (in the north); Thatta (Sind), Gujarat, Ajmer (in the 
west); Delhi, Agra, Awadh, Illahabad and Malwa (in central region); Bihar, Bengal and Orissa (in the east); 
Khandesh, Berar, Ahmadnagar (Bijapur), Aurangabad (Daulatabad); Golconda (Hyderabad) and Bidar (in the 
south) (Khan 1992: 106-7).
43 The map does not purport to be an exact representation of the changing provinces over time. 'The evidence 
permits of rough approximations only, but it is believed that a fair representation is attained' (1967: 176).
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Rather than being reorganised, many of these provinces were based on prior 
administrative divisions and borders of kingdoms, especially those of the ancient Hindu 
states. However, as Map 2.1 demonstrates, there is a congruence between some of the 
states in present day India and Pakistan, and the 'nuclear regions...which are 
perennially significant in Indian historical geography' (Spate and Learmouth 1967: 187- 
188)44 . The most notable are those of Sind, Gujarat, Punjab, Rajasthan and Uttar 
Pradesh. 'In the Dravidian south the pattern is more confused' (Spate and Learmouth 
1967: 177), but areas in Orissa, Andhra Pradesh as well as Tamil Nadu can be 
discerned.
The reorganisation of the subahs was prompted by Akbar's desire to systematise the 
administrative framework. Whether or not they were organised according to cultural 
boundaries, the fact that many provinces were permitted to keep their own kings was 
significant as they were the foundation stone of Akbar's administration. Additionally, 
the provincial boundaries often coincided with physical boundaries, and 'these 
sometimes also coincided with linguistic frontiers' (Day 1949: 118). It is therefore not 
surprising that some congruence existed between territorial and cultural boundaries 
under the Mughals. Interestingly, however Finer views the policy as a sign of 
weakness.
The Mughals conquered and pieced the conquered states together but did not 
homogenise them. The Hindu Mahrattas and the Sikhs both rose against 
Aurangzeb, the fundamentalist Muslim emperor (1997b: 1257).
Ali also argues that,
the subcontinent of India had a centralised quasi-modern state without any 
developing sense of nationhood... the people at large were indifferent to whether 
they were under an imperial or a regional regime (1995: 277).
This is a problem that has transferred itself to the present day regimes in India and 
Pakistan.
44 Thev explain the continuity by the fact that "these nuclear regions clearly represent die major agricultural 
areas'"(1967: 188).
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Map 2.2. Composite picture of the linguistic regions of India and Pakistan and the 
nuclear areas under Akbar and Aurangzeb
Kashmir!
I'ashto
•s *••«• *.-!•!
IVlulayalani
Source: Composite map created by the author from three sources. The black lines showing the 
persistence of nuclear areas were taken from Spate and Learmouth (1967: 176). The linguistic regions 
were taken from Rahman (1996: 254-255) and King (1997).
Key.
Boundaries (width proportionate to frequency)
Map 2.2 shows an even stronger congruence between the linguistic regions, especially 
in the north of the subcontinent, and the nuclear areas. The two exceptions are that the 
Hindi speaking region in the north has been subdivided over time - not surprising given 
its large territorial expanse - and that the tribal areas of Pakistan were not included 
within the historic empires. A comparison of Map 2.1 and Map 2.2 demonstrates that 
state borders in India correspond to a large degree with those of language, with the 
exception of the Hindi-speaking areas. In the case of Pakistan, the Punjab includes a 
large territorial area of Siraiki speakers within its borders. Additionally, the province of 
Baluchistan includes Baluchi, Brahvi and Pushtu speakers within its borders. This
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heterogeneity has had implications for federal stabilisation as discussed in Chapter 
Seven.
Ethnic accommodation
The majority of the population of the Mughal Empire was non-Muslim. Although 
Muslims held the majority of the positions of power in central government, the role of 
the Hindu zamindar was crucial for the collection of the land revenue upon which 
Mughal power ultimately rested. Emperor Akbar was tolerant of other faiths, and 
pragmatic, to the extent of marrying a Hindu, Persian and a Christian45 . His strategy of 
ruling was remarkably conciliatory, especially given that during this period, Europe was 
embroiled in divisive religious wars. Akbar's strategy was calculated, however, and 
paid dividends by winning the allegiance of the Rajputs of Rajasthan46 . Hindu leaders 
were also co-opted into the system as rulers of subahs. Although only one sixth of the 
mansabdars under Akbar were Hindus, they were disproportionately represented in the 
higher echelons (Spear 1965: 35). Akbar also abolished the jizya, a tax on non- 
Muslims, and even went to the lengths of establishing a Kavi Raj at court - a Hindu poet 
laureate (Schwartzberg 1978: 204). Akbar's great grandson Aurangzeb adopted a 
confrontational policy; destroying Hindu temples during uprisings in Karnataka and 
Rajasthan (James 1997: 6). Jizya was also re-imposed despite it accounting for a small 
proportion of the tax revenue47 . However one quarter of mansabdars were Hindus 
under Aurangzeb's reign, although they were watched carefully (Bose and Jalal 1998: 
41). While accepting Aurangzeb's intolerance, Keay is careful to point to the 
ideological and strategic challenges that lay behind his policies (2000: 243). Spear 
concludes that Aurangzeb 'was too cautious to outrage Hindus as a whole, in spite of 
particular acts of intolerance, but their previous passive support and even support turned 
into indifference and disdain' (1965: 71). Aurangzeb was an orthodox pious Sunni and 
was also intolerant of many sects of Islam, especially the Shi'ite communities of the 
Deccan. He forcibly integrated Bijapur, a Muslim ruled state, into the Mughal Empire 
(Keay 2000: 241).
45 The mother of Emperor Jeganhir was a Rajput princess whose marriage to Akbar was a deliberate strategy to 
accommodate die Rajputs (although claims that a Rajput was deliberately chosen as the mother of the next 
emperor have to be placed in the context of Akbar's long and desperate wait for a son).
46 That Akbar's strategy was a calculated one is demonstrated by the fact Afghans were discriminated against 
as thev were his main political threat. His strategy was not multicultural. Akbar was censorious of practices 
such as Sati and pre-pubescent mamages (All 1997: 219-220).
47 Therefore Bose and Jalal are on shaky ground when they argue that jiyza was reimposed for financial reasons 
(1998:41).
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It has been argued that Aurangzeb's intolerant policies were one reason for the rebellion 
of the Marathas and the subsequent decline of the Mughal Empire. While the weakness 
of subsequent Emperors is a more convincing explanation for the decline of the empire, 
the former point is valid. No regime has been able to rule successfully the whole or 
nearly the whole of the subcontinent without accommodating different religions and 
cultures. The fact that the Mughals did so through institutions permitting territorial 
autonomy had federal effects. It retained and politically legitimised regional diversity, 
much of the diversity defined by language.
2.3. English/British traditions of governance and power
As a result of its uncoordinated territorial expansion, the East India Company's (EIC) 
administration was haphazard. The Company was set up in 1600 and established 
trading posts on the coast during the seventeenth century - Madras, Surat/Bombay and 
Calcutta. These three territories became known as Presidencies, after the 'commercial 
factories which had Presidents of Council ... and during most of the eighteenth century 
the Presidencies of Madras, Bombay and Calcutta were independent and of equal 
standing' (Griffiths 1952: 154). Newer factories were added to the control of these 
Presidencies, leading to an unplanned, sprawling territorial expanse48 . The EIC 
developed its operations and structures of government in the three areas independently 
of the others. This was not surprising, given the challenges of distance and problems of 
communication, although they were quick to aid the others if needed. Before 1773, the 
Presidencies were completely independent entities, subordinate only to the Company's 
governing body in London.
As the Mughal Empire declined, the Company gradually inserted itself at the top of the 
structures and models of rule ultimately formed around processes of taxation and 
defence vacated by the previous regime. Low argues that
48 A co-ordinated strategy of expansion did not exist. However, to claim that commercial interest was the only 
driving force behind the"expansion of the Company's power would ignore the differences in motivation among 
the emplovees of the Company.
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... the British conquests did not much alter these structures. For the most part 
they merely involved the supersession of traditional Indian rulers by alien 
British bureaucrats (1991: 59).
Effectively ruling such a territorially vast area, initially at least, necessitated the use of 
intermediaries, especially as the EIC did not arrive as a unified military conquering 
force.
In common with the Mughals, the EIC also used zamindars as intermediaries to help 
control the areas under its direct territorial control. It also systematically concluded 
treaties and alliances with the Princes. These treaties were concluded for economic, 
political and military reasons, and differed according to the power of the prince. Some 
had virtual independence; others were little more than vassals. Even in princely states 
where nominal sovereignty existed, the British official resident exerted influence and 
provided 'advice'49 .
The Battle of Plassey in 1757 was initially seen only as 'a solution to a local problem: 
the future security of the Company's operations in Bengal' (James 1997: 36). However, 
the outcome was that in exchange for a fixed payment to the (nominal) Emperor the EIC 
was granted the sole right to impose and collect land taxes in Bengal. Direct territorial 
control of taxation was the key to power in India. Henceforth all real power in Bengal, 
and ultimately India, was concentrated in the EIC, funding an expansionist drive in a 
similar way to the Mughals. Between 1757 and 1857 Westminster acquired more 
control. In 1773 after allegations of high-level corruption, the EIC was deprived of sole 
control30 . A more unified system of administration was created with Calcutta as the 
central seat of administration. The Governor of the Bengal Presidency was given the 
title of Governor-General, with the authority 'of superintending and controlling' in 
certain matters the Governments of Madras and Bombay (Government of India 1948c: 
Article 9). This confirmed the dependent status of the other two Presidencies.
"" This penetration increased over time and was only put on a more solid footing after Westminster acquired 
direct control of India and rewarded those princes who had remained loyal during the uprising of 1857. 
However, not all the princes were peacefully accommodated under this system. In the late eighteenth century, 
the EIC fought wars against the Marathas in western India and Tipu Sultan in Mysore.
50 Although Fox's 1783 Bill to transfer all effective powers to the British Government was rejected in the 
House of Lords, causing his government to fall.
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In 1858 an Act of Parliament relieved the EIC of its role in the governance of India after 
the debacle of the uprising of 1857, for which London held the Company responsible51 . 
Westminster assumed direct control of Indian governance and the Secretary of State 
became a member of the Cabinet. Despite the centralised nature of both regimes, both 
the Mughals and the British used intermediaries to collect taxes and the British 
increasingly came to rely on the provinces for tax collection. As in Mughal days, 
continued central control was based on conceding greater executive power to the 
provinces. After the uprising, the British were dependent on the loyalty of the princes, 
whom they relied upon to represent conservative interests. Thereafter, they treated them 
as bastions of the regime52 .
Systems of provincial government
The gradual extension of federal principles and the subsequent extension of democratic 
rights to Indians living within British India at the provincial level were important factors 
in determining the later development of the Indian and Pakistani federations. Despite 
this, not all developments were decentralising. In 1833, under the influence of the 
Utilitarians, Westminster continued the centralisation process, both between London 
and India, but also within it.
The Superintendence, Direction and Control of the whole Civil and Military 
Government of all the said Territories and Revenues in India shall be and is 
hereby vested in a Governor-General and Counsellors (Government of India 
1948a: Article 39)53 .
Under this clause the Governor General of Bengal expanded his discretionary powers 
over the two subordinate presidencies, and was given the power to abolish the Councils 
of Madras and Bombay. In the event, the number of Councillors in these provinces was 
reduced from four to two. More importantly, this Act removed all legislative powers
51 In 1834 Westminster had closed down the commercial business of the Company. Subsequently, the EIC was 
dependent on revenues from taxation. This gave a further incentive for territorial expansion, as seen under 
Governor-General Dalhousie at the end of the 1840s. London must therefore bear some responsibility for the
actions of the Company.
52 Until their primary goal became to exit India with as little loss of British lives as possible.
53 Parliament rejected the proposal that the 'whole civil and military government' should be vested in the 
Governor General (Stokes 1959: 182-3). But as Stokes argues, "the sacrifice was one of form rather than 
substance" (1959: 182). With the extraordinary powers of the Governor General there was no need to strip the 
provinces of their 'semblance of independence".
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from the provinces34 and the provinces became financially dependent upon the centre, a 
trend that was never folly reversed subsequently. The Utilitarian centralising trend did 
not survive the death of its founders, and was reversed soon after the death of Bentham 
and Mill53 . Macaulay was appointed to the Government of India legislative council in 
1834. With his 'Whig suspicion of political power.. .there could be no sympathy for the 
planned, centralised, bureaucratic state, which Bentham had envisaged' (Stokes 1959: 
192). Although elements of Utilitarianism were retained, its doctrinaire and centralising 
application was abandoned.
The 1853 Act created a lieutenant governor to administer Bengal (Government of India 
1948b: Article 16). This allayed
the fears of the other two presidencies ... that they were mere appendages to the 
Presidency of Bengal so long as the Governor of Bengal continued to be the 
Governor-General of British India (Sharma 1932: 150).
The beginnings of provincial representation at the centre were laid down. The 
Governor-General's Council's legislative element was also expanded and included 'One 
member for each Presidency and Lieutenant Governorship' (Government of India 
1948b: Article 22). This was designed to reverse the situation 'of there being no 
member of the Legislative Council at Calcutta who knew anything of the manners and 
customs of other parts of India06 . However, while this appeared to be a significant 
victory for proponents of provincial administration, at the same time the centre obtained 
the power to alter the boundaries of the provinces of India and acquired all residual 
powers (Government of India 1948b: Article 18). This conformed to the trend 
established under the Mughals, of conceding territorial autonomy to aid efficient 
administration, thus reinforcing rather than undermining the power of the centre. In 
1861 57 the Indian Councils Act attempted to establish closer contact between the 
government and the governed, and reinstated and expanded the legislative element in 
the Madras and Bombay Councils, half of whom were to be people who did not hold 
office. The number of provincial legislative councils was expanded (previously 
comprising only Madras, Bengal and Bombay) by the provision to establish lieutenant
54 The Regulating Act of 1773 had vested 'the power of superintending and controlling" in die Governor- 
General. 'But as those Presidencies have had the right of legislating for themselves, your superintendence has 
been exercised only on rare and particular occasions" (Court of Directors 1948).
55 Respectively in 1832 and 1836.
56 Speech by Sir Charles Wood, Secretary of State for India 1859-1866, (cited in Mukherjii 1915: 87).
57 After the uprising of 1857.
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governorships with legislative councils in the North-Western Provinces58 (1886) and 
Punjab (1897) (Keith 1936: 182).
However, even with the 'progression' made under the 1861 Act, the powers of the 
legislatures were limited. Contrary to their sister organisations in other parts of the 
British Empire, they were not permitted to discuss taxation. Their function was more 
advisory - a channel of communication - and they were not sovereign legislative bodies 
(Coupland 1942: 13). In practice as seen under the Mughals, the restrictions imposed 
by the sheer territorial size of India, and the administrative complexity of ruling the 
country, ensured that central powers 'were exercised in matters of policy rather than of 
current administration' (Coupland 1942: 11). An 1861 memo from the India Office in 
London to the Governor-General wanted the local legislatures to carry out 'as far as 
possible, the necessary legislative business for their territories under their respective 
jurisdiction. The circumstances of different parts of India are widely different', 
(reproduced in Sharma 1932: 152).
Additionally, 'the cost of administering India was rising rapidly. In order to extend 
taxation it was necessary to increase local representation, which meant that Indians had 
to be allowed into government' (Bayly 1989: 135) - on Lockean principles. The 
Finance Minister's opinion on the 1882 Government of India resolution concerning 
Local Self Government was that 'We shall not subvert the British Empire by allowing 
the Bengali Baboo to discuss his own schools and drains. Rather shall we afford him a 
safety valve if we can turn his attention to such innocent subjects', (quoted in Bayly 
1989: 135). Because of administrative expediency,
a series of settlements were made in accordance with the needs of various 
provinces and their ability to raise funds within their own borders. By the end of 
the nineteenth century it had become customary to regard these rules as quasi- 
permanent (Coupland 1942: 11).
In 1904 the trend was reinforced through the allocation of definite shares of income to 
the provinces. 'A real beginning was made in the direction of genuine autonomy' 
(Keith 1936: 187).
58 Which became the United Provinces.
-62-
The above chronology shows that while the granting of self-government to the 
provinces progressed slowly, it was an inexorable slide. Every reform conceded a little 
more to British educated Indians who were pressing for a say in their government (and 
frequently citing the precedent established in the other colonies, specifically Canada and 
Australia). The Indian Councils Act of 1892 increased the size of the provincial 
legislative councils and extended their area of competence. By 1909, indirectly elected 
members were in a majority in the council of Bengal and had significantly increased in 
number in the other provincial councils. The process of democratisation and co-option 
of Indians into the governing administration was instituted at the provincial level as a 
'safety valve' mechanism. The provincial governments were still mere agents of the 
centre, 'general instructions were to be carried out even against their own convictions' 
(Sharma 1932: 160). However, the fact that provinces became the focus point of 
democratic politics had ramifications for the development of political parties. 
Ultimately, this contributed to the politics that led to partition in 1947 and the formation 
of the constitutions after independence.
Provincial reorganisation.
The Mughal provincial boundaries were broken by the EIC's random administrative 
expansion. When Westminster took direct control in 1858 Whitehall undertook a 
systematic reorganisation of their Indian possessions. The Presidencies were broken up 
although they retained memories of their independence that were slow to die. Swiftly 
however, the new provinces also developed identities of their own (Coupland 1942: 12). 
This was significant for later developments. The development of democracy in India 
was a provincial phenomenon as the British conceded power at levels they considered 
'safe'. Democratisation at the provincial level enabled the colonial power to maintain 
control of the centre through a process of divide and rule.
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Table 2.1: Reorganisations of provinces under the British
Year Reorganisation
1835 The 1833 Act was amended. Instead of its recommendation to divide 
Bengal Presidency into the Presidency of Fort William and Presidency of 
Agra, a lieutenant Governorship of the North Western Provinces was 
created instead.
The Chief Commissioner's province of Punjab was created - portions of 
the area were combined with recent acquisitions.
1853
1856 Oudh (a former Princely State) was acquired by British because of 
'misgovernance' and made into a province.
1861
——-• ————————™=——————————————————————————,————————————————,—————————————————————————————————————&___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
The Central Provinces were formed. Sagar and Narbada territories of the 
North Western Provinces were combined with the Nagpur territories of 
Bengal to form a Chief Commissioner's province. In 1862 Sambalpur and 
its dependencies were transferred from Bengal to Central Provinces. Berar 
was added in 1903 when it was 'leased in perpetuity' to the British by the 
Nizam of Hyderabad (as a result of non-payment for the subsidiary 
alliance).
1869 The Chief Commissionership of Mysore and Coorg was created (Coorg 
was transferred from Madras). Coorg was created as a separate Chief 
Commissioner's province in 1881 when Mysore reverted to its status as a 
princely state.
1871 Ajmer and Merwara were separated from the North Western Provinces and 
established as a Chief Commissioner's Province.
1872 The Andaman and Nicobar islands were united as a Chief Commissioner's 
Province.
1874 Assam was separated from Bengal and was constituted as a Chief 
Commissioner's Province.
1877 Oudh was merged with the North Western Provinces to form the United 
Provinces of Agra and Oudh.________________________
1887 British Baluchistan was incorporated into British India as a province.
1901 The North West Frontier Province was formed from tribal frontier districts 
added to the Punjab in the late nineteenth century.______________
1902 North Western Provinces were renamed the United Provinces to avoid 
confusion with the North West Frontier Province.
1905 Bengal, Bihar, Orissa and Assam were converted into two provinces under 
lieutenant-governors, one composed of Western Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, 
the other of Eastern Bengal and Assam.___________________
1911 Lord Curzon's partition was set aside. Eastern and Western Bengal 
became three provinces. Bengal became the charge of a governor in 
council, Bihar and Orissa were placed under lieutenant-governor in 
council, and Assam was entrusted to a chief commissioner.______
1936 The province of Orissa was created from the province of Bihar and Orissa 
and the province of Sind was created from Bombay.____________
Source: Adapted from Schwartzberg (1978: 210-217).
Notes: The table does not include acquisitions of areas of Princely States except where they affect
existing provinces. I have excluded Burma and Ceylon.
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Table 2.1 details the reorganisations that took place under the British. Several themes 
can be teased out.
• As administration became more complex, and the large size of the provinces led to 
inefficiency, a number of provinces were reorganised into smaller units59 ;
• The expansion of provinces coincided with the increase in representative 
government;
• The process of reorganisation reveals a preference for religious rather than linguistic 
criteria as religious cleavages were easier to identify and categorise. Religious 
reorganisation also served to divide and rule as seen in Bengal, Orissa and Sind.
The first partition of Bengal in 1905 was critical. Bengal was divided between eastern 
Bengal and Assam and a province consisting of western Bengal, Bihar and Orissa. This 
reorganisation created two religiously defined provinces. Educated Bengali speaking 
Hindus were concerned firstly about the creation of a Muslim majority province in 
which they would be marginalised along religious lines and secondly about their status 
as a linguistic minority in a state merged with Orissa (Oriya speaking) and Bihar (Hindi 
speaking). 'Hindus saw Curzon's desire to create a Muslim majority province where 
previously none had existed' (Schwartzberg 1978: 217). The Muslim League was 
formed in 1906, partly in reaction against this vocal Hindu sentiment that they 
interpreted as being anti-Muslim60 . It was encouraged by the British who either 
initiated (Banerjee 1949a: 205), or at least supported the demand for separate electorates 
(Robinson 1993: 143-144).
The reasons behind the 1905 partition are disputed. The Indian elite asserted that it was 
an attempt to divide and rule the Hindu and Muslim communities. As Menon states, 
'the dividing line was so crudely drawn that it meant the splitting of the province into 
two communal blocs' (1957: 6). Keay argues that 'only the tidiest of minds would 
have tackled such a thorny project, only the most arrogant of autocrats would have 
persisted with it' (2000: 464). While it is tempting to attribute the motivations of
59 The 1901 creation of the North West Frontier Province was an attempt of Curzon to create a buffer between 
the Punjab and Afghanistan. The Punjab was made more linguistically homogeneous by the creation of the 
NWFP. but the Muslim majority was substantially reduced within the province - with important ramifications
later.
°° Robinson also links the creation of the Muslim League to the perception of the Aligarh Muslims that "they 
appeared to have lost the favour of the government just at the time that it was to share out more powers among 
Indians' (.1993: 142).
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partition to a case of divide and rule, and 'Curzon ... was not unimpressed by the view 
that Bengal's highly vocal critics would also thereby be partitioned' it needs to be 
stressed that the British (and the Mughals before them) had previously pursued 
reorganisation within this Presidency61 . An additional administrative rationale cannot 
be discounted, although the neat division between the two religious communities did 
serve British interests well. But, the (primarily) Hindu agitation against the partition 
forced the British to reverse their decision in 1911. The re-partition of Bengal in 1911 
created the provinces of Bihar, Bengal and Assam, which increased the congruence of 
provincial boundaries with homogeneous linguistic populations. Despite this, the 
partition of Bengal led directly to the formation of the All India Muslim League. 
Although it did not speak for most Muslims until the 1940s, it was a nail in the coffin of 
a united India - although partition did not become inevitable until as late as 194662 .
The 1919 Act did not recommend a reorganisation of states. However the Montagu- 
Chelmsford report on which it was based stated that, 'Our conception of the eventual 
future of India is a sisterhood of States ...perhaps modified in area according to the 
character and economic interests of their people' (1918: Article 349). In both the 1919 
and the 1935 Acts the centre retained the power to change the boundaries of a unit. The 
Act of 1919 contains a forerunner of sections in the Indian and Pakistani constitutions.
The Governor General in Council may, after obtaining an expression of opinion 
from the local government and the local legislature affected, by notification ... 
constitute a new governor's province... (Government of India 1964a: Section 15
(1))-
There was nothing new in this. What was interesting is that a debate had begun over the 
need to create 'smaller, more homogeneous areas' among members of the Round Table 
group - an academic circle promoting the idea of an Imperial Federation and who 
contributed to the design of the South African Union (Burn 1932: 591). These debates 
soon began to impact upon British and Indian discussions of the linguistic or religious 
composition of provinces. While the British pursued a similar task of empire building, 
their provinces did not reflect cultural boundaries to the same extent as the Mughals. It 
was only at the time of limited democratisation that reorganisation took place along
61 The 1833 Act proposed to split the Fort William Presidency (Bengal) and in 1835 a lieutenant governorship 
of the North Western Provinces was created. See Table 2.1 for more details.
62 This is discussed in Chapters Three and Four.
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religious lines. This combination ensured that religion would become a mobilising 
force in the independence movement, and therefore impact on post-independence 
federal design and hence stability.
Ethnic accommodation
The British view of the Indian subcontinent as diverse and divided against itself served 
two functions. Firstly they claimed that their presence was required to maintain order, 
without which there would be bloodshed. It also enabled them to divide and rule. It was 
only under the British that the notion of distinct Hindu and Muslim communities came 
into shape. Under the Mughals, the concept of a 'Hindu' was used to connote different 
sects and castes rather than a unified faith (Metcalf 1994: 132). The British categorised 
and ranked the different social groupings, and by so doing, increased awareness of the 
differences within the hierarchical society63 . This attempt at classification was an 
exercise in administrative efficiency, but it also served as a method of marking India off 
as different, as well as dividing the Indians amongst themselves. A contemporaneous 
account of the British dominions, argued that 'so long as we can keep the Hindoo races 
divided in sentiment, so long is our supremacy assured to us' (Mortimer-Franklyn 1887: 
206).
The British were not as 'neutral' or removed from the religious conflicts in the 
subcontinent as they are sometimes portrayed. Much of the agitation which led to the 
1857 uprising was produced by rumours that the Company was polluting both Hindus 
and Muslims through using pig and cow fat on cartridges and mixing cow's blood with 
salt (James 1997: 236). The fears of conversion bought many Hindus flocking to the 
cause of removing the British, despite the fact that it was a Mughal Emperor who was 
the target for the restoration. While most of the stories were exaggerated, the British 
were certainly guilty of seeking to 'enlighten' the Indians. Mortimer-Franklyn argues 
that when 'English rule increased Indian intelligence, the gulf between him and the 
Hindoo would be reduced. And will emancipate the Hindoo from the thraldom of 
superstition' 64 (1887: 208), a policy that some British educated, secular leaders of India 
after Independence sought to continue. After the Uprising, missionary activity in India,
63 The first decennial census was introduced in 1871. For the first time it revealed the relative local and 
national strength of the different communities (Talbot 2000: 13).
64 While 'reassuringly" adding that Englishmen would still be more intelligent than the 'Hindoo'.
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once declared by Wilberforce to be 'that greatest of all causes, for I really place it 
before Abolition (of slavery)', was curtailed. Queen Victoria disclaimed 'any desire to 
impose Our convictions on any of our subjects' (Keay 2000: 429). The dangers of 
religious conversion were thus recognised.
An appreciation of the British understanding of the subcontinent as a collection of 
diverse races and religions contributes to an analysis of the nature of the provincial 
reorganisations which were undertaken, as well as the means by which they sought to 
devolve power. The rationale for the slow delivery of elected government has 
sometimes been attributed to the fact that India, in contrast to the other colonies, was 
diverse. As AJ.Balfour stated in opposing Home Rule for Ireland - representative 
government was
only suitable .... (w)hen you are dealing with a population in the main 
homogeneous, in the main equal ... in a community where the minority are 
prepared to accept the decisions of the majority (cited in Coupland 1942: 27).
This statement ignored the fact that self-government had been granted to Canada, which 
had a religiously, linguistically and culturally reinforcing cleavage between the French 
and the English speakers. Therefore a racial motivation cannot be discounted in 
accounting for the slow devolution of power, as well as the method by which it was 
conceded65 .
In 190966 indirect elections were held for the first time at the centre and in the 
provinces. The elections were held on the communal principle. In the aftermath of the 
communal divisions after the partition of Bengal, Viceroy Minto was persuaded,
that any electoral representation in India would be doomed to ... failure which 
aimed at granting a personal enfranchisement regardless of the beliefs and 
traditions of the communities composing the population of this continent 
(Coupland 1942: 34).
65 In 1883 the civil service was reformed to permit Indians to enter the higher services, and exams replaced the 
previous svstem of nomination. However, this system was still biased against Indians as the requirement to 
travel to London to sit the exams, and the low age limit for taking the exams, ensured that few could avail 
themselves of the opportunity.
66 After a Liberal Government came to power with a large majority
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Yet separate electorates reinforced the very cleavages which the British had cited as 
their reason for delaying the introduction of representative government; confirming their 
divide and rule strategy67 . The British justified their strategy according to the principles 
espoused by a future Prime Minister,
The irritating problems of the small nationality, of the type of Ulster, included in 
a State of different nationality are likely to be solved by constitutional rights 
being secured to the minority; and there is very good reason for believing that 
when minority rights are thus recognised, so far from a divided allegiance being 
created or existing differences being stereotyped, unity will be promoted 
(Ramsay MacDonald 1919: 76).
Coupland argues that it was because of democracy and equality under the law that both 
communities felt secure and began to grapple for power (1942: 35). This was partially 
the case; access to power resulted in mobilisation around the emotive cleavage of 
religion. However, it is undeniable that at different stages of the constitutional 
decolonisation process, the British used one group as collaborators against the other. 
The creation of separate electorates cannot simply be seen as a concession to a 
legitimate fear, as separate electorates were 'nothing less than the pulling back of sixty- 
two millions of people from joining the ranks of the seditious opposition', (a 
contemporary statement quoted in Metcalf 1994: 224). Although the principle of 
election was accepted for the centre (the Governor-General's Legislative Council) as 
well as the provinces, democratisation proceeded at a piecemeal pace. '(T)he 
constituencies were still to be communities and groups of various kinds and not general 
constituencies of the normal democratic type' (Coupland 1942: 17). Separate 
electorates became part of the Government of India's strategy of control, co-opting 
Muslim elites into government, although not into the higher echelons of power.
As Brown reminds us, democratisation increased pressures to determine the issue of 
which Indians would be represented (1985: 127). The Montagu-Chelmsford report on 
which the 1919 Act was based reluctantly conceded the communal principle of 
representation, but subsequently extended it to the Sikh community because they were 
'a distinct and important people; they supply a gallant and valuable element of the 
Indian Army, but they are everywhere in a minority, and experience has shown that they 
go virtually un-represented' (my emphasis) (Montagu and Chelmsford 1918: Article
07 Although they had been used at municipal level in the Punjab to maintain -communal balance" before their 
introduction as a state-wide device (Brown 1994: 145).
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232). While the proclamations of the statesmen decry the charge of divide and rule68 , 
British policy was dependent upon some division among the Indian elite and the Hindu- 
Muslim divide was the most obvious. However, the report's authors were also reacting 
to the Lucknow formula, hammered out between the Congress Party and the Muslim 
League in 1916. This provided for the representation of Muslims in the central and 
provincial legislatures through separate electorates. The 1919 Act incorporated this 
principle by providing communal representation at both levels of government. It also 
allocated seats to non-religiously defined communities69 .
2.4. 1919 Government of India Act
Continuities and discontinuities have been discussed in relation to territorial autonomy 
in British policy more generally, but the 1919 Act deserves separate consideration. This 
is for the following reasons. Firstly, the 1919 Act was the institutional product of the 
Montagu Declaration of 1917, which proclaimed self-governance for India. Secondly, it 
produced an explicitly federal form of government. Although it conceded 'too little too 
late', the provisions of the Act structured much of the subsequent debate.
Viceroy Hardinge's Delhi Despatch of 25th August 1911 stated that Indians needed to be 
given a larger share in the governance of their country, and linked this to the need to 
accord the provinces more autonomy. The next viceroy, Lord Chelmsford, came to the 
conclusion 'that the endowment of British India as an integral part of the British Empire 
with self-government was the goal of British rule', (quoted in Banerjee 1949b: 1). 
However, it was only when Montagu became the new Secretary of State for India in 
1917 that his views were taken up by (sections of) the home government. He called for 
'the progressive realisation of responsible government in India', (reproduced in 
Banerjee 1949b: 1).
While 1919 was a step in the direction of democratic federal government, even British 
constitutional historians such as Keith conceded that the Act of 1919 'effectively
°s "The British Government is often accused of dividing men in order to govern them. But if it unnecessarily 
divides them at the very moment when it professes to start them on the road to governing themselves it will 
find it difficult to meet the charge of being hypocntical or short-sighted' (my emphasis) (Government of India 
1964a j Article 229). The report's authors concluded with the necessity of maintaining 'adequate safeguards'
for the Muslims.
69 In addition to the Muslim community, Sikhs, Europeans, Anglo-Indians and Indian Christians were granted
seats. -70-
negatived (sic) any real test of the capacity of Indian ministers to work responsible 
government' (1936: viii). Even liberally minded British politicians argued that Indians 
would have to be gradually inculcated with the ideas of government and responsible 
opposition rather than being granted self-government in one fell swoop. This was 
partially because of the fear of the instability that would be produced by the differences 
in race, religion and customs, as well as the lack of stable parties with majorities in the 
provincial legislatures (Sharma 1976: 39)70 .
Divisions within the British establishment widened after the First World War, primarily 
over the issue of whether India should be treated differently from the white colonies. 
Through the agencies of Secretary of State Montagu and Viceroy Chelmsford a decision 
was taken to decentralise formally the Indian Government, for the first time codifying 
the division of powers between centre and provinces. The decision to grant Indians a 
share in the government of their country at provincial level was significant. It can be 
seen as a mechanism of control - not only was Indian responsibility confined to 
'unimportant' issues, but the ultimate power lay with the Governor of the province and 
the Governor-General above him. However, it also conformed to the strategy of co- 
option practised by the Mughals. The increase in Indian legislative and executive 
responsibilities was to give (however imperfectly) members of the Indian elite 
experience of rule (or parliamentary opposition in the case of the Congress who stood 
for election but refused to take office). Secondly, as Brown reminds us, the 1919 Act 
opened up the province as the arena of political competition (1985: 169). It also had 
wider effects. As the Montagu-Chelmsford Report stated '... change obviously cannot 
be confined to the Provinces. In proportion as they become more responsible the 
control which the Government of India exercises over them must diminish' (1918: 
Article 380).
The 1919 Act was a step in the direction of democratisation but the electorate was 
restricted and the Governor General had overarching powers. The Preamble to the 1919 
Act states that
concurrently with the gradual development of self-governing institutions in 
the Provinces of India it is expedient to give to those Provinces in provincial
70 Although by recognising separate electorates and reserved seats, the British promoted these very same 
differences.
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matters the largest measure of independence of the Government of India, which 
is compatible with the due discharge by the latter of its own responsibilities.
Section 1 provided 'for the classification of subjects in relation to the functions of 
government, as central and provincial subjects' (Government of India 1964a: Section 1 
a). Sharma argues that the 1919 Act 'thus recognised the great and supreme necessity 
of reversing completely the process of centralisation begun in 1833' (1932: 165). This 
is an overstatement, especially given the extraordinary powers of the Governor-General. 
It also ignores the decentralisation since 1833. The concession to the provinces was 
circumscribed by, 'the question (of) how this devolution of power can be conceded 
without impairing the supreme authority of the Governor-General in Council'. Lord 
Hardinge's Delhi Despatch 25th August 1911, (quoted in Menon 1957: 13). Before 
1919, many functions had been delegated to the provinces. However, this was the first 
time a formal division of functions between the central and provincial governments was 
codified71 (although residuary powers remained with the Centre).
Dyarchy
While the 1919 Act maintained separate electorates and Muslim over-representation in 
provinces where they were a minority72 , it did not concede the provincial autonomy 
called for in the Lucknow Pact. It created a system of dual control which came to be 
called dyarchy. The system transferred specified provincial subjects to the control of a 
provincial legislative council, upon whose advice the provincial Governor would act 
(Government of India 1964a: Article l(d)). Other powers delegated to the provincial 
level were retained by the provincial Governor who was to be advised by his executive 
council of two to four persons, at least one of whom was to be an Indian (Government 
of India 1964a: Article 3 (1)).
The system of dyarchy, while imperfect from the view of the Indian elite recommended 
itself to the British elite on the grounds that,
any further advance on the lines of the Morley-Minto reforms would give the 
electorate power to paralyse government at every turn, but not the power and the 
responsibility of conducting government for themselves (Barua 1984: 42-3).
71 Although the existing division of powers was not substantially altered. 
'- Both of which had been agreed to in the Lucknow Pact of 1916.
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A future Prime Minister, Ramsay MacDonald, was scathing of dyarchy.
The proposal in the Montagu-Chelmsford Report that it should consist of two 
sections, one owing allegiance to the Viceroy and the other looking to the 
Legislatures for authority, is clumsy and in every sense expedient (1919: 91).
The system had precedents in Canada. The Durham Report of 1839 had permitted 
domestic affairs to be exercised by the Union and the other colonies, while foreign 
policy, defence and overseas trade were retained by Crown. However in the Indian case 
the division of powers was rigidly codified, broaching no compromise, and in practice 
operated in a more limited fashion than was provided for. Additionally, the division of 
sovereignty was complex. Section 1 (1) (d) provided,
for the transfer from among the provincial subjects of subjects (in this Act 
referred to as 'transferred subjects') to the administration of the governor acting 
with ministers appointed under this Act (Government of India 1964a).
Section 1 (4) stated that (All) 'provincial subjects, other than transferred subjects, are in 
this Act referred to as 'reserved subjects' (Government of India 1964a). Residual (non- 
transferred) provincial powers remained in the hands of the Governor, and the numbers 
of powers transferred to the elected representatives of the provinces was limited. This 
resulted in a situation where, as a contemporaneous account observed, 'you cannot with 
seemliness ask people to trust you and then show obviously that you do not trust them 
... Lack of trust is writ large across the face of that document' (Wedgewood 1921: 139). 
Additionally, the 1919 Act provided the provincial Governor with the power to override 
his Legislative Council's decisions on transferred powers if 'the Bill or any clause of it 
or the amendment affects the safety or tranquillity of his province or any part of it' 
(Government of India 1964a: Section 1 (4)).
Subjects reserved for the exercise of the provincial Governor included control over land 
revenue, finance, and law and order. He also appointed ministers who would aid him in 
the administration of transferred subjects (Government of India 1964a: Section 4 (1)). 
Their advice was not binding.
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In relation to transferred subjects the Governor shall be guided by the advice of 
his Ministers, unless he sees sufficient cause to dissent from their opinion, in 
which case he may require action to be taken otherwise than in accordance with 
that advice (Government of India 1964a: Section 4 (3)).
As the Montagu-Chelmsford Report stated 'we do not think that he should accept 
without hesitation and discussion proposals which are clearly seen to be the result of 
inexperience' (1918: Article 219).
The choice of topics to be transferred,
was dictated by the consideration of the matters which most easily could be 
entrusted to (Indian) ministers and which offered them the greatest scope for 
social and economic development, the nation-building activities, and the sphere 
of social reform, the latter a sphere in which British officials could not safely 
operate' (Keith 1936: 254).
They also included '... those in which mistakes that might occur would not be 
irremediable' (Menon 1957: 20). The transferred financial powers of the provinces 
were also limited. The newly acquired provincial revenues were linked to the provincial 
subjects and were acquired at the expense of the central government. The Government 
of India therefore required that a proportion of these funds be paid back to the centre 
(Menon 1957: 22). In addition, 'rather than assigning certain revenues to the transferred 
subjects ... the joint report and the select committee decided in favour of annual 
distribution of revenue by discussion' (Keith 1936: 247). The lack of secured revenue 
detracted from the autonomy of the provinces to exercise their rights, as surely as the 
powers of the provincial governor detracted from real and effective democratisation.
'Viceregalism'
In addition to the limited nature of democratisation, the Governor General remained 
theoretically entitled to legislate over the entire field of government administration in 
India, and 'was made an integral part of the authority of legislation' (Keith 1936: 254). 
Ultimately no provincial act was valid until the Governor General had consented to it. 
More importantly, a Bill 'if not so consented to, (by either or both assemblies) shall, on 
signature by the Governor-General, become an Act' if the Governor-General certifies 
'that the passage of the Bill is essential for the safety, tranquillity or interests of British 
India'(Government of India 1964a: Section 26 (1)). Both chambers at the centre could
be dissolved (or extended) at the will of the Governor General (Government of India
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1964a: Section 21 (a b)); and 28 of the 52 provincial subjects were wholly or partially 
subject to central legislation. Section 12 (1) of the Act required the Governor General's 
consent before contentious laws could be introduced. Provincial autonomy was also 
curtailed by the provision that, 'without the previous sanction of the Governor General', 
subjects which might remotely be connected to central powers were excluded from the 
provinces' powers. These included the imposition of new taxes or even from,
... regulating a provincial subject which has been declared by rules under the 
principal Act to be either in whole or in part, subject to legislation by the Indian 
Legislature, in respect of any matter to which such declaration applies 
(Government of India 1964a: Section 10 (3)).
In addition, the Governor-General retained power over provincial questions. The 
provincial Governor 'was thus compelled as well as authorised closely to control the 
actions of his ministers' (Keith 1936: 259). The Governor-General additionally 
possessed the power to override the entire constitution if the peace and security of India 
were threatened. Sharma therefore misses the point when he argues that 'in practice this 
control was extremely limited and exercised on perhaps very few occasions and that too 
in connexion with matters affecting all Indian services' (1932: 171), given the 
subsequent debate over the power of the centre over the provinces in both federations73 .
2.5. Conclusion
This chapter establishes the durability of taxation units, petty principalities and a degree 
of autonomy (self-rule) within the subcontinent. The significance of this inquiry reveals 
that the British, who built on the Mughals, in their turn produced legacies of governance 
which would impact upon the federal constitutions of independent India and Pakistan. 
These legacies are the subject of Chapter Three. It suffices to say that patterns can be 
traced through time in the territorial space that now constitutes India, Pakistan and 
Bangladesh. If the thesis of progression holds, Low's claim that 'Congress captured the 
Raj from India by supersession' makes perfect sense (1991: 74). A similar situation 
pertained in Pakistan. The British adopted the mechanisms of federalism as a means of 
co-opting and accommodating the Indian middle class, but their other methods of co- 
option such as those of separate electorates, and the co-option of the princely states
' Althoudi I have the benefit of writing with hindsight, and Sharma was writing under British rule.
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worked against the unification of the Indian subcontinent and its peoples. Both the 
Congress and the League had to respond to these additional constitutional proposals, 
which ultimately included degrees of consociationalism.
To argue that federal elements were part of a necessary strategy of government to rule 
such a large and territorially diverse region is almost tautological. Not only was the 
Indian subcontinent geographically large, but its population was (and still is) extremely 
diverse, segmented along religious, linguistic, regional and caste lines. All these 
divisions in turn influenced the federal structures that were developed. This does not 
mean that federalism was inevitable. The fact that continuities can be traced is 
significant. It poses the question why the structures adopted after independence differed 
so radically according to the provincial composition of their units? An examination of 
the plans proposed by the main protagonists between 1916 and 1946 in Chapter Three 
sets out on this task by assessing their majoritarian versus consociational characteristics.
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Chapter Three: Method from Muddle: Federal Plans in pre- 
independence India 1916-1946
'The Government of India Act 1935 was 'itself essentially a temporising device behind its impressive
federal facade ' (Mansergh 1999: 32).
'Congress and a strong centre were the best insurance the British could take out to prevent chaos and
balkanisation in the India they proposed to leave. But giving Congress the strong centre it wanted was
difficult to square with the provincial thesis in the Punjab and Bengal' (Jalal 1985: 75).
'We divide and you rule' Mulana Muhammad All 74 to the British Government at the first RTC in 1930,
(cited in Sayeed 1968: 7).
'The basis of Pakistan is the fear of interference by the Centre in Muslim majority areas as the Hindus 
will be a majority in the centre ' (Azad 1988: 152).
3.1. Introduction
Territorial autonomy was a historically established ruling strategy for the Indian 
subcontinent, even if it was not the rigid codified constitutional federal form of the 
nineteenth and twentieth century analysed by constitutionalists such as Wheare (1963: 
esp. 33). To argue that the states of India and Pakistan were influenced by the state 
structures that preceded them is not a revelation. A stronger claim supported by the 
evidence is that federation was the only possible institutional structure through which 
the subcontinent could have been ruled after partition. This does not necessarily mean 
that the elites who designed the post-independence constitutions were ideologically 
committed to federal forms of government. Jawaharlal Nehru's75 statement in the Rajya 
Sabha in December 1955 that a one-unit federation 'would be ideal' is a strong 
indication of his dispositions76 (Bondurant 1958: 56). This chapter demonstrates that 
both the Muslim League and the Congress Party, despite their many internal divisions, 
indeed perhaps because of them, signed up to plans that were federal. To understand 
post-independence constitutional formation, and its impact upon my dependent variable, 
federal stabilisation, it is vital to elucidate the pre-independence preferences of the 
British, the League and Congress.
74 Indian Nationalist Muslim and President of Congress 1923-1924.
"5 Hereon referred to as Nehru. His father, Motilal Nehru will be referred to by forename as well.
~6 Although he swiftly added 'but I am not sure that would be ideal in some ways. Anyhow, now it is not a
practical proposition'.
Without them I cannot assess the validity of my three independent variables77 and one 
intervening variable78 . To do so I examine the following three hypotheses79 .
- The British Government was consistent in its plans: This hypothesis primarily 
relates to institutional antecedents of federalism. Unless a clear pattern can be discerned 
in British plans, the relevance of the British legacy to post-independence constitution 
formation must be questioned.
2H0 - There was no difference between the Congress and League in the degree of 
consociationalism in the accepted plans If the null is correct, then we should assume 
that the post-independence constitutions of India and Pakistan would be identical on this 
variable.
3H0 - There was no difference between the effective number of ethnic groups 
(eneth80) and the degree of consociationalism in the plans proposed. This is my 
third independent variable. As the effective number of ethnic groups is a constant 
before independence and the constitutional plans discussed up to independence were 
focused upon united India, this hypothesis can only be assessed retrospectively in 
Chapter Five. It is essential to make the point that 'orthodox' historiography has 
portrayed Jinnah as hell-bent on achieving partition and the Congress standing for unity 
at any cost81 . JalaTs eloquent and persuasive thesis demonstrates that this position is at 
the very least simplistic, and at most, contrary to the facts (1985: esp. xv-xvi & 174- 
191). Jalal demonstrates that Congress's constitutional preferences were dictated by the
Qfy
religious composition of the state it sought to run . As this chapter makes clear, 
Congress favoured a centralised but partitioned state to a decentralised united one with a 
large territorially concentrated Muslim minority to accommodate.
77 a) Institutional legacies; b) National identity articulation; c) Effective number of ethnic groups.
78 The homogeneity of federal units.
79 ! use conventional statistical notation. H0 denotes a null hypothesis. A hypothesis is a statement about the 
relationship between variables that is derived from a theory. The null is posited because in order to accept the 
alternate hvpothesis (HO these data must allow me to reject the null.
80 The effective number of ethnic groups. The formula for calculating the number is discussed on page 143.
81 For an in-depth analysis of the orthodox and revisionist positions see Roy (1993: 102-132).
82 Although she does not analyse it as such.
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3.2. Institutional antecedents of federalism
The plans proposed between 1916 and 1946 were numerous and complicated. Not all 
were directly concerned with the issue of federalism and federal design. Issues such as 
the granting of Dominion Status rather than foil independence, or reservation of seats 
and separate electorates for Scheduled Castes often occupied more prominent ground. 
Despite this, all the constitutional plans proposed within these dates were drafted under 
the assumption that there would be a central government with provincial governments 
with a certain amount of autonomy. Certain aspects of what are normally considered 
elements of federal systems were not present. As a colony, the constitution would 
necessarily be a product of the Westminster Parliament and the Governor General as 
representative of that parliament possessed extraordinary powers. Within these 
limitations, the plans proposed a definitively federal form of government, with 
provincial representation and division of powers between the provinces and the centre. 
This colonial legacy has proved to be a definitive one.
Federations, as we have seen can take many forms and are created for many different 
purposes. The structures of federalism adopted in India were partially mechanisms to 
perpetuate British rule, firstly through democratising at a 'safe' level and later through 
including the primarily pro-British Princes within the central institutions. But they were 
also a necessity to rule such a large and diverse country. The British Government came 
to view federal structures as a gradualist mechanism for conceding democracy, and, at 
some future date, Dominion Status. In this it was guided by the experience of other 
Dominions of the Commonwealth - Australia, Canada and South Africa. In its turn, the 
Congress Party incorporated provincial units into its party organisation after 1908, but 
favoured a centralised federation as a mechanism of ruling India. As an organisation 
Congress did NOT favour a unitary government83 . It concurred with the British over 
the centrist nature of the federation while disagreeing over the extent of Indian control 
of these structures. Jalal argues that Jinnah's initial preferences were for a centralised 
federation along Congress lines with minority protection at the centre and within the
83 Despite the Presidential Address of Mr C Vijaraghavachanar in 1920 at Nagpur - ironically at the very 
session where Congress reorganised its internal organisation around linguistic Provincial Congress Committees 
(PCCs) In discussing the 1919 Act he incorrectly argued that it was 'a new and perilous Utopia... India has 
ever been a unitary country... The India of Asoka and of Akbar were great unitary countries and their reigns 
were the brightest and their people were the freest in the history of India" Presidential Address 35 Session INC 
Dec 76-31 1920 (reproduced in Zaidi and Zaidi 1979: 631-2).
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provinces (1985: 10). This reflected his desire to consolidate the Muslim League's 
position across all of India. However, a tension existed within the League between the 
minority and majority Muslim provinces over this issue. The Muslim majority 
provinces viewed federalism primarily as a mechanism of minority protection, and 
therefore favoured a more decentralised federation. Jinnah subsequently modified his 
position as his mobilising strategy required the accommodation of the Muslim majority
provinces84 .
While ajl the plans discussed in this chapter operated under the assumption of an 
eventual federal (or possibly confederal) constitution for India, they differed according 
to various criteria. I focus on the elements relevant to the success of a federation as a 
mechanism of ethnic conflict regulation. I discuss variables that are not normally 
considered as relevant to a federal system. This is for two reasons. Firstly, for 
federalism to be an effective mechanism of regulating ethnic conflict it often requires 
additional elements. While methods of securing proportionality in decision-making 
organs, security or a grand executive coalition are more commonly associated with 
theories of consociationalism expounded by Arend Lijphart, they have also been 
associated with federal organisation, especially in multiethnic societies. Consociational 
federal structures facilitate the accommodation of territorially dispersed ethnic groups, 
something which federal structures cannot easily do85 . They also address the concerns 
of territorially concentrated groups who are a minority in the state as a whole, for whom 
federal structures give no guarantees of minority veto or protection outside their 
province, especially at the centre. Although consociational elements are distinct from 
those specifically associated with federalism, there can be overlaps, as Lijphart argues 
(1979: 505-512). The demand for the inclusion of these consociational elements, 
specifically by the Muslims who were in a provincial minority, must therefore be seen 
as an integral part of the acceptance of the federal system of government in united India, 
and should not, indeed, cannot, be dissociated from the plans proposed and accepted.
Secondly, an analysis that takes into account consociational elements is better placed to 
posit the distinction between the attitudes towards minority accommodation proposed
84 Although the Muslim League did not command the support of the majority of Muslims until after 1940. its 
demands influenced constitutional form. It was taken into account by both the British and the Congress.
85 When groups are territorially concentrated, consociationalism enhances the benefits of federalism without the 
danger of alienating minority groups from the decision-making process. It is this danger that enhances the fear 
of separatism precluding many statesmen from advancing it as an ethnic conflict regulation mechanism.
- 80 -
by the Congress and the League than a simple focus on formal elements of federal 
structures does. Although a federal form of government can be part of a consociational 
system, it is neither necessary nor sufficient for consociationalism. Federations can be 
and often are majoritarian systems of government. Concentrating on the degree of 
consociationalism within federal plans fits into alternate hypothesis 2Hi: were there 
differences between the federal plans proposed by the different parties according to their 
degree of consociationalism? It provides a strong comparative element with which to 
assess the post-independence constitutions.
I have identified nine variables of the many constitutional proposals advanced between 
1916 and 1946 as set out in Table 3.1. The nine variables are grouped under Lijphart's 
fourfold classification of the four elements of consociational forms of government. All 
nine fit into the criteria specified above, either being elements of federations, or 
consociational elements that complement them. All nine variables were also integral to 
the type of federation proposed and facilitate comparison of the plans according to 
testable criteria. As such they complement IHo and 2H<>.
Table 3.1. The elements and variables to test federal degrees of consociationalism
el. Grand Coalition
e2. Proportionality
e3. Segmental Autonomy
e4. Mutual Veto
xl. Executive Weightage
ic2. Separate Electorates
r3. Reserved Seats
x4. Legislative Weightage
x:5. Bicameral Representation
x6. Religious reorganisation
$7. Linguistic reorganisation
x8. Residual powers
r9. Community veto rights
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Grand Coalition
Lijphart includes a grand coalition as one of the elements of consociational democracy 
because of its inclusion of all the political leaders of the significant segments in a 
society (1977: 25). In so doing he precludes the existence of political groups that 
transcend ethnic lines86 . Lijphart compares the grand coalition to a government of 
national unity formed to combat an emergency, but points out that in plural societies the 
potential for an on-going emergency is greater, and therefore the need for a permanent 
government of national unity, stronger.
The first variable (xl) I look for in the plans is that of weightage87 for one or more 
community in the executive in the province (before central representation was 
conceded) and later the centre. The institutional representation of one or more ethnic 
groups can be either a formal or an informal arrangement. It is important to note that 
weightage or reserved seats within an executive does not guarantee that this 
community's interests will be protected. Unless parity is achieved or decision making 
rules are enforced which guarantee a minority veto, minority groups can always be 
outvoted. It merely ensures that they possess a substantial voice at the level at which 
decisions are taken. This element of consociationalism is eminently compatible with 
federal executives as Steiner analyses in Switzerland (1989: 107).
Proportionality
For Lijphart, proportionality primarily refers to the 'method of allocating civil service 
appointments and scarce resources (1977: 51) and the 'removal of a large number of 
potentially divisive issues from the decision-making process'. Lijphart only secondarily 
includes the issue of representation in proportion to community strength in 'decision- 
making organs' because representation does not guarantee the security of group 
interests, as noted above (1977: 39). However, it is with the representation of the group 
in the legislature in proportion to or in excess of population that I am concerned. 
Proportionality in government appointments was not an important element in the 
constitutional plans under discussion, although the issue recurred throughout the period.
86 The Congress Party argued that it did transcend these cleavages (although in actuality it was not successful in 
doing so). This perception/bargaining chip was responsible for many of the differences between Congress and 
League in their constitutional preferences.
87 Which mav or may not be in proportion to population.
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The second variable (x2) I analyse is that of separate electorates. These are part of the 
proportionality element of consociationalism because they can be used to guarantee 
proportionality of representation in accordance with population strength - vital if groups 
are not territorially concentrated and will lose out under the simple plurality electoral 
system. They can also be used to over-represent minority communities. Separate 
electorates were advocated by the Muslim League and other Muslim organisations. 
Ambedkar also advanced them for the untouchables during the Round Table 
Conferences (RTC). They were advocated as a mechanism of securing adequate 
representation in the legislature, but also as a means of electing representatives who 
would stand up for their interests. Separate electorates, as with the Party List electoral 
system, increase the control of the leaders of the community by segmenting the 
communities. They do not ensure that one party gains all the votes of this community - 
intra-segment fragmentation can occur. However, with no need to appeal to other 
communities, incentives for extremism are increased rather than decreased88 . There is a 
case for including this variable under the segmental autonomy element. However, 
separate electorates were not only used as a mechanism of segmentation but to ensure a 
certain number of representatives. Additionally, while separate electorates were a 
mechanism to segment the communities, they did not provide autonomy. Separate 
electorates were applied equally to Muslim populations in Muslim majority provinces as 
they were to Muslims in Hindu majority provinces.
The third variable (x3), related to separate electorates, but distinct from it, is that of 
reserved seats for certain communities in the provinces or at the centre. There are 
various mechanisms by which reserved seats are allocated to minorities. They can be 
allocated without any regard for the population within a particular unit (a system that 
allocated seats equally would fall into this category). Alternatively they can be 
allocated either in proportion to population or in excess of population. These latter two 
are more common and can lead to the under-representation of a majority within that 
particular legislature - a source of discomfort to the Muslim majority in Bengal and 
Punjab. While it could be argued that separate electorates can equally be a mechanism
88 Separate electorates are not the only electoral mechanism for ensuring representation. In pre-independence 
India the possibility of having primaries where only members of the community could choose who would be 
able to stand in the constituency was proposed by Attlee at the RTC (Times 1931: 30). This mechanism is 
compatible with joint electorates - and would ensure that only candidates acceptable to the community were 
elected. The tact that these proposals were not accepted demonstrates that the desire to segment the 
communities from one another was of paramount importance.
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of providing reserved seats, the two are distinct. Seats can be reserved for a community 
with a general electoral role to elect them. Therefore while separate electorates require 
reserved seats, the converse is not true.
The fourth variable (x4) according to which constitutional plans diverged was that of 
legislative weightage. Conceded in the 1909 Act, legislative weightage fits more 
comfortably under proportionality than it does under the grand coalition element of 
consociationalism. Guaranteed representation in a legislature is no guarantee of 
executive participation, especially in a majoritarian system of government. Legislative 
weightage guarantees a certain level of representation for minority communities, often 
in excess of its population. It only becomes part of minority veto rights if the excess 
representation prevents the normal majority from governing alone. It differs from 
reserved seats that do not necessarily guarantee extra representation according to 
numerical strength. Weightage can be used to promote a community's representation at 
the national level commensurate either with its political importance (however defined) 
or with its national strength, which because of its territorial distribution it is unlikely to 
gain elect orally. It can be used to promote national level protection for a territorially 
concentrated minority, or for dispersed communities.
The fifth variable (x5), and the fourth to be included by me under Lijphart's element of 
proportionality is that of representation in the second chamber of a federal legislature. 
Representation in the lower chamber of a federal legislature usually occurs according to 
the population strength of the units that comprise the federation. Representation in the 
upper house (a frequently occurring though not necessary element of a federal system) 
varies between equality of representation for all units regardless of size (as in the USA 
and Pakistan after 1973), representation according to population size (Austria) and those 
in which representation compensates marginally for population differences but does not 
attempt to achieve equality of representation (India and Canada). If units are 
homogeneous or particularly incongruent in terms of size (Lijphart 1984a: 74), the 
representation in the upper chamber becomes vital for issues of inclusion and exclusion. 
Representation in the second chamber can therefore be seen as also increasing 
segmental autonomy.
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Segmental Autonomy
Lijphart includes segmental autonomy as one of his elements of consociationalism 
because,
It is the logical corollary to the grand coalition principle. On all matters of 
common interest, decisions should be made by all the segments together with 
roughly proportional degrees of influence89. On all other matters, however, the 
decisions and their execution can be left to their separate segments (1977: 41).
The design of provincial units fits into Lijphart's segmental autonomy category through 
creating an institutional space for territorially concentrated groups. Within this 
territorial space the groups' leaders control decisions relating to their community's well 
being, such as education or the language of the state. This variable is linked most 
closely to federalism as a mechanism of ethnic conflict regulation. I concentrate on it 
because my intervening variable is the ethnic homogeneity of the provincial unit. 
Lijphart specifically associates federalism with segmental autonomy in 'Democracy in 
Plural Societies'. Segmental autonomy is designed to 'at least initially ... make plural 
societies more thoroughly plural' and to strengthen segmental organisations (1977: 42). 
Because government (as opposed to autonomy) at the provincial level is in practice 
always organised along territorial lines, federalism offers an especially attractive way of 
implementing segmental autonomy for territorially concentrated ethnic groups.
The sixth (x6) and seventh (x7) variables are therefore closely equated with federal 
design: the design and composition of the units of the federation according to religious 
and/or linguistic criteria. The extent of segmental autonomy conceded in practice varies 
according to the powers that are allocated to the provincial level of government (or to 
selected provinces under asymmetrical federal arrangements). Yet institutional 
recognition of the legitimacy of ethnic units is significant in itself. It demonstrates that 
the state in question is committed to the maintenance of these identities. These two 
variables are difficult to classify. The acceptance of one of the two variables (linguistic 
or religious) does not necessarily entail the rejection of the other. Therefore, the other 
demand may be sidelined; for example the Muslim League in its quest for more Muslim 
states did not address the linguistic question, but did not reject it either. Additionally,
89 To their population strength.
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the simple scoring mechanism employed in this analysis does not and cannot distinguish 
between the acceptance of different religious claims, whether Sikh, Muslim, Hindu or 
Christian. Lijphart reminds us of the need to be alert to different kinds of segmental 
cleavage (1977: 18). These issues are problematic.
The eighth (x8) variable is that of the location of residual powers. While the location of 
these powers might more pertinently be used to measure the degree of centralisation of a 
federation in conjunction with the distribution of revenues, by themselves they are 
meaningless and assume more or less importance depending on other factors90 . The 
location of the residual powers of a federation in conjunction with the creation of 
ethnically defined units is strongly indicative of the importance of these units' 
autonomy and is symbolically important91 . Residual powers could also be included 
within Lijphart's element of a mutual veto because it provides the community with the 
ability to protect its vital interests. I have included it under the segmental autonomy 
element because mutual vetoes are usually exercised at the centre. Residual powers in a 
province may protect the significant interests of the community but they do not veto the 
actions of a regime.
Mutual Veto
My ninth and final variable (x9) is that of the mutual veto which exactly corresponds to 
Lijphart's fourth element. Lijphart stresses the importance of the mutual veto in 
constitutional design as a mechanism to ensure that a community represented in 
government will not have its vital interests outvoted at the centre - damaging the 
condition vital to make consociational democracy work - that of inter-segmental elite 
cooperation. Lijphart acknowledges that the mutual veto in effect amounts to negative 
minority rule, but argues that as all communities benefit from the protection it affords, 
minority communities have an incentive not to abuse it (1977: 36,38). The mutual veto 
is a device by which a community can object, either in the legislature and/or executive 
to the passing of a decision, which that community's representatives decide affects their
90 The exact enumeration of powers for each level of government, emergency powers of the centre and 
financial distribution of powers.
91 The Canadian and Australian federations adopted opposite positions on the location of residual powers at the 
time of federation. Canada sought to create a centralised federation having viewed the US Civil War as a 
lesson of the dangers of decentralisation, hi contrast, Australia was constituted from provinces with a much 
greater awareness of their independent existence and therefore allocated residual powers to the provinces. It is 
important to note however, that in both these federations, while the allocation of the residual powers remained 
the same, the attitude towards centralisation changed through of the operation of the courts - Australia 
becominCT in practice a more centralised federation than Canada.
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vital interests92 . The mutual veto has also been used as a measure to prohibit discussion 
of a contentious issue. It is usually triggered through a formula - three quarters or two 
thirds of a community's representatives within the relevant legislative or executive body 
having to agree to use the veto. It also differs according to whether the required 
percentage is calculated from those present and voting or from all those registered as 
representatives of that community whether present or not. This arrangement was central 
to the operation of the Northern Ireland Assembly before its suspension.
3.3. Formal Analysis
If the plan incorporated the relevant consociational variable it scores 1, if not, it scores 0 
as set out in Table 3.293 . I have scored a variable 0 if it was not mentioned in the plan 
and if its absence is not indicative of a deliberate omission94 .
Table 3.2. Descriptions of majoritarian and consociational forms in scoring system.
No
xl
x2
x3
x4
x5
x6
x7
x8
x9
Variable
Executive Weightage
Separate Electorates
Reserved Seats
Legislative Weightage
Representation in the Second Chamber
Religious Territorial Reorganisation
Linguistic Territorial Reorganisation
Residual Powers
Community Veto Rights
1 - consociational
Weightage
Separate electorates
Reserved seats
Weightage
Equality
Religious provinces
Linguistic provinces
To the provinces
Veto rights
0 - majoritarian
No weightage
Joint electorates
No reserved seats
No weightage
Proportional
Administrative provinces
Administrative provinces
To the centre
No veto rights
I exclude all plans that cannot be scored on five of the nine variables (r)95 . Other 
influences on constitutional formation such as the discussions of the three RTCs of 
1930-1932 are of course relevant to my analysis. However, they proved unworkable 
with the formulae set out here. The sample size is too small to be subjected to any 
meaningful statistical analysis. These data will therefore be presented in a qualitative 
comparative format. Of all the plans proposed by these three actors between 1916-1946
92 Lijphart does not stipulate that tins mutual veto has to be enshnned IB a written constitution.
93 I considered using a more sophisticated mechanism to assess degrees of consociationalism within the 
variables (for example the levels of weightage). However, this was impossible to standardise, and detracted
from the analysis.
94 E o The 1919 Act did not concede linguistic reorganisation of provinces. However, the Montagu- 
Chelmsford Report on which the Act was based called for more homogeneous units (1918: Article 246). The 
report anmed that operating in the vernacular would increase interest and participation in politics. As the Act 
ignored this recommendation, its omission is a deliberate one. Tins variable is therefore scored 0 rather than O.
95 A plan does not have to be scored on all four elements, although in practice, all have been.
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I have only been able to score eight96 . Many of the plans discussed in this period were 
nothing more than one-issue presentations designed to influence the debate. The Lahore 
Declaration of 1940 is a prime example - it demanded independent and autonomous 
states, but did not explicitly call for any particular form of constitutional structure.
The formula I have chosen to analyse the plans leading up to independence averages the 
scores for the variables allocated to Lijphart's four elements of consociationalism. It 
then sums the four variables, but 'weights' two of them. Lijphart argues that 'the two 
most important (elements) ... are the complementary principles of grand coalition and 
segmental autonomy' (1979: 500). Lijphart has consistently prioritised executive power 
sharing as a necessary feature of consociationalism because of the requirement of elite 
agreement for consociationalism to be successful. He also prioritises segmental 
autonomy because '(t)he ideal consociation maximises both the segment's power in the 
area of common concerns and their freedom to organize their own affairs 
autonomously' (1979: 501). An additional reason for weighting segmental autonomy is 
that its inclusion or exclusion places greater emphasis upon my intervening variable; 
that of the homogeneity of units in explaining federal stabilisation97 . This weighting 
does not contradict the results of the un-weighted scores although it does confirm my 
argument in a stronger fashion.
To conclude this section - a quick comment on what has been excluded. I have 
concentrated upon consociational rather than formally federal elements. Although 
many of the variables are perfectly compatible with federalism, they are not always 
associated with it. In my formal analysis I have omitted the following variables that are 
commonly used to compare federations, the centralisation variable and the extent of the 
Governor General's powers.
The most common measure to analyse the level of centralisation is the distribution of 
tax revenues between the different levels of government or the location of residual 
powers or distribution of powers between the two levels of government98 . I have not 
included an analysis of these variables. Most of the plans proposed before
96 Although Sikander Hyat Khan's 1939 plan could have been included on the basis of the specified criteria, I 
have excluded it from discussion, as he was not a member of the Muslim League.
97 Appendix One works through the formula.
98 See Lijphart for a discussion of receipts from revenue (1984b:177-179), Riker for a discussion of minimum 
and maximum devolution of powers (1964: 5-6), and Watts for an analysis of the different approaches (1994:
17-20). -88-
independence (already a very small sample) did not reach the implementation stage or 
involve any discussion of tax revenues; therefore it is impossible to conduct a 
comparative analysis of even hypothetical tax revenues. Without an analysis of tax 
revenues, an analysis including the location of residual powers as a measure of 
centralisation would be superficial and misleading. Also, the location of revenue cannot 
account for the existence of emergency powers of the centre nor the party system's role 
in undermining (or promoting) the autonomy of the provincial units. It is therefore 
insufficient on its own.
The extent of the powers of the Governor-General" is directly related to the nature of 
both federations and the power of the centre. However, before independence, debate 
over the extent of these powers was primarily related to the power of the colonial 
regime rather than the nature of the federation. The Governor General and provincial 
Governor in the 1935 Government of India Act were given the power to act in the 
interests of minorities (Government of India 1964b: Article 12 9c & 52 (b)). Even the 
Muslim League stridently objected to these provisions on the grounds that 'it is well 
nigh impossible to conceive of a dictator possessed of greater powers' 100 . It is 
significant that even the Muslim League saw these provisions as related to colonial 
control rather than minority protection. In contrast to Wilkinson, I argue that the 
powers of the Governor General in this regard were not related to degrees of 
consociationalism before independence, rather to British control (2000a: 773-774).
Before I discuss the scores themselves, one final point needs to be addressed. This 
chapter concentrates upon the federal legacies of the British, the Congress and the 
League in post-independence India and Pakistan. Inevitably, in a period so wide but 
also with so many actors, any analysis runs the risk of being superficial101 . This is 
especially the case when focussing on the leaders of movements. In addition, 
differences within these organisations are often more significant than those between 
them. Different institutional solutions recommended themselves to accommodate the 
same community - one a minority at the centre but with the security of being a local
99 Later the President in both India and Pakistan.
100 President of the Muslim League, Syed Wazir Hasan, All India Muslim League 24 Session Bombay Apnl 
1936, (reproduced in Pirzada 1970: 252).
101 I do not include the Princes within the analysis as their preferences were even more diverse than those of the 
Congress, British and League. -89-
majority (Muslims in Sind), and one who was 'twice cursed', being a minority both at 
the provincial and the national level (Muslims in the United Provinces).
In criticising Madan's methodology focussing on texts and speeches, Manor has argued 
that '(p)ditical action has always been more important than political rhetoric in 
determining outcomes in India' (1996: 474). In seeking to address this thorny 
methodological problem I have concentrated upon the plans that the relevant party 
signed up to as expressions of an institutional mentality, and have attributed less 
significance to conference speeches and press briefings. This is not to deny the role of 
individual agency - Azad's criticism of Nehru places the blame for the failure of the 
Cabinet Mission squarely on his shoulders (1988: 166). However, it puts them into 
context - Jalal claims that Nehru's pronouncement in 1946 was no surprise in relation 
to the debates of the Congress at this time (1985: 209). The only way in which I can 
take account of these detailed problems is to deconstruct the attitudes of the two main 
movements through a longer textual analysis. In this chapter my analysis, scoring 
system and conclusions concentrate upon the changes over time in the preferences of 
the India-wide organisations and movements. These changes are shown in Table 3.3. 
Chapter Four concentrates upon the different contexts in which these plans were 
conceived.
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Institutional legacies
Assessing the effect of institutional legacies on the development of the federal structures 
of India and Pakistan requires an appreciation of how many of the federal provisions 
after independence conformed to the plans proposed by the British. The extent of the 
similarities is discussed in Chapter Five. This chapter concentrates on the following 
null hypotheses:
• The value of analysing the post-independence constitutions is predicated upon 
the consistency of the British plans before independence. Therefore my first 
null hypothesis argues that the British Government was not consistent in its 
plans. 1H0 - the British Government was not consistent in its plans. If it is 
not possible to disprove the null then the institutional antecedents of the federal 
structures after independence must be questioned.
• The second null hypothesis is that there was no difference between the Congress 
and League in the degree of consociationalism they accepted. If we cannot 
disprove this null then we would expect the degree of consociationalism in India 
and Pakistan's constitutions to be identical. 2H0 - there was no difference 
between the Congress and League in the degree of consociationalism in the 
accepted plans.
a) The British Government was not consistent in its plans
The most accessible way to assess whether the British Government was consistent in its 
plans is to look at the range of scores. Of the three organisations, the British 
Government had the most divergent scores, as seen in Table 3.4 102 .
Table 3.4. The range of scores from the accepted plans.
Party
Range _,
Muslim League a
0.75
Congress Party b
0.52
British Government c
0.77
Source: As in Table 3.3.
N^Ta ML-1916. 1929, 1946. b CP- 1916, 1928. 1946. C BG-1919. 1930, 1935 ? 1942. 1946
102 Although the range was high for all three actors.
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The large range of scores for the British Government is indicative of a lack of continuity 
in its plans over the degree of consociationalism within federal structures. The wide 
range is not surprising given that the British claimed to be trying to reconcile divergent 
interests; indeed, it serves to illustrate that they were not as independent as they are 
often portrayed. They changed policies according to the exigencies of the situation e.g. 
according to wartime priorities, or the desire to include the Princes to slow down 
democratisation. Even if the Cripps plan103 is excluded from the average on the grounds 
that it was a wartime proposal to lure Congress into supporting the war effort - it failed 
- the British Government's range of scores still produced a wide range of 0.68. This 
calls into question my independent variable of institutional antecedents, with the 
exception of the advocacy of the federal structure.
To reinforce this point, unlike the Congress and League, the British did not possess any 
'absolutes' across the nine variables. The British proposed five plans in the period 
under discussion and therefore the opportunities for change were nearly twice as great 
as those of the Congress or League. Even accounting for this, the lack of continuity is 
dramatic. Separate electorates and reserved seats were included in all the British plans 
with the exception of the Cripps Plan of 1942. It has been argued that Cripps was an 
aberration and Churchill expected it to fail, pulling the rug from beneath Cripps' feet 
when a deal was looking likely (Jalal 1985: 73; Inder Singh 1990: 74). Even if this 
were the case, this would not explain why the Cripps proposals were so close to the 
Congress preferences. The omission of separate electorates and reserved seats was 
therefore significant, as the composition of the Constituent Assembly arising from this 
plan would be vital in influencing the type of constitution which was drafted. While the 
Muslims would have been in a minority in any case, the election of the constitution 
body by a single electoral college of all the members of provincial legislatures, gave 
them an even smaller number of seats than they would have received using separate 
electorates. As Jinnah complained, 'when that body is formed, I cannot conceive how 
they can come to any other conclusion except the Union; and that it why it is so 
composed' 104 . Therefore the omission of separate electorates and reserved seats must 
be seen as indicative of changing priorities for the British - the need to get the Congress 
on board - even if it did not succeed. The only other variable over which there was
103 Which produced a score of 0, and was therefore perfectly majoritanan despite its acceptance of the right of 
secession of provinces.
104 Presidential Address, All India Muslim League Twenty Ninth Session Allahabad Apnl 3-6 1942. 
(reproduced in Pirzada 1970: 386').
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almost unanimity of purpose was that concerning executive weightage. In four out of 
the five plans it was not included, indicative of the limitations of the divide and rule 
policy and the promotion of Muslim interests when it came to British control of the 
subcontinent. It was finally included in the Cabinet Mission Plan (CMP) - but this was 
the only plan in which the British Government had definitively accepted that its rule 
was over.
This is not to say that other institutional continuities do not exist. As Chapter Five 
discusses, a large proportion of the post-independence constitutions of India and 
Pakistan was lifted directly from the 1935 Government of India Act, as was the 
experience of working these constitutional forms. Additionally, the federal structure 
was a definite legacy, even if the specifics of its form were not. However, in terms of 
consociational elements it is not possible to point to any constants which either the 
League or Congress could have adopted. Although I am not rejecting the institutional 
antecedents as a valid independent variable, I need to proceed in an alternative fashion.
• I examine whether the British plans were closer to one of the main parties than 
the other - despite the varied spread of these plans.
• I examine whether the inconsistencies can be accounted for by the closeness to 
independence and the likelihood of disengagement in the imminent future.
• I assess whether the British during this period can be understood as independent 
actors. Were they as influenced by the plans and demands of the other 
movements as they influenced them?
a) In analysing the institutional legacies of the pre-independence period it is instructive 
to consider whether the British Government, despite its wide-ranging preferences was
/
consistently closer to either the Congress or the Muslim League. If their average scores 
were significantly closer to one rather than the other, then the lack of consistency in the 
British plans does not prevent us from using British preferences to explain 
constitutional formation after independence. Using the averages of scores is beset with 
problems as the different plans were conceived of in very different environments and
-94-
for different reasons. Yet for my comparative purposes it provides the best way of 
condensing the preferences over this period.
Table 3.5. The averages of the scores of the accepted plans
Party
Average score
Muslim League
0.67
Congress Party
0.43
British Government
0.33
Source: As in Table 3.3.
Table 3.5 indicates that the average British proposal was much closer to that of 
Congress than to that of the League. This is significant because the conventional 
wisdom is that the British sought to use the Muslim's political demands as a mechanism 
of divide and rule. Constitutional plans to cement these differences were a perfect 
mechanism to do so. While I do not seek to contradict the divide and rule thesis, these 
data presented above indicate that there were limits to the encouragement of the Muslim 
League, and that it was primarily confined to the issue of separate electorates - 
maintaining the boundaries between the communities 105 . Wilkinson has described India 
before 1947 as a consociational state (2000a: 772-774). While he is correct that there 
were many consociational elements present, these were not at the executive or the 
minority veto level. As Chart 3.1 illustrates below, many of the British proposals were 
significantly majoritarian.
The fact that the scores of the Congress and British were closer together than those of 
the League and the British suggests that the constitution of India would be 
majoritarian106 . Additionally, an inverse relationship existed between the degrees of 
consociationalism espoused and the range of scores: those who were more concerned 
with consociational protection were less likely to compromise on this matter. This 
supports the hypothesis that we would expect Pakistan's constitution after independence 
to be much more consociational .
105 Although Parikh claims that the British used 'aspirations of minority elites to dilute (Congress's) power', 
her primary focus is on separate electorates (1997: 155).
106 Congress's rejection of the majoritarian 1935 Act and 1942 Cnpps plan was primarily attributable to the 
limited extent of Indian control of the centre and the inclusion of un-elected princely representatives rather than
their federal provisions. ..
107 The extent to which this was the case, despite the changed ethnic composition of the states will be analysed
in Chapter Five. -95-
Chart 3.1. Bar Chart of principal actors' proposals scored according to the degree 
of consociationalism.
• Muslim League 
ill Congress Party
• British Government
Plans arranged according 
to date
Source: As in Table 3.3.
b) Can the inconsistencies in the British position be related to the closeness to 
independence? If there was no relationship between the plans the British proposed and 
the closeness to independence, then we would have to conclude that the high range of 
scores of the British could not be accounted for by imminent disengagement.
Chart 3.2. Scattergram of year and degrees of consociationalism in British plans 
including a trend line
1910 1915 1945 1950
Source: As in Table 3.3.
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Chart 3.2 demonstrates that there is a medium positive trend between the closeness to 
independence and the degree of consociationalism, even despite the wholly majoritarian 
Cripps Mission. Therefore, the perceived proximity to independence did affect the 
proposed degrees of consociationalism. As Table 3.6 illustrates, this was not confined 
to the British. The scores for all actors were higher in 1946 than they were at the 
beginning of the period, despite the lack of linearity in the intervening years.
Table 3.6. The change in range of scores for the three actors
Year
1916/1919*
1946
Muslim League
0.25
0.77
Congress Party
0.25
0.77
British Government
0.09
0.77
Source: As in Table 3.3.
Notes: * Lucknow Pact of 1916 or 1919 Government of India Act
The increase in scores represents the increased influence in the power of the Muslim 
League and in its demands for representation, although on the other variables of 
consociationalism, the British were much less sympathetic. The British were much less 
concerned to maintain a majoritarian system of government once they decided to quit 
the subcontinent - a fact that explains the slope upwards in Chart 3.3. Interestingly, as 
discussed below, the Muslim League actually moderated its consociational demands 
once independence for a united India became a real possibility. While Congress 
initially accepted the CMP, its concern to maintain the structures of the Raj for 
independent India made this acceptance a tenuous one.
c) It could be argued that the lack of continuity of British Government scores can be 
accounted for by the difficulty of treating the British as independent actors. From the 
setting up of the INC in 1885 and the acceptance of demands for separate electorates in 
the 1909 Reform Act, British Governments were subject to varying degrees of pressure 
from the Indian politicians and their own MPs. While the 1919 Act attempted to 
sideline Indians' influence to the provincial arena, in the 1920s demands became more 
insistent for reform at the centre. The setting up of the Simon Commission in 1927 
excluded Indian politicians, but the outcry at this, as well as a change in Government in 
London (from Conservative to Labour) promoted the three RTCs held between 1930
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and 1932108 . These well known facts demonstrate that the British plans in this period 
should be seen as much as reactive as they were proactive. This conclusion does not 
detract from the fact that the British could unilaterally implement constitutional plans in 
a way that the Congress and League could not. The British enacted the 1935 
Government of India Act despite all main parties being opposed to it. As Attlee 
complained,
I could not see that there had been any enthusiasm whatever for this Bill in 
India. There was, as a matter of fact, rejection by all the live movements in India109 .
Their partial dependence upon the Indian organisations partially explains why their 
range is so wide.
b) The two main movements did not differ in their proposed constitutional 
structures
Neither Congress nor the League could be accused of either following slavishly or 
completely rejecting the British proposals, as the British proposals differed so widely. 
However, they can be compared to each other to assess the differences in their preferred 
degrees of consociationalism. The null is therefore that there are no differences. As 
Table 3.5 showed, the average score of the League was 0.67 whereas the Congress was 
0.43. The fact that these differences existed is no revelation for anyone with a basic 
knowledge of the history of the subcontinent, and indeed, was the logical corollary of 
the fact that the British were much closer to the Congress than the League. What is 
interesting is that the range of scores for both the League and the Congress - as Table 
3.4 showed - was substantial - 0.75 and 0.52 respectively. This poses problems for 
using this scoring method for analysing post-independence continuity and discontinuity 
in constitutional formation.
However, there is another way to utilise these data. Revisionist historiography of the 
partition has questioned the traditional interpretation of the events surrounding the 
CMP. The Plan was accepted by all three actors in its minimal format although it was
108 Although onlv the second was attended by the Congress. In 1932 the Labour Government became a 
National Government under Ramsay MacDonald.
109 Mr Attlee on the Government of India Bill 1935. House of Commons Feb 6 1935, (cited in Banerjee
1949b: 256).
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published separately from the imposed settlement over the communal composition of 
the interim government. Those espousing an orthodox version of the events leading to 
partition stress Jinnah's and the Muslim League's acceptance of the Cabinet Mission as 
a stepping stone towards partition and an independent Pakistan (Kaushik 1964: 318; 
Inder Singh 1990: 142,169). The Muslim League Council accepted the plan while 
reiterating that 'the attainment of the goal of complete sovereign Pakistan still remains 
the unalterable objective of the Muslims of India' 110 . This school sees acceptance of the 
CMP as a prelude to partition.
In contrast, the so called revisionist historiography of Jalal and previously, Moon, have 
questioned the desire of Jinnah for an independent Pakistan (Moon 1961: 21, 49-56; 
Jalal 1985: xv-xvi, 179-187). They portray the Pakistan demand as a strategy to secure 
rights for the Muslims within a decentralised, possibly confederal united India, as well 
as pointing to Jinnah's personal preferences for safeguarding Muslims in minority 
provinces as well as those in majority ones. They note that the Cabinet Mission 
definitively rejected a sovereign Pakistan. Revisionists have placed the blame for 
partition onto the shoulders of the Congress generally (Jalal 1985: 209) or Nehru in 
particular (Azad 1988: 166).
Table 3.7. The average and range of scores from the plans adopted by Congress 
and League before 1946 (scores including 1946 in brackets)
Party
Average Score
Range
Muslim League
0.63 (0.67)
0.75 (0.75)
Congress Party
0.27 (0.43)
0.03 (0.52)
Source. As in Table 3.3.
Table 3.7 demonstrates that the League's average preference remains similar whether 
the CMP is included or not. This supports the revisionists' arguments that the League's 
preference, headed by Jinnah was to create consociational power sharing arrangements 
within a united India and that the partition demand was a bargaining chip. The fact that 
Congress's average score falls dramatically, from 0.43 with the Mission included to 
0.27 when the CMP is excluded similarly supports the argument that Congress's 
agreement to the Cabinet Mission was not sustainable and was an aberration of its
1 Resolution of the Muslim League Council, June 6* 1946, (reproduced in Banerjee and Bose 1946: 191).
-99-
organisational and individual preferences. Jalal concludes that Nehru's rejection of the 
permanence of the plan should not have come as a surprise to those familiar with the 
internal dynamics of the Congress 'but his open repudiation of the plan gave a severe 
shock to ... Muslims' (1985: 209).
If the CMP is excluded, Congress's range of scores falls dramatically to 0.03, 
Congress's first preference was for a majoritarian federation and importantly, one that 
was centralised; the League's first preference was for a consociational federation. 
Although Congress accepted some consociational features, and the League was willing 
to concede some majoritarian ones, both movements preferred partition to working 
within a constitution that diverged too far from their original preferences.
Because Congress's preferences were more stable than those of the League, all other 
things being equal we should expect more continuity between pre and post- 
independence constitutional preferences. Conversely, as the League's range is wider, it 
is more difficult to predict post-independence constitutional formation. Because the 
League and Congress had radically different averages and ranges of preferences we can 
strongly reject the null - there were major differences between the League and the 
Congress on the degree of consociationalism within their preferred constitutions. 
Therefore we would expect huge differences in the constitutions of India and Pakistan 
after independence on this issue, all other things being equal 111 .
3.4. Conclusion
In a study of this breadth, covering three organisations, all incredibly internally diverse, 
details are inevitably obscured. The formal analysis presented here condenses the 
information, to test workable hypotheses. While the three actors' preferences changed 
over time as circumstances and personalities changed, it is interesting to compare the 
average scores, but also the range. I do not seek to minimise the importance of other
111 Although I argue that Congress prevented the possibly of the Cabinet Mission Plan succeeding, I do not 
araye that the plan would have succeeded in holding India together. As discussed in the conclusion to this 
thesis federations with a number of units of three or less have historically been unstable. The Plan was 
ultimately rejected by the League following Nehru's repudiation of the permanence of the arrangements 
proposed'. Mulana Abul Kalam Azad's unabridged 'India Wins Freedom" released in 1988, puts the blame for 
the failure of the Cabinet Mission Plan squarely on the shoulders of Nehru (1988: 166). Azad was a Nationalist 
Muslim who became President of the Congress twice, and retained the position during 1939-1946 as Congress 
was banned and most of its leaders imprisoned.
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actors or to deny the diversity within the movements. This is merely an attempt to make 
manageable the unmanageable. In so doing I have both reinforced and challenged 
existing history on the pre-independence period.
The conclusions reached so far indicate that we would expect Congress's institutional 
majoritarian preferences to be borne out in independent India given a) its general 
closeness to the British institutional legacy; b) the willingness of the upper echelons of 
the party to reject a plan which would have secured a united India (in the short term at 
least) in order to create a centralised majoritarian constitution; c) the experience of 
working these structures. However, independent India had a changed religious 
configuration. Muslims remained large in absolute numbers, but had diminished in 
percentage terms. Additionally, they were not territorially concentrated, with the 
significant exception of Kashmir and therefore could not be accommodated within 
federal structures. Chapter Five discusses the extent to which continuities existed 
between the two periods, and to what extent they were dictated by this changed 
demography and geography.
It is more problematic to use the scores and preferences of the League to predict the 
constitutional make up of independent Pakistan. The Muslim League rejected British 
majoritarian constitutions. However, this was in a situation where they were in a 
minority overall and had to reconcile the tensions between the territorially concentrated 
majorities and dispersed minorities throughout the rest of India, especially the northern 
United Provinces. Additionally, unlike the Congress, the Muslim League had not 
boycotted the institutions, acquiring the experience of working these institutions for 
longer than Congress members. An analysis of post-independence constitutional 
formation in Pakistan must inevitably take these factors, but especially the changed 
religious configuration, into account.
These issues will be revisited in Chapter Five. Before these issues can be addressed, the 
motivations behind the differing scores, not only between the organisations, but also 
within them, have to be evaluated. This is the subject of Chapter Four - to elucidate the 
more complex positions on attitudes towards federation and consociationalism as 
institutions to structure ethnic conflict regulation, as well as their attitudes towards the 
type of units within these systems.
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Chapter Four: Practical politics of federal design in pre- 
independence Indian politics 1916-1946
'Federalism is the ideal solution acclaimed by Indians of all parties and shades of opinion, but it is no 
less true that the kind of federation envisaged by the Viceroy and the British Parliament will bring to
India not peace but a sword' (Pole 1939: 206).
'Centralisation as a system is inconsistent with non-violent structure of society ... Centralisation cannot 
be sustained and defended without adequate force' Gandhi in 1942, (quoted in Barua 1984: 79).
'Since the Reforms of 1919 introduced responsible government to some extent, the linguistic and cultural 
diversities in these provinces have come to the fore' (Sharma 1932: 191).
4.1. Introduction
The position of the British Government, the Congress and the League as parties in a 
'triangular relationship' has been evaluated (Mansergh 1999: 6). This chapter has 
narrower objectives. We have seen that there are methodological limitations in 
comparing the positions of these three organisations over time. This is not because of 
changes in policy, which the analysis is designed to identify, but because to speak of a 
'party line' is problematic. The Congress was a centralised and disciplined organisation 
but had several major disputes within its ranks112 . While the issue of federalism was not 
one of them, it serves to illustrate the difficulties in assessing organisational coherence. 
There are even more difficulties in portraying the Muslim League as a unified 
organisation, even though its leadership was more stable. Unlike the Congress which 
changed its President annually113 , Jinnah became, in JalaPs terminology, 'the sole 
spokesman'. He was the Muslim League's most vocal spokesman at the all-India level, 
contrasting sharply with the Congress Party's many prominent all-India leaders. Yet the 
League was riven with divisions. Sole spokesman notwithstanding, the League was 
polarised between the priorities of the Muslim majority and the Muslim minority 
provinces.
This chapter contextualises the debates through discussing the major differences 
between the Muslim League and the Congress, but also the areas on which there was 
most agreement. I do not discuss the British Government's preferences as the manner 
in which they structured the debate has already been covered. My scoring formula 
demonstrated that it was not possible to identify a specific legacy in the field of federal
112 Over the issue of the boycott and non-cooperation with the Bndsh constitutional structures and over the 
issue of whether to accept Dominion Status or call for complete independence.
113 Azad's long tenure was because of the incarceration of the Congress leaders during the war.
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design (as opposed to the recognition of the need for a federal structure of government 
to rule the subcontinent). The British 'winner-takes-all' system of federation appealed 
to the Congress while the concern of the British with segmenting and dividing 
communities appealed to the League. I also exclude discussion of the Princes, Akali 
Dal, National Liberals, Unionists, Hindu Mahasabha and Red Shirts. Talbot argues that
An analysis which ignores the emergence of other regional or communal parties 
inevitably glosses over the compromises which the bearers of Indian and Pakistan 
nationalism had to make with ascriptive loyalties. It also leaves the reader to 
puzzle over their resurgence since independence (2000: 111).
The point is valid and I do not seek to marginalise the importance of these movements. 
However, I cannot take account of their preferences in the macro analysis deployed 
here. This chapter's purpose is to unpack the macro-level analysis of Chapter Three. In 
so doing it achieves two objectives.
One: it evaluates the attitudes of the Congress and League towards federalism as a 
concept. In Chapter One, federalism was defined as a commitment to the self- 
government of a people through the division of sovereignty between at least two 
territorially defined levels of government. The term federation in contrast, defines a 
specific political system within the genus of federal political systems, which may or 
may not be democratic. In evaluating the attitude of the Congress and League to 
federalism, the distinction between a unitary and federal form of government (as 
opposed to centralised and decentralised forms of government) is vital. Within the 
history of the period it is common to read that 1935 was the first federation of India 
(e.g. Wheare 1963: 32; Sharma 1976: 60; Barua 1984: 56). This is false114 . Chapter 
One demonstrated that federations as forms of government are diverse. Federations are 
not necessarily the most decentralised forms of government - what is important in 
defining a federation is the division of sovereignty between at least two territorially 
defined levels of government, NOT how much sovereignty is devolved. The perception 
that Congress was in favour of a unitary state and the League in favour of a federation is 
similarly false.
Two: this chapter evaluates the attitudes of Congress and League towards federal 
design - concentrating on federation as a structure of government. The specific element
114 1919 was the first constitution with a federal division of sovereignty between the centre and the provinces.
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of federal design of importance to my analysis is that of the composition of the units 
within the federation. This is one of my intervening variables to explain the 
comparative success of federalism in the sub-continent; that homogeneous units 
promote security, intra-elite competition and division of the dominant group. The 
attitude of the Congress to linguistic reorganisation is well documented (Roy 1965: 217- 
220; King 1997: 52-73). Not so commonly appreciated, especially given the anathema 
to the subject post-independence, is the Congress's acceptance of the religious 
reorganisation of Sind in the 1928 Nehru Report. The Muslim League's position with 
regard to federal design, in contrast, has not been explicitly commented on in the 
literature. This omission is surprising because whether Jinnah sought an independent 
Pakistan (orthodox historians), or security within a united India (revisionist historians), 
both strategies involved a degree of religious organisation of units. The partition of the 
subcontinent involved the division of the Punjab and Bengal on religious lines, although 
Jinnah resisted the logic of the argument until the bitter end. If the revisionists' position 
is accepted, then Jinnah's desire to be 'safe' within a united India demanded provincial 
reorganisation and power sharing for religiously defined provinces - as he accepted in 
1929 and Iqbal demanded in 1930.
4.2. Attitudes towards federalism as a concept
Federalism expresses itself as a division of sovereignty between two levels of 
territorially defined government. While a commitment to federalism cannot be 
separated from its governmental form, in the period under discussion both Congress and 
the League accepted the need for a federation, and advocated federal forms of 
government. This is an important point to make. Although they disagreed over specific 
forms of federation, specifically over the scale and depth of the powers of the federal 
government, this should not be taken to mean that either party officially advocated a 
unitary form of government in the plans discussed, although some individuals within the 
Congress did115 . The commitment to a federal system of government, as argued, can be 
partially accounted for by the fact that the parties worked within a British institutional 
framework. This framework was initially based around autonomous presidencies,
115 There is evidence of members from the southern provinces advocating unitary structures of government, as 
did Mr C N Muthuranga Mudaliar, head of the Reception Committee for the 1927 Madras Congress, who 
maintained that "Federal Government... will be peculiarly unsuitable to India with its revived sense of 
solidarity' Welcome address at the 42nd Session of the ENC at Madras Dec 26-8 1927, (reproduced in Zaidi and 
Zaidi 1980a: 226).
- 104-
which gradually came under central control. After the uprising of 1857 India moved 
towards a formally federal constitution. This movement was dictated by the practical 
demands of decision-making over a wide geographical area, which caused difficulties 
for quick and effective communication, culminating in the 1919 Act. In this the British 
borrowed and adapted Mughal institutions of governance, but were also influenced by 
the experience of the other colonies. Federation was also a mechanism of preserving 
British power - provincial self-government was less threatening to the Raj than 
democratic control of the centre.
Congress Party
The Congress was initially suspicious of federal structures of government, especially 
under the 1919 Act. It was concerned that the British sought to pursue a policy of 
divide and rule using the provincial governments. It also worried that federation was a 
mechanism to thwart self-government in the absence of real power at the centre - an 
accurate perception of Britain's intentions. It is important to stress that the Congress 
did not reject the 1919 Act because of its concession of provincial autonomy116 . It 
rejected it because under the system of dyarchy; only a few select powers were 
transferred to the Indian ministers in the provinces. The remainder resided in the hands 
of the provincial Governor-in-Council (Sitaramayya 1935: 208). The fact that Congress 
did not oppose the federal provisions is illustrated by the fact that in 1924, Motilal 
Nehru - a prominent Swarajist 117 - advocated the extension of provincial powers and 
revenues (Sharma 1976: 122).
Congress's acceptance of the need for federation was exactly the same as the British - 
practical. The size and diversity of India required it, and Congress had also been 
influenced by the experience of the colonies. Besant, as Congress President in 1917, 
called for 'A Bill...establishing self-government in India on lines resembling those of 
the Commonwealth' (Sitaramayya 1935: 247). Additionally, its internal party 
organisation after 1908 was structured around Provincial Congress Committees (PCCs), 
and after 1920, linguistically defined PCCs at that. Even though the All India Congress
110 On the contrary, the 19th resolution at the 1915 Congress session had called for self-government 'by 
introduction of Provincial Autonomy' (Sitaramayya 1935: 208).
117 The name of a faction within the Congress who sought to disrupt the 1919 Act by contesting elections and 
seekina to undermine the institutions from within, rather than pursuing the Gandhian policy of non-co­ 
operation.
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from the centre. Unlike the Congress who viewed the concession of power at the 
provincial level as a negative mechanism of maintaining the Raj, elements within the 
Muslim League were content with provincial autonomy within a British controlled 
federation precisely because of the dangers of a Hindu Raj. The League's attitude 
towards federalism was therefore more complex than that of the Congress.
The 'community' around which the Muslim League mobilised can be split at its most 
basic into those living in provinces primarily populated by Muslims - North West 
Frontier Province, Punjab and Bengal120, and those in which they were a minority; 
United Provinces and Bihar being the two most prominent. Unlike the Congress that 
proclaimed to represent all Indians, the League had a narrower base. Until the late 
1930s it could only claim to represent those Muslims in Hindu majority provinces. As 
federalism is a device best suited for regulating ethnic conflict when groups are 
territorially concentrated, federal structures of government offered no immediate 
security for Muslim minorities in a province. Therefore, Jinnah and others in the 
Muslim minority provinces were initially just as centralist as those in the Congress121 . 
It subscribed to a more decentralised federation only as a strategy to co-opt the Muslim 
majority provinces into the League (Jalal 1985: 54).
The difference in political aims among the majority and minority Muslim provinces was 
not immediately apparent. Demands for representation at the centre, a consociational 
mechanism, additionally served the interests of the Muslims in Muslim majority 
provinces, as well as those in provinces dominated by Hindus. This was because 
federal structures of government did not guarantee Muslim interests within an all-India 
setting. Similarly, demands for the creation of separate electorates and reserved seats 
(also priorities for Muslim minorities) promoted Punjabi and Bengali Muslim's 
interests, a majority in their respective provinces, but only just. For the Muslim 
majority provinces there was no necessary incompatibility between federal and 
consociational elements within the League's proposed plans, although those in the 
Punjab and Bengal sought reserved seats to maintain their majority status. Although 
there was no necessary incompatibility between the elements, many Muslims living in 
Muslim majority provinces perceived one.
120 Baluchistan was a British protectorate rather than a province and Sind was not a separate province until
1936.
121 Jinnah hailed from the Bombay Presidency, in the area that is now the Indian State ot Gujarat.
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It had always been the contention of Muhammad Shafi 122 that Muslim majorities, 
particularly where they were narrow as in Punjab and Bengal, were being 
sacrificed in order to get more seats for Muslims than were due to them on the 
basis of their population in Hindu majority provinces (Sayeed 1968: 65).
However, while consociational elements protected the Muslim minorities' interests, and 
their leaders extended the same courtesy to Hindu and Sikh minorities in the Muslim 
majority provinces, the issue of residual powers and religious re-organisation of 
provinces did not serve the Muslim minorities' interests. In this CWC member, 
Sitaramayya was incorrect (1935: 811). He implausibly argued that Muslims wanted 
residuary powers in the provinces so as to 'deal effectively with Provinces having a 
majority of Hindus which might ill treat the Muslims'. He was standing the logic on its 
head - residuary powers were useless in these provinces precisely because they could be 
turned against the Muslim minorities.
These tensions between the consociational and federal variables identified in Chapter 
Three were revealed in the position of Jinnah towards a federation. Hailing from a 
Muslim minority province, from which most of the League's support came123 , he was 
more orientated towards securing power at the centre than those in the majority 
provinces, already relatively secure in their position. This did not preclude his support 
for a federation - although Jalal argues he was lukewarm to the idea personally (1985: 
13). In this he was similar to many of the Congress High Command. This changed in 
1929 when Jinnah's 14 points envisaged no change in the constitution without the 
concurrence of the provinces - a federal provision. This was a sure sign of his change 
in strategy. Jinnah still had a very different conception of federation to Shafi. Within a 
weak federation, favoured by the Muslim majority provinces, strong Muslim provinces 
would ensure that the Muslim League would be the servant not the master. In Jinnah's 
opinion, Muslim minorities needed a strong centre to achieve power and patronage 
(Jalal 1985: 51).
The change in the fortunes of the Muslim League came after the 1937 elections when 
the Congress gained majority control of five provinces and the Muslim League suffered
122 The leader of a faction of the Muslim League that broke away over the issue of boycotting the Simon 
Commission in 1928 - Ms faction saw advantage in co-operating with the British rather than the Congress.
123 Other entities captured the vote in die Muslim majority provinces - such as the Unionist Part}' in Punjab and 
Red Shirts in North West Frontier Province.
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an electoral debacle. Following Congress's success the Muslim majority provinces 
came to accept that they needed security at the centre. They turned away from 
territorial segmental autonomy as their sole strategy. 'No juggling of the political 
arithmetic could prevent safe provincial Muslim majorities from being turned into an 
ineffectual minority at the centre' (Jalal 1985: 52). It is at this point that Jinnah's 
consociational and the majority province's federal strategies coalesced strongly, and the 
League became an effective mobilising force, centralising control of its organisation in 
a manner similar to Congress.
Although Jinnah vociferously rejected the 1935 Act, firstly for its inclusion of the
1 9.J.Princes , and then for its benefiting the Congress 'agenda' (despite Congress's 
denunciation of the Act in even more virulent tones than the League), he did not reject 
the federal form. This is important to reiterate. A united Indian federation was still 
supported by the Muslim League even after Congress gained an absolute majority in 
five out of the eleven provinces in the 1937 elections. The Muslim League suffered an 
embarrassing defeat - securing only 108 out of the 482 Muslim seats and not securing a 
majority in any province (Mansergh 1999: 9). Despite this, at the 25th Session of the All 
India Muslim League in 1937, Resolution II stated that
The object of the AIML shall be the establishment in India of full independence 
in the form of federation of free democratic States in which the rights and 
interests of the Musalmans and other minorities are adequately and effectively 
safeguarded in the Constitution125 .
Therefore, the League's diminishing commitment to an all-India federation cannot be 
attributed simply to the Congress's rejection of coalition ministries. Congress had 
promised a coalition with the Muslim League in the United Provinces, but was so 
successful it reneged on the deal. This was not merely a partisan communal decision or 
one confirming Congress's belief in the Westminster system of government - Muslims 
in the Congress Party opposed such a coalition to preserve their own positions (Hasan 
1993: 13). The actions of the Congress convinced many in the League of the dangers of 
a majoritarian federation. The allegations included the singing of the anti-Muslim song 
Bcmde Mataram and discrimination against Muslim culture and Muslims in
124 On the grounds that this would bring an undemocratic force into a constitution which was supposed to be 
movin<J in a more democratic and inclusive direction.
125 AIML '5 th Session Lucknow. Oct 15-18 1937, (reproduced in Pirzada 1970: 274).
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appointments. ^Whether or not they were justified, they were believed' (Talbot 1990: 
xvii). At the 26th Session in Patna in 1938, Jinnah argued that;
If the Congress can gain control over the Federal machinery, then, by means of 
direct and indirect powers vested in the Federal Government, the Congress 
would be able to reduce to a nonentity the Government of the Hon'ble Fazul 
Huq in Bengal and the Hon'ble Sir Sikander Hayat Khan in the Punjab 
(reproduced in Pirzada 1970: 309).
In 1939 events had reached such a state that the Muslim League declared that it was 
Irrevocably opposed to any 'federal objective' which must necessarily result in a 
majority community rule under the guise of democracy and parliamentary system of 
government' 126). The Lahore Declaration of 1940 demanding independent sovereign 
states in the northeast and northwest parts of India was not a 'short step' away from the 
formation of the Congress Ministries, but a result of their controversial actions, 
especially in the United Provinces which the Pirpur Report detailed in 1939 127 .
While the Muslim League expressed its dissatisfaction with a united Indian federation, 
the Lahore Resolution supported a federal form. It called for independent and sovereign 
autonomous states, 'grouped' together. After 1940, League pronouncements on the 
form of a federation in an independent Pakistan were vague. The imperative was to 
retain unity within its ranks. 'As long as Pakistan remained unachieved, all Muslims 
were supposed to subordinate their personal and ideological differences to the national 
goal' (Sayeed 1968: 180). However, in 1945 in an interview to the Associated Press of 
America Jinnah stated that the units of a federation of Pakistan would 'have all the 
autonomy that you will find in the constitutions of the United States of America, 
Canada and Australia' (cited in Pirzada 1970: xxxi).
Building on the British legacy, the Muslim League had an eminently practical purpose 
in subscribing to the federal idea. It was committed to it as a mechanism of minority 
protection for provincial Muslim majorities, in conjunction with consociational 
mechanisms at the centre. The actions of the Congress ministries after 1937 convinced 
many within the movement of the limitations of such a strategy, given the large Hindu
126 Emergency Meeting of the Working Committee of the All India Muslim League 17 th -18th September 1939, 
New Delhi, (reproduced in Pirzada 1970: 310).
12 ' The Lahore Resolution was also prompted by Viceroy Lithlingow, who pushed the Muslim League to come 
up with a statement on its aims in an attempt to 'prove' that Congress's call for immediate independence and a 
constituent assembly was not representative of the whole of India (Jalal 1985: 48).
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majority at the all-India level. Jinnah, through articulating the demand for Pakistan 
(although the Lahore Resolution never mentioned the word), sought to secure 
consociational security at the centre as well as more autonomy for the provinces (as 
seen by the Muslim League's acceptance of the Cabinet Mission Plan).
Neither the Congress nor the League felt able to reject the federal idea. Both recognised 
the necessities that drove the British to adopt the framework. As the League and the 
Congress both advocated democratic and federal forms of government, it is necessary to 
unpack the conflict between the two organisations' preferences further. Both federalism 
and democracy can be majoritarian or consociational. An understanding of the conflicts 
between the two parties can be best understood by employing this consociational- 
majoritarian dimension. This dimension also facilitates a comparison of the 
constitutions that were adopted after independence. Structurally it is easier to split the 
following discussion into these two dimensions. This follows from the line of reasoning 
in Chapter Three that established that the Muslim League's preferences were for a more 
consociational federation than that of the Congress.
4.3. What were the differences concerning federal provisions?
With regard to formally federal provisions, Congress and the League were remarkably 
similar - differing only on the issue of the location of residual powers. Should these 
powers be with the centre or in the provinces - 'a very important question and the crux 
of the whole problem' (Sharma 1932: 210). The differences over this issue go to the 
heart of the debate between League and Congress, but also between different sections of 
the League. The two parties agreed over the issue of reorganisation of provinces, 
although they had different priorities. In terms of other federal provisions such as the 
representation of provinces in the bicameral legislature, the Muslim League maintained 
silence and Congress only addressed it in the Nehru Report - supporting a majoritarian 
set up. Issues of a written constitution and Supreme Court were also not controversial.
Congress generally opposed residual powers being allocated to the provincial units of a 
federation. While it did not seek to dispute the rights of these provinces to be effective 
units of governance, it did not accord them pride of place in the governance of the state 
as a whole. The Congress Party was far more concerned with power at the centre and
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the Nehru Report rejected the allocation of residual powers to provinces. Although the 
CWC compromised in a 1931 resolution128 arguing that '(t)he future constitution of the 
country shall be federal. The residuary power shall vest in the federating units, unless, 
on further examination, it is found to be against the best interests of India ', the 
emphasis added by Gandhi was the significant part of this statement (Sitaramayya 1935: 
808). At the Second RTC, convened to determine the future constitution of India under 
British rule, the Congress remained implacably opposed to the location of residual 
powers in the provinces. The lack of agreement between the Congress and the League 
over the issue ensured that the Government of India Act 1935 fudged the issue - Article 
104 (1). It left the subject of 'non-elucidated' (therefore residual) powers at the 
discretion of the Governor General - therefore effectively in the hands of the centre. 
However, in 1942 after the Congress rejected the Cripps Mission, the AICC adopted the 
'Quit India' resolution that included the statement,
The Provisional Government will evolve a scheme for a Constituent Assembly 
which will prepare a constitution for the Government of India acceptable to all 
sections of the people. The Constitution according to the Congress view should 
be a federal one, with the largest measure of autonomy for the federating units, 
and with the residuary powers vesting in these units. Bombay August 7-8 - my 
emphasis - (reproduced in Zaidi and Zaidi 198la: 392).
This resolution did not include the caveat of 'the best interests of India' noted above and 
therefore marked a departure from the more cautious position adopted previously. This 
departure can be explained by the fact that Cripps had changed the parameters within 
which the 'communal problem' would be decided, by allowing provinces to secede. 
Although Cripps 'tried to defend his position by pointing out that the right was given to 
a Province as a whole and not to any particular community' (Azad 1988: 60), this was 
the first time the British Government had officially recognised that an independent India 
might not be a united one. Congress was thus accepting the provincial location of 
residual powers as an attempt to 'solve' the communal problem without separation, and 
concerned to build as broad support for immediate British withdrawal as possible. This 
preference changed once British withdrawal became imminent.
Congress later reluctantly accepted the CMP in 1946, which left the centre with only 
three powers, foreign affairs, currency and defence. This was the only constitutional
128 Bombay July 7-12 (reproduced in Zaidi and Zaidi 1980b: 193). 
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plan signed up to by the Congress involving other parties in which it accepted that 
residual powers should reside in the provinces. Despite this, the Congress strongly 
argued for the power of taxation to the centre to fund these subjects - an argument 
strongly resisted by the League. Congress's acceptance of the Mission's Plan ran 
contrary to its established constitutional preferences and ultimately Nehru undermined 
the plan, in order, at the very least, to give the Congress freedom of manoeuvre in future 
constitutional formation129 . The division of powers and location in the provinces was 
an important part of the problem with this Plan for the Congress. While some within 
the party were prepared to concede a confederal formula to keep India intact, others 
such as Nehru were not. The issue of residual powers was an important element 
undermining the acceptance of the CMP, possibly as important as the issue of executive 
formation. The preferences of the Congress as expressed at the Second RTC in 1931 
won through in the end, ultimately leading to the partition of India.
The position of the Muslim League was very different. The Muslim minority provinces 
(where most of the League's support was concentrated) and the Muslim majority 
provinces (where the League hoped to expand its support), obviously had very different 
concerns. Although their priorities were not necessarily antithetical to one another's, 
they had the potential to be. The location of residual powers was one of these issues.
Residual powers were a demand suited to the needs of the Muslim majority provinces 
that would gain more autonomy from the centre with which to enhance their security. 
For those Muslims in a minority, residual powers for provinces predominantly 
populated by another religious group, did not enhance their security and potentially 
undermined it. The security promoted or diminished by the location of residual powers 
is, of course, dependent upon which powers are allocated to the centre and the 
provinces, and how the courts will regulate their use. Jinnah's initial concern with the 
needs of the Muslim minorities ensured he did not call for the provincial location of 
residual powers until after the publication of the Nehru Report. The Nehru Report 
rejected his 1927 concession to abolish separate electorates because of the 'strings' 
attached to it. In return for this concession Jinnah had demanded representation in the
129 Nehru's answer to a question at the Press Conference of 10th July 1946, that Congress would enter the 
Constituent Assembly 'completely unfettered by agreements and free to meet all situations as they arise' 
(quoted in Azad 1988: 164), is the subject of much debate amongst orthodox and revisionist historians. The 
onlv nossible effect this statement could have had on the attitude of the Muslim League was to undermine theonly possible effect
whole of the Cabinet Mission Plan.
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Bengal and Punjab provincial legislatures according to population (so that the Muslims 
would receive a slight majority of seats in each case), a mutual veto at the centre and 
that in the central legislature Muslim representation should not be less than one third130 .
In the absence of Congress accommodating Jinnah's demands on securing rights for the 
Muslim minorities,
(b)y the late nineteen twenties the demands of the Muslim provinces, the Punjab 
in particular, had swamped Jinnah's centralist strategy. Jinnah the nationalist 
concerned with securing a share of power for Muslims at a strong centre, had to 
recognise the forces of provincialism and appear to come out in favour of a weak 
federal structure (Jalal 1985: 10).
The demand that residual powers be allocated to provinces coincided with the demands 
for the separation of Sind from Bombay and the recognition of Baluchistan and North 
West Frontier Province as Governor's Provinces. The demand for residual powers must 
therefore be viewed in the context of promoting further provincial autonomy for 
Muslim majority provinces. Jinnah, in short, was changing strategy. In the language of 
consociationalism and federalism, it marked a change from seeking segmental 
autonomy and consociational executive power-sharing in a strong centre, to seeking 
territorially defined autonomy and a weaker centre (while not abandoning power 
sharing).
Significantly Iqbal backed up the demand for a territorial solution in 1930, calling for 
independent Muslim states (as part of India). Following on from the 14 points, Iqbal 
demanded that,
The Muslims of India can have no objection to purely territorial electorates131 if 
provinces are demarcated so as to secure comparatively homogeneous 
communities possessing linguistic, racial, cultural and religious unity.
130 His other conditions were: a) Sind to be constituted as a separate province, b) Baluchistan and the North 
West Frontier Province to become full Governor's provinces, c) the Muslim majority provinces of Sind, North 
West Frontier Province and Baluchistan were to concede over-representation of Hindu minorities in the same 
manner as Hindu ma]ority provinces did to Muslims. None of these were controversial. It is significant that he 
did NOT include the demand for residual powers in tins list. It is also significant dial die 1927 Congress 
Madras Session had accepted the demand for majority reservation in the Punjab and the Bengal and the mutual 
veto (.Pirzada 1969: Ix).
131 E a abandoning separate electorates.
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As Jinnah had done he included the caveat that 'what is called 'residuary powers' must 
be left entirely to self-governing States'. In so doing he was articulating a federal 
solution to the 'communal problem132 . Jalal argues that Iqbal's statement was part of a 
centralised federal strategy (1985: 12). Jinnah's changed preference for the location of 
residual powers undermines the credibility of this statement. At the RTC, the Muslim 
League refused to budge on this issue.
4.4. Differences concerning consociational federal provisions
While there was one, albeit significant difference over the formal federal provisions 
between the Congress and the League, the primary disagreement concerned the degree 
of consociationalism. This is why Sharma concentrates his analysis upon a discussion 
of factors affecting the/ora? of the Indian federation - separate electorates and reserved 
seats (1932: 210). These two issues, together with the issue of mutual veto rights for a 
minority in the executive, were sacrosanct for the League, and all three appear in all the 
plans the League signed up to or advocated. Congress was not as consistent. These 
issues were vitally important to the League because a federal system does not guarantee 
protection for minorities except within a province in which they are a comfortable (as 
opposed to a bare) majority. Even with control of a province, a community in a 
minority in the country as a whole is not guaranteed sufficient representation, let alone 
an effective voice in decision-making at the centre. This is why the needs of the 
Muslim majority and Muslim minority provinces were not antithetical in all respects 
and when Jinnah moved towards a federal strategy to accommodate the Muslim 
majority provinces, consociational elements remained important.
Both separate electorates and reserved seats would have guaranteed a certain level of 
representation at the centre (and in the provinces), although they would not guarantee an 
effective voice in decision-making. This is why the demand for the mutual veto was 
significant. Although there were differences of approach between the Congress and the 
League over the issue of reserved seats, the Congress accepted reserved seats in all three 
plans it signed up to during this period. Even the Nehru Report accepted them 
reluctantly, arguing that
: Iqbal AIML 21 st Session Allahabad Dec 29-30 1930 (reproduced in Pirzada 1970: 161-162).
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for various reasons of expediency, such reservation was recommended for a time 
to serve as a transitional stage ... The idea was that during the interval the 
distrust of one community of the other would be very much lessened if not 
altogether removed (1928: 38).
Congress also expanded the use of reserved seats for untouchables after the Communal 
Award of Ramsay MacDonald in 1932 bestowed separate electorates on the 
untouchable community. To prevent untouchables being classified separately from the 
rest of Hindus, Gandhi undertook a hunger strike. The resulting compromise was the 
Poona Pact between Gandhi and Ambedkar, which abolished separate electorates for 
untouchables while allocating them a larger number of reserved seats 1.133
In contrast to Congress's pragmatic but grudging concession of reserved seats, these 
reserved seats were indispensable for the Muslim League, featuring in all its plans - a 
precondition for legislative weightage and linked also to separate electorates. This issue 
of reserved seats was central to Jinnah's strategy of reinforcing the Muslim position at 
the centre. In a majoritarian political system even those with a guaranteed reservation 
of seats could be excluded from power. Yet reserved seats and guaranteed 
representation would have made it much harder for them to have been so, especially had 
the Muslims secured one-third representation in the central legislature. Therefore one- 
third reservation at the centre was not a trivial demand, but one that was central to 
Jinnah's strategy, especially if parties were split along religious lines 134 .
Congress rejected the one-third demand in no uncertain terms.
They cannot be allowed reservation over and above that proportion (of their 
population) in the central legislature (we cannot) ... recommend reservation of 
one third of the total number of seats for Muslims in the central legislature 
(Nehru 1928: 54).
The Nehru Report also rejected the reservation of seats for the Muslims in Punjab and 
Bengal on the basis of population (which would have given them a slim majority). It
133 It is significant that despite Gandhi and Congress's protestations of representing the whole of the Indian 
'nation", Gandhi did not see their abolition for Muslims as a fasting issue, precisely because of his limited 
support within the Muslim as opposed to the Harijan community.
134 In 1946 Jinnah was more concerned to secure the grouping of provinces and the allocation of residual 
powers to these provinces. At this stage, legislative weightage was not such a prominent issue and it did not
feature in the CMP.
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did so on the ground that 'reservation for a majority is indefensible' (1928: 39), despite 
Congress's acceptance of the demand the year previously.
Separate electorates were the second element on which the Muslim League was 
adamant it would not compromise, at least in the absence of the safeguards laid down in 
1927. The Congress Party was opposed to their use as seen in the intractable language 
used in the Nehru Report. Despite this Congress conceded their use in 1916 and again 
in 1946 - the separate electorates being one of the least contentious issues in the latter. 
They did not jump at Jinnah's offer to scrap them in return for one-third representation 
at the centre and residual powers to the provinces in 1927. This does not mean that they 
were not important - separate electorates undermined the basis of Congress's ideology: 
India as a united nation. The fact that it did not jump at the chance to scrap them 
suggests that Congress's belief in united nationhood was subservient to other matters - 
namely its own level of representation and control of the centre.
The third element on which the Muslim League did not compromise was that of the 
mutual veto. This was a consociational demand. It was the Congress Party at its 4th 
Congress in 1888 that decided that 'no subject shall be passed for discussion by the 
Subjects Committee to the introduction of which the Hindu or Muslim delegates as a 
body object unanimously or nearly so.' The proportion of objectors was fixed at three 
quarters and it was adopted in the Congress's constitution in 1908 (Sitaramayya 1935: 
87). It was designed to encourage Muslims to join the organisation (in this it largely 
failed). Given this provision within the Congress's organisation and the rationale for its 
inclusion therein, the question must be asked, why was this provision excluded from the 
Nehru Report despite Jinnah's insistence that it be included? It had been confirmed by 
the Congress at the 1927 Congress Madras Session only one year previously, and the 
Nehru Report was set up as an 'all parties' conference.
There are two explanations, both of which carry weight. The first is that the influence 
of the Hindu Mahasabha at the 1928 All Parties Conference cannot be discounted - 
seeking to prevent a Hindu-Muslim rapprochement. Jayakar, the leader of the Hindu 
Mahasabha, argued that even if the concessions Jinnah wanted were granted, Jinnah 
would not be able to bring his followers along with him. The Hindu Mahasabha was a 
small organisation. Despite this, Motilal Nehru and others in the Congress Party were
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sympathetic to some of its ideas precisely because the concession of too many minority 
rights was seen to be antithetical to national unity (and therefore would not serve the 
interests of the minorities either in their opinion). The second explanation is that the 
Congress, sensing that Dominion Status, if not independence, was within its grasp, had 
changed its mind on the art of the possible and was moving towards an even more 
majoritarian framework. Mansergh has argued that to compromise on these issues 
would have undermined Congress's position (1999: 10). Others have argued that Jinnah 
would have been unable to deliver on his promises. A more convincing explanation is 
that Congress was primarily concerned with maintaining its prospective control over the 
centre as a means to promote national unity. This is consistent with the argument put 
forward so far.
The failure of the Nehru Report to accept the amendments proposed by Jinnah led to the 
rapprochement of the Shafi and Jinnah wings of the League. The Shafi wing had 
remained true to the call for separate electorates but was also associated with the 
demands for the Muslim majority provinces. They were closer to the British 
Government (they participated in the discussions held to the Simon Commission) and 
less willing to compromise with the Congress than Jinnah. Barua argues that it was the 
rejection of the Muslim demands in the Nehru Report that led to the League's 
separatism (1984: 65). In contrast, the constitutional lawyer Noorani, argues that the 
Nehru Report did not make the parting of the ways between the two parties inevitable, 
or otherwise the 1937 elections would not have seen a coalition between the Congress 
and the League (2001: 84). I concur with Noorani.
4.5. Reorganisation of provinces
It has already been argued that the ethnic composition of provinces fits into the 
segmental autonomy category. Yet there is no reason that a unit should contain the 
majority of the population of a particular ethnic group. In many federations such a set 
up would be impossible to achieve for reasons of administrative convenience. In India 
one Hindi-speaking unit would produce a province of 443 million people, or 45% of the 
Indian population (Government of India 2001). In many cases there would be a lack of 
territorial contiguity. Additionally, it would create problems for fair and equitable 
representation in the central legislature if the units were greatly different in population
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J35size . Finally, having total segmentation along territorial and community lines (one 
ethnic group = one unit) is not particularly conducive to national integration - especially 
if huge disparities in representation exist. However, if an ethnic group is subdivided 
between more than one unit, it diminishes the elite's ability to speak for and control 
their ethnic group, said to be vital for a successful consociational settlement.
Whether or not an ethnic group is located within one unit of a federation, the fact 
remains that homogeneous units permit an ethnic group control over issues on the 
provincial list of powers. Provincial lists usually include functions such as education, 
language policy and law and order as well as control over local taxation (although the 
extent of provincial autonomy differs substantially between federal systems). As 
already discussed in Chapter One, the ethnic compositions of the units of a federation 
are important for the stability of the federation. This is for two reasons. Firstly because 
recognition of the legitimacy of a group's identity, permitting it institutional expression 
is indicative of an inclusive state strategy in relation to the particular identity 
recognised136 . The negotiation of the basis of unit demarcation and the politics of that 
demarcation are thus also negotiations about the identity of the state' (Rajagopalan 
2001: 14). The second reason why the effective number of ethnic groups at the 
provincial level affects the stability of a federation is that it influences the extent to 
which in a democratic federation a chance to gain power at the provincial level 
increases intra-ethnic competition. This intra-ethnic competition is reflected in the party 
system.
Congress Party
Congress was favourably disposed towards the reorganisation of provinces before 
independence despite its majoritarian preferences in other areas of constitution 
formation. This confirms the above point that concessions regarding ethnic units are 
not necessarily related to consociationalism. Contrary to popular history, it was not 
implacably opposed to reorganisation of provinces along religious grounds as seen in
135 In the lower chamber, large difficulties in population size create large differences in representation, which 
are not conducive to the smooth operation of a federation given the potential for one large province to cut-vote 
all others. In the upper chamber the same problem would occur if provinces were represented according to 
population strength. If the more common set up were adopted, where provinces are represented equally, this 
can lead to charges of inequity if the small provinces can out vote the larger one e.g. Sikkim in India has a 
population of 540 493 while Uttar Pradesh has 166 million (Government of India 2001).
136 This is not necessarily the case however. Federalism is still maligned in South Africa because of its 
association with the apartheid 'homelands' concept (as is consociation). It is also maligned because ol 
'manufacturing identities 1 .
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the 1928 Nehru Report. This historical misperception arose because of Congress's 
opposition to the 1905 partition of Bengal along religious lines as well as the attitudes 
of Jawaharlal Nehru to the demand for the reorganisation of the Punjab after 
independence. Congress's opposition to the Bengal partition was not entirely related to 
its secular stance. Congress rejected the perception of India as divided communally, but 
it also saw the partition as a mechanism to divide and weaken the politically active 
Hindu population in Bengal. Additionally, it was concerned that educated Hindus in the 
province were being 'cut off from obtaining service positions in Calcutta and elsewhere 
in the west' (Schwartzberg 1978: 217). The fact that Congress was not irrevocably 
opposed to the creation of Muslim majority provinces is borne out by the fact that in the 
1920s the Congress adopted a more complex attitude towards religiously defined 
provinces. The Nehru Report of 1928 sanctioned the creation of Sind on religious lines. 
Although the creation of Sind is often cited as a linguistically motivated reorganisation, 
the Report specifically talked of communal criteria, and separately included a discussion 
of the Sind question in an annex at the back of the report rather than in the section on 
the creation of an Oriya speaking province (which it also sanctioned). Additionally it 
justified the creation of Sind on the basis of self-determination, on the grounds that the 
Commission has 'yet to know that a single Musalman opposes it' (Nehru 1928: 66). 
Sharma, a contemporary source, claimed that '(t)he Nehru Committee while deploring 
the communal tinge that has unnecessarily been given to the question of Sind, conceded 
the Muslim demand on this point' (1932: 321). The Nehru Report also sanctioned the 
creation of Governor's provinces of the Muslim majority provinces of the North West 
Frontier Province and Baluchistan - although not creating new provinces along 
religious lines, it was sanctioning an increase in existing powers.
Congress's acceptance of some of the details of the CMP was half hearted at best 
(residual powers to the grouping of provinces and the compulsory nature of this 
grouping) and downright hostile to others (the formula for deciding Muslim 
representation in the executive). It was not however implacably opposed to the 
grouping ideal, although it opposed Jmnah's original demand of a bipolar federation. 
1946 was not the first time Congress had accepted groupings. In 1939 Gandhi had 
instructed the Congress not to oppose Sikander Hyat Khan's plan that operated upon a 
similar 'grouping' assumption. While it must be conceded that Congress was not
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unreservedly advocating these religious reorganisations, rather responding to demands 
from the Muslim community, it was not opposed to these reorganisations.
Congress was by contrast deeply committed to the principle of linguistic reorganisation. 
There were long standing demands within the Congress Party, initially relating to the 
1894 demand for the creation of Bihar from the province of Bengal (Sitaramayya 1935: 
250). In a forerunner of the 1911 British annulment of the partition of Bengal, the 
Congress in 1908 created Bihar as a separate PCC, the same year it restructured the 
AICC to reflect provincial populations in its composition. In 1917 the Congress units of 
Sind and Andhra were created, despite the opposition of Tamil delegates and Annie 
Besant, the Congress President. In 1920 at Nagpur, the Congress reorganised its PCCs 
along linguistic lines, creating twenty-one PCCs with pre-specified provincial 
headquarters and languages. This compared favourably to the nine British Indian 
provinces in existence at this time (AICC 1956: 1).
(W)ide and strong was the belief that for Provincial Autonomy to be successful, 
the medium of instruction as well as administration must be the provincial 
language (Sitaramayya 1935: 250).
Amongst others King claims that Gandhi accepted linguistic reorganisation only 
tactically to ease Muslim reservations about Swaraj in provinces such as Sind and that 
'the Congress support for linguistic boundaries was almost always a consequence of 
other considerations, usually communal in nature' (1997: 61). But this does not ring 
true. Congress's acceptance of linguistic reorganisation of its own organisation had 
nothing to do with communal considerations, and everything to do with a mobilising 
strategy in the struggle for independence. Additionally, 'the Reforms of 1919 having 
considerably changed the form and principle of Indian administration, the necessity of 
redistributing the provinces ha(d) pressed itself on the people' (Sharma 1932: 229).
The systematic restructuring of Congress's organisation and a commitment to linguistic 
reorganisation coincided with Gandhi's rise to prominence in the Congress. Although 
he initially opposed linguistic reorganisation, in 1920 he cited it as one of the four 
principles he held dear137 . It also coincided with Congress becoming a more democratic 
and active organisation (Kaushik 1964: 34). Instead of a three-day annual wonder, it
137 Although he confessed that the reforms were secondary to national reconstruction (Sitaramayya 1935: 320).
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became an organisation 'humming with activity' throughout the year. The link between 
linguistic reorganisation and the Congress's mobilising success was a dynamic one. As 
Manor argues, the fact that Congress was such a broad church had as its corollary the 
need for internal representation, and linguistic reorganisation strengthened the Congress 
in many regions (1990: 29). Low supports this. 'When ... the Congress provinces were 
redrawn they ... helped pave the way for the recruitment of new categories of 
supporters' (1991: 75). The 1920 reorganisation and the general acceptance of the 
legitimacy of the linguistic demand increased the acceptability of the Congress and 
opened its ranks to non-English speaking leaders. Congress's success sprang from its 
ability to mobilise the masses, for which local organisation was required. It linked itself 
tightly into the linguistic movement of India through reorganising its PCCs along 
linguistic lines. Schwartzberg also argues that the location of the Congress Party's 
annual session should be seen as significant. 'After the turn of the century it 
increasingly moved its venue further and further afield' (1978: 220).
The Nehru Report provides the best example of Congress thinking on the matter of 
linguistic reorganisation. Sayeed's allegation that the Congress conceded linguistic 
reorganisation only to counter the concessions made to the Muslims over the creation of 
Sind does not ring true given that Congress had been committed to this course since 
1920 (1968: 69). Following on from the 1927 Congress Resolution stating that the time 
had come for the redistribution of provinces on a linguistic basis and urging the creation 
of Andhra, Utkal (Orissa), Sind and Karnataka138 , the Nehru Report concluded that
if a province is to educate itself and do its daily work through the medium of its 
own language, it must necessarily be a linguistic area ... Language as a rule 
corresponds with a special variety of culture of traditions and literature. In a 
linguistic area all these factors will help in the general progress of the province 
...thus we see that the two most important considerations in rearranging 
provinces are the linguistic principle and the wishes of the majority of the people 
(1928: 62-3).
The political identity of a state is often revealed by the extent of political institutional 
recognition of the different ethnicities within its borders. This can be for ideological 
and/or practical reasons. Congress's attitudes towards linguistic reorganisation were 
extremely practical. In 1938 the CWC while still accepting linguistic reorganisation 
(the AICC had reaffirmed it for the first time in 1937), argued that
138 AICC Resolution Bombay May 15 th-18th 1927, (reproduced in Zaidi and Zaidi 1980a: 262).
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This committee desires to assure the people of the areas concerned that the 
solution of this question would be undertaken as a part of the future scheme of 
the Government of India as soon as the Congress has the power to do so and 
calls upon the people of these areas to desist from any further agitation in this 
behalf which may divert attention from the main issue now before the country 
(my emphasis) (Sitaramayya 1969: 94).
The Congress was to move even further in the direction after independence, so much so 
that Nehru was seen to be 'defending legacies of the old imperial order' (Manor 1990: 
35).
Muslim League
Unlike the Congress who claimed to be a national party, the League's mobilisation 
strategy was premised upon gaining the support of Muslims. Initially Jinnah had been 
concerned to pursue a consociational strategy of gaining power at the centre. He 
subsequently moved towards a territorial autonomy strategy in addition to the 
consociational power sharing strategy - seeking to encourage a religious reorganisation 
of provinces, predicated upon the need to create as many Muslim majority provinces as 
possible.
Their object thereby is to get as much power for their people in the several of 
these provinces as is ultimately decided upon ... to get a large share in the 
federal or central Indian Government by virtue of the number of the provinces 
with Muslim majorities' (Sharma 1932: 236).
The Lahore Resolution also mentioned the possibility of territorial readjustment; 
foreshadowing the partition of Bengal and Punjab either within united India or through 
partition.
(N)o constitution plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to the 
Muslims unless it is designed on the following basic principles, viz, that 
geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so 
constituted, with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary, that the 
areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority, as in the North 
Western and Eastern zones of India, should be grouped to constitute 
Independent States in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and 
sovereign139 .
139 Resolution 1, All India Muslim League Twenty Seventh Session Lahore March 22-24 1940, (reproduced in
Piizada 1970: 341).
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The future Prime Minister of Pakistan, Liaquat All Khan denied that this sentence 
envisaged the division of Bengal and Punjab (Pirzada 1970: xxiii), but it is the only 
plausible interpretation of the statement as territorial expansion would have endangered 
the slim Muslim majority in these provinces. Although the CMP did not recommend 
religious reorganisation, the basis of its plan was provincial groupings - defined along 
communal lines. The League supported these groupings as part of its territorial 
autonomy strategy, and the zones were seen as essential to promoting Muslim security 
(compatible with consociationalism) and preventing partition.
The Muslim League did not have a definite policy on linguistic redistribution of the 
units of the federation, although it was not contrary to its interests. It was not seen to be 
important to the Muslim bargaining position in all-India discussions. In 1924 and 
repeated in 1929, the League argued that,
Any territorial redistribution that might at any time be necessary should not in 
any way affect the Muslim majority in the Punjab, Bengal and the North West 
Frontier Province' (Jinnah 1969).
While not an explicit call for linguistic provinces, this statement took into account the 
Congress demands for linguistic reorganisation, while seeking to ensure that religious 
groupings would not be undermined. Similarly, in 1930, Iqbal argued that
it is clear that, in view of India's infinite variety in climates, races, languages, 
creeds and social systems, the creation of autonomous States based on the unity 
of language, race, history, religion and identity of economic interests, is the only 
possible way to secure a stable constitutional structure in India140 (my emphasis).
However, while the League was not opposed to linguistic reorganisation in Congress 
areas, the call of Suhrawardy, the premier of Bengal in 1946, that 'the units should be as 
far as possible ... workable units and should conform to the conditions of linguistic and 
cultural affinities', (quoted in Pirzada 1970: xxxiii), exposed the tensions which would 
come to plague Pakistan. Jinnah's strategy was predicated on Muslim unity, anything 
which undermined this, especially language and culture, threatened the consociational
140 Presidential Address of All India Muslim League 21 st Session Allahabad Dec 1930, (reproduced in Pirzada
1970: 160).
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elite autonomy he strove so hard to achieve. Linguistic reorganisations that threatened 
Muslim unity were therefore rejected, a policy he continued after independence.
It is significant that the League and Congress were both committed to reorganisation of 
units, but along very different lines. The reorganisation of units along ethnic lines is the 
intervening variable in my analysis. It is important to note here that while Congress did 
not advocate religious reorganisation, it did not oppose it. After independence it 
changed its position, with destabilising consequences. In contrast, the League's post- 
independence position on this variable was more predictable. What is interesting about 
the above discussion on reorganisation of units is how important it was, not only to the 
federal constitutions that they sought to create, but also to the mobilising strategies of 
the two organisations.
4.6. Conclusion
The preceding analysis has unpacked the preferences of the Congress and the League 
over time. Importantly it has established that almost everything was negotiable at one 
time or other, whether this was the issue of residual powers with the Congress Party, or 
the issue of separate electorates with Jinnah and the League. This makes it harder to 
draw substantive conclusions about linkages between pre and post constitutional 
formation. The above caveat notwithstanding, the following conclusions stand.
The first conclusion is that both parties espoused federal forms of government. The 
federal legacy was absolutely entrenched, partially because of the perception that 
federalism was perceived as the only possible institutional configuration to rule such a 
diverse and geographically large country, but also because of the institutional 
experience of working these constitutional forms. Despite the agreement on federal 
structures, the specific form of this federal constitution was subject to much 
disagreement among the parties, and was still 'up for grabs'. The extent to which the 
ethnic composition of the units the elites envisaged working the constitution within 
(which changed after partition) affected the continuity of institutional forms is the 
subject of Chapter Five.
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Congress as a whole was more post-independence orientated than the League; as a self- 
defined national party seeking control of, rather than accommodation within, 
constitutional structures. The desire to supersede the British accounts for the fact that 
the Congress's version of the federal form was a majoritarian one, notwithstanding its 
commitment to a religiously defined mutual veto for its internal organisation, reserved 
seats and linguistic reorganisation. Ironically, it shied away from legislative weightage 
for Muslims, despite the fact that as a 'national' party it would have been able to contest 
these seats and fill some of the weightage itself. Its rejection of weightage was at least a 
partial recognition of the inadequacy of its claim to be national as much as it was its 
self-proclaimed desire to avoid the segmentation of India into different groups. It also 
has to be related to its conception and articulation of national identity. The fact that 
Congress saw federation as being compatible with a majoritarian form of government is 
indicated by the fact that it did not oppose the creation of, or more powers being ceded 
to, Muslim provinces141 . The major exception to this was of course, the partition of 
Bengal, as discussed. Congress's general opposition to residual powers being located in 
the units supports the fact that there were limits to the federal devolution of power it 
would permit - Congress's federal form was a centrist one.
The League's reticence in expounding its position on post-independence arrangements 
is tackled by both the orthodox and the revisionist historians of partition. If the 
orthodox position is accepted then the League's lack of concern with post-independence 
arrangements is attributed to the all-or-nothing commitment to Pakistan. 'If Pakistan 
did not come into existence, all their wider plans were by that very failure rendered 
meaningless' (Mansergh 1999: 59). If the revisionist position of Jalal is accepted, then 
Jinnah's failure to elucidate clearly the constitutional provisions of the new state is 
attributable to his need to avoid clarity in order to keep the maximum number of 
followers on board. This was compatible with the consociational settlement Jinnah 
sought to achieve within a united India, for the success of which elite autonomy was 
vital. This federal consociational strategy sought to secure Muslim representation both 
at the central and provincial levels. While Jinnah's priorities were focused on this aim, 
he actively sought to move towards a territorial autonomy strategy under pressure from 
the Muslim majority provinces, in an attempt to speak for the Muslim 'community'.
141 Althouah not residual powers.
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With the exception of the call for residual powers to be allocated to the provinces this 
was compatible with his consociational strategy, as already outlined.
The third observation is that the reorganisations of units both Congress and the League 
advocated were, in most part, designed to support the parties' organisational strength 
and to accommodate different factions. Congress's claim to be a national organisation 
was realistically predicated more on its ability to accommodate different linguistic 
groups and their elites than it was upon the religious question. In contrast, Jinnah tried 
to be a national force based on solely religious criteria - a much smaller catchment area; 
one quarter of the British Indian population. More autonomy for Muslim majority 
provinces did not undermine his strategy of seeking Muslim security in a united India 
although it represented a compromise.
These above preferences - majoritarian federation versus consociational federation and 
the dynamics of party organisation and mobilisation - were to have ramifications for the 
post-independence constitutional settlement in the following ways. Firstly the 
differences between the Congress Party and the Muslim League on the intervening 
variable - reorganisation of units, although they were not as great as often portrayed - 
can be traced before independence. Secondly, it shows that the Congress Party and the 
Muslim League were committed to majoritarian and consociational federations 
respectively. The extent to which these constitutional preferences were carried over in 
the post-independence period will be discussed in Chapter Five. In Pakistan it would be 
expected that separate electorates, reserved seats for minorities and community veto 
rights would be present. In India, one would expect to see reserved seats for minorities 
and linguistic reorganisation of provinces. If there was no change between the pre and 
post-independence preferences then this either indicates consistency of vision, OR that 
the changed effective number of ethnic groups did not affect the constitutional 
formation. In such ethnically divided societies this would be staggering. If there was a 
change, then the strategy is simpler - I analyse what factors changed and what variables 
contributed to this.
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Chapter Five: Division and federalism: majoritarianism, 
consociationalism and provincial design
'(The constitution could be) both unitary as well as federal according to the requirements of time and 
circumstances' Ambedkar, (quoted in Austin 1966: 188).
'Sardar Patel characterised the impatient champions of the redistribution of provinces on a linguistic 
basis as the assassins of nationalism' (yanhanen 1992: 72).
'If Pakistan is to return to the past to safeguard the future, it is not to the mythical theocratic intentions of
its founders. It is rather to the original ideas of the 1940 Lahore Resolution that emphasised the 
decentralisation of power to the federating units of a Mitslim state. Secondly it is to the consociational, 
accommodationist politics of the Muslim League's Unionist Party rivals in the Punjab during the 1940s'
(Talbot 1998: 5).
5.1. Introduction
Post-independence constitutional formation in India and Pakistan was hotly contested. 
Constitutional design is always a controversial business, whether it comprises 'mere' 
tinkering with the means of electing representatives (electoral reform) or is concerned 
with creating an entirely new constitution. This is because constitutions structure the 
rules of the political, legal, social and possibly even moral games in a state e.g. the 
personal laws of the state. Constitutions also say something about the nature of a state, 
the way it projects itself internally and externally (Dittmer 1993: 17).
Constitutions are used to reconstruct the state's central self-portrait. They 
typically contain statements of what the state is or means to be, they spell out the 
rights of citizens as individuals and as members of groups, and they describe the 
internal structure of the state (Rajagopalan 2001: 30).
Other laws and the actual operation of the constitution are also vital. So too are the 
state-sponsored national identity and the actions (or non actions) of the officers of the 
state142 . However, Rajagopalan is correct in assuming that '(c)onstitutions express the 
vision of the state in its most idealised form' (2001: 30). An analysis which concentrates 
on constitutions therefore provides a useful starting point; precisely because it provides 
an understanding of the way the state's founders purposively sought to project it and 
define its membership.
142 E.a. the failure of the Rao Government in 1992 or the state BJP government to prevent the destruction of the 
Babrf Mosque in Ayodhya. For a discussion of elite non decision-making see Bachrach and Baratz (1963: 632-
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This thesis is premised on the understanding that institutional legacies are important. 
When a state writes a new constitution, it does not have perfect freedom of manoeuvre. 
Its recent history is a powerful constraint. The 'learning effects' of using a set of 
institutions such as parliamentarism and federalism are important (Pierson 2000: 254). 
They structure the parameters of the debate. The existence of these institutional 
legacies does not preclude the constraining role of outside influences143 . However, 
although the Constituent Assembly Debates (CAD) of India and Pakistan were replete 
with references to other constitutions, as examples to emulate, or examples to avoid144, 
they were still constrained by the institutional legacies of the colonial power. Although 
ex-colonies can deliberately emulate, or avoid the example set by the colonial power, it 
would be naive to ignore the legacies that previous strategies and institutions of 
governance within a state play in the framing of a constitution.
Chapter Three examined the institutional legacies within which Indian and Pakistani 
elites had to work and developed a formula to measure the degrees of consociationalism 
within the federally based constitutions. Table 5.1 reproduces the formula, and scores 
the post-independence constitutions of India and Pakistan - as enacted in 1950 and 1956 
respectively - in their original form. I seek to examine two points.
1. To identify institutional legacies that influenced constitutional design; the pre- 
independence plans of the British, and those of the Congress and the League.
2. To identify the differences that emerged between these institutional legacies and the 
actual constitutions, and to posit an explanation for these changes using my second 
independent variable of the effective number of linguistic and religious groups (enling 
and enrel145).
143 India's federation was influenced by the Soviet system, and the Americans in the interests of regional 
security promoted the One Unit Plan of Pakistan. The Americans wanted a strong centre for such an important
buffer state.
144 Reference was made in both Constituent Assemblies to existing federations (Austin 1966: 186) e.g. Mr N 
Gopalaswami Avyangar quoted from the Report of the Royal Commission on the Australian Constitution 
(Government of mdia 1947b: 47). In Pakistan a report was commissioned for the Constituent Assembly 
detailing the structures and institutions of other federations (Ahmad 1949). This report discussed general 
principles of federalism and produced an analysis of the division of powers in the US, Canada, Australia and
South Africa. .
145 The abbreviations enling and enrel refer to the effective number ot linguistic and religious groups 
respectively The formula for calculating an 'effective group' is explained on page 143.
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5.2. Institutional Legacies
The strongest institutional legacy was that of the acceptance of federalism as a structure 
of governance in South Asia. Neither of the Constituent Assemblies seriously 
considered any other mechanism. The territorial size of the states encouraged this, as 
well as the territorial discontinuity of the Eastern and Western Wings in Pakistan146 . 
The specific form in which the federations were created is the vital ingredient in my 
analysis, especially concerning the degrees of consociationalism and the creation of 
ethnically homogeneous units. Congress and the League differed radically over this 
issue before independence.
Colonial legacies
The British constitutional plans varied according to the degrees of minority protection 
included within their (increasingly federal) constitutional plans. In assessing colonial 
legacies, a case can be made for using the 1935 Government of India Act as the 
benchmark. It was the British Raj's most extensive constitution, produced after 
consultation with the Indian political parties, including the Princely States147. It was 
also produced as a governing document - through which the British intended to rule for 
some time (they did not include a commitment to a future Dominion status within it). 
The constitutions that the League and Congress developed and signed up to before 
independence were, in varying degrees, bargaining chips148 . As such, to facilitate a 
meaningful comparison of the constitutions of India and Pakistan after independence 
when the realties of power were paramount, it is more appropriate to compare these 
constitutions with a real constitution. As Washbrook has observed, the Indian 
constitution took 250149 of its clauses directly from the 1935 Government of India Act 
(1997: 37). Finally, the interim constitutions of both India and Pakistan after 
independence were based on the 1935 Act150 . In assessing the constitutional similarities 
between the British and post-independence eras it is therefore legitimate to use the
146 Conversely, the lack of territorial contiguity in Pakistan also led to calls for more centralisation (Choudhury,
1969: 79).
147 Despite the consultation, the League, Congress and the Princes rejected the final Act. This did not preclude 
the League and the Congress from contesting the elections of 1937 held under it.
148 Although the Congress sought to rule through die structures, while the League sought accommodation 
within them.
U9 
150
Approximately 68%.
This Act was renamed as the 1947 Indian Independence Act with Westminster's power of amendment
removed. -131-
scores of the 1935 Government of India Act to analyse the constitutional changes from 
the British legacy.
Table 5.1. Comparative consociational analysis of the 1935 Government of India 
Act, Constitution of the Republic of India and Constitution of the Islamic Republic 
of Pakistan.
el. Grand Coalition
xl. Executive Weightage
e2. Proportionality
x2. Separate Electorates
x3. Reserved Seats
x4. Legislative Weightage
x5. Representation in second chamber
e3. Segmental Autonomy
x6. Religious territorial reorganisation
x7. Linguistic territorial reorganisation
x8. Residual powers
e4. Mutual Veto
|x9. Community veto rights
1.5ei+0.5e2+1.5e3-K).5e4
4
1935 Govt. of 
India Act (i)
0
1
1
1
0
1
1
0
0
0.34
1950 Indian 
Constitution (ii)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.00
1956 Pakistani 
Constitution (iii)
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
0.25
Source: (i) (Government of India 1964b) (ii) (Government of India 1950) (iii) (Government of Pakistan 
1956).
Notes: The Indian constitution included reserved seats for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. 
However, I have not scored this variable as a positive because of the following reasons. Firstly, 
Scheduled Castes do not constitute a separate ethnic group. There is no one identity for a Scheduled 
Caste any more than there is for a Brahmin or a Kshatriya - it is a regionally defined phenomenon. There 
is a stronger case to be made for including Scheduled Tribes as a separate ethnic group. Vanhanen argues 
that Scheduled Tribes are 'the most clearly separate ethnic group in India' (1992: 52). At the most basic 
level they can be subdivided into Adivasis and those racially distinct communities of the northeast of 
India (Manor 1996: 462). They are therefore not a homogeneous community - many tribes exist within 
the northeast. It is therefore nonsensical to speak of a community of Scheduled Tribes 'they encompass 
many groups and communities' (Phadnis and Ganguly 2001: 65). It is undeniable that some tribes such 
as the Nagas and the Mizos, which have fought secessionist wars against the centre, are large enough and 
have a sense of an identity that qualifies them for the status of an ethnic group despite their internal 
diversity151 . However, not all these areas have reserved seats for tribes. Meghalaya and Arunachal 
Pradesh do not. Nagaland and Tripura have only one seat out of two reserved for a ST and Assam has 
only two out of 14 (Election Commission of India 2000). Mizoram is the only state which has 100% of 
its seats (one seat) reserved for Scheduled Tribes. As it is generally nonsensical to talk of the Scheduled 
Tribes as a homogeneous entity and the reserved seats are not allocated to all Scheduled Tribes, I have 
decided to concentrate on linguistic and religious communities only in relation to this element.
Table 5.1 immediately lends itself to two observations. The first of these is that 
Congress, which espoused majoritarian preferences before independence, became even
151 Ali points out that there are 16 clans 'that identify with the Naga nation' (1993: 25).
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more majoritarian after independence. This was reflected in the 1950 constitution. 
Austin observes that India retained the executive and judicial provisions of the 1935 Act 
but completely remade the legislative provisions (1966: 144). This is apparent from the 
scoring system that reveals that the Congress rejected all legislative proportionality for 
religious or linguistic groups. The second observation is that while the British 
preferences before independence were generally closer to those of the Congress, after 
independence it was the constitution of Pakistan that closely mirrored the 1935 
Government of India Act, rather than India. This is both in terms of the overall score - 
0.25 for the constitution of Pakistan, and 0.34 for the Government of India Act 1935 - 
but also in terms of the detailed constitutional provisions. Yet this conceals the fact that 
Pakistan's legislative provisions were subject to immense change - disputes over which 
were one reason for the protracted constitution making process. This will be discussed 
in more detail below. The one immediately noticeable difference between Pakistan's 
constitution and the 1935 Act concerns the segmental autonomy provisions - especially 
the design of the provincial units of a federation - the intervening variable in my 
analysis. This is something that needs to be examined further. On a more general level, 
as Austin reminds us, the Indians and Pakistanis had no real experience of 'the working 
of a more traditional federal system...their immediate experience with government, 
therefore, almost inevitably led them towards centralisation' (1966: 189). What was 
more significant was that both tended towards majoritarianism after independence. It is 
my contention that the reduced effective number of religious groups explains this 
change.
Political parties' legacies
The fact that the elites who participated in the making of the pre-independence plans 
were those who participated in the framing of the constitutions after independence 
makes the linkages between the pre and post-independence constitutions extremely 
important. While they were not the only actors, and were not monolithic organisations, 
the Congress Party and the Muslim League played major roles in constitution formation 
in their respective states. In the case of Pakistan, Jinnah's death removed a stabilising 
influence, but more importantly, removed the strategist of constitutional proposals 
before independence. Despite the lack of continuity in leadership after the assassination 
of Prime Minister Liaquat All Khan in 1951 and the factionalisation of the Muslim 
League discussed by Waseem (1994b: 114-117), drawing continuities between the two
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periods is still a valid exercise. The League controlled the Pakistani Constituent 
Assembly until its dissolution in 1954 by Governor General Ghulam Mohammad. 
Callard's point remains valid that as late as 1954 'the conclusion is unavoidable that, on 
major constitutional issues, the place of decision was transferred from the Assembly to 
the Muslim League Parliamentary Party' (1957: 98). Additionally, a process of 
constitution formation which had to accommodate regional politicians and their 
demands was no different from the situation which pertained before independence 
(Talbot 1990: 108-112).
The linkages between the pre and post-independence actors in India are of course, easier 
to make. Congress was predominant in both eras. As Austin discusses, with the 
exception of the 'untouchable' Ambedkar, the Congress 'oligarchy' of Nehru, Azad, 
Patel or Prasad held the chairmanship of the major constitutional committees (1966: 
18). Congress also dominated the Constituent Assembly with 74% of the seats (Butler 
1995: 72-3). Despite this, Congress was not a monolithic organisation and tensions 
existed, especially between Nehru and Patel. After Congress took power in the 1937 
elections many more conservative and business elements joined in pursuit of the 
rewards of office (Manor 1990: 31). This strengthened the hand of Patel. Despite these 
qualifications, Nehru wielded enormous influence.
India
A comparison of Table 3.3 and Table 5.1 reveals that the constitution of India was 
similar to the proposals that the Congress had made before independence. While 
Congress had ultimately acquiesced in a positive score for all the consociational 
variables at some time during the period 1916-1946 152, these points were grudgingly 
conceded.
In the Constituent Assembly ... the members of sensitive minorities (Muslims 
particularly) supported the Swiss system or some form of elected ministry, while 
members of larger communities favoured traditional cabinet government (Austin 
1966: 118& 123).
152 With the exception of equal representation in a bicameral legislature for the states of a federation.
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Nehru 'flatly rejected' a power-sharing executive (Austin 1966: 118, 123 & 132). 
Despite the pre-independence majoritarian preferences, the Nehru Report of 1928 had 
included consociational autonomy for three of the variables; a) reserved seats; b) 
religious reorganisation and c) linguistic reorganisation. When these three variables 
were included hi the plans Congress signed up to they were scored consociationally. 
The move to majoritarianism in the post-independence constitution therefore requires 
elaboration.
a) reserved seats
While Congress rejected separate electorates in the Nehru Report and was generally 
opposed to them, the Nehru Report reluctantly accepted reserved seats on the grounds 
that they were necessary to secure the protection of the minorities. Although India was 
much more religiously homogeneous after the partition, the absolute number of 
religious minorities was substantial. Muslims accounted for 10% of the total population 
of India, and other religious minorities such as Sikhs, Christians, Buddhists and Jains 
comprised another 5%. It is arguable that the Muslim community had more reason to 
feel insecure after partition, their numbers having diminished. They were therefore in 
need of more rather than less protection. Yet this played out in different ways. The 
changed religious balance also made the Muslims more dependent on the will of the 
Congress Party. Patel headed the Sub Committee on Minorities. Its initial report on the 
27th August 1947 rejected separate electorates but recommended 'as a general rule that 
seats for the different recognised minorities shall be reserved in the various legislatures 
on the basis of their population...initially for a period of ten years' (Constituent 
Assembly of India 1947: 267). The report was accepted. However, on the 25th May 
1949 Patel moved an amendment to the report, removing the reserved seats, on the 
grounds that 'the effect of partition was not fully comprehended or appreciated' and that 
the minorities themselves wished to remove these reservations (Constituent Assembly 
of India 1949). While this statement was resented by Muslim members of the 
Constituent Assembly153 , as Austin argues, '(ultimately (Muslims) would decide, along 
with other minorities... to forego even reservation in the Legislature, hoping by its 
sacrifice to ensure fair treatment from the Hindu majority' (1966: 151).
153 Mr Mohamed Ismail Sahib (Madras: Muslim) argued that 'if the majority community or the party in power 
(sic) to do away with any of these safeguards, that is one thing. But I submit that it is not fair to place the 
responsibility for doing away with such safeguards on the shoulders of the minority' (Constituent Assembly of
India 1949).
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Chiriyankandath puts a slightly different slant on this point, viewing the concession as a 
bargaining chip. He argues that 'the majority of north Indian Muslims eventually 
acquiesced in the abandonment of reserved seats while seeking to preserve religious 
freedoms' (2000: 12).
The omission of reserved seats is indicative of the fact that the inclusive nation the 
Indian elite sought to create did not extend to inclusion within the decision-making 
process. Austin argues that Nehru would have accepted reserved seats but he 'believed 
it was 'manifestly absurd to carry on with this reservation business' (1966: 154). 
Wilkinson is less charitable, citing the fact that in the Constituent Assembly, Nehru 
opposed reserved seats for all minorities, including Scheduled Castes and Tribes 
(2000a: 774). What cannot be denied is that the removal of reserved seats for religious 
groups fitted with Congress's general preferences. Although there were many 
prominent Muslims within Congress, such as Azad, they were not there as leaders of 
their community. These individuals had specifically opposed separate representation, 
'seeing the Moslems' place as inevitably within the larger complex' (Gupta 1962: 363). 
The weakness of the Muslim leadership, most of who had migrated to Pakistan, and the 
association of the ones which remained with the Congress, is demonstrated by the fact 
that the Indian constitution included reserved seats for the Scheduled Castes and Tribes 
- forcefully argued for by Ambedkar154.
b) and c) religious and linguistic reorganisation
The issue of the reorganisation of provinces along religious lines was a contentious one 
before independence. The partition of Bengal in 1905 inflamed nationalist Hindus. It 
was perceived as a mechanism of divide and rule and ignited linguistic demands . The 
1919 Government of India Act had ignored calls for religious reorganisation. Given the 
proximity to the 1911 reversal of the Bengal partition this was not surprising. In 1935 
the Government of India Act bowed to the demands for the creation of the provinces of 
Sind and Orissa. While both these provinces were linguistically defined, there was also 
a religious rationale behind their creation. Sind was a Muslim area and had been 
demanded by the Muslim League for this reason. While Orissa was a culmination of
154 The fact that the Muslims lacked a forceful leadership, prepared to articulate their separate interests 
demonstrates why Lijphart's 1996 categorisation of the Congress Party as a 'Grand Coalition in his
^S^SSsS1^^^"5 lon§ standmg ' In 18% *e C°ngreSS CaUed f°r ^ Separatl°n °f 
Bihar from Bengal on linguistic grounds.
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the long-standing demand for an Oriya speaking province, its creation at the same time 
as the creation of Sind ensured that the issue of religious reorganisation of provinces 
was also at the fore. As Sir Reginald Craddock stated at the Joint Committee on Indian 
Constitutional Reforms in 1933,
. .. the whole of India considers that the proposal to create a new Province of 
Sind is intended to placate Moslem sentiment, and similarly the creation of a 
new province of Orissa is intended as a counterpoise to gratify Hindu sentiment 
(Joint Committee on Constitutional Reform 1934: 443-444)156
The constitution of independent India as it was initially devised, made no concessions to 
linguistic or religious territorial demands. The rejection of religious reorganisation has 
been treated as unproblematic by many authors, and omitted from the analysis of 
authors questioning India's status as a consociation such as Wilkinson (2000a: 767- 
791)157. However, the Indian secular state did not separate state and religion, rather 
promoting neutrality between religions158 . This conception of secularism did not 
preclude the religious reorganisation of states, although it made it more unlikely. 
Secondly, the Nehru Report of 1928 argued for the creation of Sind on religious 
grounds. It could be argued that this was a one off occurrence. While it indeed proved 
to be exceptional, the Nehru Report did not specifically limit the application of the 
religious principle. As discussed below, it was the reduced proportion of Muslims, no 
longer an 'effective' religious group within an independent India, which had the most 
impact on the rejection of religious reorganisation of states as the groups who would 
benefit by it, Muslims and Sikhs, were small minorities in the new state.
The rejection of linguistic reorganisation in the original constitution was more of an 
aberration. Austin argues that Article 3 of the Indian constitution provided for the 
centre to amend unilaterally provincial boundaries precisely in order to facilitate a later 
process of linguistic reorganisation and provide a safety value (1966: 238). Austin's 
interpretation is too generous. Even Lijphart concedes 'that Nehru was not a fully
15S However, Craddock was in reality opposing the demand for Orissa on linguistic grounds, for fear that it 
would inflame the Telugu speakers to the south (Joint Committee on Constitutional Reform 1934: 443). 
Additionally, the demand for an Oriyan speaking unit was long standing.
157 Wilkinson argues that before independence India was a consociational state. However he does not mention 
the fact that the religious majority Lhe Muslims enjoyed in certain states was a form of segmental autonomy
(2000a: 772-774). , .158 Although it has not been neutral in practice, tins has not been in exclusive favour ol the majority Hindu 
community One of the 'grievances of the BJP' has been precisely that Muslims have their own personal laws. 
For a discussion of Indian secularism see Mitra (1991: 759-777), Madan (1997: 759-754), Chiriyankandath 
(2000- 8-2'') Corbridge and Harriss (2000: esp. Ch 2) and Desai (2000: 113-121).
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convinced consociational thinker is shown by his initial opposition to the principle of 
linguistic federalism' (1996: 262). Talbot is nearer the mark when he argues that the 
reorganisation of states should not be held up as
an example of Nehruvian accommodationist policies which stands in stark 
contrast to the handling of linguistic demands in neighbouring Pakistan 
(because) in reality, Nehru acceded to this process with extreme reluctance 
(2000: 179).
Both the Dar Report of 1948 and the Congress JVP Report 159 (Bar 1948; Linguistic 
Provinces Commission 1949) rejected linguistic reorganisation as a general principle, 
and both recommended that consideration of the issue be postponed in the wider 
interests of national unity160 .
The rejection of linguistic reorganisation was a major difference compared to the pre- 
independence constitutions of the British and the Congress. The initial rejection of 
linguistic reorganisation after independence can be explained by two factors. The first 
one was the violence that accompanied partition, which reinforced, although it did not 
create the fear in the Indian elite's minds of the danger of 'primordial identities'. As the 
JVP Committee argued, 'partition has led us to become wary of anything that tends to 
separate and divide' (Linguistic Provinces Commission 1949: 5-6). Although there was 
truth in this statement. Congress had already started to qualify its commitment to 
linguistic reorganisation as a primary goal before independence161 . The second, and I 
argue the more important factor, was that linguistic provinces were sidelined precisely 
because of the unwillingness to bring these identities into the decision-making process 
at the centre and politicise them (as they would be represented in the Lok and Rajya 
Sabhas). The rejection of linguistic reorganisation was therefore a specific extension of 
the majoritarian nature of the Indian federation. Subsequent linguistic reorganisation 
mitigated the majoritarianism somewhat as linguistically defined provinces were
159 The Dar report was commissioned by the President of the Constituent Assembly; the JVP Report was a 
Congress report, the members of which were J Nehru, V Patel, P Sitaramayya.
160 The Dar Report argued that 'the formation of provinces on exclusively or even mainly linguistic 
consideration is not in the larger interests of the Indian nation and should not be taken in hand'. However, it did 
concede that 'in the formation of new provinces, wherever such a work is taken in hand, oneness of language 
mav be one of the factors to be taken into consideration along with others; but it should not be the decisive or 
even the main factor' (1948: 34-5). The JVP Report argued that partition was a major factor in the reversal of 
the Congress position, and demanded 'further stem discouragement of communalism, provincialism and all 
other separatist and disruptive tendencies' (Linguistic Provinces Commission 1949: 5). It did concede that the 
demand for an Andhra province had wide consent and that although no general principle of linguistic 
reorganisation could be conceded, the question of an Andhra province should be examined (1949: 16). 
161 CWC Resolution of 1938 (Reproduced in Zaidi and Zaidi 1980c Vol. 11: 42-43).
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represented in the Lok and Rajya Sabhas. Lijphart argued that India under Nehru fitted 
his model of a consociational democracy. Yet he does not discuss the fact that even 
after linguistic states were conceded, India's bicameral legislature was constituted 
according to majoritarian principles, a 'demos enabling' format in which the states were 
represented in close accordance to their population (Stepan, 1999: 23) 162 . While 
Lijphart has analysed the deviation from proportionality in federal chambers in other 
works (1984a: 174), he does not address this point in his 1996 article. The high 
deviation from proportionality ensured the domination of the larger populated Hindi 
speaking states of the north in both the lower and upper chambers of the central 
legislature, and demonstrates why federal structures on their own are not 
consociational 163 .
Although Nehru ultimately reversed his position on the issue of linguistic 
reorganisation, he did so reluctantly and only after overwhelming pressure from within 
the Congress. Gopal is therefore far off the mark when he argues that,
the general aspirations for comprehensive linguistic provinces might have been 
kept in control had Nehru declared firmly that there was no question of recasting 
India at this stage. His failure to do so was not solely a consequence of 
weakness, he felt that it would be undemocratic to smother this sentiment which, 
on general grounds, he did not find objectionable (1979: 259).
The Congress tried to prevent its PCCs from joining the agitation for linguistic 
provinces, as this statement by Nehru to the Presidents of the Congress PCCs makes 
clear on the 7th July 1954.
The Working Committee has made it perfectly clear that there must be no public 
agitation by Congressmen, and that this question of the reorganisation of states 
should be considered calmly and dispassionately (Nehru 1955: 7).
It failed to do so. The belated acceptance of linguistic reorganisation was an outcome 
produced by the danger of internal as well as external dissent. As Desai notes, language
162 The majontanamsm was mitigated somewhat by the fact that this chamber is indirectly elected by the state 
legislatures using the Single Transferable Vote. STV was used 'in order to give some representation to 
minority communities and parties" (Basu 1994: 196).
163 Although Lustick (1997: 113-117) and Wilkinson (2000a: 767-790) criticise Lijphart's description of India 
as a consociational democracy, as they do not concentrate on federal design, they do not make this point.
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politics produced more street violence in the twenty years after the partition riots than 
did religious violence (2000: 93; Wilkinson 2002: 15-16).
Pakistan
The constitution of Pakistan bore similarities to the proposals put forward by the 
Muslim League before independence on some elements of Lijphart's categorisation, but 
overall was much more majoritarian. The constitutional form changed much more in 
the Pakistani case than in the Indian. Because preferences before independence were 
very wide ranging, this was predictable. The changes can also be attributed to the fact 
that before independence, Muslims were seeking security within a constitution 
dominated by Hindus. After independence Muslims became the majority community. 
Instead of seeking security within institutions, their preferences changed to controlling 
these institutions. Therefore, although separate electorates and reserved seats were 
included in the constitution, their inclusion for the Hindu community was a mechanism 
of divide and rule rather than minority accommodation164 . Their introduction was 
compatible with a segregationist strategy in a Muslim dominated state, the recognition 
of one religion not precluding recognition, categorisation and segmentation of another. 
Legislative weightage was also included, but for a different community than 
previously163 . Interestingly, in none of the plans the Muslim League had signed up to or 
created had the composition of the bicameral legislature featured. For very different 
reasons, the 1956 constitution of Pakistan is scored blank on this variable (0). The 
third change was that within a Muslim majority polity other cleavages such as language 
became pivotal. The omission of linguistic reorganisation from the constitution of 
Pakistan was not surprising based on the pre-independence scores, although the decision 
to create a heterogeneous province in the Western Wing proved to be detrimental to the 
stability of the Pakistan federation.
While all the plans signed up by the Muslim League before independence had included 
community veto rights, these were excluded from the constitution as was executive 
weightage. Although the demand for executive weightage had not been included in the
164 Hindus within the Eastern Wing opposed their introduction for precisely tins reason. They were only 
introduced in the Western Wing.
165 The legislative weightage in the 1956 Pakistani constitution over-represented the Western Wing in the 
National Assembly, to ensure parity with the demographically dominant Eastern Wing. As the Western Wing 
was linguistically "heterogeneous, this did not amount to recognition of a linguistic identity in the decision- 
making institutions of the state.
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Lucknow Pact, its omission in that Act was because executive power had not been 
delegated to Indians at this stage. Executive weightage was a central feature of Jinnah's 
demands in 1929, and was a source of contention in the 1946 Cabinet Mission Plan. 
The omission of a) executive weightage and b) community veto rights in the Pakistani 
constitution were major differences from the pre-independence preferences of the 
League. Their omission skews the overall score heavily because they are the sole 
variables within their respective elements. Their exclusion therefore requires 
explanation.
a) executive weightage
This issue was critical at the time of partition, and disagreement between Congress and 
League over the exact form of the weightage in the government to be formed under the 
Cabinet Mission Plan contributed to its failure166 . Executive weightage was a vital part 
of Jinnah's centralising consociational strategy; accommodating both the demands of 
the Muslim minority and Muslim majority provinces. While the Muslim majority 
provinces were concerned to secure provincial autonomy, in a federal system this did 
not guarantee their interests would be protected at the centre. Therefore executive 
weightage for their community was a natural corollary of their demands. But in a 
Muslim majority state, the parameters of the debate changed. The Pakistani elites did 
not see the necessity of including executive weightage for religious communities, 
though significantly they excluded it for linguistic communities as well. While they 
were happy to include representatives of religious groups within the legislature, and 
their so doing is significant for understanding the national identity as articulated by the 
Pakistani state, the Pakistani elites were not happy to include these identities within the 
executive. They were close to British preferences in this regard.
b) community veto rights
Similar motivations accounted for the exclusion of community veto rights. The 
Pakistani elite accepted the legitimacy of different religious identities in decision- 
making institutions in a way that their Indian counterparts did not, but this acceptance
166 It is the major counterweight to the argument that Nehru's statement on the non-binding nature of the 
Cabinet Mission Plan was the cause of partition - if agreement could not be reached on the interim 
government what hope was there for independent India?
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did not extend to recognition in the decision-making organs of the state 167 . Prime 
Minister Mohammad Ali Bogra's formula of 1953 168 had included a mutual veto along 
provincial lines, through a complex formula involving the upper and lower house169 , In 
the 1956 constitution, not only had the second chamber been removed, but with it the 
veto powers for either of the wings (although the provinces were allocated residual 
powers as a quid pro quo).
In both states the pre-independence preferences are of some use in accounting for 
constitution formation, but they can only take us so far. Pre-independence preferences 
were an important independent variable because of the importance of the federal legacy 
to post-independence India and Pakistan. Austin claims that there was no dogma in 
accepting federalism for India and Pakistan (1966: 186). As I have already argued, this 
was not the case. Federalism was a necessary form of governance for the states of India 
and Pakistan, although the British and Mughal constitutional structures did not dictate 
the form. Even though the constitutions diverged substantially from the pre- 
independence preferences articulated by Congress and the League, this does not 
diminish the validity of the pre and post-independence comparison. However, with 
these institutional antecedents taken into account, there is a missing element. Even in 
India where substantial continuity existed between the elites of the pre and post- 
partition era, the constitutional framework changed. It is my contention that the 
changed religious composition of the states after partition changed the constitutional 
preferences.
167 This did not preclude the sanctity of the personal laws for the minority religious communities - Article 198
"® The formula was set to be accepted by the Constituent Assembly before its dissolution by Governor General 
Ghulam Mohammad.
169 'hi the case of difference of opinion between the two Houses in respect of any measure, the following step 
will be taken: A joint session of the two Houses will be called; the measure may then be passed by a majority 
vote, provided the majority includes 30% of the members present and voting from each zone' (Bogra 1953: 5-
6).
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5.3. The effective number of ethnic groups
My second independent variable in explaining federal stabilisation is that of the 
effective number of ethnic groups (eneth). The effective number of ethnic groups is a 
statistical formula applied by O'Leary to assess the stability of democratic federations 
(2001a: 288-289). O'Leary's 'law' is that without a dominant group (defined using the 
statistical formula set out below) a majoritarian democratic federation will not be stable 
and will require additional consociational mechanisms to accommodate the different 
ethnic groups.
The conclusions O'Leary reaches are based on a re-working of a statistical formula. 
The formula was originally developed by Hirschman as an index to assess the 
concentration of economic power (1945: 159). Taagepera and Shugart applied the 
formula to the study of party systems (1989: 77-91). They measured the effective 
number of parties in a political system. The actual number of political parties tells us 
very little of political interest as parties have varying degrees of influence and a party 
may exist with minimal support. They sought to discover the influence and political 
effects that these 'effective' parties had170 . Their formula is a useful one because it does 
not exaggerate the influence of the tiny parties. O'Leary adapts the formula to measure 
the number of ethnic groups (whether defined along linguistic, religious, racial or 
cultural lines 171 ) within a political system. His formula is useful for my analysis 
because he is also concerned with federal stability.
The formula is l/Z/>2 j
'Where p\ is the fractional share of the i-th ethnonational group and £ stands for 
summation over all components' (O'Leary 2002b: 171). The formula 'allows each 
group's share of the population to 'determine its own weight' so its share is multiplied 
by its share' (O'Leary 200la: 288). The weighted values of each group are 
subsequently added together and then divided into 1 (the reciprocal of the index). The 
division into 1 ensures that the final score is a logical one, making 'political and
170 For a more detailed discussion on the history of this formula see Hirschman (1945: 157-162), Taagepera and 
Shugart (1989: 79-80) and O'Leary (2001a: 288-289).
171 The particular identity that is categorised is controversial and specialists on the countries that O'Leary 
discusses mav dispute the applicability of the particular cnterion. To avoid this, O'Leary has included multiple 
identities Therefore there may be more than one result for a country - as with religion and language in India.
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intuitive sense' (200la: 289). Instead of producing a score between 0 and 1 as my 
formula for scoring the consociational elements of federations does, it creates a score 
that corresponds to the effective number of ethnic groups in a state. The range therefore 
starts at 1 if there is just one ethnic group, and rises according to the 'effective' number 
of groups. Groups with a very small fractional share of the population do not skew the 
results.
In the case of united India, the effective number of religious groups (enrel) is calculated 
as follows.
Table 5.2. The distribution of religious communities in 1941
Religious Group
Hindus
Muslims
Christians
Sikhs
Others
TOTAL
% of pop
65.9
23.8
1.6
1.5
7.2
100
Weighted values
0.4343
0.0566
0.0003
0.0002
0.0052
0.497
enrel
2.01
Source: Adapted from Government of India (1943).
Notes: Weighted values produced by multiplying the fractional share by itself, e.g. .659 x .659 = 0.4343. 
'Others' includes tribal groups who were classified separately under the 1941 British census as 
comprising 6.6% of the population. Enrel remains the same whether they are classified with the 
others or separately. For comparative purposes with the post-independence charts I have classified them 
with the 'others'.
While some scholars of South Asia would no doubt raise their eyebrows at the notion 
that there were two effective religious groups within united India, effectiveness should 
not be confused with parity. The fact that Jinnah managed to secure promises of a level 
of consociational and federal protection within united India supports the claim of the 
Muslim community's 'effectiveness'. Additionally, when the Muslim population of 
India declined, the Congress constitution became more majoritarian. This indicates that 
as the Muslim's 'effectiveness' declined - their demands could be discounted 172 .
Ethnic groups within a political system can be categorised according to multiple criteria. 
I focus on religion and language. The manner in which these identities have been
172 Although it is debatable whether the Hindu community was dominant in the sense of having a unified sense 
of purpose! It is divided by caste, language and region.
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differentially accommodated is vital to explaining federal stabilisation in the two 
countries. Both have posed challenges to the stabilisation of the two federations. The 
manner in which the Indian or Pakistani state has sought to manage them through the 
federal structure is vital to understanding federal stabilisation in the two countries. 
Although tribal violence has posed serious challenges to federal stabilisation in India 
(Manor 1995: 120), in the majority of cases, individual tribes are not large enough to 
form units around. Even the state of Nagaland is comprised of many tribes, at least six, 
although an over-arching Naga identity exists (Ali 1993: 25). Similarly, caste politics 
affects federal stabilisation, but at the level of party politics. Castes are not large 
enough to form individual states around, and differ according to their geographical 
location.
The relationship of the effective numbers of ethnic groups to degrees of 
consociationalism
One of the hypotheses set out in Chapter One was that as the effective number of ethnic 
groups changed, the nature of the federal constitution proposed for the state changed 
along consociational criteria. Although 3H0 - that there was no relationship between 
the effective number of ethnic groups and the degree of consociationalism in the plans 
proposed - may be seen as a ridiculously easy null hypothesis to falsify, it is still 
important to do so. Ethnically diverse societies manage their diversity in different ways 
even if they have the same number of effective ethnic groups (McGarry and O'Leary 
1993: Ch 1). However, if the constitutional framework did not change after 
independence with such a radically changed effective number of ethnic groups this 
would be staggering. It would indicate that either the institutional antecedents were 
very restrictive, or that the elite sponsored national identity was inflexible and was 
unrelated to the numbers of groups within the state.
a) The effective number of religious groups
Calls and demands for a change in the effective number of religious groups resulted in 
the partition of the subcontinent. The pre-independence constitutional preferences of 
the Muslim League and of the Congress were at least partially determined by the 
existence of a high number of effective religious groups. The Congress ostensibly did 
not form its constitutional plans on this basis, being inclusive of all groups within its
conception of the Indian nation. Despite this, its desire for a centralised federation had
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as its corollary the dilution of the demands of the Muslim majority provinces173 . While 
most of the constitutional preferences of the Congress remained remarkably consistent, 
not all did so. I contend that the reduced effective number of religious groups after 
independence accounted for the majority of changes that occurred. As Table 5.2 
showed, the enrel of the state of India before independence was 2.01.
Muslims were almost one quarter of the population and therefore counted as an 
effective religious group despite the fact that Hindus were 66% of the population. We 
have already established that there were differences according to the degree of 
consociationalism within the federations of post-independence India and Pakistan 
compared to the preferences previously articulated by Congress and League. In this 
section I demonstrate that these differences were partially related to changes in the 
effective numbers of religious and linguistic groups. Establishing this enables me to 
reject null hypothesis 3H0.
The main differences between the pre and post-independence preferences of the 
Congress Party concerned the variables of religious reorganisation, reserved seats and 
linguistic reorganisation. It is possible to argue that the reduced effective number of 
religious groups changed two out of the three. The demand for religious reorganisation 
was undermined by the fact that the main areas with religiously concentrated groups had 
become part of Pakistan. Reserved seats for Muslims were omitted from the Indian 
constitution because the diminished percentage of Muslims within the state decreased 
their bargaining power. The general move in a majoritarian direction was also the result 
of the decline in the effective number of religious groups. 'Mountbatten announced 
Partition on 3 rd of June 1947. Within four days the Assembly had embarked on a 
centralised federal union' (Austin 1966: 193). The horrors of partition partially 
determined the increased majoritarian nature of the Indian constitution. But it must be 
remembered that the preference for a majoritarian constitution determined the response 
of Congress to the Cabinet Mission Plan - leading to partition and a lower effective 
number of religious groups.
173 This is not the same as saying that they wanted a Hindu dominated state. It was the territorial concentration 
of the Muslim community that threatened the federal governing structure. Congress's constitutional 
preferences, dictated by its notion of national identity, enabled it to accommodate non-territoriallv concentrated 
minorities but not territorially concentrated ones.
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Chart 5.1. Religious groups in India after partition
Religious Group
Hindu
Muslim
Christian
Sikh
Others
TOTAL
enrel
% Pop
85
10
2
2
1
100
1.36
(•Hindu
• Muslim
• Christian
• Sikh 
D Others
Source: Data adapted from Government of India (1953b).
Therefore, because the effective number of religious groups in a partitioned India was 
only 1.36 as seen in Chart 5.1, O'Leary's law that the federation did not require 
consociational mechanisms applied. The Congress intuitively perceived this. Nehru 
and the Congress were unhappy about the provisions of the CMP precisely because it 
included so many consociational provisions. Therefore, the decline in the effective 
number of religious groups, at least partially caused by Nehru's rejection of the CMP 
would be expected to lead to a more majoritarian constitution after independence. As 
demonstrated in Table 5.1, the constitution was indeed more majoritarian after 
independence. The Muslims of partitioned India comprised only 10% of the population, 
but possessed 36 million members, a population larger than many independent 
countries, and the third largest Muslim population in the world, a status they still 
possess today174 . Therefore, the effective number of religious groups by itself does not 
indicate whether consociational provisions were necessary for federalism to be a 
successful mechanism of ethnic conflict regulation175 . Conversely, despite their 
absolute size, their diminished percentage of the population could have enabled them to 
call for more protection rather than less. Communities do not usually call for protection
174 Pakistan's 1951 census returned a Muslim population of 64,959,000 (Government of Pakistan 1951b). 
India's census returned a population of 35,400,117. Even though the 1951 census was not held in Kashmir, 
when its estimated Muslim population is added to the total for the rest of India there were only 38,412,147 
Muslims in the country (Government of India 1953b). The 1998 Census in Pakistan returned the Muslim 
community's population strength as 127,433,409 (Government of Pakistan 2001: 207). Religious data is not 
yet available for the 2001 census in India. However, most sources estimate that Muslims comprise 12% of the 
Indian population of 1,027,015,247 (Central Intelligence Agency 2002). This gives the community a 
population of 123,241,829. It therefore appears likely that the population of India's Muslims will soon 
overtake Pakistan's, but they have not done so yet.
175 O'Leary does not claim that a federation will necessarily be stable with a low effective number of ethnic
groups. -147-
when they feel secure. The fact that the Muslim community dropped the demand for 
reserved seats was related to their lack of leadership. The reduced effective number of 
religious groups reduced the need to concede religious reorganisation, as did the fact 
that fewer areas existed which could have been reorganised along religious lines. 
However, a small number of areas did exist. The Sikh majority region within the 
Punjab could have been a candidate for religious reorganisation, as could many regions 
within the north east of the country.
The effect of the changed effective number of religious groups was limited to the two 
variables of religious reorganisation and reserved seats. This was because although the 
Hindu community increased its dominance after partition, the fact of Hindu dominance 
did not change. Hindus were a majority both before and after independence. This 
enables us to reject the null hypothesis 3H0, that there was no relationship between the 
effective number of ethnic groups and the degree of consociationalism in the post- 
independence constitutions. However, this cannot explain why the perceived legitimacy 
of this demand had receded. To understand why the general perceived legitimacy of 
religious representation had diminished, as well as why linguistic reorganisation was 
rejected it is necessary to consider the state-sponsored conceptions of national identity, 
which are examined in Chapter Six.
Chart 5.2. Religious groups in Pakistan after partition
Religious Group
Muslim
Hindu
Christian
Others
TOTAL
enrel
% Pop
86
13
0.6
0.4
100
1.32
• Muslim 
H Hindu
• Christian 
D Others
Source: Data adapted from Government of Pakistan (195 Ib).
Notes: 'Hindu' includes members of the Scheduled Castes who were classified separately in the
Pakistani census, but were still Hindus.
As can be seen in Chart 5.2, the effective number of religious groups declined from 2.01 
in united India to 1.32 in Pakistan. Interestingly for a state that was created on the basis 
of religion, Pakistan possessed a similar number of religious minorities as India. The
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dominant group, the Muslims, was 86% of the population compared to 85% of Hindus 
in India. This in itself is staggering given the exclusivist rationale behind partition, and 
is a fact that is not much commented on176 . The changes in Pakistan's constitution can 
be related to the changed effective number of religious groups much more than they 
could in the case of India - it is therefore easier to falsify 3H0 . In pre-independence 
India, the Muslim League concentrated upon securing accommodation within the 
structures of the constitution. After independence, the dominance of the Muslim 
community was assured. This inevitably affected the constitutional framework that was 
produced. Rather than seeking security, the Muslim community were now concerned 
with the business of governance. They were a majority of the population in a state for 
the first time in the subcontinent. The reduced effective number of religious groups in 
the case of Pakistan therefore had a dramatic impact.
The changes in the consociational federal provisions concerned executive weightage 
and the removal of the mutual veto. The new found majority status of the Muslims 
ensured that the protection in decision-making institutions for that community was no 
longer required. However, as was the case of India, the effective number of groups at 
the national level cannot tell the whole story; it conceals the fact that within East 
Pakistan Hindus comprised 22% of the population177 . 'Compared to West Pakistan, it is 
estimated, a lesser number of non-Muslims left East Pakistan and even fewer Muslims 
from India entered that wing' (Masood, 1970: 39). This point is important because it is 
indicative of a fact that became apparent after partition, that for the population of East 
Bengal, the Bengali identity was as important as their religious status. This is why there 
was less movement across the border than in the Punjab at the time of partition. 
However, this unity was strained in the wake of the economic crisis that affected East 
Pakistan after partition and 'more than a million persons abandoned their homes before 
the year was out, though many returned after a measure of tranquillity was restored' 
(Brecher 1959: 428). Additionally, a comparison of the number of effective ethnic 
groups cannot reveal that a new leadership transported itself to Pakistan, the 
Muhajirs 178, who lacked a power base despite being the leaders of the Muslim League.
176 These data suggest the crude 'fairness' of the Radcliffe line. 'The ratio of the majority to the minority 
populations was almost identical' (O'Leary 2001b: 14-15).
177 13% of the population of Pakistan.
178 The word translates to mean refugee. This group were Muslims who migrated to Pakistan irom India at 
partition Manv Muslims migrated; the word primarily refers to Muslims who migrated to Karachi. Many 
Punjabi Muslims migrated to the Punjab but they were more easily absorbed because of the cultural
similarities. - 149-
In the words of lan Talbot, this created a 'fearful state' in which 'pluralism was seen as 
a source of weakness not of strength' (1998: 7). This had implications for federal 
stabilisation.
b) Effective number of linguistic groups
The effective number of linguistic groups before independence in India was 8.52, 
incredibly high179. Chart 5.3 demonstrates this diversity. This high number of effective 
linguistic groups explains the importance that Congress placed on the linguistic 
reorganisation of its PCCs and its commitment to a reorganisation of states along 
linguistic lines. It was an excellent means of mobilisation and a way of securing the 
effective use of identity politics in the nationalist movement (Manor 1990: 29).
Chart 5.3.1941 linguistic distribution of India
Language
Hindi
Bengali
Bihari
Telugu
Marathi
Tamil
Punjabi
Rajasthani
Kannada
Oriya
Gujarati
Malayalam
Austric Family
Sindhi
Other Dravidian
Pahari
Tibeto-Chinese Family
Pushtu
Kashmiri
Others
Total
enling
% of pop
23.58
15.81
8.31
7.80
6.22
6.02
7.26
4.14
3.34
3.31
3.23
2.72
1.45
1.19
1.15
0.81
0.74
0.49
0.43
1.82
100
8.52
Hindi
Rajasthani
Tamil
Marathi
Bengali
Punjabi
Telugu
Bihari
Source: Data adapted from Government of India (1947c)
Notes: This source from which this table was compiled used the 1931 census data to compile its figures, 
but adjusted them to take account of the creation of Sind and Orissa. Urdu was subsumed within Hindi in 
this census.
179 No states in O'Leary's table of democratic federations come close to this figure. The highest is that of 
Nigeria with a score of 6.91 (O'Leary 2001a: 290). In all the federations of the twentieth century, both 
democratic and non-democratic, only Uganda has a higher effective number of ethnic groups of 15.08. Data 
adapted from United Nations (1963).
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The high effective number of linguistic groups also explains why Jinnah and the 
Muslim League could not oppose linguistic reorganisation as a general principle 
although they opposed it for Muslim majority areas. Despite the high number of 
effective linguistic groups before independence, the most salient political identity was 
that of religion180 . After independence, linguistic identities resurfaced with a vengeance 
within both India and Pakistan.
Chart 5.4.1961 linguistic distribution of India
Language
Hindi
Telugu
Bengali
Marathi
Tamil
Urdu
Gujarati
K. armada
Malayalam
Bihari
Oriya
lajastani
Punjabi
Assamese
Austro- Asiatic
Pahari
ribeto-Chinese
Kashmiri
Other
Total
enling
% of pop
30.40
8.58
7.72
7.58
6.96
5.31
4.63
3.97
3.88
3.83
3.58
3.40
2.49
1.55
1.41
1.04
0.73
0.50
2.44
100.00
7.67
Hindi
Malayalam 
Kannada
Gujarati
Urdu Telugu
Tamil
Marathi
Bengali
Source: Data adapted from Government of India (1961e) and Kothari (1970: 324). 
Notes: I have used data from the 1961 census to create this table rather than creating a chart for the 1951 
census. This is because the 1961 data are more reliable, not lumping Hindi, Punjabi, Urdu and Pahari 
together in the case of five northern states, the Punjab, Himachel Pradesh, Delhi, Bilaspur and Pepsu. 
Despite this, the enumeration of Punjabi speakers was lower than it should have been, because Hindu 
Punjabi speakers in the Punjab returned themselves as Hindi-speaking to deflect calls for the creation of a 
separate Punjabi speaking state (Wilkinson 2002: 4).
hi independent India, as Chart 5.4 shows, the effective number of linguistic groups was 
7.67, still incredibly high despite partition. Therefore there is no linguistic staatsvolk, 
the majority linguistic community - Hindi speakers - comprise only 30.4% of the
180 Identities are situational, and language was temporarily subsumed under religion because of the success of 
the Muslim League's mobilising campaign. This did not mean that linguistic identities were unimportant. As 
Robinson demonstrates, the campaign to secure Urdu as a means of instruction and of government service 
cannot be separated from the Muslim movement for autonomy/partition (1993: esp 33-83).
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population . On O'Leary's criteria, if the cleavage was salient, consociational 
mechanisms would be required to stabilise the linguistic cleavages of the Indian 
federation along democratic lines. Lijphart's 1996 article in the American Political 
Science Review argued that India after independence was an example of a 
consociational democracy and therefore a confirming rather than a deviant case for his 
theory. I concur with Lustick that Lijphart's treatment of the case is suspect and reveals 
'...an impressionistic methodological posture, (and) flexible rules for coding data' 
(1997: 117). Table 5.1 demonstrated that India's constitution was totally majoritarian at 
the time of independence. Even if the additional elements mentioned by Lijphart are 
included under the segmental autonomy element182 the constitution scores only 0.19 183 .
While Lijphart points to the existence of a Grand Coalition within the cabinet by the 
Congress's proportional inclusion of the members of minorities according to religious 
and linguistic criteria184, what he does not acknowledge is that the Muslim 
representatives were Congress Muslims. These leaders were very different from an 
ethnically defined elite cartel with authority over, and autonomy from, the community 
they represented. Secondly, as Lustick points out, this Grand Coalition at no time 
managed to secure a majority of votes (1997: 115). Thirdly, 'no Muslim was appointed 
to any of the four major cabinet positions in the federal government' in Nehru's tenure 
(Wilkinson 2000a: 779). Kothari has described the 'Congress System' as a system 
where the Congress as the predominant party after independence, accommodated other 
groups within it. 'It consists of a party of consensus and parties of pressure' (1964: 
1162). However, as Wilkinson discusses, the CWC's 'recommendations on minority 
proportionality were being flaunted at every level of government from district boards 
right up to the national parliament' (2000a: 778-779). Therefore Lijphart has not made 
a convincing case for the existence of consociational democracy in Nehruvian India in 
the most important area of grand coalition, rather only in the areas of segmental 
autonomy. This linguistic autonomy permitted the use of languages recognised in the 
Eighth Schedule of the constitution for government and for civil service examinations. 
Subsequently re-drawing federal units to reflect linguistic concentrations increased this
181 Although this percentage rises and falls according to how Hindi speakers are classified, e.g. in the 1971 
census Bihan and Rajasthani speakers were conflated with Hindi speakers.
182 Such as the lack of a uniform civil code and educational autonomy and state funding for linguistic and 
religious schools.
183 If linguistic reorganisation is included within this amended scoring system, the Indian constitution scores
0.25.
184 Which Austin in 1966 concluded had worked remarkably well (1966: 125).
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autonomy. Yet the constitution offered linguistic autonomy for linguistic minorities as 
well as majorities. First, all states are constitutionally required to provide adequate 
primary education facilities for children of minority language groups, or if numerous 
enough, to permit them to set up their own educational institutions (this provision also 
applies to religious groups). Whilst these decisions are in the hands of the states, and 
linguistic minorities have been discriminated against, the President of India is 
empowered to appoint a special officer for linguistic minorities; there is therefore a 
procedure for minorities to complain to, and seek redress from, the national 
government. This segmental autonomy was essential for federal stabilisation, but the 
overall degree of consociational democracy remained low.
In the case of Pakistan, as can be seen in Chart 5.5, the effective number of linguistic 
groups of 2.62 diminished substantially from the pre-independence score of 8.52 for 
India, but was still above O'Leary's threshold of 1.9 for a stable democratic 
majoritarian federation. The fact that the Pakistani elite did not seek to accommodate 
linguistic identities through consociational mechanisms is an important point.
Chart 5.5. Linguistic Distribution in Pakistan in 1951
Language
Bengali
Punjabi
Pushtu
Sindhi
Urdu
Baluchi
Others
TOTAL
enling
% Pop
54.42
27.55
6.61
5.28
3.24
1.24
1.66
100
2.62
Urdu
Bengali
Punjabi
Source: Data adapted from Government of Pakistan (1951b).
While the absence of linguistic reorganisation was compatible with their pre- 
independence constitutional preferences, O'Leary's formula would support the 
contention that they were short-sighted in not accommodating these linguistic groups 
and that the absence of accommodation destabilised the federation. While the Pakistani 
constitution of 1956 scored 0.35 on the consociational dimension when separate
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personal laws are added into the formula, as well as the provisions for educational 
autonomy - these provisions were only for religious communities. Linguistic 
communities were not accommodated at the provincial or the national level under the 
1956 constitution with the belated exception of the recognition of Bengali as a state 
language on a par with Urdu. Pakistan did not recognise the legitimacy of provincial 
languages. This contrasted with India, which, even before linguistic reorganisation was 
conceded, recognised the right of the states to use their own languages. It is in the field 
of language that the greatest challenges came to the stability of the federations of India 
and Pakistan at the time of independence. Since the Pakistani state was created around 
ostensibly religious criteria, provincial linguistic identities, never far below the surface 
in the struggle for Pakistan, resurfaced with a vengeance. Although there was no call 
for linguistic reorganisation in Pakistan; alternative consociational linguistic 
accommodation was possible through language laws. One final point concerning the 
changed effective number of linguistic groups is that it affected the general 
constitutional formation in Pakistan. Partition created one demographically dominant 
group with over 50% of the population, the Bengalis. However, they did not constitute 
a staatsvolk and, more importantly, did not possess the resources of state power185 . The 
high number of effective linguistic groups shows that there was a second large linguistic 
group, the Punjabis. Interestingly, their dominance was coupled with a centralisation of 
the Pakistani state186 . Their changed position was reflective of the fact that the Muslims 
were now the staatsvolk.
The distribution of the provincial effective number of ethnic groups
The second purpose of analysing the effective number of ethnic groups is to assess the 
distribution of the effective number of ethnic groups at the provincial level. The 
intervening variable in explaining federal stabilisation in India and Pakistan has been 
the organisation of units along ethnically homogeneous lines and the recognition of 
ethnic groups in the decision-making institutions. The effective number of ethnic 
groups at the provincial level is, I maintain, just as important in explaining federal 
stabilisation as the national number. Provincial reorganisation has been, and remains, a
185 They were massively underrepresented in the army and the bureaucracy and were denied the opportunity to 
form the government after the Awarm League won a majority of seats in the 1970 national elections, hi 
Schermerhom's terminology, they were 'mass subjects' - the majority of the population, but a subordinate 
group, not possessing any power (1978: 12).
This is interesting because before independence when religious identities were more salient, the Punjabi 
Muslims had been concerned to promote confederal, decentralised constitutional forms.
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contested phenomenon in both countries. India initially rejected linguistic 
reorganisation despite the Congress's long-standing commitment to the project before 
independence. The units of independent India were amenable to linguistic 
reorganisation as can be seen in Table 5.3.
Table 5.3. The effective number of linguistic and religious groups of the states of 
India before linguistic reorganisation
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
STATE
Ajmer
Andaman and Nicobar
Assam
Bhopal
Bihar
Bilaspur
Bombay
Coorg
Delhi
Himachel Pradesh
Hyderabad
Jammu and Kashmir
Kutch
Madhya Bharat
Madhya Pradesh
Madras
Manipur
Mysore
Orissa
Pepsu
Punjab
Rajasthan
Sikkim
Suarastra
Travancore
Tripura
Uttar Pradesh
Vindhya Pradesh
West Bengal
enrel
1.32
4.1
2.08
1.38
1.35
1.03
1.27
1.3
1.39
1,04
1,32
1.82
1.89
1.17
1.1
1.29
2.35
1.22
1.05
2.08
1.88
1.21
1.7
1.31
2.12
1.63
1.34
1.05
1.28
enling
2.54
5.35
2.92
1.51
1.56
5.87
3.19
4.16
1.62
5.87
3.19
2.83
1.03
1.74
3.06
2.94
2.3
2.13
1.47
2.09
2.09
6.65
6.89
1.06
1.31
2.55
1.53
1.01
1.35
Source- Linguistic data adapted from Government of India (1951 h; 1951e; 1951d; 195 If; 1951c; 1951n; 
1951a; 1951g; 1951b; 1951J; 1951k: 19511; 1951m: 19511; 1961e; 1961a: 1961c; 196 Id: 196 lb). 
Religious data adapted from Government of India (1953b).
Notes;
1) These data for Delhi. Punjab. Pepsu. Himachel Pradesh and Bilaspur were taken from the 1961 
censuses. This was because the census of 1951 (Government of India 1953a) did not differentiate 
between Hindi. Punjabi. Urdu and Pahari in these states. These data for Jammu and Kashmir were also 
taken from the 1961 census as no census was taken in 1951.
2) The states without a dominant group are highlighted in bold.
-155-
Out of the 29 states, only 11 (38%) were below O'Leary's level for majoritarian federal 
stability when analysed according to linguistic criteria. This means that there was great 
potential for reorganisation. In contrast, only 17% of the Indian states before 
reorganisation did not possess a dominant group according to religious criteria (defined 
as possessing an effective number of religious groups of 1.9 or below). These were 
Assam, Pepsu, Travancore-Cochin, Manipur and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. 
There was generally less need to reorganise states on religious grounds. This did not 
mean that these identities were irrelevant. Many of these states were to become 
problematic later on. Although O'Leary's criterion for federal stability was applied to 
understanding the system-wise dynamics, it appears that it can also apply at the 
provincial level as well. Although Punjab possessed a dominant group in 1951 - the 
Hindus - this was by the barest of margins (1.88). When Punjab and Pepsu were 
combined in 1956, it scored 1.92, slightly above O'Leary's criterion for federal 
stability187 .
The fact that the northeast (from Assam) and Punjab were reorganised according to 
linguistic and tribal lines rather than religion, and Kashmir has never been so 
reorganised188 , is indicative of the changed status of religious reorganisation since 
independence. This reluctance to concede the legitimacy of a religiously defined unit 
contrasts with the position taken in the Nehru Report of 1928 to the reorganisation of 
Sind. At this point the Muslims were a much larger percentage of the national 
population. Therefore the changed legitimacy of religious reorganisation can be related 
to the national number of effective religious groups, but also to that at the provincial 
level; there were fewer states that could be reorganised according to religious criteria.
Congress belatedly succumbed to internal and external pressure, and after conceding the 
legitimacy of Andhra Pradesh in 1953, appointed a States Reorganisation Commission. 
The SRC reported in 1955 and recommended a radical reorganisation of the map of 
India. In the rejection of linguistic reorganisation Congress was initially inconsistent 
with its pre-independence constitutional preferences, but returned 'to the fold' under 
entirely predictable outrage and pressure. It is however, too much to claim that Nehru
187 Punjab was eventually reorganised in 1966 but not along religious lines. The reorganisation did not create a 
particularly homogeneous province along linguistic lines, and remains incomplete.
fss There have been recent calls for a division of Jammu and Kashmir into religiously defined units by the 
Sandi Panvar These have been kicked into the long grass by the BJP dominated coalition at the centre.
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was returning to the consociational fold as Lijphart does (1996: 262). Yet it stabilised 
the federation along linguistic lines. Despite the concerns articulated by Selig Harrison 
(1960: 135, 307) and Brecher (1959: 21), linguistic reorganisation accommodated 
conflicts and stabilised the federation. This contrasts with the position taken by the 
news magazine, India Today in 1998.
Four decades ago, the country upturned every tenet of good governance by 
carving out new states on the basis of language rather than administrative 
convenience (1998)189 .
Unlike India, Pakistan was consistent in its rejection of linguistic accommodation in 
terms of the constitutional preferences expressed before independence. These 
preferences rejected the application of linguistic divisions to Muslim majority areas, but 
were guilty of ignoring the calls for autonomy within the Muslim League. Pakistan's 
strategy of dealing with linguistic diversity was the exact opposite of India. Not all the 
units of the federation were homogeneous although four out of the six had a dominant 
group, and East Bengal in particular was remarkably homogeneous. Yet, as seen in 
Table 5.4 and Chart 5.6, the Baluchi States Union and the capital city of Karachi were 
linguistically heterogeneous190 . However there were no calls for linguistic 
reorganisation (although the Chirtagong Hill Tracts demanded autonomy).
Table 5.4. The effective number of linguistic groups in all the provinces of Pakistan 
before the One Unit Plan
Name of State
Baluchistan and States Union
5ast Bengal
Federal capital area - Karachi
North West Frontier Province (incl. frontier regions)
Junjab and Bahawalpur state
Sind and Khairpur state
PAKISTAN
ENIJNG
4.27
1.04
3.15
1.53
1.12
1.77
2.62
Source; Data adapted from Government of Pakistan (195 Ib).
189 Published in both Hindi and English.
190 Karachi was the capital city, flooded by Muhajirs after partition, which substantially increased its 
heteroaeneity. Baluchistan was comprised of multiple tribal areas. Within Pakistan as a whole, six districts 
were anomalously located in accordance with provincial critena, two districts in the NWFP had a majority of 
Punjabi speakers, one district in Baluchistan had a majority of Sindhi speakers and three provinces also in 
Baluchistan had a majority who spoke Pushtu (Masood 1970: 58-71'). Baluchistan was the only province that 
was constituted anew. Pushtu speakers were deliberately included within its boundaries rather than adding 
them to the NWFP (Rahman 1996: 156). This undermined both Baluchi homogeneity and calls for a greater
Pakhtoonstan. -157-
Chart 5.6. Linguistic Distribution of the provinces of Pakistan 1951 organised by 
the effective number of linguistic groups
EAST BENGAL
PUNJAB AND BAHAWALPUR 
a, STATE 
2 NWFP (INCL FRONTIER 
2 REGIONS)
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to
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KARACHI
BALUCHISTAN AND STATES 
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D BENGALI
• PUNJABI
• PUSHTU
• SINDHI
• URDU
• BALUCHI 
DOTHER
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 
Percentage of distribution
Source: Data adapted from Government of Pakistan (1951b).
Despite the 'relative' homogeneity of its units as seen in Chart 5.6, Pakistan pursued a 
strategy that made the units less homogeneous, hi 1955 Pakistan merged its Western 
Wing into one unit. This was an important indicator of Pakistan's attitude to linguistic 
accommodation. It decreased the average effective number of linguistic groups as seen 
in Table 5.5. At the same time it increased linguistic diversity within the federal 
structures, rather than diminishing it. hi my view this undermined federal stabilisation.
Table 5.5. The linguistic distribution of East and West Pakistan after the creation 
of the One Unit Plan of 1955
Name of State
West Pakistan
East Pakistan
PAKISTAN
ENLING
2.36
1.04
2.62
Source: Data adapted from Government of Pakistan (1951b).
Of equal significance was the fact that under the 1956 Constitution of Pakistan 
provincial languages were not recognised. The language riots of 1948 and 1951 hi East 
Pakistan over this issue were indicative of the exclusion of linguistic identities that was 
to follow in the constitution, the seeds of which were sown by Jinnah in his rejection of 
'parochial' linguistic identities in favour of Urdu. Although Bengali was recognised as
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the joint state language in the 1956 constitution as a quid pro quo to agreeing to 
legislative parity, provincial languages were NOT recognised191 . Although Sindhi 
continued to be used in schools in the province these schools came under pressure 
during the 1950s and 1960s and their numbers sharply declined (Rahman 1996: 116). 
According to O'Leary's criteria, the high effective number of linguistic groups would 
point to the dangers of the exclusion of linguistic identities from the constitutional 
framework. The changed effective number of linguistic groups at the national level and 
the reduced effective number of religious groups, ensured that language became the 
most significant identity marker after independence. The absence of constitutional 
recognition and the amalgamation of units into a Punjabi dominated Western Wing 
were folly in this regard192 . There was no real call for reorganisation along religious 
lines, as this would not have been practical. Only the district of the Chittagong Hill 
Tracts had a non-Muslim majority within it after partition193 .
5.4. Conclusion
While the changed effective number of ethnic groups, specifically the changed effective 
number of religious groups affected the constitutional formation of both states, it was 
more important in the case of Pakistan. However, it was not the only explanatory 
variable in determining the exact constitutional provisions. India and Pakistan both had 
a similar effective number of religious groups and they adopted different constitutional 
provisions. However, in both cases the lower number of effective religious groups 
provided the impetus for linguistic demands to emerge. This required a constitutional 
response that was eventually forthcoming in India. Although this could have been 
predicted on the basis of pre-independence constitutional preferences, as argued, India 
conceded linguistic reorganisation only with reluctance. The accommodationist 
response was not forthcoming in Pakistan. Although the effective number of ethnic
191 Rajagopalan is incorrect in arguing that they were (2001: 47).
192 One of my hypotheses is that the homogeneity of the units of a federation is neither sufficient nor a 
necessary condition for secession. While this has generally held true in South Asia, the case of East Pakistan is 
a notable exception. As I will discuss in Chapters Six, Seven and Eight, other factors such as state strategies of 
inclusion and exclusion as well as the number of provincial units and the division of the dominant group are
also vital.
193 hi an anomaly of the Radcliffe Award, Khulna district in Bengal, which was awarded to Pakistan, had a bare 
Hindu majority before partition. This changed after partition (Government of Pakistan 195 la). The Chittagong 
Hill Tracts were a contested region - ethnically similar to the districts of Mizoram and Tripura (then both part 
of Assam) which they bordered. Radcliffe argued that the district could not be assigned 'to a State different 
from that which controlled the district of Chittagong itself (1958: 3) despite the district not having a Muslim 
majority Therefore he allocated the district to Pakistan despite the disquiet of India. However, India benefited 
from several controversial decisions within the Punjab.
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groups does not and cannot dictate constitutional form, as I have argued, it does explain 
the decisions that were taken as well as providing an indication of the identities that 
needed accommodating. If these identities were not accommodated within 
constitutional structures, we have to seek to a) understand why, and b) understand what 
impact this decision had upon federal stabilisation. The first point is addressed in 
Chapter Six, the second in Chapter Seven. Although the changed ethnic composition of 
the states changed the context in which decisions on constitution formation were made 
it does not explain why, for example, India initially rejected linguistic reorganisation. 
For this we must examine the national identity of the state as articulated by the elites. 
The relationship between the plans that were articulated before independence and the 
version of the national identity that the elites articulated has only been briefly touched 
upon. The reactions to the demands for linguistic and religious recognition can and 
should be related to the national identity articulated by the elites of India and Pakistan. 
This national identity explains the exact strategies that were chosen and explains some 
of the apparent inconsistencies. This is the subject of Chapter Six.
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Chapter Six: Inclusion or Segregation? Federalism as a
multicultural strategy
'When the vision of the state is contested, the vision of the units is apt to be contested' (Rajagopalan
1999: 193).
'To accept Muslims or Christians as minorities would (be) tantamount to making religion a permanent 
divisive line ..., in every walk of social life. Indirectly, this would mean upholding the pernicious two- 
nation or multi-nationality theory' (Vajpayee 1961: 2)' 94.
'It may be that the founding fathers of independent India did not fully understand the significance of
ethnic loyalties and cleavages, some institutions adopted by them would have been better suited to
homogeneous societies than to India' (Vanhanen 1992: 3).
6.1. Introduction
My final independent variable in explaining federal stabilisation in India and Pakistan is 
that of the state-sponsored national identity. The state's articulation of a national 
identity is arguably the most important independent variable in explaining attitudes 
towards constitution formation (which I contend has affected federal stabilisation in 
India and Pakistan). As should be clear from the previous chapters, it cannot stand­ 
alone. State-sponsored national identities in India and Pakistan were inevitably 
influenced by those constitutional structures that existed under the British. Ignoring 
institutional legacies reduces our ability to identify the changes in constitutional 
strategies to manage ethnic diversity after partition. Without an appreciation of these 
changes it is not possible to explain the reasons behind them.
A state can respond to diversity within its borders by seeking to repress, expel, 
eliminate, accommodate or assimilate (McGarry and O'Leary 1993: 1-40). The 
existence of diversity does not dictate a specific response. Despite this, analysing the 
effective number of ethnic groups is necessary to understand constitutional structures. 
The state-sponsored national identity and strategies to manage diversity cannot be 
divorced from it. However, although the effective number of ethnic groups is vital to 
understanding the constitutional changes that occurred after independence, as 
established in Chapter Five it cannot explain all these changes. It is my contention that 
the conceptions of national identity need to be appreciated to understand these changes. 
The articulation of the national identity by the elites of India and Pakistan must 
therefore be understood in conjunction with the effective number of ethnic groups as
194 Prime Minister of India 1996, 1998-present.
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well as the institutional legacies. The combination of the three contributes to an 
understanding of federal stabilisation in India and Pakistan.
6.2. National Identity
The articulation of a national identity influences the institutional design of a state and its 
response to ethnic diversity, especially at a time of constitutional flux such as 
decolonisation. States promote differing conceptions of national identity. In most 
states, national and political borders do not coincide; therefore notions of national 
identity are often contested, whether state-sponsored or otherwise. To be accepted, a 
state-sponsored national identity must have resonance with the general population. 
States, especially former colonial possessions, have sought to construct nations as a 
means of legitimising their rule within often very ethnically diverse territories. These 
nations can be civic, defined by residence within the territory regardless of language, 
religion or tribe. Alternatively they can be ethnic, e.g. based on religious identity. 
What is important is that states promote certain conceptions of national identity. 
National identity cannot be directly equated with patriotism (loyalty to the state) as it 
defines the legitimacy (or otherwise) of claims for recognition of ethnic groups within 
that state. Groups may be loyal to a state but not be recognised by it and included 
within its identity193 .
The state-sponsored national identity is given expression in the institutions of the state. 
In short, it articulates what it is to be a member of a state and in what capacity 'private' 
characteristics of an individual are adopted or rejected as manifestations of that identity. 
Ethnic identities can support, coexist with or oppose the state-sponsored national 
identity. Therefore the state's articulation of a national identity has implications for 
ethnic conflict regulation, as the acceptance of the legitimacy of a group's claims affects 
the distribution of political and economic resources. As it is state-sponsored it is an 
elite conception, although to be stable it has to be reflected in popular perceptions.
The categorisation of a state-sponsored national identity is complex. The provisions of 
the constitution (whether codified or otherwise) are the obvious starting point. In 
addition, laws concerning citizenship, educational provision and personal laws are
195 Although this state of affairs is unlikely to be sustainable.
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important. Finally, the ideological discourse of the inhabitants of the state (especially 
the prominent elite members) influences the ability of different sections of the state's 
inhabitants to identify with the state. It is difficult to categorise definitively a state as 
identities are situational and a person excluded as a result of one identity may be 
included on another. Despite this, it is important to do so. Among others, Brubaker has 
distinguished between civic and ethnic states, and their laws relating to citizenship 
(1992: Introduction). Yet, this distinction is limited. Civic identities have often been 
equated with inclusive, liberal states, while ethnic descriptions have been seen as 'nasty' 
and illiberal. These perceptions are often inaccurate. Civic conceptions of national 
identity can reinforce historical ethnic domination, as has been the case in America. 
States organised around ethnic categories may permit greater recognition for non- 
dominant groups than their civic counterparts. Additionally, simply defining identities 
as civic or ethnic does not address the question of whether an identity presents overt or 
covert costs of inclusion, as discussed by Carling (1992: 302-306).
State strategies to regulate diversity can be categorised into four ideal types; 
assimilation, integration, multiculturalism and segregation. These ideal types broadly 
conform to some of the categories set out by McGarry and O'Leary although their 
typology also includes specific institutional arrangements (1993: 1-40). These four 
strategies can be categorised according to whether they recognise ethnic identities in the 
public realm, confine them to the private realm, or seek to eliminate ethnic difference 
entirely. To facilitate the categorisation, the costs for a non-dominant group of being 
regulated by one of these strategies must be included.
It is problematic to define a non-dominant group. In most cases a non-dominant group 
comprises a minority of the population e.g. Native Americans. Immigrants can also be 
defined as non-dominant groups. However, the framework set out below only includes 
immigrants when they become numerous (and territorially concentrated) enough to 
demand action from the government on behalf of their community. However, non- 
dominant groups are not necessarily in a minority. Examples of a non-dominant 
majority were the Bengalis within Pakistan before 1971 and the black 'community' in 
apartheid South Africa. These types of groups have helpfully been described as' mass 
subjects' (Schermerhorn 1978: 12). If a majority is a 'subject' then a minority group 
must be dominant - e.g. the white community in South Africa. Therefore, to determine
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whether a majority group is dominant, additional criteria need to be deployed. These 
additional criteria include whether a clear hierarchy of ethnic groups exists within the 
state in question, whether the rights of citizenship are denied to the majority 
community, or whether democracy has been subverted in order that the majority is not 
able to exercise its demographic strength.
Table 6.1. State strategies to regulate ethnic diversity
High Cost
Medium 
Cost
Low Cost
Identity recognised in the 
public and the private sphere
Segregation
Multiculturalism
Identity recognised 
in private sphere
Integration
Identity neither recognised 
publiclv nor privatelv
Assimilation
Notes: The table is my own. However, the public/private distinction has been made by McGarry and 
O'Leary (1993: 16-22) and also by O'Leary (2001c: 34).
Assimilation:
A state pursuing an assimilationist strategy articulates a national identity than can either 
be civic or ethnic196 . Assimilationist strategies are inclusive. Assimilationist states 
such as France have few barriers to citizenship. However, the cost of assimilation for 
the non-dominant group is high as it entails the loss of their ethnicity in the private as 
well as the public sphere. There are two types of assimilationist strategies.
• Fusion: This assimilationist strategy entails the fusion of different identities into 
one identity. If a and b are differentiated identities, then C is a new identity created out 
of the fusion of a and b This can be schematically written as
a+b =
Membership of this identity entails the abolition of the original identity, both in the 
public and the private spheres. This does not mean that the identity will disappear 
entirely, but it does mean that it is the state's strategy to make it disappear entirely. 
Although the USA is often cited as a case of assimilationist fusion this has not been an
196 Most 'civic' identities in reality possess an ethnic core e.g. the historic WASP identity in the US.
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accurate description of state strategy for over a hundred and fifty years197 The 
Yugoslav case is a better example of a state that articulated a strategy of fusion. 
'Ethnicity was not so much dealt with as declared non-existent' and the system was 
managed 'through the political monopoly of the party' (Schopflin 1993: 180-181). The 
fact that it was not successful does not mean that the strategy was not adopted.
• Acculturation: although assimilationist fusion results in the abolition of the 
original identity, assimilationist acculturation is a more extreme strategy. The original 
identity is subsumed in both instances but only in acculturation is it subsumed to an 
already existing dominant identity. In this case a is the dominant identity and b is the 
non-dominant identity. Schematically this can be written as
a+b = a
The dominant identity can be either civic or ethnic. France is an example of a state 
espousing acculturation. Although the French identity claims to be civic, in reality, 
most civic identities possess an ethnic core. 'There was a French nation, defined largely 
by blood and later by conceptions of "our ancestors, the Gauls" ' (Horowitz 1992: 7). 
The assimilationist nature of this strategy is demonstrated by the fact that, '(i)t is 
possible to be an Italian in France, but it is not possible to be an Italian-Frenchman in 
the same easy way as it is possible to be an Italian-American' (Horowitz 1992: 7).
Integration:
Integrationist strategies seek to confine ethnicity to the private sphere. This conception 
of national identity deliberately ignores ethnicity as a means of legitimising the state. 
Everyone is equal within this state; 'liberal integrationists promote bills of rights with 
equal rights for individuals rather than communities' (McGarry and O'Leary 1993: 17).
197 It was in the 1840s that the 'great school wars' in New York broke out over the demands for Catholic 
education, and in the 1880s there were disputes concerning the rights of 'German children to receive instruction 
in German' (Glazer 1994: 122). These issues multiplied in the 1920s (Horoxvitz 1992: 16). The US now 
encourages bilingual ballot papers in 422 "covered jurisdictions" most of which are counties—in 28 states". 
•The act defined these language minorities as persons of Spanish heritage. American Indians, Asian Americans, 
and Alaskan Natives' (GAO1997: 1 & 4). I am indebted to Dame Steve Shirley for bringing the latter point to 
mv attention. In addition America practices affirmative action policies. Any one of these policies challenges 
the description of current day America as a 'melting pot' - although this is not to deny that America still 
assimilates many of its more recent day immigrants, especially those from the Asian community (Horowitz
1992: 22-23). - 165 -
This strategy is therefore an inclusive one, and can be equated with most 'civic' forms 
of national identity. This is not to deny that there have been notable exceptions made in 
states espousing this identity, e.g. until recently the Australian attitude concerning its 
Aboriginal population. In addition, integrationist strategies are rarely ethnically neutral, 
e.g. the choice of the language of government effectively discriminates against a group 
that does not speak the 'civic' national language. This latent ethnic dimension increases 
the costs to a non-dominant group of being subject to this strategy. As McGarry and 
O'Leary point out, integrationist strategies may also be a means of consolidating 
majority control (1993: 18). Integrationist strategies differ from assimilation because 
they permit groups to maintain their identities in the personal sphere. They are not 
threatened by the maintenance of these identities. The case of Britain is often cited as 
an integrationist state (Birch 1977: esp. Ch 3). However, it has become more 
multicultural in recent years e.g. in relation to non-Christian schools.
Multiculturalism:
This strategy protects personal identities and institutionalises them within the public 
sphere. Therefore, the identity the state promotes will be multi-faceted. Multiple 
identities are promoted in the public sphere, using educational, housing and 
employment policies, e.g. Canada and Switzerland. Not all identities within the state 
may be part of the national identity, e.g. religious groups may be denied state 
recognition. However, they will be permitted private expression. Canada and 
Switzerland both have multicultural strategies of inclusion, based primarily around 
language. A non-dominant group has low costs of being subject to a multicultural 
strategy if its identity is included within the national identity. However, it is arguable 
that multicultural strategies increase ethnic conflict by separating non-dominant groups 
from the rest of society. Multicultural strategies do not necessarily require 
consociational frameworks (Smooha 2002: 425), although consociational government is 
a multicultural strategy. Multicultural strategies are also inclusivist, especially for those 
identities protected in the public sphere.
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Segregation:
A strategy of segregation is similar to a multicultural one because it recognises different 
identities in the public sphere and adopts state policies in accordance with these 
differences. It may even seek to protect these identities - deliberately emphasising the 
divisions between the identities. However, such a strategy differs from multiculturalism 
on one important point - it does not treat these identities as equals. Such state strategies 
have high costs for a non-dominant community. They are also exclusive. There are 
high, often insurmountable barriers to membership of the dominant group. 
Segregationist strategies, like assimilationist ones, have to be subdivided.
• Control. Not all control strategies seek to maintain ethnic difference; some 
regimes 'suppressed latent divisions between ethnic communities'. Yet others are 
premised on the dominance of the most 'powerful ethnic community' (McGarry and 
O'Leary 1993: 23). Control strategies do not seek to eliminate differences by 
transforming the non-dominant group into members of the dominant one. Ethnic 
difference is recognised within both the public and the private spheres. However, 
unlike multicultural policies that seek to protect this identity, segregationist control 
strategies have less laudable intentions. The element of voluntarism and consent is 
absent. South Africa under apartheid was an excellent example of a segregationist 
control strategy - individuals were (often forcibly) categorised into different racial 
groups by the state. Separate homelands were enforced and the black community were 
denied the right to vote. Yet control can co-exist with formal democracy. Smooha 
characterises this as an 'ethnic democracy', which 'lacks the feature of 'civic equality' 
and 'civic nation" (2002: 425).
• Citizenship: The second type of segregation is different from the first because it 
does not purposivefy seek to dominate another community. However it denies the rights 
of citizenship to a non-dominant group and maintains the distinction between itself and 
the non-dominant group. The cases of Germany and the UAE typify states where 
citizenship is defined by ethnicity. Assimilation or integration is not possible. While 
non-dominant groups may not be physically segregated from the dominant group, they 
are denied the rights of citizenship. Control strategies may also deny rights of 
citizenship to the non-dominant group (apartheid South Africa). But they do not
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necessarily do so (Palestinians living within Israel 198). Before the naturalisation reforms 
of 1999, Germany fitted these criteria. Citizenship was granted to 'ethnic' Germans 
migrating from other countries such as Russia, while it was not granted to even third 
generation German-born Turks. State policies were geared towards the notion that third 
generation immigrants might 'return to their ancestral home countries' (Horowitz 1992: 
11). A similar policy operates in the UAE. In 1982, the most recent data available, 
only 20% of the population were citizens, the rest being migrant workers, primarily 
from South and South East Asia (Central Intelligence Agency 2002).
The strategies identified above are not necessarily exclusive of one another. They are 
ideal types. Different strategies can be used in relation to different groups within the 
same state. By differentiating policies adopted in relation to linguistic and religious 
identities in India and Pakistan it is possible to discern different state strategies and 
articulations of national identity. Differentiating between the strategies adopted with 
regard to these two identities is vital to understanding issues of federal stabilisation in 
India and Pakistan. A concession or a change in the strategy involves a realignment of 
resources and access to power. This has been seen most dramatically in the design of 
the federal systems in both states.
6.3. State Conceptions of National Identity at Independence
Congress and the Muslim League were not unchallenged by other parties, nor indeed, 
monolithic entities (Talbot 2000: 111). The Congress was challenged from outside by 
Hindu groups such as the Mahasabha, especially at the time of the Nehru Report of 
1928, and of course, the League. The Congress was also a broad church. Vast 
differences existed within it, both over what kind of economic system independent India 
should seek to create, as well as the notion of national identity that should be promoted, 
particularly over whether it should be a secular or a Hindu majoritarian identity 
(Chiriyankandath 2000: 9). In the interests of manageability, these differences have 
been subsumed in the analysis 199 . The Muslim League was also riddled with 
factionalism. In addition, the League faced challenges to its claim to speak on behalf of 
the whole Muslim community within India, notably from the Unionist Party in the
198 As distinct from those in the occupied territories.
199 For a more detailed discussion on the factional politics within Congress see Kothari (1964) and for a 
discussion of the increased communalism within Congress see Gupta (1962: 357-8) and Austin (1966: 11).
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Punjab and the Red Shirts in NWFP. Unlike the Congress, which committed to 
linguistic provinces in 1920 and reorganised to reflect this commitment, the League had 
never come to terms with linguistic regional diversity. Jinnah's reference to 
'independent states' in 1940 was merely a reflection of the vagueness of the demand for 
Pakistan that was necessary to gain and maintain the support of these regional 
groupings.
The attempts by the leaders of Congress and League, both before and after 
independence to articulate the idea of the 'nation' profoundly influenced the type of 
institutions which were created to give expression to this 'nation'. Territorial 
demarcation of the units of a federal state is one way of defining the identities that are 
seen as legitimate.
There is no question that the demarcation of units is a tangible, physical 
statement of the state or nation-state's self image as well as the image of the 
'place' of its units (Rajagopalan 1999: 192).
It occupies such a space because the demarcation of units not only permits political 
recognition of certain identities, but, in a federal system gives them a place within 
decision-making organs200 . While it is one thing to permit a cultural identity to express 
itself in the personal sphere - an integrationist strategy - it is quite another to 
institutionalise an identity in the public sphere. It is an even stronger commitment to 
allow that identity to be reflected in decision-making institutions. When a federation is 
organised around territorially concentrated ethnic groups, federalism can provide a 
mechanism of affirming ethnic segmental autonomy. When these homogeneous units 
secure representation in decision-making bodies, they may be part of a wider 
consociational segmental autonomy framework201 .
In defining the nature of state-sponsored national identities of India and Pakistan I have 
concentrated primarily on the ideas articulated by Nehru and Jinnah. To do so is not to 
deny the existence of other important figures, nor the debates that occurred within the 
major political parties, or indeed between them. The pronouncements of these
200 Unless it seeks to ignore these identities politically and creates heterogeneous units to achieve this end, or 
does not give democratic rights to ethnically homogeneous units. 
m Although consociational structures do not require federal ones.
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individuals were not made in isolation from the movements of which they were 
members and leaders. But these particular individuals had a great influence on 
constitutional formation and on the constitutional preferences of the movements of 
which they were leaders. In Nehru's case the connection was obvious. He was Prime 
Minister of India from 1947-1964 and shaped the making of the constitution, although 
he was not the only important figure in this process, and his position was strengthened 
by the death of Patel in 1950 (Desai 2000: 112). As Chatterjee states,
it is in the writings of this principal political architect of the new Indian state that 
one can find, more clearly than anywhere else, the key ideological elements and 
relations of nationalist thought at its moment of arrival (1999b: 132).
Even Talbot, who rejects the 'high polities' approach, concedes that after the death of 
Patel, Nehru stamped his ideas on the nation building programme (2000: 116). It is 
harder to assess Jinnah's legacy as he died so soon after the creation of Pakistan. 
During this time however, he set the parameters of the debate, both in his statements on 
language and provincial autonomy, but also in his actions as Governor General.
India
Nehru argued that India was a historic unity, based on traditions of toleration, 
incorporation and assimilation (1946: 79). He refused to accept religion as the basis of 
nationality, arguing that there was no one definition of 'a nation'. Nehru therefore 
rejected Jinnah's two-nation theory and in The Discovery of India', portrayed Indian 
history as all-inclusive and accommodating. He attributed India's strength to its success 
in attaining unity through diversity (1946: 112). Nehru's socialist beliefs influenced his 
attitude towards ethnic demands, which, whether based on language, religion or caste, 
he assumed to be identities that would fade away with the onset of modernisation. 
Although Nehru's one-nation theory promoted the protection of minority rights, it was 
designed to thwart demands for Hindustan, rather than to promote multiculturalism. 
This is an important distinction that explains his reticence in accommodating 'irrational' 
identities in the public sphere. Nehru's ideal strategy to managing India's diversity can 
be described as an integrationist one.
Despite his preferences, Nehru was constrained by the high effective number of ethnic 
groups within India. Before independence Congress had accepted religious and
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linguistic reorganisation as well as reserved seats for Muslims. All three required 
recognition in decision-making organs - consociational practices. It was therefore 
significant that the Congress backtracked on these after independence. The more 
majoritarian nature of the post-independence constitution was not entirely unexpected as 
it fitted with both the predominantly Hindu Congress's preferences and also those 
socialists who shared Nehru's vision of the irrelevance, and ultimate oblivion of 
'primordial' identities. Nehru's preference for a centralised, integrationist majoritarian 
constitution had led to the ultimate rejection of the Cabinet Mission Plan - with the 
predictable result of partition. The lower number of effective religious groups after 
partition ensured that the constitution was able to become more majoritarian without 
destabilising the state.
However the strategy adopted by the Indian state was not an integrationist one. This 
was because of the dilemma as identified by Chiriyankandath that,
underwriting any minority 'rights' could be seen as compromising the secular 
character of the state, but if such rights were left unprotected, there was the 
danger that the state might be secular in form but unrestrainedly majoritarian in 
practice (2000: 12).
Despite Nehru's belief in the primacy of individual rights rather than those of groups, 
the Indian state recognised both linguistic and religious identities in the public sphere. 
This was for three reasons.
• Firstly, after the horrors of partition, traditional identities could not be swept aside. 
Nehru was aware of the need to allay the minorities' fears (Rudolph and Rudolph 
2000: 31) if only because his desire to avoid a 'Hindustan' required a level of 
protection for religious minorities. In the process the constitution 'gave statutory 
recognition to minorities, thereby implicitly accepting the existence of a majority' 
(Chiriyankandath 2000: 20).
• Secondly, although Nehru would have preferred to adopt an integrationist strategy, 
the effective number of linguistic groups demanded accommodation in the public 
sphere. After partition India had a very high number of effective linguistic groups - 
as we saw, enlmg was 7.67. Such a high number of effective linguistic groups 
required political recognition, although Nehru did not initially realise this.
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. Thirdly, partition had given credence to the two-nation theory. Many Congressmen 
thought that Muslims should not have any political rights within India. Tensions 
famously existed between Nehru and Patel on this issue202 . Ashoka's four lions in 
the state emblem epitomised a tolerant Maurayan past, but potentially conflicted 
with the first article of the Constitution, which stated that 'India, that is Bharat, shall 
be a Union of States'. Bharatta is 'the old Sanskrit name derived from the mythical 
founder of the race' (Nehru 1946: 38). Its inclusion in the constitution according to 
Mitra 'is an unwitting double entendre that indicates the unresolved conflict 
between tradition and modernity' (1991: 761). At the time of independence it was 
used as an 'acceptable' alternative to 'Hindustan', but was still a religious reference 
in the constitution of a secular state.
a) Linguistic accommodation
Despite the integrationist strategy preferred by Nehru, linguistic identities were given a 
multicultural 'nod' in Article 345 of the constitution. It provided that,
Subject to the provisions of articles 346 and 347, the Legislature of a State may 
by law adopt any one or more of the languages in use in the State or Hindi as the 
language or languages to be used for all or any of the official purposes of that 
State.
This provision promotes and protects linguistic identities in the public sphere; 
recognising different languages as languages of government at the provincial level. 
This provision was included in the constitution before linguistic reorganisation had been 
conceded. It was important because it meant that 'speakers of the major regional 
languages could continue to use their own languages in the examinations for entry into 
the Union public services' (Brass 1994: 164). While nationalist movements are never 
solely motivated by economic considerations, the two can coincide. When they do they 
are a potent force. This provision ensured that the Hindi speaking states would not 
dominate government appointments. However, it was not a measure of consociational 
segmental autonomy that challenged majoritarianism for three reasons. Firstly, this 
provision accorded no representation in decision-making organs. Secondly, and more 
importantly, the provincial units were very heterogeneous. Before linguistic
202 'Patel, the Deputy Prune Minister and Home and States Minister ... m retrospect appears as a Hindu 
nationalist' (Rudolph and Rudolph 2000: 30).
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reorganisation in 1956, over 60% of the states had an effective number of linguistic 
groups above 2. Thirdly, Article 346 diminished the inclusiveness of this provision.
The language for the time being authorised for use in the Union for official 
purposes shall be the official language for communication between one State 
and another State and between a State and the Union.
This was not a problem while English remained an official language (Article 243). 
However, Article 351 provided that It shall be the duty of the Union to promote the 
spread of the Hindi language'. It is therefore it is not surprising that Article 346 was not 
seen to be inclusive by the states of the Union who did not speak Hindi. As 
Rajagopalan reminds us, the declaration of Hindi as an official language
is the only place where the state identifies itself with any particular identity trait. 
Little wonder, then, that in the first thirty years of the union's existence, 
language was the most contentious identity issue (2001: 35)203 .
Linguistic autonomy was reduced in effectiveness without the power to have influence 
at the centre. Linguistic autonomy did not challenge centralised majoritarianism. This 
was why the question of the official language of the state became such a politically 
charged issue, both before and after linguistic reorganisation. The constitution had 
provided that English should be retained for a fifteen-year interim period - expiring in 
1965. In 1963 the Official Languages Act was passed, providing that 'Hindi was indeed 
to become the sole official language of the country in 1965, but English was to be 
continued as an associate additional official language' (Brass 1994: 165). Provision 
was made for parliament to re-consider the issue every ten years. Nehru personally 
assured the non-Hindi speaking states that there would be no attempt to impose Hindi 
upon them 'but the ambiguity in the Act of 1963 left an unresolved tension' (Brass 
1994: 166). The ambiguity did not keep the peace for long after Nehru's death as 
discussed by Das Gupta (1975: 478-485) and Brass (1994: 166-167). It was only in the 
amended Act of 1967 that the position of English was secured for use in Parliament and 
for centre-state communications by providing a veto to 'the legislatures of all the States 
which have not adopted Hindi as their Official Language' (Government of India 1967). 
This concession was vital to the stabilisation of the federation.
203 The description of 'India that is Bharat' means his argument is overstated. Hindi was made the -official' 
rather than the 'national' language precisely because of the claims of the regional languages to also be 
'national'. -173-
Nehru and the Congress initially retreated from the pre-independence commitment to 
linguistic reorganisation. As the rejection was a reversal of policy, it cannot be related 
to continuity in constitutional preferences. The rejection also cannot be related to the 
reduced effective number of linguistic groups, as although partition reduced linguistic 
diversity, it did not reduce it significantly. Partition, and the elite fear of further 
disintegration gave Nehru and Patel the pretext required to shelve the demand, but it 
was not the cause of the u-turn. The initial reversal of policy over linguistic 
reorganisation is the one element of constitutional form that can be directly related to 
Nehru's attempt to create an integrationist majoritarian strategy for the state. However, 
the Congress divided over the issue. The Congress President in 1948, the Telugu- 
speaking Sitaramayya, called for linguistic reorganisation. No matter how strong 
Nehru's modernising tendencies, against which he saw arrayed the forces of 
provincialism, the strength of linguistic identities expressed within Nehru's own 
Congress Party ensured that they could not be ignored.
In 1953 after prolonged agitation, the demand to create Andhra Pradesh was conceded 
and in 1955 the SRC accepted in practice the demands for linguistic reorganisation. 
However, the Commission's terms of reference for reorganisation were national unity 
and economic and administrative considerations (1955: 10). In his statement 
announcing the appointment of the SRC, Nehru acknowledged that 'the language and 
culture of an area have an undoubted importance' but added that there were other 
important considerations, namely,
the preservation and strengthening of the unity and security of India (and) a 
great ordered plan for her economic, cultural and moral progress. Changes 
which interfere with the successful prosecution of such a national plan would be 
harmful to the national interest (Nehru 1953: 2843).
The SRC received 152,250 memoranda although 'the number of well-considered 
memoranda (did) not exceed about 2000', travelled all over India and interviewed 
approximately 9000 people (1955: ii-iii). The national wing of the INC did not submit a 
memorandum to the SRC (although the Commission's remit had been defined by 
Nehru). However, the PCCs were free to do so. The PCCs of Maharashtra and
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Karnataka were permitted to make joint representations with other parties in favour of 
the linguistic reorganisation of their states204 .
The SRC eventually reorganised the majority of the federal states around linguistic 
groups. However, these units were conceded grudgingly and often justified according 
to administrative and economic criteria rather than the legitimacy of linguistic demands. 
As the SRC stated
the reorganisation of states has to be regarded as a means to an end and not an 
end in itself, that being the case, it is quite legitimate to consider whether there is 
on the whole a balance of advantage in any change (my emphasis) (1955: 29).
Rajagopalan is therefore incorrect when he argues that linguistic reorganisation was an 
expression of the identity of the state (2001: 14). Instead it was a very reluctant 
concession by Nehru, though a transformation of the nature of the state205 . It is only 
after the 1967 Official Languages (Amended) Act and linguistic reorganisation were 
both in place that India possessed a truly multicultural and partially consociational 
linguistic strategy. Before this Act was amended, the provision to adopt Hindi as the 
sole official language challenged even this limited multiculturalism206 . The move to a 
consociational multicultural strategy after Nehru's death did follow from concessions 
made during his lifetime. These concessions were promoted by electoral 
considerations, demonstrating that the high effective number of linguistic groups could 
not be ignored. This change in policy and the creation of linguistically homogeneous 
units was, I contend, a major explanatory factor promoting the stabilisation of the Indian 
federation.
b) Religious accommodation
When it came to the institutional recognition of religious demands, the Indian state 
reached a unique compromise (Chiriyankandath 2000: 12-13). Although the word 
secular did not appear in the constitution until 1976, India's original constitution
204 CWC meeting New Delhi 22nd May 1954, (reproduced in Zaidi and Zaidi 1981b: 547-8).
205 To mitigate the 'dangers' posed by the linguistic reorganisation of states, Nehru simultaneously announced 
the creation of zonal councils. 'Above all, the zone was thought of as a means for developing the habit of 
cooperation and for overcoming the divisiveness in linguistic sectionalism' (Bondurant 1958: 56). These zones 
have not been significant as they are only advisory 'and the results have been less than impressive' (Hardgrave 
and Kochanek 2000: 150).
206 The strategy was edging close to acculturation because it had very high costs for non-Hindi speakers, many 
of whom had a much richer linguistic heritage than the relatively recent Hindi written in the Devanagari script.
-175-
embodied secular provisions207 Article 15 (1) of the constitution stated that The State 
shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, 
place of birth or any of them'. Secularism in India did not entail the separation of state 
and religion. It sought to maintain the neutrality of the state with regard to the different 
religions. The Indian state does not deny the legitimacy of religion in the public sphere 
and has funded educational institutions of all denominations. In Nehru's words, '(i)t 
does not obviously mean a state where religion as such is discouraged. It means 
freedom of choice and conscience, including freedom for those who may have no 
religion'208 .
Subject to public order, morality and health and to the other provisions of this 
Part, all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right 
freely to profess, practise and propagate religion (Article 25 (1)).
While this right was conditional, the right to 'profess, practise and propagate' was 
significant209 . As the promotion of religion was not forbidden in the public sphere, and 
the state and religion were not strictly separated, this was a multicultural strategy. 
Other examples of multiculturalism were that the personal laws of the Muslim and 
Christian minorities were protected, continuing the practice from the British era. India 
rejected the imposition of a uniform civil code. However, India was only multicultural 
in relation to some religious communities. Ironically, the Hindu Code Bill sought to 
redefine what it is to be a Hindu, and secularise aspects of Hinduism210 . While the 
Muslim and Christian minorities were exempt from the Hindu Code Bill, not all 
religious minorities were. Article 25 (Ib) of the constitution provided 'for social 
welfare and reform or the throwing open of Hindu religious institutions of a public 
character to all classes and sections of Hindus.' The explanatory clause states that 'the 
reference to Hindus shall be construed as including a reference to persons professing the 
Sikh, Jaina or Buddhist religion', thereby challenging the reality of multiculturalism for
207 'Was it because socialist or secularism were contested terms in the 1940s, or was it because they were taken 
for granted by the nationalist elites, charged with the invention of modem India" (Corbridge and Hamss 2000: 
21)? The authors conclude that the answer lies somewhere in between. Secularism was less contested than 
socialism, neutrality between religions having been the practice (in theory) of the Government of India before 
1947. In contrast, socialism was seen to be Nehru's private obsession.
208 'A Circular to the Pradesh Congress Committees', 5.8.54, (reproduced in Gopal 1983: 328).
209 And currently contested by the RSS in relation to Christian missionary activities. For a discussion of the 
BJP's campaign' against Christians see Zavos (2001: 73-89). This provision was included in the constitution 
because of the intervention of Sardar Patel (Chiriyankandath 2000: 14).
210 Although Hindus have been the sole financial beneficiaries of the Hindi United Family tax provisions. I am 
indebted to Marie Lall for bringing this point to my attention.
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these religions. There was no consistent strategy with regard to religious groups - these 
latter minorities were subject to a strategy of acculturation.
The Congress was not so accommodating in relation to reserved seats and religious 
reorganisation. Congress had reluctantly accepted these before independence. The 
reduced effective number of religious groups is the main explanatory variable 
accounting for their omission from the Indian constitution. The effective number of 
linguistic groups had remained high and the politicisation of linguistic identities had 
forced the governing elite to concede linguistic reorganisation. Nehru had accepted 
partition precisely to be able to implement majoritarian centralism which was facilitated 
by a lower number of effective religious groups. The Muslim community was much 
reduced as a proportion of the population of India, and in addition, their leaders were 
more concerned to secure the goodwill of the Congress. Wilkinson (2000a: 774) and 
Chiriyankandath (2000: 13) detail the pressure put on the Muslim community to drop 
the demand for reserved seats. Muslims and Christians therefore had constitutionally 
recognised personal autonomy, but none in decision-making institutions. This was 
compatible with multiculturalism but significantly, also with a majoritarian 
constitutional framework. Although it could be argued that the concession of personal 
laws was a form of segmental autonomy, the absence of any of the other features of a 
consociation diminished this protection.
The organisation of unit boundaries along religious lines was antithetical to Nehru's 
integrationist preferences but also to his majoritarianism. This was because the 
territorial nature of the demands for religious reorganisation posed a greater threat to an 
integrationist civic territorial conception of nationhood than accommodation at the 
personal level did211 . Additionally, because these religious groups were smaller in 
number after partition, they posed less of a threat to the security of the state. Despite 
this, a reorganisation of states that coincided with a territorially concentrated non-Hindu 
religious group was rejected. Nehru rejected the linguistic reorganisation of the Punjab 
on the lines that it 'propagated communalism' (Dua 1990: 193; Singh 2000: 90)212 . 
However, the status quo was the existence of Hindu majority provinces, and Nehru's 
reticence in conceding the linguistic reorganisation of non-Hindu areas demonstrated
211 This is also an argument that can be applied to explain the initial rejection of linguistic reorganisation.
212 The SRC initially recommended merging Punjab, Pepsu and Himachel Pradesh to create a larger and solidly 
bilinaual state. Sikh opposition killed the plan (Dua 1990: 192).
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that the Indian state was not neutral between the religious communities213 . As Table 
6.2 reveals, all religions other than the Hindus were under-represented at state level.
Table 6.2. Religious group's demographic control of Indian states in 1951
Group (absolute majority of 
state's population).
Hindu
Muslim
Christian
Sikh
Others
No overall control
Total
% Pop
85
10
2
2
1
n/a
100
Number of 
states controlled
26
1
0
0
0
2
29
% Control of 
states
90
3
0
0
0
7
100
Source: Government of India (1953b).
Notes The states with no overall control were Andaman and Nicobar Islands where Christians had 31%
of the population and Hindus 30%, and Pepsu where Sikhs had 49.3% of the population and Hindus had
48.8%.
When linguistic and religious identities coincided, the Indian state was reticent about 
conceding territorial recognition. Therefore the religious identity became the relevant 
identity for the centre over that of language, as seen in the Punjab. In these cases 
federalism's ability to regulate ethnic conflict became problematic. Although a 
selective incorporation of ethnic groups does not challenge the validity of a 
multicultural strategy, problems arise if the accommodation of some groups over others 
is related to an ethnic exclusivism, or is perceived to be a strategy of control . While 
India was a Hindu majority state and it should therefore have been expected that the 
majority of its units would also have Hindu majority populations, as can be seen in 
Table 6.3 there were territorially concentrated areas in which alternative religions were 
a majority.
The religious distribution of states has changed since Nehru's death with the acceptance 
of the demand for a Punjabi-speaking state. The death of Nehru removed one of the 
main obstacles to its concession (Singh 2000: 91). Subsequently, the Indian state has 
reorganised the northeast of the country. As can be seen in Table 6.3, there are now five 
states which do not have a Hindu majority, and one in which no religious group is a
213 Tammu and Kashmir was the only non-Hindu majority state - in which normal democratic politics was not 
permitted to operate (Bose 1997: 38).
*14 As discussed above intearatiomst strategies can be a form ot control (McGarry and O Lean- 1993: 18).
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majority (Arunachal Pradesh). With the exception of Jammu and Kashmir they were all 
created after Nehru's death, although it is important to note that none of them was 
conceded on ostensibly religious grounds.
Table 6.3. Religious group's demographic control of Indian states in 1991
Group (absolute majority of 
state's population).
Hindu
Muslim
Christian
Sikh
Others
No overall control
Total
% Pop
82
12
2
2
2
n/a
100
Number of states 
controlled
19
1
3
1
0
1
25
% Control of 
states
76
4
12
4
0
4
100
Source: Adapted from Government of India (1990; 199Ib).
Notes; Arunachal Pradesh was the state with no overall control. I have used 1981 data for Jammu and
Kashmir as no census was conducted in 1991.
Secessionist demands have primarily occurred within these regions - the 'periphery'. 
However, to attribute secessionist demands to the fact that these regions have a different 
dominant religion is simplistic. These states are not particularly homogeneous along 
religious lines, and the Indian state has not been neutral in its approach to their demands 
for autonomy. Most of the movements in these regions have been promoted by the 
central government's inaction or manipulation (Brass 1994: 192-227). Congress 
governments, especially those of Indira and Rajiv Gandhi, were unwilling to permit 
these states to be ruled by alternative parties than the Congress215 . This behaviour has 
been mitigated and perhaps abolished by the Bommai Supreme Court judgement of 
19942167 but also because India has entered an era of coalition politics.
Additionally, the commitment to the accommodation and equal worth of all groups and 
peoples resulted in an uncompromising attitude to the maintenance of India's territorial 
integrity. Nehru was committed to a strong state in order 'to bring about the social 
revolution that India must achieve if it was to survive' (Austin 1966: 4). As discussed, 
Nehru was willing to concede partition to secure a centralised state. Ironically, he was
215 Althoueh as Appendix Three details, the imposition of President's Rule has certainly not been confined to
these states. . .116 The Bommai judgement of the Supreme Court restricts the ability ot the centre to dismiss state governments
without following procedures such as giving the state government a chance to prove its majority on the floor of
. . TT-I i i c\r\f _ 1O/~\\its Legislative Assembly (Tummala 1996: 380).
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not willing to risk losing Kashmir and the Indian state adopted an intransigent position 
over the issue217 . Any concession permitting the breakaway of Kashmir would be 
tantamount to refuting the claim of India to be a secular, multicultural state. As Singh 
argues,
(l)egitimating Indian presence in Kashmir, the Congress fanned a curious 
double-speak, which held that Indian secularism would be threatened if Kashmir 
left the Indian Union. The obverse, that if India's secularism was so strong the 
right of provinces to self-determination should be entertained, was insidiously 
made a political non-issue... (1997: 60-61).
Nehru did not subscribe to the majoritarian version of Hindu nationalism which, in the 
words of Partha Chatterjee,
assumes the centrality of the modern state in the life of the nation ... The 
majority 'community' is Hindu, the others are minorities. State policy must 
therefore reflect this preponderance, and the minorities must accept the 
leadership and protection of the majority (1999a: 100).
However, the version of the constitution Nehru promoted was majoritarian. This 
exposed the contradiction identified by Chatterjee that,
in order to prevent the oppression of minorities by the majority, the state must 
enact legal measures to protect the rights and separate identities of the 
minorities. The difficulty is that the formal institutions of the state, based on an 
undifferentiated concept of citizenship cannot allow for the separate 
representation of minorities. Consequently the question of who represents 
minorities necessarily remains problematic, and constantly threatens the tenuous 
identity of nation and state (1999a: 112).
Chatterjee sums up the position very well. India possessed limited multicultural 
elements at an early stage even within the majoritarian structures of the Indian 
constitution. Segmental autonomy elements existed but there is a qualitative difference 
between the acceptance of personal laws, and consociational recognition in political 
decision-making institutions - India only reluctantly conceded linguistic reorganisation 
for this reason. Both language and religion were equally threatening to Nehru's 
integrationist strategy - but only one of them had a high enough effective number of 
groups to warrant accommodation in decision-making institutions. The fact that
217 His intransigence over this issue must also be attributable to personal reasons. A Kashmin Pandit (albeit 
brought up in Allahabad), it was his ancestral homeland.
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linguistic identities were eventually accommodated on a territorial dimension was a 
major factor in explaining federal stabilisation in India.
The recognition of personal laws did constitute a form of consociational recognition - in 
terms of promoting segmental autonomy for groups. Therefore, I disagree with 
Chiriyankandath who argues that the inclusion of the personal laws 'highlights the 
distinction the makers of the Constitution made between granting political recognition 
to minorities and respecting their religious and cultural autonomy' (2000: 15). The 
concession of personal laws did constitute political recognition and can be viewed as a 
limited form of consociational segmental autonomy. However, as argued, the 
recognition of provincial languages was not sufficient to challenge majoritarianism 
without the concession of linguistic states. Religious groups were not given further 
political recognition in the form of reserved seats.
India's concern to safeguard its territorial integrity and to mitigate the 'danger' of 
undermining an all-Indian identity has been reflected through the structure of other 
institutions of the state, including the bureaucracy, judiciary and army. Unlike in 
Pakistan, there are no regional quotas for appointments in the Indian Administrative 
Service (IAS). With the exception of reservations for the Scheduled Castes and Tribes 
- geographically dispersed communities - appointment is purely on merit. The 
controversy over the official languages of India was related to the perception that non- 
Hindi speaking applicants would be disadvantaged in government examinations if they 
were not allowed to use their mother tongue. As discussed, different linguistic 
communities are permitted to use a language specified in the Eighth Schedule to the 
constitution to sit this examination218 . Yet there is no guarantee that these linguistic 
communities will have guaranteed representation in the IAS, or even that the states of 
the federation will have a certain number of I AS positions reserved for their candidates.
The integrationist strategy is further strengthened by the fact that, with the exception of 
the very top scoring applicants, successful applicants are sent to a different state than 
their own (Radin 1999: 87). The bureaucracy ... provide(s) a mechanism for national 
integration through members of the services allocated to the various states on the basis 
of ability. They ... provide the nation with an all-India outlook' (Radin 1999: 85). In
218 Successful applicants are trained in, and are subsequently required to 'demonstrate competency in, the 
regional language' of the state to which they are assigned (Radin 1999: 87).
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addition, the centre does not possess its own civil service - it is comprised of IAS 
members deputed from the states.
The centre has tried to institute a similar process for the judiciary. In 1981 the Law 
Minister, Shankar declared that, in accordance with the SRC's recommendations, one 
third of High Court judges should be appointed from outside the state in which they 
were to preside. In so doing he declared that this was part of an overall strategy to 
'further national integration and to combat narrow parochial tendencies bred by caste, 
kinships and local affiliations' (Baxi 1985: 39). As Baxi discusses at length - this has 
not happened (1985: 37-59). No effort has been made to even have a 'sprinkling of 
Justices' from outside a state (Baxi 1985: 41).
The one exception to the regionally neutral appointment process has been in relation to 
the army. Although the Indian army does not release data on the individual composition 
of regiments (Cohen 1990: 189), since 1953 the Indian state has pursued a policy of 
recruiting from those states that traditionally have not been army recruiting zones 
(Khalidi 2001-2002: 540). In 1971 this policy was stepped up, and was one of the 
contributing factors to the alienation of the Sikh community who were over-represented 
in the army according to their proportion of the population219 . The demand to reverse 
the policy featured in the Anandpur Sahib Resolution - demonstrating that such policies 
can increase as well as ameliorate ethnic conflict.
Pakistan
In contrast to Nehru's reluctant acceptance of multiculturalism, Jinnah articulated a 
multicultural strategy with consociational dimensions. The demand for consociational 
accommodation within a united India and then for an independent Pakistan was 
premised upon the belief, influenced by the poet Iqbal, that 'the Musalmans are not a 
minority. The Musalmans are a nation by any definition'220 . Jinnah rejected Congress's 
claim that the Muslim community would be safe within a united majoritarian India.
Here we have a permanent Hindu majority and the rest are minorities which 
cannot within any conceivable period of time hope to become majorities. The
219 As Cohen analyses, in 1974 Punjab provided 15% of the army, hi this year Punjab was assigned a quota of
2-6% which was commensurate with its population (including Hindus) (1990: 210-211).
220 'Presidential Address at the 27th Session of the All-Indian Muslim League; Lahore March 1940, (reproduced
inPrrzadal970:335).
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majority can afford to assume a non-communal label, but it remains exclusively 
Hindu in its spirit and action221 (my emphasis).
Jinnah's fears of 'Hindustan' were confirmed by the actions of many of the Congress 
provincial administrations of 1937-1939, specifically those in the United Provinces. 
After the partition of the subcontinent, Jinnah still viewed the coherence of the Muslim 
community as vital to its survival.
a) Religious accommodation
In relation to religion, Pakistan could be said to be multicultural. Indicative of this is 
the fact that the flag of Pakistan has a white stripe that symbolises the existence of 
minorities within the state (as nominally does the Indian)222 . After independence, 
Pakistan boasted the same percentage of religious minorities as secular India. Therefore 
Jinnah was speaking to a sizeable population when he declared that 'minorities to 
whichever community they may belong will be safeguarded. Their religion or faith or 
belief will be secure...They will be, in all respects, the citizens of Pakistan without any 
distinction... 2 '. Religious minority rights were also enshrined in the Constitution and 
their personal laws were protected from being brought into conformity with Islam 
(Article 198 (1)). However, this multiculturalism was not defined by equality. Muslim 
and Pakistani identities were interchangeable in the new state, and Islam was 
constitutionalised as the dominant identity224 . The 1956 constitution, entitled 'The 
Islamic Republic of Pakistan' began with the preamble 'in the name of Allah'. It then 
affirmed the sovereignty of God. 'Sovereignty over the entire Universe belongs to All 
Almighty alone' (Choudhury 1969: 103)225 . Therefore elements of hierarchy and
221 'Speech delivered at the Muslim University Union'on 5.2.38, (reproduced in Ahmad 1960: 42-43).
222 The colours of the Indian flag were initially determined in 1921 'after careful consultation with leaders of all 
communities in the Congress', hi the 1930s Nehru tried 'later not to lay stress on the communal reason for the 
colours as we wanted it to be considered the common national flag of all' (1938: 34-5). This was the 'official 
version' cited by the CAD (Government of India 1947a: 764). Other speakers contended that the colours were 
communal, although they could also appeal to other communities (Government of India 1947a: 784-787).
223 Press Conference in Delhi 14.7.47 (reproduced in A&al 1966: 421).
224 Moon alleges that although Jinnah rejected Rajagopalachari's 'moth eaten Pakistan' of partitioned Punjab 
and Bengal in 1942, he made no attempt to win over the Sikhs and other sections of the non-Muslim population 
in the Punjab. Moon argues that Jinnah should have offered the Sikhs their own state within an independent 
Pakistan (1961: 82-96). The inclusion of a Sikh state would a) have seriously undermined the nature of 
Pakistan as a homeland for Muslims (of which P stood for a Muslim Punjab), and b) included a very sizeable 
group within the decision-making institutions (although separate electorates for the Hindu community did 
include 22% of the population). The inclusion of the Sikh population would have increased Punjabi dominance 
within the Pakistani army, but it would have diluted the Punjabi Muslim majority.
225 Although Pakistan has never been a theocracy and religiously denned political parties have performed 
extremelv badlv at the polls - gaining on average 3-4% of the vote. The 2002 election was an aberration in this 
respect, with an alliance of religious parties gaining 19% of the seats in the National Assembly. Whether this is 
an electoral 'blip' remains to be seen.
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segregation existed. As Talbot also details, in 1947 Suhrawardy tried to open 
membership of the Muslim League to Hindus, but was rebuffed. 'Ideology took 
precedence over nation building' (1998: 92). In order to justify its claim to be the sole 
representative of the Indian Muslims, the AIML had adopted a strident approach in 
which its Muslim Nationalist, Unionist or Red Shirt rivals were denounced as both 
traitors to Islam and the Indian Muslim community. Because it was not making such 
exclusivist claims, the Congress could afford to be more tolerant (Talbot 1998. 92). 
Additionally, Liaquat Ali Khan argued in 1950 that 'the formation of new political 
parties in opposition to the Muslim League is against the interest of Pakistan', (quoted 
in Talbot 1998: 93). The constitution did not preclude minority protection. However, 
the constitutional hierarchy limited the substantive identification with the state for those 
minorities.
b) Linguistic accommodation
In Pakistan, being a Muslim was a prerequisite for substantive identification with the 
state226 . All other religions were excluded from substantive identification with the state 
without incurring a high cost - that of changing one's religion. Such a national identity 
would have been expected to be inclusive to all Muslims. In the event, as illustrated by 
the secession of East Pakistan, this was not the case. Jinnah regarded all identities as 
subservient to Islam, and regionalism was seen as negative and detracting from Islamic 
unity227 . 'So what is the use of saying we are Bengalis, or Sindhis, or Pathans, or 
Punjabis? No, we are Muslims', (quoted in Syed 1979: 98). Jinnah was consistent in 
his attitude to linguistic regionalism both before and after independence. However, the 
fact that the effective number of linguistic groups remained above 1.9 was indicative of 
the fact that linguistic conflicts were likely to cause federal instability in the absence of 
consociational measures (O'Leary 200la: 291-292). Coupled with the fact that the 
'independent states' cited in the Pakistan Resolution were relatively homogeneous 
linguistic entities who had their own identities before partition it is not surprising that 
difficulties emerged (Masood 1970: 32).
Although denying the legitimacy of linguistic provincial claims for recognition would 
have been consistent with Jinnah's multicultural/segregationist strategy in favour of
226 Although not all Muslims were automatically included. In the 1950s Ahmadiyas were controversially 
classified as not being Islamic because of their worship of saints. 
217 This was remarkably similar to Nehru despite his civic conception of nationality.
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Islam, (which saw ethnic identities as irrelevant) the disparity in the treatment of the 
regions was not228 . Although some claim that Jinnah's responsibility for the 
discrimination was limited, he set the tone before partition by marginalising the Bengali 
speaking leaders of the AIML in favour of Urdu speakers from Calcutta (Talbot, 2000: 
148). The denial of regional claims for recognition was always going to create tensions; 
the inequality of access to state resources only exacerbated it.
Pakistan's strategy in relation to language has fluctuated over time. Before 1954 
Pakistan's elites pursued an integrationist strategy - promoting Urdu as the state 
language of Pakistan. Urdu was spoken as a mother tongue by only 3.24% of the 
population at the time. While there is a case to be made for categorising the use of Urdu 
as a 'neutral' language, similar to the adoption of Bahasa in Indonesia rather than the 
dominant Javanese, it was chosen as the state language as a result of its association with 
the Muslim nationalist movement in northern India. It thus took on exclusive 
connotations - as alluded to in the definition of integration - such strategies are not 
always ethnically neutral.
It benefited some linguistic groups more than others: Bengali and Sindhi were 
disproportionately endangered by the imposition of Urdu. Punjabi, Baluchi and Pushtu 
did not have a strong literary tradition so were not as threatened by this decision 
according to some (Masood 1970: 63). This is too neat. A more comprehensive 
analysis is provided by Rahman (2002: Ch 6). The British moved away from using 
Persian in administration in the North Western Provinces229 in the 1840s. They 
continued this process in the Punjab after its annexation in 1853. This contrasted with 
the Central Provinces and Bihar where the provincial government favoured Hindi 
(Rahman 2002: 222)230 . Therefore, in what became the United Provinces, Punjab and 
the NWFP231 'the language of the domains of power (employment) was Urdu' (Rahman 
2002: 222). The NWFP and the Punjab had historical experience of operating in Urdu 
in government circles whereas Baluchistan, Sind and Bengal did not. The Baluchi, 
Sindhi and Bengali languages were therefore disadvantaged and excluded by the new
m It is worth mentioning that the name of Pakistan, coined by a student, Rahmat All at Cambridge in 1933,
omitted the province of Bengal from the acronym. '(Pakstan) by which we mean the five Northern units of
India viz.: Punjab, North West Frontier Province (Afghan), A'ashmir, Sind and BaluchisTMiV. Coincidentally it
translates as Land of the Pure (Aziz 1987: 81).
229 Which became the United Provinces, and later Uttar Pradesh.
230 1 am grateful to lan Talbot for bringing this point to my attention.
231 After its separation from Punjab in 1901.
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language policy. Exclusion was compounded by the fact that the United Provinces 
(from where the Muhajirs had predominately migrated) had also operated in Urdu 
before independence.
While the policy in reference to language was ostensibly integrationist, it reinforced 
Punjabi domination of the state and its institutions. After 1954, Bengali was accepted 
as a joint state language, and the language policy became technically more 
multicultural. However, there were high costs for the 40% of the population not 
speaking either language as their mother tongue232 . The provinces of the Western Wing 
were not allowed to have their own provincial languages, although provinces such as 
Sind retained Sindhi in schooling, and the centre gradually moved to close Sindhi 
medium schools (Rahman 1996: 117)233 . The strategy was nominally multicultural 
between the Eastern and the Western Wings, but remained integrationist -within the 
Western Wing. The fact that the strategy was only nominally multicultural revealed 
itself through the Punjabi machinations leading to the One Unit Plan. This plan was 
devised to counter Bengali demographic dominance and relegate them to the status of 
'mass subjects'. The Bengalis were aware of this, and perceived the One Unit Plan to 
be a rejection of their identity. Their leaders only accepted the plan when Bengali was 
recognised as the joint state language of Pakistan. As subsequent events would reveal, 
the One Unit Plan was an institutionalisation of an ethnic hierarchy and therefore 
indicative of a strategy of segregation rather than multiculturalism, despite the 
constitutional recognition of Bengali. In addition, the One Unit Plan consolidated 
Punjabi dominance over the Western Wing: the capital of West Pakistan was Lahore 
and provincial languages were not recognised .
As Rajagopalan discusses, there are limits to an analysis that concentrates on 
constitutional provisions (2001: 51). Even if the state is ethnically neutral (which the 
Pakistani state was not), some institutions lend themselves to ethnic appropriation. In a 
state such as Pakistan which had high effective number of linguistic groups after 
independence, limited resources AND conflict with a much stronger neighbouring
232 Although many of die Punjabi elite were included within this 40%, for whom, as said, Urdu was part of their
state building policy.233 After the secession of East Pakistan and the promulgation of the 1973 constitution, provincial languages 
were accepted as legitimate, although Urdu and English persisted as national languages. Articles 28 and 251.
234 Despite the promise to the Chief Minister of the NWFP, Sardar Abdur Rashid Khan, that the capital would 
be in his province. It is claimed that this deception was the factor that tncked him to support the creation of 
One Unit (Malik 1988: 47-48).
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power, the power of the army as a means of defence, and also of maintaining internal 
order became increasingly relevant235 . Pathan and Punjabi domination of this institution 
exacerbated ethnic tensions. In this sense, R J Moore's contention that 'the Pakistan 
Army stands out as one of the foremost stabilising elements in the country...performing 
notable services in the nation's behalf is misguided (1969: 447). While Punjabisation 
can be detected in the formation and operation of the institutions in Pakistan, and post- 
1973 in its demographic dominance of the lower chamber236 , much of the ethnicisation 
and exclusivism has operated outside the constitutional frameworks in Pakistan. While 
Punjabis were by no means a monolithic bloc (Samad 1995b: 32), the perception that 
they were has not been conducive to national integration.
Both the civil service and the army were ethnically skewed in favour of the Punjabis 
and the Pathans. Sindhis, Baluchis, and most importantly, Bengalis, were minimally 
represented (Talbot 1998: 221). The disparity in provincial appointments drastically 
destabilised the federation. This was very important in Pakistan as the institutions in 
which power resides have been the army and the bureaucracy. Power sharing in a non- 
democratic setting may not be as effective as democratic consociationalism, but the co- 
option of elites is possible. Pakistan's elite tried to de-ethnicise the state as much as 
possible through an integrationist policy towards all Muslims. This was a fagade. In 
reality they were consolidating a new ethnic core. The community of the state that were 
demographically dominant - Bengalis - were subject to a practice of segregation.
Despite this segregationist strategy, both before and after the secession of East Pakistan 
a regional (rather than a linguistic) quota existed for bureaucratic appointments237. 80% 
of the appointments were to be filled by a quota. Before its secession, East Pakistan had 
40%, Punjab and Bhalawpur 23%, Karachi 2% and the rest were to share 15% between 
them (Kennedy 1987: 187). However, 87% of the senior officers in the central civil 
service were from West Pakistan in 1960 (Naz 1990: 84). After 1971, the quota system 
was reformed, to be based on one that was roughly based on population. Although it 
has lessened ethnic inequalities, as Kennedy discusses, it has not eliminated them. 
Muhajirs and Punjabis are still over-represented according to their population and
235 See Jalal for further discussion (1995: 50-62).
230 The 1973 constitution had a second chamber in which all units were equally represented.
337 The distinction is significant because many of the provinces of Pakistan such as Smd and Baluchistan
not particularly homogeneous along linguistic lines.
are
Sindhis and Baluchis have alleged that 'domicile fraud' is widespread238 (Kennedy 
1993: 137-140). In addition, as the quotas are roughly based on population, as Punjabis 
are approximately 50% of the population; this confirms their dominance in this realm.
The situation with regard to the army was not so progressive. The quota for 
bureaucratic appointments has 'never been applied to recruitment to the military, the 
ethnic preserve of Punjabis' (Kennedy 1993: 140). At the time of independence, as 
Cohen discusses, there was resistance to expanding Bengali representation in the army. 
60% of the army came from the Punjab at the time of independence (1998: 43). In 1959 
Bengalis comprised only 2% of the top military elite (Rahman 1996: 121). In 1998 
there had not been much change in Punjabi domination - 75% of the army came from 
only 3 districts in the Punjab and 2 districts from NWFP (Cohen 1998: 43). Punjabi 
domination of the two powerful institutions of the Pakistani state maintains their ethnic 
dominance through a segregationist strategy.
6.4. Conclusion
An examination of the practice of the two states with reference to language and religion 
casts doubts over the coherence of the strategies adopted to manage diversity. Nehru 
and Jinnah's ideal strategies were challenged by the linguistic diversity within their 
states. Their willingness and ability to adapt to these challenges had consequences for 
the stability of the two federations. Neither leader's articulation of the national identity, 
defining the legitimacy of claims for recognition by their diverse populations can be 
used to explain wholly the inequitable accommodation of different ethnic groups. 
Nehru permitted provincial languages but only very reluctantly did he recognise 
language in decision-making institutions through linguistic reorganisation. However, 
his simultaneous commitment to forge all Indians into one nation had as its corollary, an 
urge to maintain India's territorial integrity. His unwillingness to concede territorial 
institutional recognition to any religious groups explains why conflicts intertwined with 
linguistic or border issues were not accorded legitimacy. The whittling away of 
Kashmiri autonomy and the refusal to grant a Punjabi speaking state until 1966 are 
examples of this. The changing configuration of the Indian political scene distorted his
238 'It is often alleged that lever Muhajirs, Punjabis or Pathans, with the connivance of ethnic-co-conspirators, 
forcre domicile certificates and stand for seats reserved for Sindhis and Baloch' (Kennedy 1993: 139)
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integrationism further. Under Indira Gandhi and afterwards (Brass 1994: 195-196), 
religion became a tool of political mobilisation239 .
Jinnah's conception of an Islamic state with protection for religious minorities was a 
multicultural one on the surface, but segregationist in reality. However, it failed to 
accommodate all Muslims equally. This exclusion was the result of two factors. The 
discrimination between regions exposed the limits of the all-encompassing integrationist 
nature of the Islamic identity. When this discrimination linked itself to a linguistic bias, 
conflict ensued. The second factor was the result of the first; Muslim identity became 
less salient as other identities were threatened in place of the Muslim one. Therefore, 
the mobilisation of Muslims as a political force that had led to the state's creation was 
not translated into an overarching identity. Pakistan's integrationist strategy 
transformed into a mechanism of segregationist control with regard to the Bengalis and 
took on an ethnic dimension with regard to the Western Wing. This restricted the state's 
ability to accommodate linguistic groups. After 1973 it accommodated languages more 
readily, but disparities remained in their representation in the institutions that mattered - 
the army and bureaucracy.
Chapters Five and Six discussed the relationship between the effective number of ethnic 
groups and the national identity. These variables cannot be separated from the 
constitutional legacies. All three independent variables contributed to constitutional 
formation and hence federal stabilisation. Nehru and Jinnah's understanding of national 
identity remained essentially the same after independence. What neither leader initially 
acknowledged was the increased salience of language partially because of the reduced 
effective number of religious groups. This challenged the strategies to accommodate 
diversity. While Pakistan was consistent in its rejection of linguistic identities, and 
India was not, India's belated recognition of language in decision-making institutions 
was a vital feature of federal stability for linguistic groups. This will be examined in 
more detail in Chapter Seven. In the case of Pakistan, the lack of accommodation of 
linguistic identities led to conflict and federal destabilisation.
Chapter Seven is concerned with the relationship between linguistic heterogeneity and 
the number of parties. The contention of this thesis is that there is a relationship
239 Although this political mobilisation was not always pro-Hindu, as seen by Rajiv Gandhi's role in the Shah 
Bano case in 1985 (Brass 1994: 233).
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between the homogeneity of a province and federal stability in South Asia. This cannot 
be separated from the other constitutional provisions, such as recognition of language at 
the national level, and the security or insecurity such a policy can create. What this 
chapter has established is that understanding the state-sponsored national identity can 
help us understand why the elites adopted a certain attitude towards constitutional 
formation. As Rajagopalan argues 'Demands for representation and for units or 
autonomy ... are both more likely to be made and less likely to be met when the identity 
or identification of the state is open to challenge' (2001: 65-66). It is not necessarily 
centralisation per se that causes problems in an ethnically diverse society; rather 
majority dominance within majoritarian institutions.
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Chapter Seven: Party fractionalisation and linguistic 
homogeneity in India and Pakistan
'The conclusion appears to be that integration has not so far completely succeeded in the growth of an 
organic political community. In fact, politics since integration, in some cases, has tended to sharpen the
sense of a separate identity' (Narain 1967: xxiii).
'Infra-group divides contribute to inter-group peace' (V'arshney 2002: 171).
'Pakistan...provides the most vivid illustration of the proposition that centre-province conflicts have less 
to do with the inherent volatility of cultural or 'ethnic' divisions in heterogeneous societies than with the 
complex and shifting ways in which social identities are forged and refashioned in response or resistance
to structures' (Jalal 1995: 183).
'Insufficient solidarity exists at the state level to fuel separatism' (Manor 2002: 447).
'It is important to point out that perceptions are more important than accurate arithmetic in influencing
political behaviour' (Jeffrey 1994: 188).
7.1. Introduction
Chapter Six discussed strategies to accommodate different communities within state 
structures; especially that of the design of the federal system. It established that a major 
difference between Indian and Pakistani strategies concerned the accommodation of 
linguistic groups. Jinnah sought to impose Urdu as the state language of Pakistan, and 
did not accept the legitimacy of linguistic inclusion within federal structures. Nehru 
accepted minority languages as a means of provincial communication, but he sought to 
marginalise identities based on language within decision-making institutions. He 
ultimately conceded linguistic reorganisation, but only for electoral reasons. Linguistic 
reorganisation in India can therefore be viewed as a necessary concession to preserve 
Congress's electoral hegemony. On another level linguistic reorganisation can be 
understood as the element of federal design that has increased India's federal stability. 
This chapter assesses the impact that the differences in the linguistic homogeneity of the 
units of India and Pakistan have had on the stabilisation of their federations.
Many scholars of federalism have decried giving autonomy to ethnically homogeneous 
units within a federation, fearing it will lead to destabilisation. In contrast I argue that 
in South Asia homogeneous units have promoted federal stabilisation by providing 
security for linguistic groups. This security encourages the conditions for the group to 
factionalise and organise on alternative criteria. The measure I use to assess whether a 
group has factionalised is that of the effective number of legislative parties240 . I
:4° The effective number of legislative parties is a measure of the effective number of political parties who have 
gained seats (Cox 1997' 208). It contrasts with the effective number of elective parties, which measures the
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correlate this measure with the effective number of linguistic groups within the federal 
units of India and Pakistan. If my argument is correct, then the relationship between the 
two should be a negative one - the lower the effective number of linguistic groups 
within the unit, the higher the number of legislative parties.
The stabilisation of the federations of India and Pakistan is my dependent variable241 . 
Federal stabilisation is a difficult variable to quantify. I define it here through a 
combination of three elements. None are sufficient, but taken together; they are a strong 
indicator of the stability of a federation.
• The maintenance of territorial integrity;
• The fractionalisation of the party system;
• The number of secessionist movements.
7.2. The maintenance of territorial integrity
Federal stabilisation can be measured most simply as the maintenance of territorial 
integrity. On such a definition, Pakistan, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia were failures, 
and India, Canada, and Switzerland definite success stories. After the initial accession 
of the Princely States242 , Pakistan lost territory with the secession of East Pakistan243 . 
In contrast, India gained the territories of Sikkim, Goa and Pondicherry.
It is possible to argue that the maintenance of territorial integrity is a flawed measure of 
federal stabilisation. This is because the international system has not been permissive 
of secession - the UN militarily intervened in the Congo to prevent Katanga's
effective number of parties according to their vote share. The literature varies as to whether the effective 
number of legislative parties (enseats) or the effective number of elective parties (envotes) is used to calculate 
the effective number of parties. Either can be used. I have chosen to use enseats. This is because I focus on 
the impact of institutional variables - the federal and the electoral system - on party system formation. 
Although Heath is correct when he argues that envotes 'is a more accurate indication to the degree of 
fractionalisation. as it reflects the actions of voters rather than the eftect of the constituency boundaries' (1999: 
67), he is not concerned with the interaction of the electoral system and federal design. For my purposes, 
enseats is more appropriate.
241 The independent variables are institutional legacies, the eneth of the two states and the state-sponsored 
national identity. These three vanables combined to influence attitudes to provincial organisation along 
linguistic lines; my intervening variable. 
~ 42 The accession of the princely states in the late 1940s must be understood as part of the decolonisation
process.
East Pakistan was called East Bengal before the creation of the One Unit Plan in 1955. I have called it East
Pakistan throughout this thesis for the sake of clarity.
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secession244 . East Pakistan's successful secession holds the dubious distinction of being 
the only opposed secession that succeeded during the cold war era245 . It succeeded 
because of Indian military intervention rather than because of the success of an 
indigenous movement246 (Marwah 1979: 13-14). Therefore a definition of federal 
stabilisation that is predicated on territorial integrity ignores the international constraints 
on the possibility of such an attempt succeeding. In addition, the success of a 
secessionist demand may be prevented by military force. No state lightly permits the 
dissolution of its territorial integrity. The twentieth century has seen many examples 
when the central government has suppressed secessionist demands using force, e.g. 
Biafra & Chechnya. Territorial integrity in such circumstances has little to do with the 
institutional structures of the state such as federal design247. The Indian state has 
responded with the use of extreme force to secessionist attempts, or autonomist 
movements that it perceives as secessionist. By the same token, it is likely that Pakistan 
would have been able to prevent East Pakistan's secession had India not intervened.
Despite this, the break up of territorial integrity is the strongest example of a federation 
that has 'failed', even if the break up is a peaceful one as in the case of Singapore in 
1965 and Czechoslovakia in 1992. The absence of a break up may not be a sign of 
success, but if a state has lost territory then this is a powerful indicator of 
destabilisation. On this variable India is a definite success, having acquired territory, 
and Pakistan a definite failure as East Pakistan seceded in 1971.
7.3. Fractionalisation and the party system.
Another measure of assessing federal stabilisation is to focus on the structure of the 
party system. This variable is relatively easy to categorise and to measure. Party 
systems within federations have two dimensions; a regional and a national one. I 
concentrate on the national one248 . As discussed in Chapter One, the creation of 
homogeneous states within a federation accentuates other divisions: once a 'self is
244 Although the international environment has arguably become more permissive in recent years, e.g. in 
relation to many of the states of the former Yugoslavia.
245 Sinaapore seceded from the Malayan federation in 1965 but this was a mutually agreed split.
246 Bv'the time India intervened, between one to three million East Pakistanis had been victims of genocide by 
the West Pakistani armed forces (Hummel 1994: 331), and ten to eleven million refugees had fled across the 
border to India (Marwah 1979; Hewitt 1997: 46).
247 However, a secessionist demand can be encouraged by exclusionary structures.
248 Although I am interested in fractionalisation of the party system at the state level, I have chosen to focus on 
the national rather than the state elections. This is because I am interested in the way these parties interact with 
each other at the national level. Parties that seek national representation are better indicators of federal 
stability, hi addition, this thesis adopts a macro level analysis and a consideration of the individual state part}' 
systems is bevond its scope. - 193 -
secure, it becomes more difficult to determine who the 'self is (Horowitz 1985: 617). 
Individuals are comprised of multiple, overlapping and sometimes complementary 
identities. Once one identity is secure it provides the conditions for other identities to 
come to the fore. Under such conditions in a democracy, parties proliferate: reflecting 
or mobilising alternative identities. In these cases, the area of political competition 
shifts within the state rather than between the state and the centre. These parties may 
not appeal to a specific regional ethnic identity such as language or religion, but they 
have a regional base249 .
Political parties who seek to become part of the national party system are not seeking to 
challenge the system; indeed they have an interest in maintaining it (Horowitz 1985: 
628). A proliferation of regionally based political parties at the national level and 
unstable coalitions may be a sign of political instability, but it does not necessarily 
follow that it leads to federal instability. It is not indicative of federal destabilisation or 
secessionism; indeed, federalism in India has become more 'real' because of
the increased importance and expanding role of state-based political parties, and 
the necessity of building federal coalitions which reconcile regional aspirations 
with national cohesion (Arora 2002: 507).
A proliferation of parties at the regional level may undermine federal stability if these 
parties are ethnically defined and seek to outflank each other (Nordlinger 1972: 118). 
In such situations, a proliferation of parties within the unit may lead to conflict with the 
centre. But this only happens when ethnically defined regional parties attempt to prove 
to their electorate that they can stand up to or gain concessions from the centre. This 
situation is likely to occur when the unit is insecure. It is important to note that the 
fractionalisation of the party system is not a sufficient measure of federal stabilisation - 
fractionalisation can occur within heterogeneous units. I only use it as a measure of 
federal stabilisation in homogeneous units.
In recent years many authors have posited a relationship between the party system and 
the federal system in India (Vanhanen 1992; Manor 1995; Verney 1997; Chhibber and
249 It is difficult to define definitively a regional party. Indexes do not take into account the different sizes of 
the units Additionally, many parties are concentrated within a particular state, but do not have an explicitly 
regional programme. "Manor lists only four states having explicitly regional parties. These are the AGP in 
Assam the TOP in Andhra Pradesh, the SAD in Punjab and the DMK and its offshoots ui Tamil Nadu. 
However there are many other parties whom Manor descnbes as de facto regional such as the CPI (M) (1995: 
118) Parties such as the Shiv Sena in Maharashtra can also be categorised as being explicitly regional.
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Kollman 1998; Wyatt 2001; Arora 2002; Sridharan 2002). Attention on the relationship 
between the two has not been as pronounced in Pakistan, primarily because its party 
system is underdeveloped. In the case of India, it is not hard to fathom the reason for 
the increased attention on the relationship between the two. Twenty years ago, Riker 
cited India as an example of an exception to Duverger's 'Law'250 primarily because 
India had a one party system at the centre despite using the simple plurality electoral 
system. He also cited it as an exception because of the multiple parties at state level 
(1982: 761). In recent years, India has seen a proliferation of parties at the centre as 
well. The proliferation of parties and the decline of the INC are problematic for 
institutionalist theorists of party systems. The percentage of seats gained by state 
parties at the centre increased from 16% in 1991 to 29% in 1999 (Rudolph and Rudolph 
2001: 1543). Coalition governments now look to be the norm rather than the exception.
As well as being an exception to institutionalist theories of party systems, India has also 
been an exception to sociological theories. Sociological theorists argue that party 
systems reflect the primary cleavages in a society such as class, language or religion. 
The most famous exponents of this argument are Lipset and Rokkan who concentrate on 
'conflicts and their translations into party systems' (1990: 93). India is an exception to 
this argument. There are many divisions within Indian society, yet the INC historically 
attracted a large section of the electorate across many diverse groups (Chhibber and 
Petrocik 2002: 56). Multiple explanations for the subsequent decline of the Congress 
Party have been advanced (Sridharan 2002: 492-496). Kohli has discussed Indira 
Gandhi's role in undermining the organisational roots of the party (1991: 5-6); Brass 
has focussed on the entrance of new social groups into the political system (1997: 204); 
and Sridharan focuses on the interactive nature of the federal and electoral systems. His 
explanation is concerned with 'the systemic properties of the first past the post electoral 
system working themselves out in a federal polity' (2002: 495). This interpretation 
forms the basis of my analysis of this measure. My institutionalist explanation is 
premised on the importance of the creation of linguistically homogeneous units. 
Linguistically homogeneous units have affected the number and type of parties that 
compete at the national level.
:-° Duverger's 'Law' was that countries with simple plurality electoral systems would produce two party 
systems as a result of the psychological and mechanical incentives (1964: 224-226).
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The role of the electoral system in India and Pakistan
In India, simple plurality magnified the votes of the INC into a majority of seats in the 
elections of 1952-1971 and 1980-1984, despite the fact that Congress never won a 
majority of votes at the national level. In the 1990s the Congress' fortunes turned and 
the party is no longer the beneficiary of the system. This was demonstrated most 
dramatically in 1999 when the party gained 28.3% of the votes, 4.6% more than the 
BJP, but secured 68 fewer seats251 (Election Commission 2000: 34).
Table 7.1. Number of recognised parties in the general elections
Election 
year
1952
1957
1962
1967
1971
1977
1980
1984
1989
1991
1996
1998
1999
National 
Parties
14
4
6
7
8
5
6
7
8
9
8
7
7
State 
Parties
39
11
11
14
17
15
19
19
20
28
30
30
40
Total (not 
including 
independents) ,
53
15
27
25
53
34
36
35
113
145
209
176
169
Effective number 
of legislative 
parties
1.78
1.73
1.84
3.12
2.12
2.63
2.17
1.69
4.34
3.62
5.80
5.25
5.86
Source: Data on the numbers of national parties adapted from Election Commission of India (1952; 
1959; 1963: 26-34; 1968; 1973; 1978; 1981; 1985; 1986; 1990; 1991; 1992; 1996a; 1998a; 2000: cited on 
pages 1-7 for all thirteen reports). Data on the effective number of legislative parties adapted from Butler 
(1995) and Election Commission of India (1996b; 1998b; 2000).
As Table 7.1 illustrates, an extraordinary number of parties competed in the first 
election of 1952252 . Many authors have argued that the other parties did not have an 
incentive to merge together because the Congress was in such a commanding position 
(Weiner 1957: 227; Riker 1982: 761; Cox 1997: 77). Although this explanation makes 
intuitive sense, it does not account for the huge drop in the numbers of parties between 
the elections of 1952 and 1957. The electoral system remained constant, and therefore
251 The BJP won 53.7% of the seats it contested, compared to the 25% won by the Congress. The BJP's 
success was attributable to pre-election alliances with members of the NDA. *.,-,, , f
252 The number of parties was extraordinary according to institutionahst explanations ot the likely number ot 
parties under simple plurality.
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the drop in parties is best explained by the fact that the majority of these parties over­ 
estimated their support in 1952 (Weiner 1957: 227)
The electoral system has undoubtedly played a large role in influencing the number of 
effective legislative parties, initially reducing their success rate. However, the number 
of parties competing in the elections has dramatically increased over time. In 1952 
there were 53 parties, and in 1957 after the consolidation of the party system only 15. 
In 1999 there were 169 parties plus many independent candidates! The effective 
number of legislative parties has also risen dramatically from 1.78 in 1952, to 5.86 in 
1999.
In the case of Pakistan, the effective number of legislative parties is also higher than 
Duverger's 'Law' would expect for a political system with simple plurality, but is lower 
than that of India.
Table 7.2. The Effective Number of Legislative Parties in Pakistan
Election year
1954
1955
1970
1977
1988
1990
1993
1997
2002
Effective number of 
legislative parties
2.95
4.99
2.75
1.58
3.18
2.89
3.13
2.05
5.35
Source. Data adapted from Afzal (1976: 79), Aziz (1976: 275-277). Election Commission of Pakistan 
(2002). Kaniyalil and Pande (1989: 79), SAARC-NGO Observers (1995: 116-117), Talbot (1998: 200 & 
314), Waseeiri(1994a: 334; 1998: 11).
]\j0tes: There were no national elections in 1954 and 1955. The Constituent Assembly was reconstituted 
in 1954 following its dismissal by Governor General Ghulam Muhammad. The effective number of 
legislative parties differed from the Constituent Assembly indirectly elected in 1947 from the provincial 
assembly elections of 1946 when the number of effective parties was 1.46. This was because provincial 
elections were held between 1951-1954. As the Constituent Assembly was indirectly elected from the 
provincial assemblies, the number of parties in the Constituent Assembly changed accordingly. The 
effective number of parties increased in 1955 as the United Front coalition of East Pakistan broke up.
The electoral system is a constant variable within India and Pakistan and cannot account 
for differences between the two states. Additionally, as can be seen in Tables 7.1 and 
7 2 the effective number of legislative parties has dramatically increased in India and 
Pakistan since independence. As the electoral system has not changed, it cannot
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account for this rise. Therefore, although I am looking at the interaction of the federal 
system and the electoral system, I concentrate on the former253 . The form of the federal 
system did change within both states. In the mid 1950s India re-designed its units along 
primarily linguistic criteria, while Pakistan consolidated the Western Wing into one 
linguistically heterogeneous province. I contend that the different types of provincial 
design affected federal stabilisation.
The relationship between provincial unit design and the party system
The hypothesis that homogeneous units have a positive effect on federal stability can be 
assessed in a number of ways. I follow Horowitz's reasoning and argue that the 
creation of homogeneous states accentuated other divisions (1985: 617). This had a 
positive effect on federal stability because it provided a structural and institutional 
incentive for the proliferation of regionally based parties. Weiner saw this as a source 
of instability, arguing that 'the multiplicity of political parties threatens to destroy stable 
government' (1957: 289). In contrast, I argue that it has been a force for stability 
because it is indicative of intra-elite competition.
The statistical section below assesses my null hypothesis. Appendix Four provides a 
justification for the statistical tests used. Appendix Five provides the key to these data 
tables. Appendix Six reproduces these data tables.
Ho - There is no relationship between the effective number of linguistic groups and 
the effective number of legislative parties
I seek to reject the null hypothesis. If I am able to reject the null hypothesis that there is 
no relationship, my alternate hypothesis is:
Hj - The variables of the effective number of linguistic groups and the effective 
number of legislative parties are negatively correlated
If I am able to accept my alternate hypothesis in India and Pakistan then it indicates that 
the homogeneity of units along linguistic lines provided the conditions for other
253 This strategy is compatible with Cox (1997: 221) and Ordeshook & Shvetsova (1994: 122) who find that the 
number of effective parties is an additive function of social heterogeneity and electoral system permissiveness.
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identities such as region, caste and class to come to the fore254 . This has created the 
conditions favourable for federal stabilisation.
India
As laid out in Table 7.3, there is a low negative correlation between the two variables of 
effective number of linguistic groups and the effective number of legislative parties. 
Although the strength of the relationship is only -.273, and is therefore a weak 
correlation coefficient (Pallant 2001: 120), the fact that the correlation coefficient has a 
negative sign indicates that the lower the effective number of linguistic groups (e.g. the 
more homogeneous the unit) the higher the effective number of legislative parties. The 
result is also significant at the 1% confidence interval (there is less than a 1% chance 
that this could have occurred randomly253).
Table 7.3. Pearson's correlation between enseats (log) and enling (log) for the 
Indian National Elections 1952-1999
Correlation Coefficient
-.273
Sig.
*#
Sig. (2-taiIed)
.000
N
263
** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed)
Source: Electoral data adapted from Butler et al (1995), Rana (1998) and Election Commission of India 
(1996b; 1998b; 2000). Linguistic data adapted from Government of India (1951h; 1951e; 1951d; 1951f; 
195 Ic: 1951n; 195 la; 1951g; 1951b; 1951J; 1951k; 1951i; 1951m; 19511; 1961e; 196 la: 1961c; 196 Id; 
1961b; 1976; 1991a).
Notes: These data exclude those units of the federation that return only one seat to the Lok Sabha. These 
units skew the relationship as enseats cannot be greater than 1.00, regardless of the score for enling. 
Excluding these units does not produce as strong correlation coefficients as including all of them, but the 
relationship is still a negative one. This is a more consistent method of proceeding and has the advantage 
of excluding Nagaland. Nagaland is also an outlier on the enling index as it has an enling of 11.25 
because the rationale for reorganisation was tribal rather than linguistic. Mizoram and Sikkim are the 
other two excluded states. I have also excluded die Union Territories of Lakshadweep, Dadra and Nagar 
Haveli, Andaman and Nicobar Islands Daman and Diu, Pondicherry and Chandigarh that return only one 
seat. I also use the log of enling and enseats to enable me to use Pearson's Correlation.
Therefore I can reject the null. There is a significant negative relationship between the 
effective number of linguistic groups and the effective number of legislative parties. 
However, the relationship is weak. Large sample sizes can yield higher significance 
levels than the correlation coefficient warrants. This may well be one of these cases
254 I do not argue that these identities were insignificant before linguistic reorganisation in India. Rather I am 
araurna that these identities became more prominent after linguistic reorganisation.
25r I use the measure of significance commonly used in political science statistical analysis - the 3% 
significance level - as my cut off point. This is expressed in the tables as a signiticance level ot 0.03 or 
smaller I have highlighted cases that are significant at the 1% level as this indicates that the sigmhcance 1S 
greater See Healev (1993: 189-191) for further discussion of alpha levels.
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(Pallant 2001: 121). Although I can reject the null, the weak relationship prompts me to 
investigate further. The results are tabulated below. Table 7.4 sorts the effective 
number of legislative parties and effective number of linguistic groups according to 
national election year. The relationship of the two variables to one another now 
becomes clearer. There are eight significant relationships between the two variables, 
and half of these are significant at the 1% level. The relationship is in the direction I 
have hypothesised and is stronger than that in Table 7.3. This corroborates my alternate 
hypothesis.
Table 7.4. Pearson's correlation ofenseats (log) and enling (log) for Indian national 
elections
Year
1952
1957
1962
1967
1971
1977
1980
1984
1989
1991
1996
1998
1999
Correlation 
Coefficient
0.14
-0.01
-0.52
-0.48
-0.59
0.11
-0.26
0.03
-0.50
-0.51
-0.41
-0.54
-0.47
Sig.
*
*
**
**
**
*
**
*
Sig. (1 Tailed)
0.26
0.49
0.02
0.03
0.01
0.32
0.13
0.45
0.01
0.01
0.03
0.00
0.01
N
23
14
15
17
18
21
21
21
22
22
23
23
23
* Correlation is significant at the 5% level (1 tailed)
** Correlation is significant at the 1% level (1 tailed)
Source: As for Table 7.3.
Notes: In Table 7.3 I used a two-tailed significance test to test the null hypothesis. This is because I was 
assessing whether there was a relationship between the two variables as well as the direction of the 
hypothesis. See Healey (1993: 185-189) for further discussion of one and two tailed significance tests. 
For the Indian section I now use one tailed significance tests, as I am interested in the relationship 
between the two variables on one end of the continuum. Table 7.3 has already demonstrated that the 
relationship between the two variables was a negative one.
Although there is not a linear relationship between the election years and the strength of 
the correlation coefficient, there is a definite trend. The relationship between the two 
variables becomes stronger in the elections that are furthest from linguistic 
reorganisation. After linguistic reorganisation was conceded, the two exceptions to the 
trend were 1977 and 1984 as can be seen in Chart 7.1
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Chart 7.1. Pearson's correlation between enseats (log) and enling (log) for Indian 
national elections
Correlation coefficient.
-i.oo o.oo i.oo
Source: As for Table 7.3.
Congress had to concede linguistic reorganisation for electoral reasons. The effective 
number of linguistic groups was too high for it to have done otherwise. The success of 
the reorganisation in terms of protecting Congress dominance is illustrated by the fact 
that the numbers of parties dropped dramatically between the two elections. As already 
argued, the reduction in parties in 1957 was partially a result of the perceived futility of 
standing against the Congress. These data indicate it was also because Congress 
temporarily reaped the benefits of reorganisation and forestalled more factionalism.
Agitation for the redistribution of states along linguistic lines has sharpened the 
factional divisions in some areas, but at the moment no other issue of state 
policy seems likely to provide a further basis for the further development of 
factions (Weiner 1957: 283).
In the event, Congress suffered a major split a decade later. I contend that if linguistic 
reorganisation had not been conceded then electoral considerations would have caused 
many more defections before this date. The demand for linguistic reorganisation was an 
issue to 'create... a coalition of voters that spans electoral constituencies' (Chhibber 
1999- is) Nehru had sought to prevent linguistic identities from gaining representation 
in decision-making institutions. Electoral considerations were the main reason he
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compromised. As Kothari points out, 'soon after the successful culmination of the 
agitation... the Congress absorbed a large number of the new entrants (into politics) and 
succeeded in capturing full initiative in state polities' (1964: 1168).
Therefore Congress reaped the benefits of linguistic reorganisation in the 1957 election. 
This is why the relationship between the effective number of linguistic groups and the 
effective number of legislative parties was a weak one in this year, although still in the 
hypothesised direction. The two aberrant elections were 'special' elections. The 1977 
election followed the Emergency in which there was a high degree of unanimity among 
the political parties on the need to defeat the Congress. The 1984 election did not buck 
the trend in such a strong fashion. But its departure from the general trend is 
explainable by Indira Gandhi's assassination, which led to her son, Rajiv, being elected 
on a huge sympathy vote.
I have established that a negative correlation exists between the effective number of 
linguistic groups and the effective number of legislative parties. I have concentrated 
solely on a linguistic measure rather than one that includes religion, caste or tribe. 
Creating a wider measure of ethnic heterogeneity256 misses the point that the 
homogeneity of the states along linguistic lines (through linguistic reorganisation) 
provided favourable conditions for alternative identities to become politically 
significant. For the purposes of this study, it is appropriate to focus on the single 
variable of linguistic heterogeneity. This point becomes clearer when these data are 
disaggregated into states for which the majority language is not Hindi, and those in 
which it is. The results are shown in Chart 7.2.
"6 As Wilkinson (2000b: 14-15) and Vanhanen (1992: 57) do. They include religious, linguistic and Scheduled 
Castes and Tribes within one measure.
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Chart 7.2. Pearson's correlations between enseats (log) and enling (log) for Indian 
national elections organised according to majority language spoken
-1.00
Correlation coefficient
0.00 1.00
o
• All India
D Non-Hindi majority
• Hindi majority
Source: As for Table 7.3.
As Chart 7.2 and Table 7.5 demonstrate, the hypothesised relationship is more strongly 
borne out for those states that have a non-Hindi majority.
Table 7.5. Correlation of all Indian elections 1952-1999 between enseats (log) and 
enling (log) sorted according to majority language
Language
Non-Hindi majority
Hindi majority
Correlation Coefficient
-0.371
-0.167
Sig.
**
Sig. (1-tailed)
0.00
0.06
N
171
92
** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (1-tailed)
Source: As for Table 7.3.
These non-Hindi majority states were not part of the 'core'. During the era of Congress
dominance 'all (Congress) Prime Ministers ... contested from constituencies...in Uttar
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Pradesh' at some time (Butler 1995: 68)257 . These non-Hindi states initially fought the 
attempt to introduce Hindi as the sole official language. The fact that it is the non-Hindi 
speaking states that have divided into competing factions illustrates that India's strategy 
of linguistic reorganisation has been a success. In Madras there were incredible 
tensions before reorganisation - the fasting to death of Potti Sriramulu in order to secure 
a Telugu speaking state in 1953 was the catalyst for the wider reorganisation of states. 
The tensions that would have been caused by not conceding linguistic reorganisation 
can be illustrated through a discussion of Bombay state, excluded from the initial 
reorganisation.
In Bombay, after the denial of the claims for a bifurcation of the state, Congress was 
challenged by two parties - the Maharashtra Samyuka Samiti258 and the Mahagujarat 
Janata Parishad. 'Leading Congressmen joined the chorus of dissent' (Brecher 1959: 
484) despite the CWC calling on Congressmen to 'avoid the agitational approach' 
(Windmiller 1956: 132). In November 1955 '600,000 workers left their jobs in 
response to the call of the leftist leaders. Almost immediately violence exploded over 
the city and an orgy of rioting and destruction resulted...' (Windmiller 1956: 135). 
Agitation on the Gujarati side was more muted as a linguistic division meant losing the 
cosmopolitan business city of Bombay to Maharashtra. 'Day by day the 
situation...became ugly...opening out opportunities for people with fissiparous political 
views to ...create confusion' (Roy 1962: 208). In January 1956 'riots (had) enveloped 
Bombay ... (and) eighty people were killed and 450 wounded ... (in) the large-scale 
police firing' (Brecher 1959: 484)259 . Although Nehru argued that the coming elections 
could 'go to hell. I am tired of listening to talks of pleasing this party and that party' 
(Windmiller 1956: 141), the state 'Congress government found it impossible to turn a 
deaf ear to this demand and carry on with the administration of the state insensible to 
the constant agitation' (Roy 1962: 207). The Maharashtra Samyuka Samiti was very 
successful in the 1957 elections, demonstrating that 'sentiment for the creation of a 
Maharashtrian state is still strong'. It reduced 'the Congress majority in the Bombay 
state legislature' (Weiner 1957: 267) The effective number of legislative parties in
257 Uttar Pradesh is the largest state in the Hindi heartland of India. It returns the most seats to die Lok Sabha. 
K M Panikkar recommended the division of the state but was outvoted by the other members of die SRC. In 
his dissenting note, he observes that the leaders of Uttar Pradesh argued 'that the existence of a large, powerful 
and well-organised state in the Gangetic Valley was a guarantee of India's unity; that such a state would be 
able to correct the disruptive tendencies of other states, and to ensure the ordered progress of India" (States 
Reorganisation Commission 1955:246).
258 Organisation for Greater Maharashtra.
259 Windmiller alleges that the death toll was much higher; between 250-400 (1956: 140).
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Bombay was the second highest in the country in the elections of 1957 compared to the 
other states where the Congress had retrenched its position after linguistic 
reorganisation. Although there were no calls for the secession of the state, the violence 
was widespread. The instability led to the division of the state into two. Congress 
reaped the benefit of reorganisation in the 1962 election 'and won an easy victory over 
all the opposition parties' (Joshi 1968: 194). Linguistic reorganisation thus produced a 
similar result in this state than it did in the rest of India five years previously.
As Table 7.6 shows, eight elections produced significant results between the two 
variables, and seven of these returned large correlation coefficients (defined as being 
above +-.50) (Pallant 2001: 120). Three of the relationships were significant at the 1% 
confidence interval.
Table 7.6. Pearson's correlation coefficients for enseats (log) and enling (log) for 
the non-Hindi majority states of India
Election Year
1952
1957
1962
1967
1971
1977
1980
1984
1989
1991
1996
1998
1999
Correlation coefficient
0.16
-0.10
-0.64
-0.51
-0.79
-0.27
-0.25
-0.26
-0.48
-0.52
-0.50
-0.65
-0.58
Sig
*
*
#*
*
*
*
#*
**
Sig 1 tailed
0.29
0.42
0.04
0.05
0.00
0.18
0.19
0.19
0.04
0.02
0.02
0.00
0.01
N
14
7
8
11
11
14
14
14
15
15
16
16
16
* Correlation is significant at the .05 level (1-tailed).
** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (1-tailed).
Source: As for Table 7.3.
Explanations for the difference between Hindi and non-Hindi majority states
As Table 7.5 showed, the relationship between the effective number of linguistic groups 
and the effective number of legislative parties was not significant for Hindi majority 
states, and the correlation coefficient was very weak. When these data are 
disaggregated into election year none of the individual correlations are significant.
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There are a number of possible explanations for the differences between the Hindi 
majority and non-Hindi majority states.
a) The states which do not have Hindi as the majority language tend to be further away 
from the capital, and are certainly not part of the Hindi heartland. In a federal system 
these states would be more likely to develop in opposition to the centre. However, 
while this factor might explain the development of regionally based parties, it does not 
explain why there should be a multiplicity of parties rather than one strong regional 
party. Therefore the fact that the non-Hindi majority states fractionalised more than the 
Hindi majority ones in the first instance is indicative of the success of the federal 
system. As Table 7.7 shows, the non-Hindi majority states have a much wider range of 
the effective number of legislative parties than the Hindi majority states do260 .
Table 7.7. The distribution ofenseats between Hindi majority and non-Hindi 
majority states for the Indian national elections 1952-1999
Language
Non-Hindi majority
Hindi majority
N
261
105
Minimum Enseats
1.00
1.00
Maximum Enseats
5.39
3.96
Source: As for Table 7.3.
Wilkinson provides a plausible explanation for the differences in the number of 
effective legislative parties between the two types of states (2000b: 21-24). He argues 
that in the early twentieth century, the status of the lower castes in the southern, non- 
Hindi speaking area of India was much worse than in the north. In these southern states 
there had been caste agitation in favour of job reservations. The British were keen to 
concede these reservations because the Brahmins in these states were at the forefront of 
the Home Rule movement.
It was the social organisations, built around more inclusive caste identities than 
those that existed in the north (where middle and lower castes were still 
concerned to distance themselves from each other) that laid the basis for the 
development of organized opposition parties to Congress after independence 
(Wilkinson 2000b: 23).
I do not argue that linguistic reorganisation was the sole factor that caused the party 
system to fractional! se. The state of Madras would be an obvious counter example as
-60 Although in recent years many of the Hindi-speaking states have possessed incredibly fractionalised 
party systems e.g. Uttar Pradesh and Bihar.
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the DMK under Annadurai split from the Dravidian Federation in 1949. However, 
Tamil Nadu's (as it became) party system ultimately supports the hypothesis. Despite 
tensions with the centre the state strongly supported the Indian Union in its 1962 war 
with China. The DMK called off its secessionist campaign in 1963 on the grounds that 
'there is a threat to our sovereignty...and we must act as one...only if there is a 
state...can we ask what we want of it', (quoted in Rajagopalan 2001: 156). hi 1967 the 
DMK split and has continued to fractionalise further. For a region that has such an 
antipathy to Hindi speakers and elements of Hinduism261 this is a definite sign of 
security within a federation. In recent years Tamil parties have been prominent 
members of the national coalition.
Chart 7.3.Variance in effective number of legislative parties in Indian national 
elections
Nenseats 
0246
1952 
1957 
1962 
1967 
1971
3 1977 
>,
o 1980•^
| 1984 
1989 
1991 
1996 
1998
1QQQ
'—————— I"" ,
1 1
1
————————————— I ———————— '
————— V
! \ •i
———— i— i—— ' i—— v,
• 1
1
————— t— .————— ,\
"]•\,
1
—————— 1 — 1————— V-1
1
:l
'•""•I
^M"Bu|
<H
Not Hindi
majority
Hindi majority
•Linear (Not 
Hindi majority)
Linear (Hindi 
majority)
Source: As for Table 7.3.
Chart 7.3 demonstrates this trend. It shows that Hindi majority states have tended to 
have lower numbers of parties than the non-Hindi majority states, hi recent years 
however, the differences have grown smaller. This explains why the relationship
261 Periyar, the leader of the Dravidian Federation in the 1940s and 1950s saw the Ramayana as an 'epic of the 
conquest of the South by the North' (Roy 1962: 269).
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between the effective number of legislative parties and the effective number of 
linguistic groups has started to swing in a negative direction again.
In recent years the northern Hindi speaking states have seen a rise in demands for job 
reservations for the lower castes. These demands provided the basis for the formation 
of political parties - the BSP was formed in 1984. When the Mandal Report262 was 
taken out of storage in 1990, it provoked violent and bloody opposition from the higher 
castes. The Hindi majority northern states have since seen their party system 
fractionalise more than at any time in the past. Uttar Pradesh is now a battleground for 
at least three significant political parties - the BSP, SP & BJP - scoring 3.96 on the 
enseats index in 1999.
The argument that the politicisation of caste has accounted for the fragmentation of the 
party system, first in the southern and later in the northern states is compatible with my 
hypothesis. It provides a satisfactory explanation of why the southern states saw a 
coherent negative relationship between the effective number of legislative parties and 
the effective number of linguistic groups. Linguistic reorganisation provided the 
security for alternative identities to mobilise. The same reasoning explains the initial 
rise in the effective number of legislative parties in the Hindi majority states. In the late 
sixties 'primarily intermediate and backward caste peasants in the Green Revolution 
areas of northern India' began to mobilise (Brass 1997: 207-208; Sridharan 2002: 493- 
4). Socialist and agrarian parties were formed as a result. As Wyatt argues,
upwardly mobile groups that were not accommodated by ... Congress ... took a 
while to organise effectively but once they had reached a certain point...they 
proved to be formidable opponents even if they were not always able to displace 
the dominant party (2001: 159).
Indira Gandhi's personal campaign strategy, focusing on issues important to the rural 
poor, was able to regain the support of these groups, leading to a diminution of the 
effective number of legislative parties in these states. Her success was facilitated by 
India's intervention in East Pakistan in 1971. However, this was at the expense of the 
organisational capacity of the party, reducing the ability of Congress to accommodate 
demands when the populist appeal failed (Manor 1995: 106). By the mid 1990s the 
party system fractionalised again as the lower castes independently asserted themselves.
262 The Mandal report recommended that 27% of government jobs should be reserved for the backward castes 
fOBCs) This increased the percentage of reserved government jobs to 50% overall (Brass 1994: 252).
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Caste mobilisation was therefore a contributing factor to party fractionalisation along 
regional and caste lines263 .
b) An alternative explanation for the differences between the Hindi and non-Hindi 
majority states is offered by Vanhanen. He contends that,
It seems reasonable to assume that the electoral support of national and semi- 
national parties is the highest in the core areas of India and that it declines in more 
remote regions ...The strongest areas of regional parties are outside the Hindi 
heartland of north India (1992: 107-108).
This argument is also compatible with my hypothesis. As Hindi speakers are the largest 
linguistic group within India, these states can be understood to be members of the 
staatsvoUc . The staatsvolk of a state typically do not perceive any incompatibility 
between the identity of their region and the identity of the state (e.g. English in Britain, 
Punjabis in Pakistan). Weiner supports this argument.
In the Hindi-speaking areas there tends to be less of an identification with the 
State governments as such, compared to the degree of identification among the 
non-Hindi language...many Hindi speaking politicians see the Hindi region as the 
'heartland' of India (1967: 325 & 342).
Vanhanen was writing in 1992, using electoral data from 1984. Recently, parties with a 
national support base have declined in states such as Uttar Pradesh. Parties with a more 
specific appeal such as the BSP and SP have come to the fore. As Varshney discusses, 
these lower caste communities have articulated a very different version of the Indian 
nation than either Hindu or secular nationalists.
Rather than talk about the nation and the placement of religious or linguistic 
groups therein, the caste narrative speaks of the deeply hierarchical and unjust 
nature of Hindu social order... an egalitarian restructuring of the Hindu social 
order is the chief goal (his emphasis) (2002: 57).
These states were already homogeneous along linguistic lines. They did not factionalise 
immediately because the population identified with the nation and with national parties 
more than those states which did not have a Hindi majority. The rise of political parties
263 Caste is a regionally differentiated phenomenon - a Brahmin in the South is very different from a Brahmin 
in the north (Varshney 2002: 59).
264 I do not agree with Singh who, adapting Ernest Gellner's point, argues that 'Hindus speak the same 
language even when they do not speak the same language' (2001: 144). The staatsvolk in India is more 
narrowly defined. -209-
mobilising around lower caste communities is indicative of the fact that they do not 
identify with the staatsvolk to the same extent.
Pakistan
Assessing the relationship between federal stabilisation and the party system is more 
problematic in Pakistan than it is in India265 . This is for five reasons.
• Pakistan has held only seven national elections in fifty-six years266 . Because the 
first national elections were not held until 1970, I have included electoral data from the 
provincial elections held between 1951-1954267 .
• The second problem with using party system data as a measure of federal 
stability in Pakistan is that unlike India which had a large number of states, the largest 
number of states in Pakistan has numbered five268 . The relationship between the 
number of units and federal stability will be discussed in the conclusion. For now it 
suffices to say that the small number of states means that any analysis inevitably has a 
low N. This potentially diminishes the validity of the results.
• The third problem is that unlike the Indian case, Pakistan's electorate has 
systematically and pervasively experienced intimidation and army interference. In the 
provincial elections in West Pakistan in the 1950s 'it was widely and persistently 
complained that these elections were a farce, a mockery and a fraud upon the electorate' 
(Callard 1957: 67). In recent years Pakistan has invited international agencies to 
observe the elections, and in 1997 the Commonwealth Observer Group pronounced 
'that this general election was credible and ... there was no evidence of systematic or 
widespread abuse of the electoral process' (1997: 38). However tensions remain -
265 The electoral data has not been collated in the same systematic fashion as in the Indian case - therefore I 
have had to rely on secondary sources.
206 In 1970 1977 1988, 1990. 1993, 1997 and 2002. I exclude elections to the Basic Democracies under Ayub 
Khan in 1962 as well as the party-less election held in 1985 under the auspices of Zia ul Huq. I have 
reluctantly included the 2002 elections. Commonwealth Observers declared that •polling itself was generally 
fair - but raise(d) questions about the run-up to the election' (BBC 2002b).
267 Provincial elections were held in Punjab and NWFP in 1951, in Sind in 1953 and in East Pakistan in 1954. 
Baluchistan only became a province under the Legal Framework Order of 1970.
268 I exclude the Federally Administered Tnbal Areas and the capital of Islamabad from this analysis, as the 
party systems are too small. Azad Kashmir is not integrated into the National Assembly of Pakistan as it has a
separate Assembly.
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although the 2002 elections were relatively free, they were dogged by severe restrictions 
on candidates before polling.
• Fourthly, political parties have not formed the same roots as they have in India 
and they have not been able to perform the same integrative function. The early leaders 
of the Muslim League, Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan, also disapproved of alternative 
political parties. In 1948 Jinnah argued that,
Every Mussalman should come under the banner of the Muslim League, which 
is the custodian of Pakistan, and build it up and make it a great state before we 
think of parties amongst ourselves which may be formed on sound and healthy 
lines, (quoted in Samad 1995a: 129)269 .
Writing on the party system up to 1958, Aziz argues that parties 'were made up more of 
a large number of leading persons with their political dependants than of distinct parties 
with visible rival programmes' (1976: 180). The situation has not improved 
dramatically since then. The Muslim League, the most organised political force at 
independence, was dependent on the landlords in the countryside who were not 
concerned with coherent political programmes (Waseem 1994b: 115-116).
• Finally, the constitution of Pakistan and the constant interference of the military 
in political life undermine the credibility of the electoral process. A state in which 
people ask when rather than if the military will take over is not a consolidated 
democracy, nor likely to become so in the near future270 . The lack of outrage at the 
military take over by General Musharraf in October 1999 confirms this observation. 
The military has not only seen itself as the saviour of Pakistan, but the constitutional 
framework after Zia's 8th amendment gave the indirectly elected President the power to 
dismiss the Prime Minister and call general elections. The use of this power led to 
elections in 1990, 1993 and 1997. In none of the elections in the post-Zia age have the 
people of Pakistan had a chance to vote a government out of office, although they have 
had five chances to vote in a government. This diminishes the efficacy which they view 
their vote271 .
269 Ghaffar Khan's 'People's Organisation" was banned and Ghaffar Khan arrested. This party 'had the 
potential of becoming a national opposition to the ruling party, with a presence in the assembly and enough 
cadres to make an impact on the streets as well' (Samad 1995a: 129).
'70 Personal conversations and general observations during rieldwork in November 1998 in Pakistan. 
:71 Iromcallv Nawaz Shanf was elected on a ticket in 1997 to abolish tins Eight Amendment. He therefore 
removed a" constitutional mechanism that could have been available to Musharraf in 1999 to depose 
'constitutionally' Shanf. Musharraf s proposed new constitution has reinstated this provision and also
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Although the results of any statistical analysis must be treated with more caution than 
those obtained from India, it does not mean that the tests are invalid. It does however; 
mean that I have to investigate the results in more detail.
Table 7.8. Pearson's correlation between enseats (log) and enling (log) in Pakistan 
for provincial elections 1951-1955 and national elections 1970-2002
Correlation Coefficient
.228
Sig. Sig 2 tailed
.187
N
35
: Electoral data adapted from Afzal (1976: 79), Aziz (1976: 275-277), Election Commission of 
Pakistan (2002), Kaniyalil and Pande (1989: 79), SAARC-NGO Observers (1995: 116-117), Talbot 
(1998: 200 & 314), Waseem (1994a: 334; 1998: 11). Linguistic data adapted from Government of 
Pakistan (195 Ib; 1984a: 10; 1984b: 10; 1984c: 10; 1984d: 9).
The collated electoral data of Table 7.8 returns a weak and non-significant relationship 
between the two variables. This means I am unable to reject the null hypothesis that 
there is no relationship between the effective number of linguistic groups and the 
effective number of legislative parties. To determine whether any of the periods in 
Pakistan's brief democratic history have had a relationship between these two variables, 
I have disaggregated these data. As the sample size is small, I cannot disaggregate these 
data into election years as in the Indian case. Therefore I have grouped these data into 
three electoral periods; 1951-1955, 1970-1977 and 1988-2002.
Table 7.9. Pearson's correlation between enseats (log) and enling (log) in Pakistan 
for provincial elections 1951-1955 and national elections 1970-2002.
Election period
1951-1955
1970-1977
1988-2002
Correlation Coefficient
-.199
-.303
.455
Sig.
*
Sig 2 tailed272
.705
.428
.044
N
6
9
20
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Source: As for Table 7.8
Table 7.9 indicates that there was no relationship between the effective number of
legislative parties and the effective number of linguistic groups in the first two periods.
Therefore we fail to reject the null for these periods. However, the relationship is a
medium to strong one however for the electoral period, 1988-2002, and is significant at
formalised the role of the military through the creation of a National Secunty Council'as the president 
believes that bv finalising the role of militaiy, sustainable democracy could be achieved! (Dawn 2002). 
m I have reverted to two-tailed analyses to determine if there is a relationship between the two variables.
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the 5% level. Importantly, the relationship is in the opposite direction to the one I 
hypothesised; there is a positive relationship between the effective number of legislative 
parties and the effective number of linguistic groups. Therefore, there is a relationship 
between the two variables. However, this does not permit me to accept the alternate 
hypothesis. The coefficient indicates that the relationship between the effective number 
of legislative parties and the effective number of linguistic groups is in the opposite 
direction to that of the Indian case. There appears to be a positive relationship between 
the two variables.
When the data is disaggregated the picture becomes clearer. My alternate hypothesis 
concerned only those units that were homogeneous. Neither Sind or Baluchistan are 
homogeneous along linguistic lines - indeed, both provinces have become more 
heterogeneous. Sind has become less homogeneous along linguistic lines as Karachi 
has attracted migrants from East Pakistan, India and Afghanistan. In 1953 the effective 
number of linguistic groups in Sind was 1.77. In 1981 this had risen to 2.95273 . Sindhis 
now account for only 52.4% of the population of Sind - they are a majority, but only 
just. In the census of 1951 Sindhi speakers comprised 74% of the population. In 1981, 
theMuhajir Urdu speakers accounted for 22.6% of the population. Baluchi, Pushtu and 
Punjabi speakers accounted for another 15% of the population, many of these in 
Karachi. In this situation it is not surprising that a multiplicity of parties exist. The 
effective number of legislative parties has varied between 1.61 in 1977 to 3.67 in 1997. 
The two main linguistic groups, the Sindhis and the Muhajirs, have their own parties, 
the PPP and the MQM. The party system has fractionalised, but along linguistic lines, 
although in recent years the only party which can claim national status, the PML, has 
also gained substantial support in the province. This fractionalisation is indicative of 
federal instability.
In the case of Baluchistan, the effective number of linguistic groups has consistently 
been above 4 and it is a multilingual province. Baluchistan only became a province in 
1970, but was merged with Pushtu speaking areas in 1954, despite the wishes of some 
Baluch sardars. 'Whether this was done intentionally to weaken the Baloch nationalist 
struggle cannot be ascertained, however, this was certainly one of its results' (Rahman 
1996: 156). The average number of effective legislative parties in Baluchistan in
:7} The only state in India with a higher effective number of linguistic groups is Nagaland, excluded as an 
outlier.
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national elections has been 3.66. The high effective number of linguistic groups also 
reflects the fact that,
the poorly developed nature of the social and physical infrastructure has forced 
the majority of the Baluchis to try and eke out a living in Sind and parts of the 
Punjab. Baluchi speakers have been reduced to a minority of about 36% (Jalal 
1995: 191).
Among the provinces that were linguistically homogeneous, NWFP appears to be the 
only province in which the relationship is as hypothesised - it has a relatively low 
effective number of linguistic groups at 1.97 but its average number of effective 
legislative parties in national elections has been 3.38. After the Punjab, it is the most 
integrated and secure state within Pakistan274 . The province is integrated because,
its foothold in the power structure has given the Pathans a much greater degree of 
self-confidence about their future in Pakistan than can be said for either the 
Baluchis or the indigenous inhabitants of Sind (Jalal 1995: 194).
Pathans have been well represented in the military and also within the 'civil and police 
services' of their own province (Jalal 1995: 194). However, these are non-democratic 
institutions, confirming that inclusion and exclusion within Pakistan has not been 
entirely related to the federal structures of government. Pushtu remains an important 
identity marker for Pathans but it was not introduced as a medium of instruction in 
primary schools until 1984 (Rahman 1996: 149). This was because it was not perceived 
to be a language that allowed great economic mobility or prospects. Calls for a greater 
Pakhtunistan do exist, but these are irredentist claims on parts of Baluchistan province 
as well as on parts of Afghanistan. They are not secessionist. However, demands for 
renaming NWFP Pakhtoonistan have been rejected on the grounds that such a name 
would encourage secessionism.
Punjab is a different story. After independence,
the new Pakistan Army had something like 60 percent Punjabi Muslims as sepoys 
and in the officer corps...from the beginning these officers claimed a special 
position in the new state of Pakistan (Cohen 1998: 42).
In addition, 'Punjabis dominate the federal bureaucracy' (Jalal 1995: 188). Punjab has 
been relatively homogeneous along linguistic lines, the highest effective number of
274 Despite some claims for a greater Pakhtoonistan to be created.
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linguistic groups being 1.63 in 1981 275 . The average effective number of legislative 
parties in national elections has been a relatively homogeneous 2.07. Before the 
secession of East Pakistan, and especially afterwards, Punjabis were perceived to 
dominate the federation. Through their dominance in the army and the bureaucracy 
they have formed 'a large percentage of the provincial civil services and police forces in 
Sind and Baluchistan' (Jalal 1995: 188). They also dominated the bureaucracy in East 
Pakistan. Although there have been calls for the division of Punjab into three provinces 
along lines of dialect - a Punjabi centre, a northern Hindko belt and a Siraiki belt in the 
south276 - the party system within the province has not fractionalised along these lines. 
'Siraiki political organisations have generally been divided, short lived and less popular 
than national political parties even in their own areas' (Rahman 1996: 186). They have 
not gained many votes, many Siraikis supporting the PPP of Sind in hope of gaining 
their own province. The PPP did not concede the demand 'for fear of alienating the 
sympathies of the Punjabi ruling elite and the army' (Rahman 1996: 187). In addition, 
as Punjabis are the staatsvolk of Pakistan they are more likely to feel secure. According 
to the hypothesis this is likely to increase rather than decrease fractionalisation. 
However, in India, the party system in the Hindi majority states did not fractionalise to 
the same extent as the non-Hindi majority states. One explanation was that the electoral 
support of national parties was higher in the core areas of India. This explanation may 
well apply to the Punjab as well - whose inhabitants are more likely than those of Sind 
or Baluchistan to identify with Pakistan. They see no incompatibility between a Punjabi 
and a Pakistani identity. This does not mean that fractionalisation could not occur or 
that the demands for a Siraiki province will go away. In the last elections, flawed 
though they were, the effective number of legislative parties in Punjab rose to 3.54.
However, although Sind and Baluchistan can be excluded from the hypothesis because 
of their heterogeneity and Punjab because of its status as the province of the Staatsvolk, 
East Pakistan cannot be. The fact that East Pakistan was an extremely homogeneous 
province that seceded is the major challenge to my hypothesis that homogeneity 
facilitates federal stabilisation. Yet the fractionalisation of the party system was only 
one of three measures to assess federal stabilisation. The number of secessionist
275 ITiis is higher than the score in 1951 because Siraikis were categorised separately. Hie Sira,kis claim a
separate province in the South of the Punjab. . .
**:I am ^atefal to Alyssa Ayres from the University of Chicago tor discussrng this 1Ssue with me.
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movements within a state is also an important measure - as is an appreciation of what 
led to these movements.
7.3. Secessionism and security
An alternative method of measuring federal stabilisation is to analyse the number of 
attempted secessions within a state. A high number of secessionist movements indicate 
that a federation has failed to accommodate a large number of groups. In Gurr's maps 
of areas of ethnopolitical conflict, India is more conflict prone than Pakistan (1993: 
121-122). Intuitively however, most observers would conclude that India's federation 
has been more successful at managing ethnic conflict than has Pakistan's. An analysis 
which only takes into account the absolute numbers of secessionist movements does not 
take account of the ethnic diversity of a state or the size of that state's population. 
India's population is much larger than that of Pakistan, and it is much more religiously 
and linguistically diverse, especially after the secession of East Pakistan in 1971. Using 
this measure on its own would ignore the real success that India has had 
accommodating linguistic identities (though it has not been as successful 
accommodating religious ones). Yet this measure is still indicative of federal 
destabilisation.
India
India has had several violent secessionist or autonomist movements, the most notable 
being those in Kashmir, Punjab, Mizoram, Assam and Nagaland. These movements 
have all been in regions with an international border. Most of the states are non-Hindu 
majority states, in the northeast of the country and there are numerous tribes. In 
contrast, the Indian state has been much more successful at accommodating identities 
which are defined by language - through institutional innovations such as the linguistic 
reorganisation of states. That the Indian federation has been more successful in 
accommodating identities defined by language rather than those defined by religion in 
demonstrated by Wilkinson (2002: 15).
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Chart 7.4. Sample of all incidents of ethnic mobilisation in India 1950-1995
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Source: Wilkinson (2002: 15).
Notes: The cases cited by Wilkinson are taken from a sample of days in each year. The absolute numbers
cited are therefore lower than the actual number, but their relative position is accurate.
As Chart 7.4 reveals, incidents that were mobilised around linguistic issues have 
declined from the 1950s. This concurs with my argument that the concession of 
linguistic reorganisation provided security and is reflected in my findings on the 
fractionalisation of the party system. Rather than leading to instability, this 
reorganisation provided the conditions for dual or multiple identities to be created. That 
linguistic identities remain strong despite linguistic reorganisation is not questioned - 
one only has to look at Tamil websites to see a vociferous campaign against insipid 
Hindi-isation (e.g. Tamil Tribune). In addition, the riots over what the official language 
of the Indian Union should be occurred after linguistic reorganisation. Yet in the main 
linguistic identities have become compatible with, rather than antithetical to, Indian 
identity. Language laws at the centre were essential to promote this security.
However, these data are very different in relation to mobilisation around religious 
issues. Mobilisation organised around a Muslim identity was non-existent in the 
1950s277 . From its emergence in the 1960s, it has increased twelve fold, and has 'been 
especially important in the long-running insurgency in Kashmir' (Wilkinson 2002: 
15)278 . Incidents which were mobilised around Sikh identities also increased twelve 
fold from the 1950s compared to the 1980s, dropping back slightly in the 1990-1995 
period. At the same time, separatist violence has increased despite dropping in the 
1950s after 'India defused linguistic separatist movements by creating new states' 
(Wilkinson 2002: 16). To assess India's record in federal stabilisation, we must
277 The quiescence of the Muslim population after partition has been discussed in Chapter Six.
278 In contrast, incidents involving Hindu-Muslim issues only quadrupled in the 1950-1995 period.
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understand what accounts for the rise in secessionism in recent years. How do the 
existence of secessionist forces in the Punjab, Jammu and Kashmir, Assam, Nagaland 
and Mizoram equate with the argument put forward so far?
Firstly, many of these units are not linguistically homogeneous279 . Jammu and 
Kashmir, Nagaland, Manipur, Assam, Meghalaya and Arunachal Pradesh all have an 
effective number of linguistic groups that are above 1.9. This makes it possible to 
exclude them, and they do not undermine my hypothesis that the creation of 
linguistically homogeneous states has promoted federal stabilisation. However, two 
other points need to be made before I can put these counter examples aside.
a) To argue that the secessionist conflicts in Jammu and Kashmir are linguistically 
motivated would be nonsensical;
b) Both Punjab and Mizoram are linguistically homogeneous; the effective number 
of linguistic groups in this state is below 1.9. These movements need to be 
accounted for. Why did linguistic homogeneity not lead to security in these 
states?
To explain federal destabilisation in these states it is necessary to look at another 
variable - their religious majority. All the states with secessionist movements since 
linguistic reorganisation with the exception of Assam - i.e. Jammu and Kashmir, 
Punjab, Mizoram and Nagaland - are non-Hindu majority states. Chapter Six 
established that religiously defined groups were accommodated differently to those 
defined by linguistic criteria. The attitude of the Indian state to non-Hindu religious 
groups has led authors such as Singh to argue that India is best understood as an ethnic 
democracy.
Where non-Hindu minorities have constituted a majority in the federating unit, 
the operation of hegemonic control has been exercised through the Hindu 
minority...the use of residual powers by the union government; the use of 
administrative structures... and the coercive power of the Indian state (2000: 47- 
8).
Does Singh's account explain the high level of secessionist movements since linguistic 
reorganisation in these units? If Singh's contention were correct, then we would expect 
to see the following. Firstly, the imposition of President's Rule under Article 356 of the
279 Data adapted from 1971.
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constitution 80 would have occurred predominantly in units without a Hindu majority. 
Secondly, we would expect to see a higher level of army interventions in these units. 
The evidence is not conclusive. Although Singh's arguments concerning an ethnic 
democracy in India are a useful addition to the debate, he portrays the Hindu core as 
more homogeneous than it is (2000: Ch. 3 esp.45-48). To assess Singh's contention, I 
have separately correlated the measures of the number of days a state has spent under 
President's Rule (prdays) with a) the majority religion in a state (ret), and b) with the 
border status of the state (border).
President's Rule
My findings can be summarised as follows.
• There is no relationship between the number of times or the number of days that 
President's Rule has been in force in a state and the majority religion of that state. 
Mann-Whitney tests281 do not reveal a statistically significant relationship between 
these two variables. Table 7.10 demonstrates why. States such as Punjab and Jammu 
and Kashmir, states without a Hindu majority, are at the top of the table. However, 
significantly, Meghalaya and Arunachal Pradesh are at the bottom. This confirms that 
the religious majority of the state in question does not determine the extent of the 
centre's interference. An explanation for the low ranking of the states of Meghalaya 
and Arunachal Pradesh could be that the former became a state, and the latter became a 
Union Territory only in 1972. This would be misleading for two reasons. The first of 
these is that the Union Territory of Mizoram was also created in 1972, but has a much 
higher rank on the table.
280 Article 356. Provisions in case of failure of constitutional machinery in States provides that 'If the 
President, on receipt of a report from the Governor of a State or otherwise, is satisfied that a situation has arisen 
in which the Government of the State cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of this 
Constitution, the President may by Proclamation (a) assume to himself all or any of the functions of the 
Government of the State and all or any of the powers vested in or exercisable by the Governor or any body or 
authority in the State other than the Legislature of the State; (b) declare that the powers of the Legislature of the 
State shall be exercisable by or under the authority of Parliament; (c) make such incidental and consequential 
provisions as appear to the President to be necessary or desirable for giving effect to the objects of the 
Proclamation, including provisions for suspending in whole or in part the operation of any provisions of this 
Constitution relating to any body or authority in the State'.
281 These test the relationship between one categorical independent variable with two levels (e.g. Hindu/Non- 
Hindu) against one continuous dependent variable (e.g. number of days that Presidential Rule has been 
enforced in a state).
-219-
Table 7.10. the number of days under President's Rule for the States and Union 
Territories of India 1951-2002
1
2
3
4
5
>
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
Mame of state
°unjab
aondicherry
Jammu and Kashmir
Manipur
LJttar Pradesh
Kerala
Nagaland
Assam
Gujarat
Tamil Nadu
West Bengal
Orissa
Bihar
Mizoram
Karnataka
Rajasthan
Madhya Pradesh
Andhra Pradesh
Goa (incl Daman and Diu)
Himachel Pradesh
Sikkim
Haryana
Tripura
Meghalaya
Maharashtra
Arunachal Pradesh
Total
Days imposed
3578
2699
2357
1930
1705
1694
7475
1397
1239
1137
1064
752
746
703
648
561
524
459
445
406
347
313
149
117
113
76
26551
No. times imposed
9
6
3
10
10
9
3
4
5
A
4
7
8
3
4
4
3
2
4
2
2
3
3
1
1
1
114
Source: Data adapted from Lok Sabha Secretariat (1996), Rajashekara (1987: 638-640), 
http://rajyasabha.nic.in (1996; 1997; 1999a; 1999b; 2002), http://www.dawn.com (2002). See Appendix
Three.
Notes: Non Hindu majority states in red type. Most lists of President's Rule do not include the Union 
Territories. I have done so because many of the incidents of President's Rule occurred in Arunachal 
Pradesh, Manipur and Mizoram when they were Union Territories. No explanation is given in the Lok 
Sabha report on why President's Rule has been applied so many times to the Union Territory of 
Pondicheny (Lok Sabha Secretariat 1996: x).
The second reason is that as can be seen in Chart 7.5 below, the imposition of 
President's Rule has varied dramatically between the decades. The 1970s were the 
decade in which the provision was used most extensively 'especially since 1972' 
(Manor 1995: 108). If President's Rule had been imposed disproportionally onto non- 
Hindu states, the occurrence of its use should have been greater in all the states in
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existence in 1972. It is no coincidence that Indira Gandhi was Prime Minister for most 
of the decade282 .
Chart 7.5. The number of days that President's Rule has been imposed on the 
states and union territories by decade
Number of days
2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
Source: As Table 7.9
• There is also no statistically significant relationship between the border status of 
a state and the length of time spent under President's Rule283 . Although the Indian state 
is paranoid about its territorial integrity, crushing all secessionist demands, it has not 
exclusively intervened or suspended democratic functioning in those states that have a 
land border with another country. The centre has been concerned to secure its control in 
all areas of India.
The fact that there is no relationship challenges the ethnic democracy argument of 
Singh. One possible explanation would be that the number of days spent under 
President's Rule is not a useful device to establish inequitable treatment. However, 
under Article 356 the Centre assumes the functions of the government of that state and 
can declare that the powers of the state legislature be exercised by the central 
parliament. The lack of a correlation between either of these variables with the number
282 The 1970s are easily the decade with a disproportionate number of uses of President's Rule, even when the 
Janata Government's dissolutions of the state assemblies whose terms of office had expired during the 
Emergency are removed from the figures.
283 1 analysed this relationship using a Kruskal-Wallis test, which is used to assess relationships between one 
categorical independent variable with three levels or more, e.g. no international border, sea border, land border, 
and one continuous dependent variable - e.g. prdays. The relationship remained insignificant even when 
border status and the majority religion of the state (Hindu-Non Hindu) were analysed using a two way between 
groups ANOVA test.
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of days spent under President's Rule is therefore significant. These were the indicators 
I would have most expected to produce a significant correlation between if the ethnic 
democracy argument is sustainable.
Yet the number of days a state spent under President's Rule is not sufficient on its own 
as a test of federal stabilisation. To proceed - one must concentrate on a final variable: 
the number of army interventions and types of violence within the state. 'The Indian 
Army has had more experience in counter-insurgency than almost any army in the 
world' (Rajagopalan 2000: 44).
Armed intervention
Cohen has analysed the number of occasions when the army intervened within Indian 
states between the years of 1973-1984284 . His data, presented in Table 7.11 below, 
demonstrate that the majority of such interventions occurred in states that had a Hindu 
majority. 60% of army interventions have occurred in the states not in the Northeast, 
Punjab or Jammu and Kashmir285 . However, in 1977 only 23% of States and Union 
Territories had a non-Hindu majority. Therefore, the fact that they have experienced 
40% of the army interventions during this period supports the argument that religion has 
been important in determining the Indian state's response to challenges, and that 
challenges leading to military intervention have been higher in these states than others. 
These interventions inevitably produced further alienation from the centre. 'By the 
early 1980s the effective government for millions of Indians was the local area or sub 
areas commander'(Cohen 1990: 203).
284 In a chapter written before the Kashmir insurgency, Stephen Cohen, an expert on the Indian army detailed 
the number of its deployments in aid to the civilian power. He covered the period 1973-1984, the period in 
which Wilkinson, (2002: 14)) Varshney, (2002: 95), Rajgopal (1987: 16-17) and Kohli (1991: 6-7) note a rise 
in violence within India. Cohen notes that the 'increase in such interventions has been dramatic'. In a nineteen 
year period, from 1951-1970 'the army was called in to suppress domestic violence on approximately 476 
occasions' (1988: 124). In a quarter of that time, between June 1979 and December 1984, they were called in 
453 times (Mathur 1992: 344-345). Armed police battalions doubled in the period covering 1963-1983. There 
were 66 such battalions in 1963 compared to 144 in 1983. Paramilitary forces used in the border regions have 
also increased substantially (Mathur 1992: 344). Wilkinson finds that since the 1980s, not only have injuries 
and the numbers of deaths increased but that 'ethnic identities have been invoked much more than economic' 
ones in mobilisation of protests' (2002: 14).
285 Although this data was collected before the current insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir, the date range 
covers most of Indira Gandhi's populist reign in which she exploited religion for populist purposes and 
alienated many of the 'peripheral' regions.
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Table 7.11. The causes of army intervention in India in the period between 1973- 
1984
Causes of intervention
Communal unrest
Tribal
Anti foreigner
Election violence
Riots (un-categorised)
Insurgency
Language riots
Food riots
Student riots
Rural
Caste
Other
Unknown
Total
Northeast, Punjab, J & K
5
4
2
1
2
1
1
16
Other States
12
1
1
1
1
1
1
3
3
24
Source: Data adapted from Cohen (1988: 125-127).
It is interesting to note that there is a definite relationship between the likelihood of 
army intervention and the state having an international land border. 77.5% of army 
interventions in the period 1973-1984 were within states with an international land 
border as can be seen in Table 7.12. This is significantly more than their representation 
within the Indian Union. This confirms the assessment that the Indian state is 
concerned to maintain control especially in these regions, as well as its concern to 
intervene in states without a Hindu majority.
Table 7.12. the number of army interventions organised according to border status 
1973-1984
Border status
No Border i
Sea Border
International Border
Total ____
No. of Army 
interventions j
3
6
31 ___
40
% of army 
interventions
7.5
15
77.5
100
% of states in 
Indian federation
14
25
61
100
Source: Adapted from Cohen (1988: 125-127).
The above data demonstrate that Singh's argument is simplistic. However, they do not 
mean that it is wrong. It is undeniable that the secessionist movements that India is 
most associated with - Punjab and Kashmir - have occurred in states that have not had a 
Hindu majority. However they are also on a land border, an important qualification.
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These states have also seen a very high number of deaths. 'In Punjab the official death- 
toll is around 30,000, whereas human rights groups believe that the actual fatalities are 
nearer 45,000' (Singh 2001: 139). In Kashmir, the figures for fatalities also vary 
widely. In 1996 Ganguly estimated that '20,000 insurgents, police, paramilitary 
personnel and civilians have lost their lives since the onset of the conflict' (1996: 76). 
In the same year Farooq Abdullah, then chief minister of Jammu and Kashmir put the 
figure closer to 50,000 (Bose 1997: 167)286 . The Northeast has also seen very high 
levels of conflict related to secessionist and inter-ethnic conflicts. Between 1980 and 
1986, 5000 people were killed in Assam (Hardgrave 1993: 61; Brown 1996: 5). In 1990 
L P Singh, the former Governor of Assam calculated that half of the deaths in India in 
the 1980s occurred in the north east of the country despite it possessing only 'one third 
of one percent of the country's total population' (1990: 14). The 'official figures put 
the death toll at around 10,000' (Singh 2001: 139). While definitive data are impossible 
to acquire, the numbers of deaths are much higher in these states, even when compared 
to other infamous incidents of violence. Official figures put the number of dead in 
communal riots relating to the demolition of the Babri Mosque at Ayodhya in between 
6th and 13 th December 1992 at 1200. Unofficial estimates at least double these figures 
(Jaffrelot 1996: 463). The recent pogrom in Gujarat killed 2000 people. In both cases 
the majority of victims were Muslims. Yet even the figures at the upper range of the 
scale are much lower than the deaths in the states of the Northeast and Punjab and 
Kashmir. The disparity is even greater when the differences in population sizes are 
taken into account.
Why have these regions seen such high levels of violence? It appears that the Indian 
elite's response to demands for autonomy has been conditioned by two factors; the 
religion of the state but also whether the state is situated next to a land border. In 
addition, central policies towards these regions have played a large role in their 
exclusion from mainstream political discourse and have engendered insecurity. The 
army may well have intervened more in the regions of the core than the periphery, but 
this says nothing about the behaviour of the army, nor the threats they face. Both of 
these are likely to be more extreme when secessionist movements are involved. The 
military is 'especially sensitive to, and scornful of, political parochialism' (Cohen 1990: 
197). However the differences in central policies in these regions are more than simply,
-s6 In a personal conversation in 2000, Bose puts the figure close to 60,000.
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dismissing state governments that oppose the will of the centre...and when all 
else fails, sending in the army and paramilitary forces. Through their 
intransigence, successive government have therefore driven many Sikhs and 
Kashmiris to join armed militant organisation (Wilkinson 2002: 24).
This is because, as demonstrated above, dismissing state governments and sending in 
the army and paramilitary forces have been used more often in the core than in the 
periphery. The difference lies more in the fact that 'the Indian state exercise(s) more 
caution in repressing identities that it feels are mainstream' than those which are not 
(Wilkinson 2002: 23). In addition, the perception of discrimination identified by people 
in these regions causes a different reaction to that in the core. Ethnic difference does 
not cause conflict, contrary to Vanhanen's contention (1992: 14). It is the denial of 
recognition and accommodation on the basis of this identity that provides the conditions 
for conflict to flourish. Central government policies, dictated by their perception of the 
effective number of ethnic groups (e.g. which identities were they forced to 
accommodate) and their notion of an Indian national identity led to a certain type of 
accommodation (linguistic) through the federal system, but systematically excluded 
others (religious). Therefore, linguistically homogeneous units have not caused ethnic 
conflict in India. Ethnic conflict has been caused by the denial of legitimate demands 
for autonomy which have been seen as challenging the national identity and hence the 
security of the Indian state. The limitations of Indian secularism have always been that 
the ideology has ostensibly treated all groups as equal, yet with regard to 
accommodation in the institutions of the state, Hindus have a built in majority. 'No 
territorial solution to ethnic problems, however, can by itself satisfy the claims of all 
minority groups' (Brass 1994: 192). Secessionist demands are not specifically related 
to the composition of the federal units, although demands for territorial adjustment have 
been present in Punjab, Nagaland and Assam. These secessionist demands have to be 
related to the perception of these states that they are treated differently from the rest of 
the Union287 .
Secessionist demands gained currency in the Punjab only after the Akali Dal's secular 
demands in the Anandpur Sahib Resolution of 1973, partially prompted by the
287 The conflict is more of a political rather than an economic one. As Dasgupta analyses - the north-eastern 
states are not backward. Mizoram has the highest literacy rate in India and Nagaland, Tripura and Manipur are 
above the national average. Their per capita incomes are very high by Indian standards (1998: 187-8). The 
smaller states in the northeast 'have a considerably higher per capita plan outlay allocation than the national 
average for all states' (Das Gupta 1998: 211). hi terms of budget transfers 'those that have done best are the 
delicate border states 7 (Jeffrey 1994: 188).
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incompleteness of the linguistic reorganisation of the state, were repeatedly ignored and 
Indira Gandhi supported a Sikh militant to undermine the Akali Dal's support. He 
succeeded too well, leading to a violent secessionist movement in the 1980s. Kashmir 
has also been treated differently from the rest of the Union. Rose quotes Nehru saying 
that Kashmiri politics revolved around personalities and that 'there was no room for 
democracy there' (1997: 38). Despite the denial of democracy within the state288 and its 
exclusion from mainstream political discourse, the state had been relatively quiescent 
over the years. It took the massive rigging and 'strong army tactics' adopted by the 
Indian state during the 1987 state election to violently escalate the conflict (Bose 1997: 
45-9). This election saw Farooq Abdullah make an alliance with the centre - hence 
losing many Kashmiri's support. A Muslim United Front (MUF) arose to challenge the 
National Conference (JKNC) but was defeated by the wide scale rigging.
It is thus not surprising that an Indian correspondent discovered after the 
eruption of insurgency in 1990 that 'nearly all the young men on the wanted list 
today were guarding ballot boxes for MUF' (as campaign volunteers) in 1987 
(Bose 1997: 46).
This reading of the situation prescribes normalisation of relations within these regions 
and a downscaling of the military presence. Despite the fact that 'more than 800' 
people lost their lives during the recent elections in Kashmir, the polls themselves were 
deemed fair, and led to a change of government (BBC 2002a). This is an encouraging 
sign. It is significant that these occurred under a Hindu nationalist coalition 
government, able to entertain the notion of political parties mobilising around religious 
identities.
Pakistan
In absolute terms, measured by the number of violent secessionist or autonomist 
movements it has experienced, Pakistan's federation has been more stable than India's. 
However, between one and three million Bengalis were killed, and ten million refugees 
were created in the attempted suppression of the East Pakistani secession. In the 1970s
288 Bose argues that the only elections that liave approximated conventional democratic norms" were those of 
1977 and 1983 and that (in 1997), -Jammu and Kashmir has had something resembling representative 
government for just twelve of its forty-nine years (1948-53, 1977-84) as an -integral part of India' (1997: 43). 
The state elections held in September 2002 have been classified as fair by outside observers, although they 
were not classified as 'free' because of the intimidation not to vote by independence movements. These 
elections resulted in a change of government, and reflected the will of the people.
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an autonomist movement occurred in Baluchistan (Hewitt 1996). The army was sent in 
to repress it - in which at least 9000 people were killed (Talbot 1998: 226). In the 
1980s a movement for an independent city-state of Karachi has emerged - claiming 
2000 lives in 1996 alone (Vali Nasr 2001: 169). Neither Baluchi nor Muhajir 
movements have demanded secession. But when they have taken a violent form then 
they are indicative of federal destabilisation.
The -secession -of-East -Pakistan is the -most -serious challenge to my previous argument 
that provincial homogeneity will lead to a factionalisation of the party system. 
However, this hypothesis came with a caveat: a homogeneous province was likely to 
lead to fractionalisation in the party system because the group was secure. If that group 
does not feel secure then there is no reason why the party system should fractionalise. 
This security is engendered by national policies of inclusion and exclusion. This is the 
same phenomenon as discussed in India, but unlike these examples, East Pakistan was 
extremely homogeneous - it had an effective number of linguistic groups of only 1.04. 
East Pakistan goes a long way to demonstrating why homogeneous provinces are not a 
sufficient condition for federal stability. The policies of the centre and the strategy to 
manage ethnic diversity are also important.
In the provincial elections of 1954 in East Pakistan my alternate hypothesis that the 
effective number of linguistic groups and the effective number of legislative parties 
were negatively correlated could not be accepted, as the effective number of legislative 
parties was 1.74 - a homogeneous party system in a homogeneous province. However, 
this score concealed a pre-election coalition. The primary components of the United 
Front were Suhrawardy's Awami League and Fazul Huq's Krishak Sramik Party. The 
rationale behind its creation was of an anti-Muslim League coalition. The Muslim 
League remained in control of the East Pakistan provincial government as well as the 
national government until 1954. The Muslim League balanced major government posts 
between the western and eastern politicians. However this distribution concealed 
differences in influence (Aziz 1976: 186). When Nazimuddin, a Bengali, was Governor 
General, the Muhajir Liaquat Ali Khan was the Prime Minister. Real power resided in 
the hands of Liaquat. When Nazimmudin became Prime Minister in the wake of 
Liaquat's assassination in 1951, real power passed to the hands of a Pushtun bureaucrat 
- Ghulam Mohammed. Power remained in his hands in 1953 after he appointed the
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Bengali, Mohammed Ali Bogra to be Prime Minister (Samad 1995a: 167)289 . In 
practice therefore, Bengalis were marginalised at the centre. Additionally, the Bengalis 
that controlled the Muslim League in the province were an Urdu speaking ashraf90 who 
had close ties with the central government and 'shared its attachment to a one nation, 
one culture policy' (Talbot 1998: 133). Nazimuddin, as both Governor General and 
then Prime Minister fitted this category. He was a Muslim League loyalist and it was 
his 'cavalier handing of the sensitive language issue during a visit to Dacca in January 
1952 (that) provoked a province-wide strike in which a number of demonstrators were 
killed' (Talbot 1998: 141)291 . The killing of these demonstrators created a condition 
where 'no political party desiring a base there could speak up for Urdu' (Afzal 1976: 
112).
The United Front can therefore be understood as an anti-Muslim League and pro- 
Bengali coalition formed from a position of insecurity. During the provincial election 
campaign of 1954, the new Bengali Prime Minister, Bogra, conceded that Bengali 
would be a joint state language in order to forestall the decimation of the Muslim 
League. It failed. The Muslim League won only 10 out of 309 seats in the province.
While the Bengali example does not initially enable me to accept the alternate 
hypothesis of a negative relationship between the effective number of linguistic groups 
and the effective number of legislative parties, this is because when a credible threat 
existed, the parties unified. After the election when Bengali had been recognised as a 
joint state language, the coalition swiftly fell apart. The number of effective legislative 
parties became 5.75, which confirms the alternate hypothesis. Although there were 
many more Bengali grievances around which the coalition could have retained its unity, 
it is important to remember that in mid-1954 the Mohammad Ali Bogra formula had 
been accepted as the basis for a constitution. As discussed in Chapter Five, this was an 
innovative formula, which gave Bengalis a majority in the lower house. Although it 
denied them a majority in the upper house as all the provinces were to be equally 
represented, important issues had to be decided by 30% of the members of each wing, a 
provision ensuring a mutual veto. This constitution would have provided East Pakistan
289 A former Ambassador to America with no political base - he was dependent on the Governor General.
290 Talbot translates this to mean gentry.
:91 Nazimuddin had initially accepted Bengali as a joint state language in 1948 although he backed down when 
Jinnah immediately repudiated him. Bengali was only introduced as a medium of instruction in schools 
(Samad 1995a' 154). In 1952 as Prime Minister, Nazimuddin categorically stated that Urdu would be the state 
language as provided for in the Basic Principles Report.
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with security. Therefore attention shifted to power sharing at the centre. Although 
Talbot argues that after the dismissal of Nazimuddin in 1953 'the fa$ade of a 
parliamentary system was to survive for five more years, but its heart had already been 
cut out' (1998: 142), this is easier to say with the benefit of hindsight. At the time the 
democratic elites perceived that the constitution was still up for grabs. The dissolution 
of the Constituent Assembly292 , often viewed as the death knell for democracy, was 
supported and urged by Suhrawardy among others on the grounds that the Constituent 
Assembly was unrepresentative - elected at the time of partition - and had a Muslim 
League majority. After the Assembly was re-convened, Fazul Huq blocked 
Suhrawardy's bid for the premiership of Pakistan, promising to support the Muslim 
League at the centre293 to prevent Suhrawardy from acquiring the power to dominate 
Bengali politics (Samad 1995a: 175).
As Ayub Khan proclaimed martial law in 1958, these contests over power within a 
democratic system disappeared. By the time of the 1970 national elections all the 
fractionalism within the East Pakistani party system had disappeared. The effective 
number of legislative parties was only 1.03. It was the denial of the Awami League's 
demands for a more equitable federal relationship between East Pakistan and the rest of 
the Pakistani federation that prompted the demand for a confederation rather than the 
homogeneity of the province. In addition of course, the fact was that minority rule was 
unacceptable to a linguistic group comprising a majority of the population. Although 
Bengalis had been represented at the centre, they did not hold the positions of power 
and had been relegated to the status of 'mass subjects'. It was the denial of the 
democratic mandate of the elections of 1970 that radicalised the Awami League. The 
Awami League won a majority of seats at the centre in the December 1970 election but 
it was not given a chance to exercise this power. Under pressure from elites in the 
Western Wing, the Assembly was never convened. Mujibur Rahman did not advocate 
secession at a rally held on 6th March 1971, although the Awami League were now 
openly talking of a confederation of Pakistan (Talbot 1998: 206-7). It took the brutality 
of the 25th March 1971 to crystallise the demand for the secession of East Pakistan. 
Therefore, the secession of East Pakistan which is the most obvious counter example to 
my argument that homogeneous provinces have contributed to federal stability in India
:92 The Constituent Assembly was dismissed by Governor General Ghulam Mohammed as a reaction to the 
attempts bv the Constituent "Assembly to strip the Governor General of his powers to dismiss the cabinet
(Talbot 1998: 142).
293 After Boera reinstated the East Pakistani provincial assembly.
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and Pakistan, was not inevitable, even after decades of perceived 'internal colonialism' 
in which large disparities in governmental development outlays as well as 'the transfer 
of resources from east to west through the diversion of foreign exchange earnings' 
existed (Talbot 1998: 138).
This confirms that for issues of federal stabilisation it is important to also look to wider 
issues of security and consociational accommodation. As Callard wrote;
For many Bengalis the real issue was not to secure provincial autonomy, 
important though that might be, but to obtain fair recognition, in theory and 
practice, of the claim of the east wing to equality with the west. There was always 
a desire for Bengali autonomy, but this was greatly enhanced, and made more 
bitter, by the feeling that the national government was fundamentally hostile to all 
things Bengali (1957: 172).
The cases of Baluchistan and Karachi can also be explained by recourse to issues of 
security. Neither the province of Baluchistan nor the city of Karachi are homogeneous. 
In addition to its heterogeneity, Baluchistan is the most marginal and least developed 
province in Pakistan, and demands for autonomy have been ignored. Bhutto's 
repression of the province in 1973 only served to alienate Baluchis further. As Hewitt 
argues, it was 'not a war aimed to create a separatist Baluchi state, it was merely an 
attempt to hold the centre to a commitment on federalism' (1996: 60). Baluchis have not 
been able to unify against the centre because of divisions among the tribes. The main 
political parties within the state include Baluch nationalist, Pathan nationalist and 
Islamic parties294 . National parties have also gained seats from contesting within the 
province, although never a majority.
The demands of the MQM in Karachi have fluctuated over time, but they are also 
related to the politics of recognition and security in a heterogeneous area. Muhajirs 
were historically the elite of Pakistan - and were the mainstay of the Muslim League, 
comprising 40% of the membership of the Muslim League at its formation. 'Aligarh 
Muslims not only got the type of political organisation they could stomach but they also 
controlled it' (Robinson 1993: 149-150). They lost some of their prominence as Jinnah 
moved towards a more federal strategy in the 1930s and 1940s, but were still powerful 
in the first decade of Pakistan's independence, especially after Urdu was recognised as 
the language of Pakistan. The decline in their power as Punjabis and Pathans took over
294 The latter did extremely well in the provuice in the 2002 elections.
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the institutions of state that mattered - especially the bureaucracy - and their small 
percentage as a proportion of the population created a feeling of insecurity. The quota 
system for positions in the federal bureaucracy compounded this insecurity and 
'provides bitter evidence that Muhajirs are losing influence in Pakistan's national elites' 
(Kennedy 1993: 137)295 . This insecurity was given a strong linguistic tint when 
Zulfiqar Bhutto the PPP came to power. The PPP's abolition of Urdu as a provincial 
language in Sind provoked language riots (Rahman 1996: 120-127). A compromise 
was finally reached which effectively retained both languages for provincial use but 'the 
most ominous consequence of the conflict is its legacy of bitterness' (Rahman 1996: 
126). The heterogeneity of Karachi has also provoked insecurity among the 
community, who demand to be recognised as Pakistan's fifth nationality. The centre 
has often encouraged the movement, partially to undermine the Sindhi political parties, 
especially the PPP.
7.4. Conclusion
Linguistic reorganisation and homogeneity of states do not necessarily lead to benign 
relations with the centre and other states as the case of East Pakistan testifies to. 
Inclusion at the centre is also vital. Other factors such as the security of the linguistic 
group within the homogeneous unit are important. While reorganisation of units is one 
way of achieving this, many other factors have to be taken into account. This is why 
state strategies for managing heterogeneous societies have a wider impact on the 
stabilisation of the federation. In the case of India and Pakistan, state strategies of 
inclusion and exclusion dictated which identities would be recognised through the 
federal structures, enhancing the security of linguistic groups in India in a way they did 
not in Pakistan. These strategies were in their turn influenced by legacies of governance 
as well as the effective number of ethnic groups within both states.
In India, the strength and direction of the relationship between the effective number of 
legislative parties and the effective number of linguistic groups was undeniable. 
Linguistic homogeneity and the effective number of legislative parties were inversely 
correlated. I have not concentrated my analysis on the types of parties within these 
localised party systems. Whether or not a party has an explicitly regional agenda is
295 Although as Kennedy documents, the Muhajir community is still over-represented according to their 
population strength in civil bureaucratic posts (1993: 137).
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irrelevant to my hypothesis. Linguistic reorganisation provided the conditions for 
alternative identities than language to come to the fore, although these identities may be 
regionally delimited. This is partially the result of the extreme heterogeneity of India - 
so much so that national parties such as the INC have 'substantially autonomous 
regional units' (Manor 1995: 111). This heterogeneity has not prevented secessionist 
movements from emerging, but after linguistic reorganisation they have been confined 
to those states in which an alternative religious majority is present and are on the border 
regions. The fact that these two factors coincided increased centre-state conflict. These 
exceptions are important. They demonstrate the practical limitations of the Indian 
state's strategy for managing ethnic diversity through the federal system. The state- 
sponsored national identity under the guise of secularism has provoked conflict with 
these units.
The fact that Sikh parties from Punjab are in alliance with the Hindu Nationalist BJP, 
demonstrates that the Congress version of secularism has not 'worked'. As Singh argues, 
the Akali Dal sees the BJP as its best hope 'for maintaining a distinct Sikh identity and 
achieving maximum political autonomy within the Indian Union' (2000: 192). The 
current BJP coalition at the centre is comprised of more than 16 parties, three of them 
regional parties from Tamil Nadu. In addition the coalition comprises regional parties 
from the non-Hindi majority states of Manipur and West Bengal as well as the above 
mentioned SAD and JKNC. The rise of the BJP has confirmed the political power of 
Hindu nationalism but has simultaneously revealed its limitations - it has not managed to 
gain enough support to form a government on its own, nor does it look likely to in the near 
future.
Pakistan's non-recognition of linguistic groups and lack of democracy undermined the 
basis for security in those states that were not represented in the powerful non- 
democratic institutions such as the army and bureaucracy. Coincidentally, in the 
Western Wing, these states were the ones that were the least homogeneous along 
linguistic lines - Sind and Baluchistan. In Pakistan it is not possible to conclude that 
there has been as strong a relationship between the homogeneity of a province and its 
party system. To a large extent this is attributable to the fact that the party system in 
Pakistan is not institutionalised and non-democratic institutions of state have been 
preponderant. As Pakistan 'had come to be dominated by the army, representation in 
that service was critical to participation in important national decisions' (Cohen 1990:
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209). Yet to ignore the effects of federal design is not sustainable. Federations can 
manage ethnic conflict even if they are not democratic. The absence of a relationship 
must also be related to the fact that many provinces of Pakistan have not been as 
homogeneous as those of India. There was no call for linguistic reorganisation at the 
time of partition as the provinces of Pakistan were relatively homogeneous. Yet the 
One Unit Plan subsumed linguistic groups under the political domination of the Punjab. 
The exclusion of Sind and Baluchistan from positions of power explains why these 
linguistic groups have not been secure within the Pakistani federation. The 
heterogeneity within their provincial borders has ensured that a multiplicity of parties 
exist within these provinces. These parties articulate the interests of the different groups 
within the province against each other as well as against the centre as the violence in 
Karachi demonstrates. This heterogeneity has enabled the centre to divide and rule, but 
to claim that the heterogeneity has contributed to federal stability would be a misreading 
of the situation. The analysis points to the importance of extraneous factors such as 
language policy on the numbers of parties, as well as proportionality in government 
bodies, especially those in which real power resides. The case of East Pakistan 
confirms this.
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Chapter Eight: conclusion and future research agendas
'The history of federations is at least as much a history of success as of dissolution... manv non-federal 
states rigidly opposing any entrenchment of regional autonomy... have been broken' (King 1993: 97).
8.1. Introduction
Federalism in the Indian subcontinent has had a bad press from many quarters. This is 
despite the fact that methods of government organised around some kind of territorial 
autonomy have managed the heterogeneity and vast size of India at least since the 
Mughal period. This is not to say that the form that territorial autonomy took did not 
change over time. Authors such as Wheare excluded federalism in the subcontinent 
from his analysis on the grounds that it diverged too far from the American model 
(1963: 33). Authors from the subcontinent have understandably criticised the centrist 
and 'quasi-federal' nature of the federations that were created (Banerjee 1989: 287; 
Arora 2002: 507). The above complaints have a rigid view of federalism. Federal 
structures of government differ on many criteria e.g. the division of financial powers, 
powers allocated between the levels of government, and the extent of consociationalism 
inherent within the federal structures. Such mechanisms change the form, but not the 
fact that federalism existed. Other authors have derided the form that the federation 
took, such as the concession of linguistic reorganisation (Harrison, 1960: 135, 307), and 
the adoption of the One Unit Plan. The One Unit Plan has been understandably 
criticised for creating bipolar provincial competition and creating grievances against the 
Punjabis in the Western Wing (Callard 1957: 189). Linguistic reorganisation in India is 
derided for leading to the proliferation of regional political parties, supposed to have 
undermined federal stability (India Today 1998).
8.2. Hypothesis testing
This thesis has concentrated on the differences in federal design between India and 
Pakistan. It was concerned to understand the reasons why Indian federalism has been 
more stable than that of Pakistan given that both operated within similar colonial 
frameworks. This thesis has found that:
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• Modes of governance that were premised upon territorial autonomy had a long 
history in the subcontinent. These systems have always been centralised, either under 
the Mughals, the British or independent India and Pakistan. Despite this they have 
relied on territorial co-option, often based around religious or linguistic criteria. The 
constitutional plans of the Congress and League since 1916 accepted and often 
promoted federal structures. Where they differed was according to the degrees of 
consociationalism within these structures.
• The degrees of consociationalism within the federal plans were much higher 
before independence than they were in the constitutions of the independent states. I 
have demonstrated that this change was related to the changed number of effective 
religious groups. Indeed, I have argued that it was in order to secure a reduced number 
of'effective' religious groups that the Congress was willing to partition the county.
• Although the effective number of religious groups declined, the effective 
number of linguistic groups remained high in both states. This made it particularly 
dangerous for the Congress to retreat from its pre-independence commitment to the 
linguistic reorganisation of states - a consociational mechanism of segmental autonomy. 
Its subsequent concession of linguistic reorganisation, with additional linguistic 
consociational mechanisms, stabilised the federation along linguistic lines. Pakistan's 
elites had not been committed to linguistic reorganisation before independence. Their 
lack of linguistic consociational accommodation created tensions that were avoided in 
India.
• The success of the Indian accommodation of linguistic identities is demonstrated 
by the fractionalisation of the party system in the most linguistically homogeneous 
states. The argument that linguistic reorganisation facilitated such accommodation is 
given more credence by the fact that this fractionalisation occurred in the states of India 
which were not part of the Hindi speaking core.
• In the case of Pakistan the argument is less clearly borne out. As the party 
system has not developed, the conflict between the units has not been managed through 
democratic structures. Yet the information gleaned from the correlation between the 
effective number of legislative parties and the effective number of linguistic groups was
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interesting. Those provinces that have been associated with the most conflictual 
relations with the centre have been a) not particularly homogeneous (Sind and 
Baluchistan) or b) not secure and un-represented at the centre (East Pakistan). The most 
homogeneous province, East Pakistan, initially had a low number of effective legislative 
parties. However, this was the result of a coalition that fractionalised as soon as the 
demands against the centre had been conceded. They united against the centre again in 
1970, under conditions of extreme provocation. East Pakistan thus reinforces the 
argument. However it points to the fact that homogeneous provinces by themselves are 
not sufficient conditions of federal stabilisation. Homogeneous provinces also require 
recognition and security. The exclusion of the Bengalis from position of power played 
an important part in undermining this recognition and security.
• The need for security has been demonstrated in India. India has not 
accommodated identities that have coincided with religion through the federal system. 
India has managed its non-Hindu majority areas in a different manner than it has its 
Hindu ones. This was initially seen in Nehru's reluctance to concede a Punjabi- 
speaking state or to create new states in the North East. Subsequently it has been seen 
in the Indian state's disproportionate use of force in the non-Hindu majority states. 
Differences in the type of accommodation were to be expected because of the state- 
sponsored national identity that rejected the consociational accommodation of religious 
identities. Despite this, the state's reaction has also been dictated by the border status of 
these non-Hindu regions.
In both India and Pakistan, consociational accommodation has been essential to 
understanding federal stabilisation. This accommodation has included the creation of 
linguistically homogeneous units, but also the recognition of the language of the units in 
central government examinations. Proportionality in government appointments, another 
consociational element, has also been vital. The inequitable representation of Bengalis, 
Sindhis and Baluchis in the institutional echelons of power in Pakistan - the 
bureaucracy and the army - has undermined ethnic conflict regulation.
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8.3. The number of units and the distribution of the staatsvolk
In conclusion I wish to suggest that the number of units of a federation, and as 
importantly, the distribution of the ethnic groups between and within them is vitally 
important to the stabilisation of a federation.
The number of units
In Chapter One I did not argue that homogeneous provinces were a sufficient cause of 
federal stabilisation, nor a necessary one. Malaysia is an example of a stable federation 
with purposively designed multiethnic units (Horowitz 1985: 617-619) even though 
Singapore was expelled from the federation in 1965 and its consociational and 
democratic practices have been undermined subsequently (Mauzy 1993: 110). My 
concern was to establish that homogeneous provinces were not necessarily a dangerous 
feature of federal systems, and that in India and Pakistan, homogeneous units have not 
been the cause of secessionist pressures. When homogeneous units such as East 
Pakistan have been the focus of federal instability, and indeed dissolution, lack of 
security, recognition and inequitable treatment have been the proximate cause. In 
Chapter One I argued that the optimal number of units within a federation should be 
more than three.
India and Pakistan have had very different types of federations not only in relation to 
the types of units which they have structured their federal systems around, but also in 
relation to the number of units within the federation. India currently has twenty-eight 
states, while Pakistan only has four. Although relative to population this is 
proportionate296, it is my contention that the lower number of states within Pakistan has 
contributed to federal instability. Small numbers of units contribute to federal 
instability for the following reasons. A small number of units are likely to lead to 
shifting coalitions (in the case of three units) and zero-sum conflict (in the case of two 
units) 'If you want to avoid political crisis, then you are better off with more than two 
contending social forces and sets of identities than you are with two' (Manor 1995: 
121) Bipolar antagonisms create obvious problems for achieving stability (Vile 1982: 
213 & 222). Large numbers of federal units do not necessarily prevent conflict as a
296 India with a population of approx. 1,100,000,000 and 28 states equates to 39.3 million people in each state. 
Pakistan with a population of approx. 145,000,000 and 4 states equates to 36.3 million people per state.
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powerful central government might abuse its power. India's government has abused the 
emergency provisions of Article 356, as the occasions of its use demonstrate in 
Appendix Three. In general however, the greater the number of units in a federation, 
the lower the potential for a unit to be excluded from a coalition or feel the lesser 
partner in a bipolar federation.
The hypothesis that the number of units in a federation should be more than three is 
supported by a comparative analysis of all federations since 1900. Although there are a 
similar number of federations with the lower range of states (two to three) as there are 
with thirteen or above, there is a marked difference between the two groups. 69% of 
federations with three states or under have failed, compared with only 13% of those 
with thirteen states or over.
Table 8.1. Federal failures and the number of states within the federation in the 
twentieth century
Units
2-3
4-7
8-12
>13
Totals
States
16
10
5
15
46
Failures
11
5
1
2
19
Percentage of failures
69
50
20
13
41
Source: Encyclopaedia Britannica (1958-1999), Elazar (1987: 45-46), Central Intelligence Agency 
(2002) and (BBC 2003).
Spearman's rho correlation coefficient between the number of units within a federation 
(ungrouped) and whether the federation was a failure or not is + .512. This is 
significant at the 1% level. It is not possible to conclude that these smaller numbers of 
states caused the failure of these federations, as a correlation cannot prove causation. 
As can be seen in Table 8.2 many of the failed federations were formed in the wake of 
the decolonisation process in Africa, e.g. the Federal Kingdom of Libya, the Mali 
Federation and the Central African Federation. These federations were formed in a 
situation of extreme flux and many only survived for a year or two, indicating little 
about the structures of government within these federations.
However, although it is not possible to assert a causal relationship between the number 
of states in a federation and the likelihood of its success, a definite trend is present.
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Table: 8.2. The number of units in the world's federations.
Name of State
Bosnia-Herzegovina
Cameroon 1961-72
Central African Federation 1956-63
Czechoslovakia 1992
Ethiopia 1952-62
Federation of Iraq and Jordan, 1958
Mali 1959-60
Pakistan 1955-71
Serbia and Montenegro (FRY) 1992-2003
St Kitts and Nevis
Union of Serbia and Montenegro 2003 +
United Arab Republic 1958-61 (Egypt and Syria)
Comoros
Libya (Federal Kingdom of) 1951-63
Malayan federation 1963-65
Nigeria 1963-66
Micronesia
Pakistan > 1971
Uganda 1962-67
Belgium
Australia
Burma 1948-62
Congo 1960-69
Yugoslavia
Indonesia 1947-50
U.A.E
Austria
Canada
Germanv 1945-90
Malava 1947-1963
British West Indies 1958-62
Malavsia
USSR
Germanv 1990 -
Nigeria 1979-83
Russia
Spain
Venezuela
Argentina
Ethiopia 1991-
Brazil
Switzerland
India ——————
Mexico _. ______ —
Nigeria > 1999
United States
Number of units
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
5
6
6
6
6
7
7
9
10
11
11
12
15
15
16
19
19
20
22
23
25
26
26
28
31
36
50
Failure
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Source: Same as Table 8.1
Notes'Onlv the first level of decentralisation is included. Those that were superseded by another
federation e.g. Germany in 1990 are italicised.
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Pakistan before 1971, Nigeria in 1966 and Czechoslovakia all broke down because of 
highly conflictual relations between small numbers of units. Nigeria managed to 
prevent Biafra from seceding but only through waging a military campaign which 
resulted in 100,000 military deaths and many more civilian causalities from starvation.
Similarly, many of the federations in the lower range are currently under threat. Since 
1997 Comoros has experienced a secessionist attempt from its islands of Anjouan and 
Moheli. The Federation of Serbia and Montenegro was dissolved in February 2003, but 
a Union of Serbia and Montenegro has superseded it. 'It is to have a federal presidency 
and federal defence and foreign ministries but the two republics are to be semi- 
independent states in charge of their own economies' (BBC 2003). Whether this is a 
prelude to a dissolution of the association between the two remains to be seen - either 
Republic can revisit the status of the Union in three years time. In 1998 Nevis held a 
referendum on whether to separate from St Kitts although it fell short of the two-thirds 
majority required for success. Finally, the federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina is 
currently held together by the presence of the international community. I do not argue 
that the number of units inevitably causes the break down of a federation, only that a 
lower number, and especially three units or below, is likely to increase instability.
The case of Pakistan before 1971 is a prime example of the dangers of a bipolar 
federation. The One Unit Plan of 1955 accentuated the conflict between the Eastern and 
Western Wing of the country. As I have argued earlier in this thesis, this was not the 
proximate cause of the secessionist demand, but it accentuated the tensions into a 'them 
and us' relationship. Not only were tensions exacerbated between the two wings, but 
also within the Western Wing. This was because the Western Wing was dominated by 
the Punjab. Since 1971 Pakistan has survived as a federation with four provinces. It is 
my contention that this low number of provinces has contributed to tensions within the 
federation.
In contrast to Pakistan, India has a large number of units, ensuring that a fluctuating 
coalition of interests exists. This large number of units has not prevented conflict, e.g. 
in Punjab, Jammu and Kashmir and the North-Eastern states. Yet these conflicts have 
been caused by policies of the centre, primarily dominated by concerns over their non- 
Hindu majorities and land border status. As already argued, secessionist movements in
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these provinces are prompted by the lack of security. This has been reinforced by the 
attitude adopted by the centre concerning claims for autonomy when the identity is 
associated with a religious minority.
The large number of units has also ensured that the Hindi speaking states are split. In 
2000 three new states were created, Uttaranchal (from Uttar Pradesh), Jharkhand (from 
Bihar), and Chatisgarh (from Madhya Pradesh). These were formed primarily on tribal 
rather than linguistic lines, but their creation has further subdivided the staatsvolk. With 
Hindi speakers constituting 40% of the Indian population, a state comprising all of 
them, as was the case in Pakistan before and after the secession of East Pakistan, would 
be unthinkable, but more importantly, inherently destabilising. This has been a long­ 
standing concern. In the States Reorganisation Commission Report, one of the authors, 
K M Panikkar expressed concern about the large size of Uttar Pradesh and 
recommended its division (1955: 244-252).
The distribution of the staatsvolk
As argued, homogeneous provinces do not always minimise tensions. Conflict against 
the centre can increase, especially when a dominant group exists or is perceived to exist. 
One way to safeguard against the perception of an over-bearing dominant group is to 
subdivide the dominant group or groups, while maintaining homogeneity within the 
units. This sub-division alleviates the danger of the potential tyranny of the majority as 
with the Germans in Switzerland (Duchacek, 1991: 31) but retains the national self- 
determination of the unit. The first and the second federations of Nigeria illustrate the 
advantages of a division. The first federation of Nigeria had three provinces, organised 
around the three main ethnic groups within the state. Competition between these 
ethnically defined provinces resulted in Biafra attempted to secede. The second 
federation was organised to avoid this danger; it had 19 provinces. While there was a 
military coup in 1983 which destroyed the federal form, this was unrelated to the federal 
compact (Horowitz 1985: 613). The most recent Nigerian federation has continued to 
follow the lesson learnt by its first failed experiment; it has 36 provinces. If a dominant 
ethnic group is divided, then it still achieves national self-determination in a 
homogeneous unit, despite the fact that the group is split between different units. The 
group remains within the same national state, in which, as the dominant group, it cannot 
feel threatened. Division has two rationales. Firstly, if dominant groups are divided
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then federalism can increase the salience of alternative identities between these units. 
Secondly, division diminishes the real or perceived dominance of a particular 
community. The division of a dominant group between a number of units makes it 
more likely that disparities between units will be diminished.
a) the splitting of the dominant group
This splitting of the dominant group provides conditions in which such a group is less 
likely to threaten the stability of a federation. Splitting the dominant group diminishes 
the perception that it is a staatsvolk in control of the central government. This is 
because splitting of a dominant group increases intra-ethnic competition and diminishes 
the unity of the dominant group.
India's Hindi speakers, the only possible staatsvolk, are already divided along lines of 
caste and region, but they are also divided into many different states. Of its 28 states, 
only nine have a Hindi majority297 . All other major linguistic communities have their 
own state (and are not sub-divided). While the arguments in favour of subdivision 
primarily concern the dominant community, authors such as Khan, Kothari and 
Vanhanen have advocated increasing the number of states in the Indian Union by 
subdividing other states as well (Kothari 1970: 115; Vanhanen 1992: 169). The states 
are certainly large enough to be sub-divided. Khan advocated creating 58 states (1992: 
45). While this brute instrument would not be possible as many of the North-Eastern 
states are too small to be viable if subdivided, most other states are large enough to 
divide more than once. Although many states would fiercely resist this move, there are 
calls for subdivision of many of the states. There have been calls for the trifurcation of 
Jammu and Kashmir and the creation of Ghorkaland (West Bengal), Bodoland (Assam), 
Telangana (Andhra Pradesh) and Vidarbha (Maharashtra). This would also address the 
problem of over-representation of the larger states in the Rajya Sabha. This large 
number of states subdivided the dominant community and has provided the conditions 
for a fluctuating coalition of interests to exist between the states.
The case of Pakistan is a striking example of the danger of a dominant group having one 
and only state. In 1955 the One Unit Plan created a federation with two units; an
297 31% of the States and Union Territories of the Indian federation had a majority population of Hindi 
speakers However, 45% of the population of India lives within these eleven units (Government of India
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Eastern and a Western Wing. The Bengalis were the majority of the population, and 
were contained within only one unit. This contrasted with India where the Hindi 
speakers were split between units. In retrospect, a division of both the Punjab and 
Bengal into smaller units could have increased the stability of the federation in the long 
term. In advancing this argument, I am aware that both had already been partitioned. It 
would have been hard to create provinces along cultural or ethnic lines despite the 
existence of the non-Muslim Chittagong Hill Tracts, but it would have been possible 
along administrative lines. In the case of the Punjab, obvious linguistic markers existed. 
This division could have provided an amelioration of the conflict between the East and 
the West by providing a new basis for coalition formation. The division of Bengal 
could also have removed the need to create the One Unit.
The actual staatsvolk in Pakistan were the Punjabis. Punjabis comprised over half of 
the population of the Western Wing. Under the One Unit Plan they dominated the 
Western Wing. Under the Legal Framework Order of 1970, the One Unit Plan was 
dissolved and the provinces were reconstituted. Baluchistan became a fully-fledged 
province for the first time and the princely states were incorporated into the four
70Sprovinces . As had previously been the case in Pakistan, the staatsvolk were 
contained within their own state.
While some Indian states might fret over their inadequate representation in the 
non-elected institutions, no single region exercises complete dominance over 
them. By contrast, the institutional dominance of a predominantly Punjabi military 
and federal bureaucracy has at each step heightened the sense of alienation on the 
part of the non-Punjabi provinces and significant linguistic minorities within them 
(Jalal 1995: 184).
The calls for the division of the Punjab would ameliorate the perception of Punjabi 
domination. It could re-structure power relations and help to quell many of the 
inequities in revenue apportioning between the provinces. It would also restructure the 
locus of power in the legislature. In 1988 Zia considered re-designing the Pakistan 
federation into eight units, but he died before he could implement it. This division 
would have created two Punjabi speaking provinces and one Siraiki speaking province 
(from Punjab), one Sindhi, and one Muhajir province (from Sind), one Baluch and one
298 Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) remained outside central control but were separately 
represented in the National Assembly as was the National Capital of Islamabad. Azad Kashmir was not 
represented in the National Assembly because of its unique status.
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Pathan province from Baluchistan and minor territorial revisions to NWFP (Kennedy 
1993: 141). The above plan demonstrates why Sind has not been as vociferous in 
calling for such a reorganisation - because of demands to create a city-state of 
Karachi . Yet such a reorganisation would be welcomed by the non-Punjabi states, 
and would also have the benefit of fulfilling all three conditions - increasing the number 
of units, splitting the dominant group and reducing disparities between the units.
b) removing disparity
In addition to increasing the number of provinces within a federation, a division of the 
dominant group reduces disparities between units. By increasing the numbers of units, 
larger units are subdivided, as happened in the Second Nigerian federation. A great 
population disparity between federal units affects representation in the legislature. 
Representation in the lower house of a legislature in a federation is usually weighted 
according to population strength300 . Representation in the upper house of a federation 
was classically designed to reflect the equal worth of the units of the federation. As 
already discussed, many federations did not follow this path - India being one of them. 
Although the smaller units have higher representation than their population strength 
allows them, the representation is not nearly proportionate. The deviation from 
proportionality is nearly the same in both the Lok and the Rajya Sabhas. The Lok 
Sabha has a deviation from proportionality of 15.33, while the Rajya Sabha has one of 
17.95301 . In both cases there has been a slight concession in the favour of the North- 
East territories, many of which have much smaller populations. Sikkim is the smallest 
state with a population of 540,493, or 0.05% of the population of the 28 states. Uttar 
Pradesh remains the largest, despite the creation of Uttaranchal. It has a population of 
166,052,859, 16.43% of the population of the states of India302 . Federation as a 
mechanism of ethnic conflict regulation only provides autonomy; it does not provide 
security at the national level within decision-making institutions. This is why degrees 
of consociationalism and representation in decision-making institutions become vital.
m Karachi was separated from Sind once before, when Karachi was the national capital from 1947-1961.
300 Although as discussed in chapter five, the National Assembly of Pakistan between 1956-1973 was a 
umcameral legislature in which the East and West had equal representation
301 The formula used for calculating deviation from proportionality is that set out in (Taagepera and Shugart 
1989: Ch 10), D = (1/2) S (s'-p'X where 5 is the percentage of seats allocated, and^> is the percentage of the 
population of'the province. The Rajya Sabha totals include the three new states while the Lok Sabha ones do
not as they have not yet been calculated. 
302 Excluding Union Territories (Government of India 2001).
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In the case of Pakistan, the demographic majority of Bengalis (55%) contained within 
East Pakistan caused tensions within the federation, and was the proximate cause of the 
prolonged constitutional wrangling. However, the attempt to address the imbalance - 
the One Unit Plan - caused more problems than it solved because it reduced rather than 
enlarged the small number of provinces. Within West Pakistan Punjab comprised 56% 
of the population. After the secession of Bangladesh Punjab has dominated the 
National Assembly with 148 seats in a house of 332303 (Election Commission of 
Pakistan 2002). Unlike the Indian upper house however, all the provinces have had 
equal representation under the 1973 constitution. This has acted as a check - Nawaz 
Sharif was not able to bring in Sharia Law as the law of Pakistan in 1998-1999 because 
of opposition within the Senate where his PML, a Punjabi dominated political party, did 
not have a majority. This law was widely perceived to be a device to enhance his 
powers.
Therefore, the number of units is important to promote good federal relations. This is 
because the alternative identities within a unit only become salient when the identity 
around which the unit has been created has been given security. This is a subject that 
requires further research. Should all units be subdivided to prevent secession, or just 
that of the dominant group?
Neither India nor Pakistan have been stable federations for the whole of their existence. 
Yet the homogeneity of units in parts of Pakistan and linguistic reorganisation in India, 
have not been the cause of instability that opponents of homogeneous provinces would 
have us believe. In the case of Pakistan, it is arguable that it was the denial of the 
Awami League's demands for a more equitable federal relationship that prompted the 
demand for a confederation. Although it was a homogeneous province, as seen in the 
1950s, divisions existed within its borders around which political parties formed and 
formed coalitions with parties represented in the Western Wing. Therefore the 
homogeneity of the province did not preclude cooperation with the Western Wing. 
Mujibur Rahman's six point demand was confederalist rather than secessionist; seeking 
power and representation at the centre. It was the brutal invasion of East Pakistan after 
the elections of 1970-1 that led to the secessionist demand. The denial of the 
democratic mandate in which the Awami League won the majority of the seats in the
303 This total includes die 35 seats reserved for women.
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National Assembly of Pakistan also contributed to this. It is a moot point whether 
Pakistan would have maintained territorial integrity in the long term - it is of course, 
possible that a confederal structure would have been the beginning of territorial 
disintegration. However it is equally possible that the threat of India's hegemony (which 
manifests itself in the party system of Bangladesh to this day) would have been a 
sufficient external threat to sustain the federation304 .
The cases of India and Pakistan demonstrate that it is the denial of claims for 
recognition, and legitimate claims for resources that are likely to increase conflict with 
the centre rather than the creation of homogeneous provinces. The recognition of 
alternative identities through federal structures brings government closer to the 
ethnically defined people, and increases the likelihood of intra-group competition for 
power and resources. The perception of a normative, or practical, commitment to 
recognising diversity is essential to a group's security. Federal institutions have played 
a large role in the creation of this security. In India there is no incompatibility between 
being a Gujarati and an Indian or a Tamil and an Indian (Mitra and Singh 1999: 161-2). 
In the 1990s this has been expressed through the regional political parties who are 
members of the governing coalition at the centre. A plethora of Tamil political parties 
exist. The AIADMK's defection from the BJP coalition in 1999 brought down the 
Vajpayee government. In the following elections, their rival, the DMK, took their place 
in the governing coalition. The Akali Dal is also part of the governing coalition, despite 
the BJP being Hindu Nationalists. The proliferation of parties is a force for stability. 
Coalition politics is now the norm - including more groups within the democratic 
process.
Dual identities and security of culture have been sadly lacking in Pakistan, both before 
and after the secession of East Pakistan. The ethnic domination of the Pakistani state by 
Punjabis has reduced all other group's identification with the institutions of the state. 
As Talbot notes, the hostility to the nuclear tests advanced by Baluchi and Sindhi 
nationalists is evidence of the limitation to the appeal of the Pakistani 'nation' (2000: 
214). Punjabi domination is cultural, economic and political - which Samad terms 
Punjabisation (1995b: 23-42). For most Punjabis there is no conflict between a Punjabi
304 This would fit with Riker's analysis (1964: 30).
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and a Pakistani identity, although Punjabis are not a homogeneous group (Samad 
1995b: 32; Talbot 1998: 127). This is not the case for the other groups.
8.4. Future research agendas
There are many potential future research agendas emerging from this thesis. The most 
obvious one is to concentrate on the extent to which consociational features have helped 
stabilise federal systems outside South Asia. Federations in ethnically divided societies 
can help to promote autonomy and security, but not if they are majoritarian forms of 
government. Territorial autonomy for a territorially concentrated ethnic group does 
promote security - and the creation of homogeneous units can be vital to provide this 
security - but without representation at the centre, it is likely to be tenuous at best. 
Federations such as Switzerland and Belgium have created explicitly consociational 
federal structures. Others such as Canada have accommodated difference within their 
political parties - this is why Canada has had both French and English Prime Ministers, 
even though the French speakers have a majority in only one province (Quebec). 
Malaysia has also experimented with a consociational political party - although the 
diminishing quality of its democracy has undermined this experiment. What is 
important to note is that consociationalism can be present in degrees, and may be an 
informal structure. In a similar manner to federal structures of government, there is no 
one set institutional configuration that will lead to accommodation.
O'Leary has argued that in a state without a staatsvolk, consociational mechanisms are 
necessary to stabilise the federation. This does not mean that a federation with a 
staatsvolk will necessarily be stable (200la: 291). Those states with a staatsvolk may 
still benefit from consociational measures, especially when their minority groups are 
territorially concentrated, and even more so if they are concentrated on a border. Such a 
concentration does not automatically lead to conflict, still less to secession. But it does 
make it easier for a perception of discrimination to emerge.
Federalism is therefore not an all-encompassing panacea. It is a complex institutional 
arrangement, compatible with centralising and majoritarian governments, as it is with 
decentralised and consociational governments. This thesis has established that while it 
does not necessarily promote security and ethnic peace, it cannot be blamed for
increasing conflict, especially when it is combined with consociational mechanisms.
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Appendixes
Appendix One: formula to measure degrees of 
consociationalism in the constitutional plans proposed
between 1916-1946
The plans have been scored according to a formula that weights Lijphart's four elements 
differently. I do not simply sum all the nine variables. Some of the elements have more 
variables within them than others. This would skew the final results. Similarly I do not 
sum all the elements equally as Lijphart prioritises segmental autonomy and grand 
coalition as the most important elements in consociational design. Therefore the 
elements of grand coalition and segmental autonomy are weighted by 1.5 and 
proportionality and mutual veto are weighted by 0.5.
e.g. 1928 Nehru Report:
The summed scores for the four elements were
Element
Grand Coalition
Proportionality
Segmental Autonomy
Mutual Veto
Description
0 were scored consociationally
1 out of 4 were scored consociationally
2 out of 3 were scored consociationally
0 were scored consociationally
Score
0
0.25
0.66
0
1.5x0
0.5x0.25
1.5x0.66
0.5x0
= 0
= 0.125
= 099
= 0
Therefore
Grand Coalition 
Proportionality 
Segmental Autonomy 
Mutual Veto
The formula directs us to sum these scores, e.g. 
0 + 0.125 + 0.99 + 0 = 1.115
The formula then directs us to divide these scores by 4 (the number of elements) e.g. 
1.115X4 = 0.28
This can be interpreted to mean that the degree of consociationalism in the Nehru 
Report was 0.28 out of 1.
-248-
Appendix Two: A breakdown of the constitutional plans 
proposed by the British, Congress and League between 1916-
1946
The Congress-League Scheme, 1916 otherwise known as the Lucknow
Pact of 1916.
Date: 1916 
Prime Movers: Congress and Muslim League.
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
Executive weightage
Separate electorates
Reserved seats
Legislative Weightage
Representation in 
second chamber
Religious territorial 
reorganisation
Linguistic territorial 
reorganisation
Residual powers
Community veto rights
No executive weightage. Although half of the 
Governor-General's council was to be Indian Article 
IV (2), and also that of the Provincial Executive 
Councils Article II (4), these were not split into 
different communities.
Article I (4) included separate electorates. The quid 
pro quo was that Muslims were not allowed to vote in 
general constituencies in addition to the separate 
electorates.
Article I (4) included reserved seats for Muslims at the 
provincial level.
Article I (4) allocated legislative weightage when 
Muslims were a minority in a province.
Not mentioned
Not mentioned
Not mentioned
Article IV (6) allocated residual powers to the centre.
Article I (4) accepted the AICC % rule for Provincial 
and Imperial Councils.
Source: Indian National Congress and Muslim League (1949).
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Government of India Act
Date: 1919 
Prime Movers: British Government.
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
Executive 
weightage
Separate 
electorates
Reserved seats
Legislative 
Weightage
Representation in 
second chamber
Religious 
territorial 
reorganisation
Linguistic 
territorial 
reorganisation
Residual powers
Community veto 
rights
Part 1 (4-1) on the composition of Provincial Executive 
Councils does not mention community representation.
Paragraph 15 'We have consequently provided for the 
preparation of separate Muhammadan and non-Muhammadan 
electoral rolls, and for separate Muhammadan constituencies' 
(East India Constitutional Reforms 1919). 'These 
representatives will be elected by the Muhammadan non- 
official members of the respective provincial legislative 
councils' (1919: Appendix IX & X).
Paragraph 15 ' In the interests of India as a whole, we 
have. . .felt ourselves amply justified in accepting the 
(Lucknow) compact as a guide in allocating the proportion of 
Muhammadan representation in the councils' (1919)
As above. Weightage provided in Council of State, 
Legislative Assembly and the Provincial Assemblies. 
Paragraphs 33 and 34(1919}
Paragraph 40 (East India Constitutional Reforms 1919: 87- 
88). The deviation to proportionality is high. Bombay and 
Punjab are over-represented according to their population and 
Madras, Bengal and United Provinces are under-represented. 
However, the range of seats allocated to the provinces varies 
from 1 (Burma) to 3.5 (Bengal). Therefore I have scored this 
as majoritarian.
Not mentioned
Not mentioned in 1919. However, the Montagu-Chelmsford 
Report of 1918 upon which the 1919 Act was based argued 
that 'a strong argument in favour of linguistic or racial units of 
government (is) that, by making it possible to conduct the 
business of legislation in the vernacular, they would . . . draw 
into the arena of public affairs men who were not acquainted 
with English' (1918: Article 246). As the 1919 Act ignored 
this recommendation - this variable is scored 0.
To the centre as allocated in Schedule I , Part 1 Parag. 47 'All 
other matters not included among provincial subjects under 
Part II of this schedule'. (1924).
Not included.
Source. Montagu and Chelmsford (1918). East India Constitutional Refonns (1919). Government of 
India (1924; 1964a).
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Nehru Report
Date: 1928 
Prime Movers: Congress (with others).
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
Executive weightage
Separate electorates
Reserved seats
Legislative Weightage
Representation in 
second chamber
Religious territorial 
reorganisation
Linguistic territorial 
reorganisation
Residual powers
Community veto rights
Articles 23, 24, 44 & 45 do not provide for community 
representation in the Executive Council at the centre or 
in the provinces. (1928: 29) specifically rejected 
communal councils.
Article I stipulated that 'there shall be joint mixed 
electorates throughout India' .
Article II provided that 'There shall be. . . reservation 
of seats. . .for Muslims in provinces where they are in a 
minority and non-Muslims in the N.W.F. Province'.
Article 8 & 9 make no mention of legislative 
weightage.
Article 8 'The Senate shall consist of 200 members. . . a 
specific number of seats being allotted to each province 
on the basis of population'.
Article V accepted Sind on the basis of a Muslim 
majority. Although there 'is no question of creating a 
communal province '(192 8: 32).
Article 72 vi accepted the creation of the provinces of 
Karnataka, Andhra and Oriya. Article 86 stipulated 
that 'The re-distribution of provinces should take place 
on a linguistic basis. . . '
Residual powers not specifically mentioned. However, 
Article 13 A a provides that 'In. . . matters of 
controversies between provinces or a province. . .the 
Central Government. . . .have all the powers. . .to 
suspend or annul the acts, executive and legislative of a 
Provincial Government'.
Article 10 (5) 'All questions. . .shall be determined by a 
majority of votes'.
Source: Nehru (1928).
-251-
Jinnah's Fourteen Points
Date: 1929 
Prime Movers: Muslim League.
1
1
1
1
0
1
0
1
1
Executive weightage
Separate electorates
Reserved seats
Legislative Weightage
Representation in 
second chamber
Religious territorial 
reorganisation
Linguistic territorial 
reorganisation
Residual powers
Community veto rights
Point 13 'No Cabinet, either Central or Provincial, 
should be formed without there being a proportion of 
Muslim Ministers of at least one-third'.
Point 5 'Representation of communal groups should 
continue to be by means of separate electorates'.
Point 3 'All legislatures. . . should be constituted (with) 
adequate and effective representation of minorities in 
every province, without reducing the majority in any 
province to a minority or even equality'.
Point 4 'In the Central Legislature, Muslim 
representation should not be less than one-third'.
Not mentioned
Point 9 'Sind should be separated from the Bombay 
Presidency'.
Did not oppose it because said that no changes should 
be made to Muslim majority provinces (Point 6). This 
reorganisation would be in addition to religious 
reorganisation. But he did not advocate it.
Point 1 'residuary powers vested in the province'.
Point 8 % rule in either a central or a provincial 
legislature.
Source: Jinnah (1969).
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Simon Commission
Date: 1930 
Prime Movers: British Government.
0
1
1
1
1
0
1
0
1
Executive weightage
Separate electorates
Reserved seats
Legislative Weightage
Representation in 
second chamber
Religious territorial 
reorganisation
Linguistic territorial 
reorganisation
Residual powers
Community veto 
rights
Part IV Ch 2 (169) did not mention communal 
considerations. Neither did Part II Ch 2 (93) & Part II Ch 
1 (48).
Part II, Ch 2 (72) (75) 'In the absence of a new agreement 
. . . we are unanimous in holding that communal 
representation for the Muhammadans of a province must be 
continued'. (76) also provided for their use for Sikhs.
Part II, Ch 2 (85) accepted reserved seats.
Part H Ch 2 (85) provides that 'in six out of the eight 
provinces, the present scale of weightage in favour of 
Muhammadans in those provinces might properly be 
retained'. At the national level, the Legislative Assembly is 
indirectly elected by provincial legislatures using PR. Part 
IV Ch 1 (143) does not retain weightage specifically except 
for the Anglo-Indian community. Part XII (365) provided 
that members 'will be elected by the Provincial Councils by 
the method of Proportional Representation, which will 
ensure that members belonging to minority communities 
will be included in sufficient numbers in the Federal 
Assembly' .
Part TV Ch I (150) 'We recommend that each Governor's 
province should be represented in the Council of State by 
three members'.
Part II Ch I (38) Recommended look at Sind on racial 
grounds. But it did not mention religious criteria and they 
were not as sympathetic to the Sindhi demand as they were 
to the Oriyan one.
Part II Ch 1 (38) recommended look at Orissa on linguistic 
grounds. Although language not privileged as the basis of 
reorganisation. Appendix VI (4) 'was in favour of the 
creation of an Orissa province'.
Not specifically mentioned but powers Part IV Ch 4 (182)
gives wide-ranging powers to the Governor-General so I 
have coded this variable 0.
Part II Ch 2 (68) 'special safeguards would have to be 
provided, and will be suggested to protect minorities against 
the possibility of a majority making an unfair use of such 
powers of revisions' Part II Ch 11 (95). Constitutional 
revision would have to be approved by 'two thirds of the 
members representing the community affected'.
Source: Indian Statutory Commission (1930a; 1930b).
Noteg : All references from Vol. H of the Report. Numbers in brackets are paragraph numbers.
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Government of India Act
Date: 1935 
Prime Movers: British Government.
0
1
1
1
0
1
1
0
0
Executive weightage
Separate electorates
Reserved seats
Legislative Weightage
Representation in 
second chamber
Religious territorial 
reorganisation
Linguistic territorial 
reorganisation
Residual powers
Community veto rights
Articles 9 (1) & 10 do not mention any communal 
composition of the Council of Ministers. Articles 50 
and 51 do not mention communal composition in the 
Councils of the provinces.
First Schedule (6-1) & 19 'No person shall be entitled 
to vote at an election to fill a Sikh seat or a 
Muhammadan seat . . . unless he is a Sikh or a 
Muhammadan, as the case may be' .
First Schedule (4) & (18 ii) reserved seats for the 
Sikhs, Muslims, Indian Christians, Anglo Indians and 
women.
First Schedule. The reserved seats for Muslims gave 
this community approximately one third representation 
in both chambers.
First Schedule. Seats were distributed among the 
provinces according to population although there was a 
minimum level of representation, so smaller provinces 
benefited.
Article 289 (1 a) Sind created.
Article 289 (1 b) Orissa created.
Article 104 'The Governor-General may. . . empower 
either the Federal Legislature or a Provincial 
Legislature to enact a law with respect to any matter 
not enumerated in any of the Lists. Article 107 (1) The 
centre prevails over the province on issues relating to 
the concurrent list.
Article 23 (1) & 66 (1) 'all questions at any sitting 
. . . shall be determined by a majority of votes of the 
members present and voting'.
Source: Government of India (1964b).
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Cripps Mission
Date: 1942 
Prime Movers: British Government.
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Executive weightage
Separate electorates
Reserved seats
Legislative Weightage
Representation in 
second chamber
Religious territorial 
reorganisation
Linguistic territorial 
reorganisation
Residual powers
Community veto rights
'if the scheme is generally accepted, the Viceroy will 
call into consultations some of the leaders as to the 
best way to form a new Government' (Cripps 1970: 
548).
'The entire membership of the Lower Houses of the 
Provincial Legislature shall as a single electoral 
college proceed to the election of the constitution- 
making body by the system of proportional 
representation'(British Government 1949: 154).)
Not included
Not included
No second chamber
Muslim League rejected it because the rights of 
secession were given to provinces not communities.
Not relevant
Not mentioned.
Provinces rather than communities have the right to 
opt out of the constitution making process. 'The right 
of any province of British India that is not prepared to 
accept the new constitution to retain its present 
constitutional position, provisions being made for its 
subsequent accession if it so desires' (British 
Government 1949: 153). These were not all 
homogeneous areas.
Source: British Government (1949) and Cripps (1949; 1970).
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Cabinet Mission Plan
Date: 1946 
Prime Movers: British Government.
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
Executive weightage
Separate electorates
Reserved seats
Legislative Weightage
Representation in 
second chamber
Religious territorial 
reorganisation
Linguistic territorial 
reorganisation
Residual powers
Community veto rights
Paragraph 3 14 places - 6 Congress Party (incl. 1 SC), 5 
Muslim League. 1 Christian, 1 Sikh and 1 Parsi (Cabinet 
Mission 1946a).
Paragraph 18 (c) 'To provide that the representatives 
allocated to each community in a province shall be 
elected by members of that community in its Legislative 
Assembly' .
Paragraph 18 (b) 'to divide this provincial allocation of 
seats between the main communities in each province in 
proportion to their population'
Paragraph 18 (b) 'to divide this provincial allocation of 
seats between the main communities in each province in 
proportion to their population'
Not mentioned. The Constituent Assembly was 
proportionate to population though.
Paragraph /The Mission rejected 'any solution which 
involves a radical partition of the Punjab and Bengal'.
Not mentioned.
Paragraph 15 (3) 'All subjects other than the Union 
subjects and all residuary powers should vest in the 
provinces'.
Paragraph 15 (2) 'Any question raising a major 
communal issue in the legislature should require for its 
decision a majority of the representatives present and 
voting of each of the two major communities as well as a 
majority of all the members present and voting'.
Source: Cabinet Mission (1946a: 1946b).
Notes: All the citations are from Cabinet Mission (1946b) unless otherwise stated.
-256-
Appendix Three: The imposition of President's Rule in India
1951-2002
Name of State
Punjab
Pepsu (later merged into Punjab)
Andhra Pradesh
Travancore-Cochin (Kerala)
Kerala
Kerala
Orissa
Kerala
Kerala
Punjab
Goa, Daman and Diu
Rajasthan
Manipur
Haryana
West Bengal
Uttar Pradesh
Bihar
Punjab
Pondicherry
Bihar
Manipur
West Bengal
Kerala
Uttar Pradesh
Orissa
Orissa
Karnataka
Gujarat
Punjab
West Bengal
Bihar
Manipur
Tripura
Bihar
Andhra
Orissa
Manipur
Uttar Pradesh
Pondicherry
Gujarat __
Pondicherry
Year imposed
1951
1953
1954
1956
1956
1959
1961
1964
1965
1966
1966
1967
1967
1967
1968
1968
1968
1968
1968
1969
1969
1970
1970
1970
1971
1971
1971
1971
1971
1971
1972
1972
1972
1972
1973
1973
1973
1973
1974
1974
1974
Days lasted
302
369
133
223
156
209
118
145
712
118
123
44
118
181
370
368
248
178
181
227
452
377
64
18
71
11
359
313
280
265
60
59
59
11
326
368
341
148
62
494
1222
Dates imposed 
between
20.06.51-1704.52
04.03.53-0703.54
15 11 54-2803.55
23.03.56-01.11.56
01.11.56-05.04.57
31.07.59-22.02.60
25.02.61-23.06.61
10.09,64-24.03.65
24.03.65-06.03.67
05.07.66-01.11.66
03.12.66-05.04.67
13.03.67-26.04.67
25.10.67-19.02.68
21.11.67-21.05.68
20.02.68-25.02.69
25.02.68-26.02.69
29.06.68-26.02.69
23.08.68-17.02.69
18.09.68-17.03.69
04.07.69-16.02.70
16.10.69-21.01.72
19.03.70-02.04.71
04.08.70-03.10.70
01.10.70-18.10.70
11.01.71-22.03.71
23.03.71-03.04.71
27.03.71-20.03.72
13.05.71-17.03.72
15.06.71-17.03.72
29.06.71-20.03.72
^ 09.01.72-08.03.72
21.01.72-20.03.72
21.01.72-20.03.72
09.03.72-19.03.72
18.01.73-10.12.73
03.03.73-06.03.74
28.03.73-04.03.74
13.06.73-08.11.73
03.01.74-06.03.74
09.02.74-18.06.75
28.03.74-02.07.77
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Nagaland
Uttar Pradesh
Tamil Nadu
Gujarat
Orissa
Uttar Pradesh
Bihar
Rajasthan
Madhya Pradesh
Punjab
Himachel Pradesh
Haryana
Orissa
West Bengal
Mizoram
Manipur
Tripura
Karnataka
Mizoram
Pondicherry
Goa, Daman and Diu
Sikkim
Arunachal Pradesh
Manipur
Kerala
Assam
Tamil Nadu
Bihar
Maharashtra
Uttar Pradesh
Orissa
Madhya Pradesh
Rajasthan
Punjab
Gujarat
Manipur
Assam
Kerala
Kerala
Assam
Pondicherry
Punjab
Sikkim
Jammu and Kashmir
Punjab
Tamil Nadu
Nagaland
1975
1975
1976
1976
1976
1977
1977
1977
1977
1977
1977
1977
1977
1977
1977
1977
1977
1977
1978
1978
1979
1979
1979
1979
1979
1979
1980
1980
1980
1980
1980
1980
1980
1980
1980
1981
1981
1981
1982
1982
1983
1983
1984
1986
1987
1988
1988
978
52
516
287
14
54
55
53
54
51
53
52
57
52
388
45
60
59
178
430
263
60
76
60
51
340
113
112
113
113
113
113
110
111
111
110
197
67
67
645
631
723
287
60
1386
363
171
22 03 75-25 1 1 77
30 11.75-21.01.76
31 01.76-30.06.77
12.03.76-24.12.76
16 12.76-29.12.76
30 04.77-23.06.77
30.04.77-24.06.77
30 04.77-22.06.77
30.04.77-23.06.77
30.04.77-20.06.77
30.04.77-22.06.77
30.04.77-21.06.77
30.04.77-29.06.77
30.04.77-21.06.77
11.05.77-02.06.78
16.05.77-29.06.77
05.11.77-04.01.78
31.12.77-27.02.78
11.11.78-08.05.79
12.11.78-16.01.80
27.04.79-16.01.80
18.08.79-17.10.79
03.11.79-18.01.80
14.11.79-13.01.80
05.12.79-25.01.80
12.12.79-06.12.80
17.02.80-09.06.80
17.02.80-08.06.80
17.02.80-09.06.80
17.02.80-09.06.80
17.02.80-09.06.80
17.02.80-09.06.80
17.02.80-06.06.80
17.02.80-07.06.80
17.02.80-07.06.80
28.02.81-19.06.81
30.06.71-13.01.82
21.10.81-28.12.81
17.03.82-24.05.82
19.03.82-27.02.83
24.06.83-16.03.85
06.10.83-29.09.85
25.05.84-08.03.85
07.09.86-06.11.86
11.05.87-25.02.92
30.01.88-27.01.89
07.08.88-25.01.89
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Vfizoram
Karnataka
Jammu and Kashmir
Karnataka
Assam
Goa
3ondicherry
Tamil Nadu
Haryana
Vleghalaya
Vlanipur
Nagaland
Uttar Pradesh
Vtadhya Pradesh
Himachel Pradesh
Rajasthan
Tripura
Manipur
Bihar
Uttar Pradesh
Gujarat
Uttar Pradesh
Goa
Bihar
Manipur
Uttar Pradesh
Jammu and Kashmir
1988
1989
1990
1990
1990
1990
1991
1991
1991
1991
1992
1992
1992
1992
1992
1992
1993
1993
1995
1995
1996
1996
1999
1999
2001
2002
2002
137
223
2274
7
215
42
173
145
80
117
122
326
363
357
353
354
30
347
7
366
34
155
17
26
276
68
17
07.09.88-24.01.89
21.04.89-30.11.89
18-07.90-9.10,96
10.10.90-17.10.90
27.11.90-30.06.91
14.12.90-25.01.91
12.01.91-04.07.91
30.01.91-24.06.91
06.04.91-23.06.91
11.10.91-05.02.92
07.01.92-08.04.92
02.04.92-22.02.93
06.12.92-04.12.93
15.12.92-07.12.93
15.12.92-03.12.93
15.12.92-04.12.93
11.03.93-10.04.93
31.12.93-13.12.94
28.03.95-04.04.95
18-10.95-17.10.96
19.09.96-23.10.96
17.10.96-21.3.97
10.02.99-27.10.99
12.02.99-10.3.99
2.6.01-5.3.02
8.3.02-15.5.02
17.10.02-02.11.02
Source: Data collated from Rajashekara (1987: 638-640), Lok Sabha Secretariat (1996), 
http://rajyasabha.nic.in (1996; 1997; 1999a; 1999b; 2002) and http://www.dawn.com (2002).
-259-
Appendix Four: Methodological justifications
My data set was compiled from the election results for all States and Union Territories 
that returned more than one seat to the Lok Sabha. I have collated these data for the 13 
Lok Sabha elections conducted between 1952-1999 for India. I have collated these data 
from the provincial elections held between 1951-1954 in Pakistan in addition to the 
electoral data for the National Assembly elections 1970-2002. This is to compensate 
for the absence of national elections between 1947-1970. These data for linguistic and 
religious distributions were compiled using census reports. Census reports will always 
be flawed in some measure - I have tried to compensate for obvious coding problems 
by using the next available census. Appendix Five gives details.
I have performed a basic correlation for the majority of tests between the two variables. 
Where necessary I have sorted these data between different groups of states e.g. in India 
between Hindi and non-Hindi speaking states. I have used the statistical package SPSS 
to perform the correlations. SPSS's ability to sort these data according to variables such 
as the majority language spoken means that I have been able to avoid more elaborate 
statistical tests.
The statistical formula used to assesses the direction and strength of the correlation is 
Pearson's correlation. This formula is used to calculate the strength of the correlation 
between two continuous variables. It is a parametric test - the stronger partner in the 
statistical family. I initially rejected Person's correlation in favour of the non- 
parametric Spearman's rho. This was because these data were not 'normally 
distributed' 305 , a usual requirement for using parametric statistical tests. It is easy to 
identify why enseats and enling do not produce normal distributions. Although India 
has a much larger enling than most other states in the world, this is at the national level; 
at the local state level the enling is much smaller. Additionally, my intervening variable 
is that of linguistic reorganisation - the creation of linguistically homogeneous states. 
This necessarily lowered enling. Similarly, simple plurality has mechanical and 
psychological effects, which operate against a large number of parties. Therefore 
enseats is lowered, again preventing a 'normal' distribution of data.
305 A normal distribution is a requirement for parametric statistical analyses. A normal distribution is a 
•symmetrical bell-shaped frequency curve formed when the number of occurrences on a range of values is 
plotted on the vertical axis against a senes of classes plotted on the horizontal axis. The bell shape indicates 
that extreme values (both large and small) occur infrequently, while the more frequent occurrences are 
clustered around the arithmetic mean' (Oxford University Press. 1996).
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However, Spearman's rho is a weaker partner in the statistical family. I therefore 
restructured my data by taking the log of the nen score, whether enseats, en/ing or 
enrel. This does not change the correlations but it makes these data approximate a 
normal distribution more closely. This enabled me to use Pearson's correlation. 
Slightly different results were returned depending on whether Pearson's or Spearman's 
rho were used, although the direction of the relationship was the same. To avoid 
accusations of skewing the results of the relationship between enseats and enling I have 
consistently reported only the Pearson's results.
It is important to note that correlations only demonstrate that a relationship exists 
between two variables. They do not prove that one variable causes another, or which 
variable is the independent (causal) and which is the dependent (affected). The results 
are interpreted as follows:
A correlation coefficient indicates the strength of the relationship between two 
variables. It ranges between 0 - 1 and -1-0. As such it also indicates the direction of 
the relationship between two variables. Is an increase in one variable related to an 
increase in another (a positive relationship), or is a decrease in one variable related to an 
increase in another (a negative relationship)? Scores of+-.10 to +-.29 or below are 
small/weak relationships, +-.30 to +-49 are medium relationships and +-.50 are 
large/strong relationships (Pallant 2001: 120).
The correlations also yield the significance level of a result. Significance levels assess 
whether the relationship between two variables could have occurred by chance. SPSS 
automatically calculates significance levels. I have adopted the 5% significance level or 
below in determining the validity of my results. This is represented as 0.05 or below - 
e.g. there is a five-percentage chance that the relationship is a random one. N is 
important, because the higher the number of cases, the more validity the results have.
In Table 7.5 (Correlation of all Indian elections 1952-1999 between enseats (log) and 
enling (log) sorted according to majority language), the results demonstrate that there is 
a negative correlation between the variables of enseats (log) and enling (log), indicated 
by the negative sign. The negative relationship is a medium one in non-Hindi majority 
states and a weak one in Hindi majority states. The relationship is significant at the 1%
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confidence interval in the non-Hindi speaking states (defined as being below 0.01). It is 
not significant at the 5% confidence interval for the Hindi majority states because the 
significance level is above 0.05.
Language
Non-Hindi majority
Hindi majority
Correlation Coefficient
-0.340
-0.167
Sig.
**
Sig. (1-tailed)
0.00
0.06
N
171
92
For more information on the use of SPSS and the mechanics to perform statistical 
calculations, as well as the most appropriate test to use, by far the most user friendly, 
and detailed source I have found is Pallant (2001).
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Appendix Five: SPSS Key
I. India
Election
1952 Electoral data adapted from Butler and Roy (1995). The linguistic data are 
adapted from the individual state census's of 1951 Government of India 
(1951h; 1951e; 1951d; 195 If; 1951c; 195 In; 1951a; 1951g; 1951b; 1951J; 
1951k; 19511; 1951m; 19511; 1961e; 1961a; 1961c; 1961d; 196 Ib). 
Exceptions are the states of Delhi, Punjab, Pepsu, Himachel Pradesh and 
Bilaspur. The 1951 census did not distinguish between Hindi, Punjabi, 
Urdu and Pahari. Therefore I have used the 1961 census even though this 
was not entirely accurate because of the politicisation of the Punjabi-Hindu 
issue. No census was taken in Jammu and Kashmir in 1951. Therefore the 
1961 census has been used Government of India (1961e; 196la; 1961c; 
1961d; 1961b). The religious data are adapted from the 1951 census, 
Government of India (1953b). Sikkim was not part of Indian Union at the 
time but has been included in the table.
1957 Electoral data adapted from Butler and Roy (1995). Religious data adapted 
from the 1971 census linguistic reorganisation changed the borders after 
1956. The 1971 census also lists 1961 distributions, Government of India 
(1976). Because Bombay was because reorganised in 1960, I have used 
1951 data, Government of India (1953b). For the Andamans I have 
adapted data from the 1951 census for religion because it was not included 
in the 1971 census (Government of India 1953b). For Punjab I have 
adapted data from the 1951 individual state census because these data in the 
1971 census did not give the distributions for the united state, instead 
breaking it down between Punjab and Haryana (Government of India 
1953b). Linguistic data adapted from 1971 that includes ALL languages, 
Government of India (1976). But Hindi is broadened in this census to 
include more dialects. Therefore some states esp. Himachel Pradesh have 
substantially lower scores than using the 1951 data. Bombay linguistic data 
is also adapted from the 1951 census because it was reorganised in 1960, 
Government of India (1951J). This is slightly erroneous as its borders did 
change in 1956 to include some princely states, but less erroneous than 
using these data after reorganisation.______________________
1962 Electoral data adapted from Butler and Roy (1995). Religious data all 
taken from the 1971 census except for Punjab when I have used data from 
the 1951 individual state census because these data in the 1971 census did 
not give the distributions for the united state, instead breaking it down 
between Punjab and Haryana. Linguistic data taken from the 1971 census 
which classifies ALL languages except for Punjab which was reorganised 
in 1966 and for which I have used 1961 data. ____________
1967 Electoral data adapted from Butler and Roy (1995). 1971 data for both 
language and religion adapted from Government of India (1976).______
1971 Electoral data adapted from Butler and Roy (1995). 1971 data for both 
language and religion adapted from Government of India (1976).
1977
1980
Electoral data adapted from Butler and Roy (1995). 1971 data for both 
language and religion adapted from Government of India (1976).
Electoral data adapted from Butler and Roy (1995). 1971 data for both
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language and religion adapted from Government of India (1976).
1984 Electoral data adapted from Butler and Roy (1995). 1971 data for both 
language and religion adapted from Government of India (1976)._______
1989 Electoral data adapted from Butler and Roy (1995). 1971 data for both 
language and religion adapted from Government of India (1976). I have 
adapted the 1991 data for language and religion for Goa and Daman and 
Diu as they were split in 1987 Government of India (1991a; 1991b).____
1991 Electoral data adapted from Butler and Roy (1995). 1971 linguistic data 
adapted except for Goa and Daman and Diu for which I have adapted data 
from the 1991 census, Government of India (1976; 199 la). 
1991 religious data Government of India (1991b). Because there was no 
census in the state of Jammu and Kashmir in 1991, I have adapted the 1981 
census data, Government of India (1990).
1996 Electoral data adapted from MS Rana (1998). I have adapted the ECI data 
for the all India percentages (I998b). 1971 linguistic data adapted except 
for Goa and Daman and Diu for which I have adapted data from the 1991 
census, Government of India (1976; 199la). 1991 religious data 
Government of India (1991b). Because there was no census in the state of 
Jammu and Kashmir in 1991, I have adapted the 1981 census data, 
Government of India (1990).
1998 Electoral data adapted from MS Rana (1998). I have used the ECI data for 
the all India percentages (1998b). 1971 linguistic data adapted except for 
Goa and Daman and Diu for which I have adapted data from the 1991 
census, Government of India (1976; 199la). 1991 religious data 
Government of India (1991b). Because there was no census in the state of 
Jammu and Kashmir in 1991, I have adapted the 1981 census data, 
Government of India (1990).________________________
1999 Electoral data adapted from ECI (2000). 1971 linguistic data adapted 
except for Goa and Daman and Diu for which I have adapted data from the 
1991 census, Government of India (1976; 199la). 1991 religious data 
Government of India (1991b). Because there was no census in the state of 
Jammu and Kashmir in 1991, I have adapted the 1981 census data, 
Government of India (1990). ______________________
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2. Pakistan
Election
1951-1954
1970
1977
1988
1990
1993
1998
2002
Provincial election data adapted from Aziz (1976: 275-277). Sind's 
provincial election data adapted from Afzal (1976: 79). Religious and 
linguistic data adapted from Government of Pakistan (195 Ib).
Election data adapted from (Talbot 1998: 200). Religious and 
linguistic data adapted from Government of Pakistan (195 Ib).
Election data adapted from Waseem (1994b: 334). Religious and 
linguistic data adapted from Government of Pakistan (1984a; 1984b; 
1984c; 1984d).
Election data adapted from Kaniyalil and Pande (1989: 79). Religious 
and linguistic data adapted from Government of Pakistan (1984a; 
1984b; 1984c; 1984d).
Election data adapted from Talbot (1998: 314). Religious and 
linguistic data adapted from Government of Pakistan (1984a; 1984b; 
1984c; 1984d).
Election data adapted from SAARC-NGO Observers (1995: 116- 
117). Religious and linguistic data adapted from Government of 
Pakistan (1984a; 1984b; 1984c; 1984d).
Election data adapted from Waseem (1998: 11). Religious and 
linguistic data adapted from Government of Pakistan (1984a; 1984b; 
1984c; 1984d).
Election data adapted from Election Commission of Pakistan (2002). 
Religious and linguistic data adapted from Government of Pakistan 
(1984a; 1984b; 1984c; 1984d).
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Appendix Six: Data for correlations
1. Data for Chapter Seven. Section 3 'India'
Election Year
1952
1952
1952
1952
1952
1952
1952
1952
1952
1952
1952
1952
1952
1952
1952
1952
1952
1952
1952
1952
1952
1952
1952
1952
1957
1957
1957
1957
1957
1957
1957
1957
1957
1957
1957
1957
1957
1957
1957
1962
1962
1962
1962
1962
1962
Name of State
Ajmer
Assam
3hopal
Bihar
Bombay
Delhi
Himachel Pradesh
Hyderabad
Jammu and Kashmir
Kutch
Madhya Bliarat
Madhya Pradesh
Vladras
Manipur
Mvsore
Orissa
PEPSU
Punjab
Rajasthan
Saurashtra
Travancore
Uttar Pradesh
Vindhya Pradesh
West Bengal
Andhra Pradesh
Assam
Bihar
Bombay
Delhi
Jammu and Kashmir
Kerala
Madhya Pradesh
Madras
Mvsore
Orissa
Punjab
Rajasthan
Uttar Pradesh
West Bengal
Andhra Pradesh
Assam
Bihar
Delhi
Gujarat
Jammu and Kashmir
Enseats
1
1.18
1
1.48
1.26
1.6
1
2.51
1
1.42
1.15
3.56
2
1.2
2.63
2.78
1.25
3.13
1
2.67
1.13
2
1.9
1.34
1.67
1.62
2.73
1
2.66
1.06
1.63
1.27
3.57
1.1
1.31
1.48
2.23
1.53
1.67
1.77
1
1.77
Logseats
0
0.17
0
0.39
0.23
0.47
0
0.92
0
0.35
0.14
1.27
0.69
0.18
0.97
1.02
0.22
1.14
0
0.98
0.12
0.69
0.64
0.29
0.51
0.48
1
0
0.98
0.06
0.49
0.24
1.27
0.1
0.27
0.39
0.8
0.43
0.51
0.57
0
0.57
Enling
2.54
2.92
1.51
1.56
3.19
1.62
5.87
3.19
2.83
1.03
1.74
3.06
2.94
2.3
2.13
1.47
2.09
2.09
6.65
1.06
1.31
1.53
1.01
1.35
1.36
2.51
1.55
3.19
1.67
2.72
1.08
1.43
1.38
2.2
1.41
2.09
1.2
1.26
1.36
1.36
2.51
1.55
1.67
1.25
2.72
Logling
0.93
1.07
0.41
0.44
1.16
0.48
1.77
1.16
1.04
0.03
0.55
1.12
1.08
0.83
0.76
0.39
0.74
0.74
1.89
0.06
0.27
0.43
0.01
0.3
0.31
0.92
0.44
1.16
0.51
1
0.08
0.36
0.32
0.79
0.34
0.74
0.18
0.23
0.31
0.31
0.92
0.44
0.51
0.22
1
Lang
0
0
2
2
0
2
0
0
0
0
2
2
0
0
0
0
2
2
0
0
0
2
2
0
0
0
2
0
2
0
0
2
0
0
0
2
2
2
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
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1962
1962
1962
1962
1962
1962
1962
1962
1962
1962
1967
1967
1967
1967
1967
1967
1967
1967
1967
1967
1967
1967
1967
1967
1967
1967
1967
1971
1971
1971
1971
1971
1971
1971
1971
1971
1971
1971
1971
1971
1971
1971
1971
1971
1971
1977
1977
1977
1977
1977
1977
Kerala
Madhva Pradesh
Madras
Maharashtra
Mvsore
Orissa
Punjab
Rajasthan
Uttar Pradesh
West Bengal
Andhra Pradesh
Assam
Bihar
Delhi
Gujarat
Haryana
Jarnmu and Kashmir
ECarnataka
Kerala
Madhya Pradesh
Maharashtra
Orissa
Punjab
Rajasthan
Tamil Nadu
Uttar Pradesh
West Bengal
Andhra Pradesh
Assam
Bihar
Delhi
Gujarat
Haryana
Himachel Pradesh
Jammu and Kashmir
Karnataka
Kerala
Madhya Pradesh
Maharashtra
Orissa
Punjab
Rajasthan
Tamil Nadu
Uttar Pradesh
West Bengal
Andhra Pradesh
Assam
Bihar
Delhi
Gujarat
Harvana
3.77
2
1.66
1.15
1.08
1.87
2.24
2.24
1.87
2.39
1.36
1.85
2.25
1.32
2.17
1.59
1.38
2.05
3.44
2.01
1.46
3.39
1.86
2.99
2.21
2.88
4.91
1.9
1.15
1.79
1
2.34
1.59
1
1.38
1
5.39
2.36
1.15
1.69
1.61
2.35
2.42
1.35
2.75
1.05
1.78
1.08
1
1.9
1
1.33
0.69
0.51
0.14
0.08
0.63
0.81
0.81
0.63
0.87
0.31
0.62
0.81
0.28
0.77
0.46
0.32
0.72
1.24
0.7
0.38
1.22
0.62
1.1
0.79
1.06
1.59
0.64
0.14
0.58
0
0.85
0.46
0
0.32
0
1.68
0.86
0.14
0.52
0.48
0.85
0.88
0.3
1.01
0.05
0.58
0.08
0
0.64
0
1.08
1.43
1.38
1.68
2.2
1.41
2.09
1.2
1.26
1.36
1.36
2.51
1.55
1.67
1.25
1.24
2.72
2.2
1.08
1.43
1.68
1.41
1.49
1.2
1.38
1.26
1.36
1.36
2.51
1.55
1.67
1.25
1.24
1.31
2.72
2.2
1.08
1.43
1.68
1.41
1.49
1.2
1.38
1.26
1.36
1.36
2.51
1.55
1.67
1.25
1.24
0.08
0.36
0.32
0.52
0.79
0.34
0.74
0.18
0.23
0.31
0.31
0.92
0.44
0.51
0.22
0.22
1
0.79
0.08
0.36
0.52
0.34
0.4
0.18
0.32
0.23
0.31
0.31
0.92
0.44
0.51
0.22
0.22
0.27
1
0.79
0.08
0.36
0.52
0.34
0.4
0.18
0.32
0.23
0.31
0.31
0.92
0.44
0.51
0.22
0.22
0
2
0
0
0
0
2
2
2
2
0
0
2
2
0
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
2
0
2
0
0
0
2
2
0
2
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
2
0
2
0
0
0
2
2
0
2
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1977
1977
1977
1977
1977
1977
1977
1977
1977
1977
1977
1977
1977
1977
1977
1980
1980
1980
1980
1980
1980
1980
1980
1980
1980
1980
1980
1980
1980
1980
1980
1980
1980
1980
1980
1980
1984
1984
1984
1984
1984
1984
1984
1984
1984
1984
1984
1984
1984
1984
1984
Himachel Pradesh
Jammu and Kashmir
Karnataka
Kerala
vladhya Pradesh
Vlaharashtra
vlanipur
Meghalaya
Orissa
3unjab
lajasthan
Tamil Nadu
Tripura
Uttar Pradesh
West Bengal
Andhra Pradesh
Assam
Bihar
Delhi
Gujarat
Haryana
Himachel Pradesh
Jammu and Kashmir
Karnataka
Kerala
Madhya Pradesh
Maharashtra
Manipur
Meghalaya
Orissa
Punjab
Rajasthan
Tamil Nadu
Tripura
Uttar Pradesh
West Bengal
Andhra Pradesh
Assam
Bihar
Delhi
Gujarat
Harvana
Himachel Pradesh
Jammu and Kashmir
Karnataka
Kerala
Madhya Pradesh
Maharashtra
Manipur
Meghalava
Orissa ____ ____
1
2.57
1.15
2.74
1.17
2.89
1
2
1.81
1.86
1.08
2.82
2
1
3.15
1.05
1
2.84
1.32
1.08
2.38
1
3
1.07
5
1.29
1.45
2
1
1.1
1.17
1.81
2.3
1
2.09
2.12
1.87
2.88
1.26
1
1.17
1
1
2
1.32
2.22
1
1.24
1
1
1.1
0
0.94
0.14
1.01
0.16
1.06
0
0.69
0.59
0.62
0.08
1.04
0.69
0
1.15
0.05
0
1.04
0.28
0.08
0.87
0
1.1
0.07
1.61
0.25
0.37
0.69
0
0.1
0.16
0.59
0.83
0
0.74
0.75
0.63
1.06
0.23
0
0.16
0
0
0.69
0.28
0.8
0
0.22
0
0
0.1
1.31
2.72
2.2
1.08
1.43
1.68
2.42
3.11
1.41
1.49
1.2
1.38
1.9
1.26
1.36
1.36
2.51
1.55
1.67
1.25
1.24
1.31
2.72
2.2
1.08
1.43
1.68
2.42
3.11
1.41
1.49
1.2
1.38
1.9
1.26
1.36
1.36
2.51
1.55
1.67
1.25
1.24
1.31
2.72
2.2
1.08
1.43
1.68
2.42
3.11
1.41
0.27
1
0.79
0.08
0.36
0.52
0.88
1.13
0.34
0.4
0.18
0.32
0.64
0.23
0.31
0.31
0.92
0.44
0.51
0.22
0.22
0.27
1
0.79
0.08
0.36
0.52
0.88
1.13
0.34
0.4
0.18
0.32
0.64
0.23
0.31
0.31
0.92
0.44
0.51
0.22
0.22
0.27
1
0.79
0.08
0.36
0.52
0.88
1.13
0.34
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
0
0
0
2
2
0
2
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
0
0
0
2
2
0
2
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
1984
1984
1984
1984
1984
1984
1989
1989
1989
1989
1989
1989
1989
1989
1989
1989
1989
1989
1989
1989
1989
1989
1989
1989
1989
1989
1989
1989
1989
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
Punjab
Rajasthan
"amil Nadu
"ripura
Uttar Pradesh
West Bengal
Andhra Pradesh
Arunachal Pradesh
Assam
Bihar
Delhi
Goa
Gujarat
laryana
•fimachel Pradesh
ammu and Kashmir
Karnataka
Cerala
Madhya Pradesh
Vlaharashtra
Manipur
Vteghalaya
Orissa
^njab
ilajasthan
Tamil Nadu
Tripura
Uttar Pradesh
West Bengal
Andhra Pradesh
Arunachal Pradesh
Assam
Bihar
Delhi
Goa
Gujarat
Haryana
Himachel Pradesh
Jammu and Kashmir
Karnataka
Kerala
Madhva Pradesh
Maharashtra
Manipur
Meghalava
Orissa
Punjab
Rajasthan
Tamil Nadu
Tripura
199J ____ (Uttar Pradesh
1.99
1
1.97
1
1.05
2.93
1.16
1
2.69
2.33
2
2.47
1.92
1.6
2.57
1.07
1.94
1.98
2.5
1
1
1.65
3.31
2.15
1.79
1
2.24
2.26
2.21
1
2.72
2.53
1.69
1
1.59
1.22
2
1.44
2.17
1.83
1.55
2
1
2.13
1.17
1
1.68
1
0.69
0
0.68
0
0.05
1.08
0.15
0
0.99
0.85
0.69
0.9
0.65
0.47
0.94
0.07
0.66
0.68
0.92
0
0
0.5
1.2
0.77
0.58
0
0.81
0.82
0.79
0
1
0.93
0.52
0
0.46
0.2
0.69
0.36
0.77
0.6
0.44
0.69
0
0.76
0.16
0.69
0.52
0
"> 74 0.81
1.49
1.2
1.38
1.9
1.26
1.36
1.36
7.67
2.51
1.55
1.67
2.62
1.25
1.24
1.31
2.72
2.2
1.08
1.43
1.68
2.42
3.11
1.41
1.49
1.2
1.38
1.9
1.26
1.36
1.36
7.67
2.51
1.55
1.67
2.62
1.25
1.24
1.31
2.72
2.2
1.08
1.43
1.68
2.42
3.11
1.41
1.49
1.2
1.38
1.9
1.26
0.4
0.18
0.32
0.64
0.23
0.31
0.31
2.04
0.92
0.44
0.51
0.96
0.22
0.22
0.27
1
0.79
0.08
0.36
0.52
0.88
1.13
0.34
0.4
0.18
0.32
0.64
0.23
0.31
0.31
2.04
0.92
0.44
0.51
0.96
0.22
0.22
0.27
1
0.79
0.08
0.36
0.52
0.88
1.13
0.34
0.4
0.18
0.32
0.64
0
2
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
2
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
2
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
0.23 2
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1991
1996
1996
1996
1996
1996
1996
1996
1996
1996
1996
1996
1996
1996
1996
1996
1996
1996
1996
1996
1996
1996
1996
1996
1998
1998
1998
1998
1998
1998
1998
1998
1998
1998
1998
1998
1998
1998
1998
1998
1998
1998
1998
1998
1998
1998
1998
1999
1999
1999
1999
West Bengal
Andhra Pradesh
Arunachal Pradesh
Assam
Bihar
Delhi
Goa
Gujarat
rlarvana
ffimachel
Jammu and Kashmir
Karnataka
Kerala
Vladhya Pradesh
Vtaharashtra
Manipur
Meghalaya
Orissa
Punjab
Rajasthan
Tamil Nadu
Tripura
Uttar Pradesh
West Bengal
Andhra Pradesh
Arunachal Pradesh
Assam
Bihar
Delhi
Goa
Gujarat
Harvana
Himachel Pradesh
Jammu and Kashmir
Karnataka
Kerala
Madhya Pradesh
Maharashtra
Manipur
Meghalaya
Orissa
Punjab
Rajasthan
Tamil Nadu
Tripura
Uttar Pradesh
West Bengal
Andhra Pradesh
Arunachal Pradesh
Assam
Bihar
2.24
2.36
1
3.63
3.39
1.69
2
1.9
3.33
1
2
2.47
4.65
1.9
2.98
1
2
1.62
2.19
2.16
2.19
1
2.38
2.74
2.71
1
1.88
3.57
1.32
1
1.65
3.57
1.6
2.57
2.93
3.64
1.6
1.99
2
1
2.85
2.25
1.78
3.85
1
1.97
2.69
1.93
1
1.85
3.17
0.81
0.86
0
1.29
1.22
0.52
0.69
0.64
1.2
0
0.69
0.9
1.54
0.64
1.09
0
0.69
0.48
0.78
0.77
0.78
0
0.87
1.01
1
0
0.63
1.27
0.28
0
0.5
1.27
0.47
0.94
1.08
1.29
0.47
0.69
0.69
0
1.05
0.81
0.58
1.35
0
0.68
0.99
0.66
0
0.62
1.15
1.36
1.36
7.67
2.51
1.55
1.67
2.62
1.25
1.24
1.31
2.72
2.2
1.08
1.43
1.68
2.42
3.11
1.41
1.49
1.2
1.38
1.9
1.26
1.36
1.36
7.67
2.51
1.55
1.67
2.62
1.25
1.24
1.31
2.72
2.2
1.08
1.43
1.68
2.42
3.11
1.41
1.49
1.2
1.38
1.9
1.26
1.36
1.36
7.67
2.51
1.55
0.31
0.31
2.04
0.92
0.44
0.51
0.96
0.22
0.22
0.27
1
0.79
0.08
0.36
0.52
0.88
1.13
0.34
0.4
0.18
0.32
0.64
0.23
0.31
0.31
2.04
0.92
0.44
0.51
0.96
0.22
0.22
0.27
1
0.79
0.08
0.36
0.52
0.88
1.13
0.34
0.4
0.18
0.32
0.64
0.23
0.31
0.31
2.04
0.92
0.44
0
0
0
0
2
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
2
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
-
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1999
1999
1999
1999
1999
1999
1999
1999
1999
1999
1999
1999
1999
1999
1999
1999
1999
1999
1999
Delhi
Goa
Gujarat
iarvana
iimachel Pradesh
ammu and Kashmir
Carnataka
Kerala
Vladhva Pradesh
Vlaharashtra
Vlanipur
Meghalaya
Orissa
Punjab
Rajasthan
Tamil Nadu
Tripura
Uttar Pradesh
West Bengal
1
1
1.55
2
1.6
1.8
2.05
2.99
1.66
4.31
2
2
2.38
2.38
1.85
4.95
1
3.96
3.27
0
0
0.44
0.69
0.47
0.59
0.72
1.1
0.51
1.46
0.69
0.69
0.87
0.87
0.62
1.6
0
1.38
1.18
1.67
2.62
1.25
1.24
1.31
2.72
2.2
1.08
1.43
1.68
2.42
3.11
1.41
1.49
1.2
1.38
1.9
1.26
1.36
0.51
0.96
0.22
0.22
0.27
1
0.79
0.08
0.36
0.52
0.88
1.13
0.34
0.4
0.18
0.32
0.64
0.23
0.31
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
0
Enseats = the effective number of legislative parties in a state. Data adapted from 
Butler et al (1995), Rana (1998) and Election Commission of India (1996b; 1998b; 
2000).
Logseats = the log of the effective number of legislative parties in a state. I have used 
logseats in all correlations.
Enting = the effective number of linguistic groups in a state. Data adapted from 
Government of India (1951h; 1951e; 1951d; 1951f; 1951c; 1951n; 1951a; 1951g; 
1951b; 1951J; 1951k; 19511; 1951m; 19511; 1961e; 1961a; 1961c; 196 Id; 1961b; 1976; 
1991a).
Logling = the log of the effective number of linguistic groups a state. I have used 
logling in all correlations.
Lang = Majority language spoken in a state. 0 = not-Hindi. 2 = Hindi.
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2. Data for Chapter Seven: Section Four. Alternative methods of 
measuring federal destabilisation
Vame of State
Andhra Pradesh
Arunachal Pradesh
Assam
Bihar
Delhi
Goa
Gujarat
rlaryana
rfimachel Pradesh
Jamtnu & Kashmir
ECarnataka
ECerala
Madhya Pradesh
Maharashtra
Manipur
Meghalaya
Mizoram
Nagaland
Orissa
Pondicherry
Punjab
Rajasthan
Sikkim
Tamil Nadu
Tripura
Uttar Pradesh
West Bengal
Prdays
459
76
1397
746
445
1239
L 313
406
2334
648
1694
524
113
1930
117
703
1475
752
2699
3518
561
347
1137
149
1705
1064
Rel
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
2
2
2
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
Border
1
2
2
2
0
1
2
0
2
2
1
1
0
1
2
2
2
2
1
1
2
2
2
1
2
2
2
Prdays = The number of days a state has been under President's Rule. Data collated 
from Rajashekara (1987: 638-640), Lok Sabha Secretariat (1996), 
http://rajyasabha.nic.in (1996; 1997; 1999a; 1999b; 2002) and http://www.dawn.com 
(2002).
Rel = The majority religion of the state. 0 = Hindu 2 = Non-Hindu.
Border = The border status of the state. 0 = no border. 1 = sea border. 2 = land border.
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3. Data for Chapter Seven. Section 5 'Pakistan'
Election year
1951
1951
1953
1954
1955
1955
1970
1970
1970
1970
1970
1977
1977
1977
1977
1988
1988
1988
1988
1990
1990
1990
1990
1993
1993
1993
1993
1997
1997
1997
1997
2002
2002
2002
2002
Name of State
Sforth West Frontier Province
Punjab
Sind
last Bengal
East Pakistan
West Pakistan
Baluchistan
Bast Pakistan
^orth West Frontier Province
^unjab
Sind
Baluchistan
^orth West Frontier Province
Punjab
Sind
Baluchistan
North West Frontier Province
Punjab
Sind
Baluchistan
North West Frontier Province
Punjab
Sind
Baluchistan
North West Frontier Province
Punjab
Sind
Baluchistan
North West Frontier Province
Punjab
Sind
Baluchistan
North West Frontier Province
Punjab
Sind
Nenseat
1.55
1.77
1.88
1.74
5.75
2.33
1.6
1.03
4.31
1.71
2.1
1
2.77
1.45
1.61
4.17
4.14
2.66
1.87
3.27
4.51
1.52
2.56
5.76
4.31
2.52
1.78
4.48
2.22
1.11
3.67
3.27
1.42
3.54
3.5
Logseat
0.44
0.57
0.63
0.55
1.75
0.85
0.47
0.03
1.46
0.54
0.74
0
1.02
0.37
0.48
1.43
1.42
0.98
0.63
1.18
1.51
0.42
0.94
1.75
1.46
0.92
0.58
1.5
0.8
0.1
1.3
1.18
0.35
1.26
1.25
Enling
1.53
1.12
1.77
1.04
1.04
2.36
4.05
1.04
1.53
1.12
1.77
4.05
1.97
1.63
2.95
4.05
1.97
1.63
2.95
4.05
1.97
1.63
2.95
4.05
1.97
1.63
2.95
4.05
1.97
1.63
2.95
4.05
1.97
1.63
2.95
Logling
0.43
0.11
0.57
0.04
0.04
0.86
1.4
0.04
0.43
0.11
0.57
1.4
0.68
0.49
1.08
1.4
0.68
0.49
1.08
1.4
0.68
0.49
1.08
1.4
0.68
0.49
1.08
1.4
0.68
0.49
1.08
1.4
0.68
0.49
1.08
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Enseats = the effective number of legislative parties in a state. Data adapted from 
Afzal (1976: 79), Aziz (1976: 275-277), Election Commission of Pakistan (2002), 
Kaniyalil and Pande (1989: 79), SAARC-NGO Observers (1995: 116-117), Talbot 
(1998: 200 & 314), Waseem (1994a: 334; 1998: 11).
Logseats = the log of the effective number of legislative parties in a state. I have used 
logseats in all correlations.
Enling = the effective number of linguistic groups in a state. Data adapted from 
Government of Pakistan (195 Ib; 1984a: 10; 1984b: 10; 1984c: 10; 1984d: 9).
Logling = the log of the effective number of linguistic groups a state. I have used 
logling in all correlations.
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